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Ex-Post Liability Rules in Modern Patent Law 
 
Rosa Castro Bernieri 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The patents’ right to exclude 
 
A patent grants a right to exclude others from using the patented invention, i.e. 
an ius excludendi alios. The patentee’s right to exclude is also interpreted as 
allowing the patentee that alleges patent infringement to ask before a court not 
only damage compensation but also remedies that aim at stopping the 
infringing activity, mainly, injunctive relief. 
 
In economic terms, the exclusiveness of patent rights is conceived as a necessary 
mechanism to ensure further innovation, facilitate further research and efficient 
market transactions on patent rights. In fact, patent laws have been largely 
justified by mainstream economic theories as a mechanism to provide 
innovation incentives by securing temporary exclusive rights for a limited 
period. During that period of exclusivity, patents produce a deadweight loss 
that is in theory compensated by the benefits of fostering further innovation. In 
addition it is often argued that patents facilitate the process of bargaining in the 
market for technologies; are a mechanism to render the results of R&D available 
to the public through patent documents and provide a signalling mechanism 
that facilitates raising financial resources for R&D companies. More 
controversial is the contention that broad patent rights on first innovations are 
an efficient mechanism to induce sequential innovation, an argument put 
forward by the prospecting theory of patent rights. Yet this theory and its 
following critiques have importantly highlighted the special problems 
surrounding most modern technologies that occur sequentially or incrementally 
rather than through breakthrough advancements. 
 
The patent system indeed attempts to balance two goals that are often in 
tension: providing innovation incentives and allowing access to patented 
technologies. Innovation incentives attain efficient outcomes from a dynamic 
efficiency point of view by allowing the creation of new and improved 
technologies and products. From a static efficiency viewpoint a loss occurs 
during the life of a patent due to the fact that patented products are sold at a 
price higher than marginal cost. Access to technologies allows final users to 
enjoy the benefits of innovative products but it also permits producers of 
second innovations to use and develop further technologies. While access to 
patented technologies is often restricted to allow innovation incentives in a pure 
trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency goals, when innovation is 
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sequential, both the incentives of first and second innovators are implied in 
such trade-off.  
 
Notwithstanding the exclusive nature of patents, economic studies have indeed 
provided compelling reasons to transform or to mitigate the exclusiveness of 
patents, at least under specific circumstances. In spite of the enormous 
contribution of economics to the analysis of patent law, the results of many 
studies, especially those in the context of incremental innovation remain largely 
contradictory. At the moment, no study can claim to offer a definite answer on 
the overall effects of patent’s exclusivity and limitations of such exclusivity and 
most studies rely on highly restrictive assumptions. While the majority of 
results depend on variables that would have to be empirically ascertained, their 
assessment is often impossible or too costly.  
 
Whereas the exclusiveness of patent rights is generally assumed by the legal 
and economic scholarship, patent laws have historically established limitations 
on the right to exclude. Among other mechanisms to limit the exclusiveness of 
patents, different laws have devised compulsory licensing provisions. A 
compulsory licensing provision allows the use of a patented technology 
without the authorization of the patent owner. While it is often argued that this 
practice might affect innovation incentives by diminishing the expected payoff 
from exclusivity, numerous critics have also been formulated and arguments 
put forward for the inclusion of limitations and exceptions on the patentees’ 
right to exclude. A similar effect to that of compulsory licensing is obtained 
when a court deciding on patent infringement limits the relief granted to 
owners to damage compensation and refuses to issue an injunctive order. This 
might happen especially in Common Law countries were injunctive relief is 
conceived as a harsh remedy governed by equity principles and hence, the 
award of injunctions is subject to a factual examination.  
 
Property and liability rules 
 
The field of economic analysis of law has formulated a framework, which is 
suitable to study the effects of the patent’s right to exclude and the design of 
limitations such as compulsory licensing provisions as well as the 
aforementioned limits on remedies available for patent owners. The 
categorization of entitlements into property and liability rules is able to capture 
such differences and yet to recognize the underlying similarities between 
different legal provisions that transform a right to exclude into a right to receive 
a monetary remuneration. Indeed, law and economics scholars have 
categorized compulsory licenses as a liability rule mechanism by which legal 
entitlements –in this case those awarded by patent law- are protected against 
the unauthorized use by others only through the payment of remuneration. 
Along with patent compulsory licenses, there are other patent doctrines and 
even the application of antitrust statutes which can convert the patentee’s right 
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to exclude into a liability rule. Conversely, a property rule puts the owner in the 
position of deciding whether to allow the use by third parties.  
 
Law and economics has also developed an important analysis with regards to 
the most important problems with the use of such liability rules, namely the 
possibility that the remuneration for patent holders might be too low and/or 
might not reflect the subjective value of the patent hence diminishing 
innovation incentives. Also, the case is often made that liability rules might 
diminish incentives for efficient negotiation over the use of patent rights. In 
addition, it is often posed that liability rules might create uncertainty 
surrounding the enforcement of patent rights, hence diminishing innovation 
incentives. 
 
Indeed, different legal doctrines embedded in patent statutes and case law 
coinciding with economic reasoning, allow what the law and economics 
literature describes as a switch from a property to a liability rule. Theoretical 
discussions and case law have also highlighted the main justifications for this 
switch and the main problems associated with the administration of liability 
rules. Notwithstanding the prolific quantity of studies on this subject and their 
application to Intellectual Property (hereinafter IP) and patents, this literature 
has also yielded highly contradictory conclusions that range from calls to the 
unlimited use of property rules to a more or less limited role for liability rules in 
the patent field. 
 
As predictable, the practice of compulsory licensing and other patent doctrines 
permitting similar effects remain highly controversial. In particular, 
disagreement about the use of these provisions has emerged during the 
negotiation of patent harmonization treaties from the Paris Convention to the 
TRIPS Agreement and including the recent wave of free trade agreements and 
bilateral investment agreements covering IP issues.   
 
Justification for this research  
 
Recent events have stimulated the debate on the exclusivity of patents and the 
use of property and liability rules to protect patent rights. A first motivation for 
these evetnts is extrinsic to patent law and reflects the evolution of modern 
technologies towards highly complex and multi-component products. A second 
motivation for such recent events is often found in the uniformity of patent 
laws (one-size-fits-all) that might impede its adaptation to such complex 
technologies, especially as it regards the protection of the right to exclude. A 
third reason arises out of this increasingly complex landscape with the rigidity 
of patent law, a combination that is said to enhance the opportunities for patent 
strategic behavior. Instances of patent strategic behavior might comprise the 
acquisition of patents as well as their strategic use, enforcement and litigation.  
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However, many gaps and misunderstandings remain with respect to the use of 
liability rules in the patent field. Confusion has been nurtured by economic as 
well as legal studies. Economic studies have led to ambiguous conclusions with 
regard to the effects of different patent doctrines, especially in settings 
characterized by incremental and sequential innovations. Misunderstandings 
have also been stimulated due to the confinement of legal discussions to the 
TRIPS Agreement and the use of compulsory licensing provisions solely in the 
context of developing countries and the protection of public health. In addition, 
the law and economics literature has largely reduced the definition of patent 
liability rules to compulsory licensing provisions. The study of liability rules 
provisions has been furthermore limited to the U.S. prevailing view, which does 
not contain special compulsory licensing provisions for patents and which until 
very recently, considered such provisions as a “rarity”1. As a result, most law 
and economics studies focusing on IP and patent liability rules mainly referred 
to statutory compulsory licenses which exist in copyright laws or to the 
presence of compulsory licensing provisions in countries outside of the U.S. as a 
“rarity” of general patent law.  
 
This gap has started to be filled, firstly by the insights of scholarly work and 
most recently by the debate following the U.S. Supreme Court decision in the 
eBay case2. In 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court decided, in the context of a specific 
litigation between patentee MercExchange and the eBay company, that in patent 
law cases, injunctive relief should be granted upon the same grounds required 
in other law fields. As a result, courts deciding patent law cases were requested 
to use a factual test that assesses the convenience of granting an injunctive order 
upon the particular circumstances of the case. Such factual test had been 
bypassed for a long time and patentees had enjoyed a privileged position in 
litigation due to the emergence of a presumption that once a patent was 
infringed, the patentee had suffered irreparable harm, a prerequisite for 
obtaining injunctive relief. The eBay case confronted the U.S. Supreme Court 
with a “new” reality of patent law, in which patents are used strategically in 
order to extract large settlements. In this new landscape, patents are not viewed 
as instruments that generate innovation incentives as legal and economic theory 
sustain but simply as “bargaining chips” that companies can commercialize but 
also employ as a “sword” to be used in litigation rather than a “shield” to 
protect valuable innovations3.    
                                                 
 
 
1 See Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215 (1980) at 215, stating that: “compulsory 
licensing is a rarity in (the U.S.) our patent system”. 
2 eBay Inc. v. Mercexchange, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006). 
3 See MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556 (E.D. Va. 2007), which revised the case on 
remand in the light of the U.S. Supreme Court decision the court considered that: “Such consistent course 
of litigating or threatening litigation to obtain money damages by a company of two employees, the 
inventor of the patents, a former patent attorney, indicates that MercExchange has utilized its patents as 
a sword to extract money rather than as a shield to protect its right to exclude or its market share, 
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Applying the eBay precedent, an important number of decisions have denied 
injunctions for owners of valid and infringed patents, thus changing a 
“traditional” practice in the U.S. against any form of compulsory licensing or 
forced access to patented inventions. As a consequence, many scholars and 
political actors have questioned such move as a radical change. Some critics 
turned to property rights theory and the necessity of applying it to patent law. 
Yet others have taken the opportunity to remind of the differences between 
property and IP that justify a wider use of liability rules for IP rights.  
 
Although this debate has not attained an equivalent impact in Europe, the 
“exclusivity aspect” of patents has been also recently put in evidence with 
regard to an alleged decline in the quality of patents as well as an increase in 
the number of cases reflecting potential strategic behavior practices and 
litigation from patentees. The European patent landscape is however, largely 
fragmented in spite of the European Patent Convention and the creation of an 
European Patent Office. Patents remain territorial rights throughout Europe 
and importantly, patent litigation is decentralized and pertains to the 
jurisdiction of each country in the absence of a Community Patent and a unified 
patent jurisdiction as foreseen in the project for a European Patent Litigation 
Agreement (hereinafter EPLA). Surprisingly, the problems surrounding the 
indiscriminate use of property rules to protect patents and the increasing 
impact of patent strategic behavior have been recently interpreted as plainly 
favoring the abovementioned projects for further patent harmonization. 
Clearly, the problem of this Thesis only refers to particular patent doctrines and 
provisions allowing non-authorized uses upon the payment of compensation. 
Nonetheless, a warning emerges from this analysis against potentially 
curtailing the use of such provisions and doctrines through forthcoming 
harmonization. As it will be highlighted in the analysis that follows, it is the 
design of such doctrines and provisions that might enable or restrain their 
appropriate use when such use is justified upon efficiency reasons and other 
public interest purposes.  
 
Such recent discussions confirm that innovation, technological changes, 
groundbreaking decisions and proposals for reform call for a constant 
assessment of the patent system. While economics has largely contributed to the 
understanding of IP, its effects and the way in which policy levers4 shape 
                                                                                                                                               
 
 
reputation, goodwill, or name recognition, as MercExchange appears to possess none of these” (emphasis 
added).  
4 Policy levers refer to the design tools that policy makers have at their disposal to adjust patent or IP 
policy in general. This name was initially used by Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and 
Economics of Reverse Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575, 1581 (2002). See also Dan Burk & Mark Lemley, Policy 
Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1638–39 (2003).  
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innovators’ incentives, the study of enforcement mechanisms, limitations and 
defenses, including compulsory licensing provisions and other patent liability 
rules have recently brought new perspectives to important national5 and 
international debates. Discussions on a patent reform in the U.S., European 
harmonization plans of a Community Patent and the EPLA as well as 
international debates within the WIPO6 and WTO have all acknowledged 
possible imbalances of the patent system as well as the potential role of liability 
rules. These debates need to be constructed on the basis of policy-oriented 
analysis, including the economic analysis of law, which in spite of being one out 
of different alternative approaches, is widely recognized in all negotiation 
forums. Indeed, while economic reasoning can either contradict or support 
other policy goals of public interest, it is growingly recognized as a 
fundamental tool to assess the costs, benefits and unintended effects of any 
patent reform on private parties and society, both at national and global forums 
of negotiation.  
 
Research question  
 
This Thesis aims at contributing with the debate surrounding the exclusiveness 
of patent rights. In this sense, the Thesis examines whether and in which 
specific cases is it efficient to transform the patentee’s right to exclude into a 
right to receive remuneration, i.e. a liability rule. This question is both timely 
and controversial. Controversial, as it was already mentioned that the issue of 
property vs. liability rules in patent law has been historically debated with 
regards to the use of compulsory licensing provisions and more recently 
proposed in the context of liability rules used by courts crafting the remedies 
for patent infringement. Controversy also surrounds the consequences of this 
debate within the broader context of theoretical questions on the nature of IP 
rights and the advantages and disadvantages of applying property law insights 
to IP law, the justification for patent protection and the interface between rights 
and remedies, e.g. whether it is the right that determines the remedy or the 
                                                 
 
 
5 Carl Shapiro, Injunctions, Hold-Up, and Patent Royalties (Aug. 2006), available at 
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/SHAPIRO/royalties.pdf, last accessed on August 10, 2009, stating, “the 
U.S. patent system is widely seen as out of balance”. See also FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (OCTOBER, 2003), 
TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE BETWEEN COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY, 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf and NATIONAL ACADEMIES OF SCIENCE 
(2004), A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, available at 
http://www.nap.edu/books/0309089107/html.concerns about bad quality of patents issued by the Patent 
and Trademark Office. 
6 See WIPO, Exclusions from patentable subject matter and exceptions and limitations to the rights (SCP/13/3) 
Standing Committee on the Law of Patents, Thirteenth Session, Geneva, March 23 to 27, 2009, available at: 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/scp/en/scp_13/scp_13_3.pdf. See also the discussions related with 
the Proposal for a Development Agenda within the WIPO (2004), Harmonization of Substantive Patent 
Law (WIPO), available at www.wipo.int and the Final Report of the WHO Commission on Innovation, 
Intellectual Property and Public Health, available at: http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/en/.  
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remedy that conceptualizes the right. From a policy-oriented perspective, the 
debate on the use of property and liability rules for patent protection is 
fundamental for the interpretation of limitations and exceptions in patent law, 
especially in the light of controversies regarding the interpretation of the TRIPS 
Agreement. This global Agreement set a minimum and global level of 
harmonization with regard to IP rights, including significant provisions on 
patent law; yet it left the possibility for countries to apply more rigorous 
standards within the limits set for by the same Agreement and also a significant 
space for a flexible application of its standards. Many obligations deriving from 
the TRIPS Agreement have been the object of diverging views and some of 
them, especially with regards to the limitations and exceptions to rights 
conferred, have confronted countries with problems of interpretation.  
 
The research question of this Thesis is also timely, as the 2006 eBay decision by 
the U.S. Supreme Court, which arrived at the beginning of this research project, 
actually opened the possibility for the use of liability rules for patents in the 
U.S. As a consequence of the simple re-interpretation of a long-standing 
traditional principle of equity which governs the grant of injunctions, a major 
change in patent law followed this decision. Whereas the effects of post-eBay 
litigation are still unclear, this Thesis examines an important number of 
decisions granting and denying injunctive relief after a factual consideration by 
different U.S. courts7. This important patent policy change has occurred in the 
context of several other decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court, which have 
presumably aimed at restraining an increasingly protective trend initiated after 
the creation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (hereinafter CAFC), 
which centralized the appeal of patent cases in the U.S.8. In a somehow 
surprising way, the U.S. Supreme Court has granted certiorari in several 
occasions during the last few years, and it has reiteratively compressed what 
was perceived as an unwarranted extension of patents rights. In several cases, 
the Supreme Court has asserted the importance of using standards rather than 
rigid rules as tools to interpret various patent doctrines9. Such decisions have 
been interpreted as redressing a lost balance in the U.S. patent system10. 
 
At the same time, the European patent landscape is facing important 
challenges. Whereas the latest discussions have focused on the problems due to 
the fragmented system and the projects of harmonization, these debates 
confront the difficult task of harmonizing many substantive patent law 
                                                 
 
 
7 Decisions applying the eBay precedent were monitored since 2007, and a summary of the most important 
cases examined is contained in the Appendix of Chapter III.  
8 See infra note 314.  
9 See the KSR decision infra note 314, with regard to the non-obviousness standard and the eBay decision, 
supra note 2, with regard to the equitable standard to decide the grant of injunctions.  
10 In addition, the CAFC has itself issued an important decision in the case of Seagate, see infra note 472 .   
Ex-post Liability Rules   
In Modern Patent Law  16  
 
 
standards among European countries before proceeding to create a patent valid 
throughout the community and enforced by a centralized court.  
 
The controversy of this Thesis involves also an important global dimension. At 
the international level, the question is mostly one of interpretation of the TRIPS 
Agreement with regard to the space allowed to the practice of compulsory 
licenses in their traditional way (Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement) and to the 
possibility of denying injunctions for infringed patents and substituting a 
property rule with the protection through a liability rule (Article 44 of the 
TRIPS Agreement). In this context, the objectives set for by article 7 of the same 
Agreement suggest that such interpretation should be guided by the 
aforementioned balance between innovation incentives and access to 
innovations as well as suggest a primordial role for economic analysis in the 
interpretation of the Agreement11: 
 
“The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should 
contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and 
dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users 
of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and 
economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations” (emphasis 
added).  
 
Further harmonization at regional and global levels will have potential 
consequences in the context of social and economic welfare as well as economic 
development. Hence, it would be desirable that any such proposal be addressed 
in the light of a balanced patent system that takes into account all stakeholders. 
In this sense, this Thesis aspires at contributing towards such interpretation of 
the patent system.    
 
Outline of the thesis  
 
The structure of the Thesis proceeds as follows. The first chapter puts forward a 
general framework for liability rules in patent law, in a sense broader than that 
developed by previous research. For these purposes, the insights of the law and 
economics literature on property and liability rules are brought together with 
the literature on traditional compulsory licensing and the most recent use of 
patent liability rules contained in the law of remedies of common law countries. 
                                                 
 
 
11 The interpretation of International Treaties is based upon the text of the Agreement as well as the 
preambles that might further clarify the intention of the contracting states. Nonetheless, it is usually 
argued that articles similar to article 7 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, World Trade Organization Agreement, Annex 1C, available at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm0_e.htm (hereinafter the TRIPS Agreement) do not 
contain operational rules. 
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Both property and liability rules are then analyzed in their efficiency outcomes 
both at a general level and in the specific IP and patent contexts. In this latter 
framework, property and liability rules are examined from both a substantive 
and remedies-based perspectives. Secondly, the chapter compares different 
types of liability rules sharing a similar rationale while differentiating these 
rules from systems that are justified upon different policy goals such as public 
interest. Thirdly, the theoretical framework of property and liability rules is 
confronted with the modern landscape of the patent system. A particular 
emphasis is given to the impact of remedies in current discussions about the 
alleged failure of patent systems to provide efficient incentives within a 
changing technological and economic landscape.  
 
This critical review of previous literature and research aims at contributing to 
this dissertation and to further debates by describing the main insights that will 
guide the analysis in the next chapters and by identifying loopholes and empty 
spaces for scholarly contribution. The chapter mainly adds to current theoretical 
and policy debates by identifying several flaws in the property and liability 
rules literature as applied to patent law. Firstly, and in contrast with the profuse 
and long-standing presence of liability rules in patent law, this literature has 
often condemned its use based upon U.S. practices, which have, simultaneously 
changed in a dramatic way over the last years. Secondly, property and liability 
rules are often treated in the literature as complementary tools even in the 
property law field. In contrast, scholars have followed a rather different method 
in their application to IP and patent law. Thirdly, the chapter proposes a 
categorization of two different types of liability rules as a suitable framework to 
classify liability rules in the IP field, i.e. ex-ante and ex-post liability rules. 
Fourthly, the chapter suggests that in the light of the TRIPS Agreement, current 
patent law only admits or at least markedly favors the use of the ex-post type of 
liability rule.  
 
The second chapter provides a historical view on the use of patent liability 
rules, focusing on the legal as well as the economic reasoning surrounding their 
use. The chapter discusses the origins of patent law and compulsory licensing 
provisions, the process of international patent harmonization and negotiations 
preceding and following the TRIPS Agreement from the perspective of the 
property and liability rules debate. According to the enhanced definition of 
patent liability rules provided in the first chapter, a discussion of the pertinent 
enforcement rules devised in the TRIPS Agreement, especially with regards to 
the issuance of injunctions and the possibility of substituting injunctions with 
damage compensation is also included. Secondly, the chapter analyzes the 
debates following the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement both with 
regards to compulsory licensing provisions and patent remedies. Thirdly, a 
brief overview of patent harmonization in Europe and the implementation of 
the Enforcement Directive pertaining to the property and liability rules debate 
are provided. Finally, a brief outline is provided on the different historical and 
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legal treatment of injunctions and damages in Civil law and Common law 
countries. This historical overview is important in order to understand both the 
origin of liability rules as a policy design mechanism to balance the goals of 
patent law with the protection of competition and the avoidance of strategic 
behavior as well as the evolution and implementation of different types of 
patent liability rules. History is also central to understanding the legal 
divergences and convergences in the use of remedies in general and their 
special evolution in patent law both in Civil law and Common law countries, 
which is further analyzed in the third chapter.   
 
The third chapter aims at contributing to the debate about property and liability 
rules in patent law precisely by examining the use of ex-post liability rules 
administered by courts in three selected countries: the U.S., the U.K. and Italy. 
The chapter provides a comparative law and economics analysis of patent law 
provisions and case law allowing the switch from a property to a liability rule 
ex-post. The concept of ex-post liability rules serves to highlight the fact that, in 
spite of originating either in law provisions or in case law, all the rules 
examined are judicially-administered and taken on a case-by-case basis and 
thus resemble much more accurately the type of liability rules used in the 
entitlements literature, in comparison, for instance with ex-ante compulsory 
licenses. Moreover, the justification of such rules is often based on the need to 
avoid strategic behavior and bargaining collapse in the senses of the debate 
about property and liability rules, rather than on the impact, for instance, of 
high search costs.  
 
Three particular cases are examined: 1) compulsory licensing provisions for lack 
of working12; 2) compulsory licensing provisions for a patent that depends on 
the use of a previously patented invention; and 3) damages substituting 
injunctive relief when this latter is denied after a judicial finding of validity and 
infringement of a patent, which is typically allowed by equitable doctrines of 
Common Law countries. The contrasting vision of Civil Law countries on the 
use of remedies, including injunctive relief is also discussed.    
                                                 
 
 
12 The term “lack of working” or “failure to work” refers to the absence of exploitation or 
commercialization of a patented invention. The term is often used in relation with “local working” or 
“national working”, that is, a requirement by which the patentee is obliged to work her patent in the 
territory of the state granting patent protection or otherwise risk that the patent might be subjected to a 
compulsory license. In order to determine whether a patent is being sufficiently worked, some legislations 
also refer to whether their exploitation is able to meet consumer’s demand and moreover, some patent 
laws require that the public demand is met at reasonable prices. Article 5-A of the Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 828 U.N.T.S. 307 (revised at Brussels on Dec. 14, 1900, at 
Washington on June 2, 1911, at the Hague on Nov. 6, 1925, at London on June 2, 1934, at Lisbon on Oct. 31, 
1958 and at Stockholm on July 14, 1967)in fact establishes that: “Each country of the Union shall have the 
right to take legislative measures providing for the grant of compulsory licenses to prevent the abuses 
which might result from the exercise of the exclusive rights conferred by the patent, for example, failure to 
work”. 
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The chapter finds that in spite of the new harmonized framework set up by the 
TRIPS Agreement, the conditions to opt for a liability rule diverge widely 
within national laws. However, in all the aforementioned cases, courts and 
agencies are allowed to opt for protecting a patent through an ex post liability 
rule and face similar obstacles in the application of a case by case reasoning. In 
addition, and as pointed out by the law and economics literature, calculating 
the compensation due to the patent holder and fostering efficient bargaining 
between the parties are important concerns in all the systems under study. The 
chapter also highlights how law and economics contributions have typically 
focused on U.S. law and practice, in noticeable contrast with the overly 
importance of international Treaties regulating substantive and enforcement 
patent law and the complex and diverse rules in place in different countries.  
 
The fourth chapter aims at broadening such seemingly restricted view by 
applying the insights developed by the law and economics literature to the 
particular features of the selected patent systems and international framework 
discussed in the previous chapter. The chapter analyzes the standard models 
used by several law and economics scholars in order to study patent hold-ups 
and discusses their principal assumptions and results. Secondly, the chapter 
confronts such assumptions and results with the most important cases 
described in the previous chapter in order to discuss the grounds for using ex 
post liability rules in efficiency terms. Such grounds include the most recent 
discussions about patent hold-ups, the emergence of patent trolls and in 
general, of patent strategic behavior. The chapter proposes to broaden 
discussions on the grounds allowing the use of ex-post liability rules according 
to the experience about emerging practices of patent strategic behavior both in 
the U.S. and Europe.   
 
The fifth chapter discusses the issue of calculating the appropriate 
compensation that substitutes a property rule, which is one of the most 
important critiques against the use of liability rules in patent law. The chapter 
discusses the theoretical insights about property and liability rules and applies 
them to the different options with regard to this calculation of such 
compensation. Afterwards, the chapter concludes by comparing the different 
available rules for patent protection in terms of costs and benefits. 
 
The general conclusions of this Thesis are various and pertain to the legal as 
well as the law and economics field. Most of the conclusions and suggestions 
can be applid only to this specific research and hence to the analysis, in law and 
economic terms of the use of property and liability rules in patent law. 
However, some of the conclusions also refer to more general questions such as 
whether property law should be necessarily reflected in IP law or whether the 
object and aims of IP protection differ so importantly that the benefits of 
applying the insights of property law to IP law will be outweighed by the costs 
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of so doing. Such arguments were often made in the context of the eBay 
litigation against the curtailment of injunctive relief for patentees. However, the 
same arguments have led to contradictory calls for applying the insights 
developed in property rights law to IP and at the same time, a call against using 
general rules as the equitable evaluation of injunctions by judges in common 
law countries that also applied to tangible property. A closely related question, 
which is often posed at the intersection of Antitrust and IP law, is whether 
patent rights deserve a differential treatment. If the answer is affirmative, it is 
nevertheless debated whether such differential treatment should tilt towards 
more or less protection than that granted to other property. In answering this 
question, many analysts have rushed in concluding that to protect innovation 
incentives; patents should enjoy deference in the application of antitrust 
statutes. But such conclusions ignore the access side of the patent balance, so 
that in some cases, the application of antitrust law might affect innovation 
incentives but this might be nevertheless less costly than obstructing access to 
further innovation. In this sense, access does not only mean to diminish prices 
and to correct market failures in static efficiency terms but also the possibility 
for further innovators to use patents and continue the path towards scientific 
and technological progress, hence deriving potential gains to the market in 
terms of dynamic efficiency as well.   
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CHAPTER I 
PROPERTY AND LIABILITY RULES: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR PATENT RIGHTS 
1 Introduction 
Patents are defined both in the legal and economic scholarship as exclusive 
rights13. Exclusivity has multiple consequences, inter alia, that any potential user 
must obtain previous consent from the patent owner, that the terms of such 
consent, including the price for using the patented invention, shall be fixed 
through voluntary negotiations and that in case of infringement, a patentee can 
solicit from a court, remedies that compensate for any non-authorized use but 
also such measures capable of stopping and avoiding future infringement as 
well as such remedies that put the patentee “back” in the position she enjoyed 
but for the infringement. 
 
Patent laws have nevertheless persistently provided for the possibility to 
transform the right to exclude of patentees into a right to receive remuneration 
i.e. what the law and economics scholarship denominates a “liability rule”. 
Unsurprisingly, such regimes have been subject to an extensive and ongoing 
controversy. In this sense, patent law provides a unique environment to apply 
and test the –contentious- insights of the law and economics literature on 
entitlement protection. This branch of study focuses on the use of alternative 
remedies for the protection of “entitlements” illustrating the use of property 
and liability rules across all legal fields and suggesting that the choice between 
remedies should be guided by the presence and importance of transaction costs.  
 
In fact, recent discussions in the patent field about the emergence and 
increasing impact of strategic patenting and litigation, which are evidenced in a 
set of broadly discussed case law and debates about patent reform and 
harmonization have all addressed the question of when –if ever- should the 
patentee’s right to exclude be transformed into a right to receive monetary 
compensation14.  
                                                 
 
 
13 See article 28 of the TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11.   
14 For claims about the need of a Patent Reform in the U.S. see JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL MEURER, PATENT 
FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK, Princeton University Press, 1-
331(2008). For global discussions see WIPO, The 45 Adopted Recommendations under the WIPO Development 
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This chapter reviews the existing literature on the subject while attempting to 
put forward an alternative framework for understanding the use of liability 
rules in patent law. For these purposes, we bring together the insights 
developed with respect to traditional compulsory licenses as well as the most 
recent literature focusing on another type of liability rule in patent law based 
upon the law of remedies of common law countries. Both types of entitlement 
protection rules, i.e. property and liability rules are analyzed through their 
efficiency outcomes and from a dual –substantive and remedies based- 
perspective. Secondly we compare different types of liability rules sharing a 
similar rationale while differentiating them from systems that are justified upon 
different policy goals such as the public interest. Thirdly, the theoretical 
framework of property and liability rules is confronted to the modern 
landscape of the patent system. A particular emphasis is given to the impact of 
remedies in current discussions about the alleged failure of patent systems to 
provide efficient incentives within a changing technological and economic 
landscape. The aim is to build up a more coherent framework that can be 
applied to examine the effects of property and liability rules in patent cases.  
 
The chapter is divided as follows. The second section introduces the economic 
approach to law as applied to patents and discusses the economic rationale of 
patent law making a distinction between the goals of substantive and 
enforcement law. Section three discusses the law and economics literature on 
property and liability rules and its main positive and normative insights. 
Section four introduces the property v. liability rules debate within the field of 
Intellectual Property (hereinafter IP) rights highlighting the common arguments 
for and against the use of liability rules in this field. Section five focuses on the 
use of liability rules in patent law. It applies the property and liability rules 
framework to currently debated issues in patent law, in order to identify the 
economic grounds for switching into liability rules and the main problems with 
the switch. The case is made, that as recently stated by the U.S. Supreme Court, 
the inherent economic function of patents has deeply changed. This, along with 
a global trend towards strengthening patent rights and diminishing the space 
for flexibilities, might require that a strong presumption favoring property rules 
in the patent context be weakened under certain circumstances.  
 
                                                                                                                                               
 
 
Agenda, in WIPO about the Development Agenda, available at: http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip-
development/en/agenda/recommendations.pdf, stating that “The WIPO Secretariat(…)should address in 
its working documents for norm-setting activities, as appropriate and as directed by Member States, issues 
such as: (a) safeguarding national implementation of intellectual property rules (b) links between 
intellectual property and competition (c) intellectual property -related transfer of technology (d) potential 
flexibilities, exceptions and limitations for Member States and (e) the possibility of additional special 
provisions for developing countries and LDCs. See also WIPO, Exclusions From Patentable Subject Matter 
And Exceptions And Limitations To The Rights, supra note 6.  
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2 Economics of Patent Protection 
Economic analysis has played an important role in the IP field long before the 
emergence of the “law and economics” movement.15 In addition to the specific 
analysis of IP rights, the application of the insights of the economics of property 
rights into this field has been defended by several scholars16. Moreover, the 
economic analysis of patent law has experienced an exponential growth and 
increasing specialization with regard to the different subject areas as well as 
with respect to policy design and the specific legal or judicial doctrines that 
might play a role in such design.  
 
In this sense, the growing importance of the “law and economics” or “economic 
analysis of law” movement has probably played an important role in such 
refinements. The economic approach to law can be defined as the application of 
economic theory -especially but not only of price theory- to evaluate the 
formation, structure, processes and impact of the law and legal institutions17. 
Price theory relies on the concepts of scarcity of resources and focuses on the 
problem of making choices in order to allocate such inherently scarce 
resources18. In making choices, individuals must assess each alternative in a 
presumably rational way, basing their decisions on the attempt to maximize 
benefits and minimize their costs. Whether they are trying to maximize utility, 
wealth or profits, the assumption is that individuals will generally make 
decisions in a rational way19.  
 
                                                 
 
 
15 WILLIAM LANDES AND RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, 
Harvard University Press, (2003) at p. 1 arguing that the idea that IPRs might be needed to have incentives 
to create, dates from the Middle Ages in the Venetian Patent Act of 1474 and English Statute of 
Monopolies of 1624 among others, and referring discussions by Smith, Bentham, Mill , Pigou and Taussig 
and Plant around the 1930’s. See Arnold Plant, An Economic Theory concerning Patents for Inventions, 1 
ECONOMICA 30 (1934), reprinted in David Vaver (Editor), Intellectual Property Rights, Critical Concepts in Law 
(2006), Volume 3, at p. 45; arguing that “we are surely entitled, therefore, to attribute the existence of the 
patent law to a desire to stimulate invention”.  
16 See LANDES AND POSNER, supra note 15, at p. 8, referring to the entitlements literature and arguing that: 
“this fundamental insight of the economic analysis of the common law is applicable to intellectual 
property and illustrates one of the themes of the book –that the economic principles that inform and 
explain property law can guide thinking about intellectual property as well”. See also Epstein, infra note  
65and accompanying text.  
17 See CENTO VELJANOSKY, ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES OF LAW, Cambridge University Press (2007), at p. 19. 
18 While price theory studies the interaction of units in the economy, including firms, consumers or 
individuals, its insights have been extended to analyze different concepts including the behavior of states 
within International Law. 
19 See VELJANOSKY, supra note 18, explaining how rational choice theory relies at the same time on the 
assumptions of substitutability, meaning that goods are can substitute one another at the margin; 
marginality which means that in any activity to obtain the maximum utility or profit, they must be 
allocated in a way that the marginal benefit from the last unit of a resource is equal to its marginal cost. 
However, behavioural law and economics studies have questioned the rationality of individuals, and 
especially of consumers. For an overview on this field see CASS SUSTEIN (ED.), BEHAVIORAL LAW AND 
ECONOMICS, Cambridge University Press, 2000. 
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While economics studies the choice of individuals and firms with regard to the 
allocation of resources, law can be regarded as a means of allocating rights or 
entitlements. Policy makers might want to achieve efficiency through the law, 
regulations and decisions. Furthermore, any law or judicial decision has effects 
on the incentives of individuals, firms and states. Hence, the economic 
approach to law considers law, including patent law, as a set of incentives. 
Whereas it is often said that economics uses an ex ante approach and conversely, 
law examines matters from an ex post view, it has been recently acknowledged 
that “many economic and legal problems arise from the temporal nature of 
economic activity and require a trade-off between ex ante and ex post 
efficiency”20.  
 
In spite of a growing consensus on the importance of evaluating the outcomes 
of legal rules and court decisions on efficiency grounds, the concept of 
efficiency is not as straightforward as it might seem at first sight21. Efficiency 
can be interpreted as requiring resources such as goods, services and 
entitlements to be allocated to the highest expected valued uses. In addition, 
efficiency relies on the concept of opportunity cost, i.e. the cost of using a 
resource defined as the return that such resource would have obtained in its 
best possible alternative use22.  
 
But the concept of efficiency is often referred to, either in a static or in a 
dynamic context. In the light of the differences between allocative and dynamic 
efficiency, trade-offs might arise and in fact do often arise between these two 
perspectives. Static efficiency assumes a given level of technology and asks 
whether consumers and producers’ decisions take into account the real 
opportunity costs of resources. It comprises two different aspects; allocative 
efficiency, which is achieved when the price of the good equals its marginal 
cost23 and productive efficiency, which entails that firms producing the goods 
are doing so at the minimum cost.  
 
Dynamic efficiency takes into account how resources are used to expand 
production possibilities and capabilities, a process that is influenced by 
                                                 
 
 
20 VELJANOSKY, p. 35, highlighting also how the “ex antelex post distinction arises in the design and 
exploitation of IPRs” where the trade-off between ex ante dynamic efficiency and ex post allocative 
efficiency defines the IPRs trade-off. 
21 See LANDES AND POSNER, supra note 15 arguing that efficiency is an objective concept whereas fairness is 
indefinite: “economics is complex and difficult but it is less complicated than legal doctrine and it can 
serve to unify different areas of the law”.  
22 See Pierre Régibeau and Katharine Rocket, IP and Competition Law: An Economic Approach, p. 505-552, in 
THE INTERFACE BETWEEN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND COMPETITION POLICY, Edited by Steven D. 
Anderman, Cambridge University Press, 2007 at p. 506.  
23 “As the cost of using a resource is equal to the benefits that it would have generated if it had been 
employed in another sector, the allocation of resources should be such that their marginal returns are 
equated across sectors”. See Regibeau and Rockett, Ibid, at p. 507 
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incentives to invest, Research and Development (hereinafter R&D) decisions, 
and innovation24. The industrial organization literature highlights the 
contradictory effects and difficulty of aligning these concepts. When a new 
product is developed, it is often the case that the producer cannot appropriate 
all benefits the product creates for consumers so that a (non) appropriability 
effect might lead to insufficient investment incentives25. New products, on the 
other hand, usually reduce the sales and profits of firms selling older products. 
Thus, a new product might impose losses on other firms which are not taken 
into account by the innovating firm and cause a business stealing effect that 
might lead to excessive investment26. When these effects are aggregated across 
sectors, the result is that “even in the absence of any policy intervention, one 
would expect over-investment in some sectors and under-investment in 
others”27.   
 
Furthermore, in order to decide whether a law or a legal reform under analysis 
would be efficient there are alternative thresholds that might be taken into 
account. Pareto efficiency, or the first best theory, asks for policy changes that 
will improve the benefits of one party without decreasing benefits for any 
involved party. However, under a Kaldor-Hicks approach, efficiency can also 
be attained when the benefits accrued to one party surpass any potential loss 
for another party so that –at least hypothetically- there could be compensation 
from the winners to the losers while gains are still achieved in terms of total 
surplus. This criterion, as we will discuss below, is of special importance in 
deciding between policies that affect both innovators and users but also in those 
affecting first and second innovators.  
 
                                                 
 
 
24 See Regibeau and Rockett, supra note 22 at p. 507 arguing that “there is no universally accepted 
definition of dynamic efficiency” and proposing one that “relates to any kind of investment decision”. 
25 See JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, The MIT Press,  (2001),  at p. 391, describing 
that “socially, a monopolist has too low an incentive to introduce a new product, because he cannot fully 
appropriate the social surplus (unless he can price-discriminate perfectly)”. 
26 See Vincenzo Denicolo, Do Patents over-compensate innovators?, Economic Policy,VOLUME 22 ISSUE 
52, Pages 679 – 729, explaining that “Another reason why the patentee’s reward may exceed what he 
contributed to society is business stealing. If before the innovation the industry comprises incumbents 
holding some market power, the innovator may be able to steal at least part of the rents previously earned 
by those incumbents”. See also JEAN TIROLE, supra note 25 at p. 399, explaining that the business-stealing 
effect within the context of patent races as “by increasing its R&D effort, a firm reduces the probability of 
its rival’s obtaining the patent, and a typical result is that firms engaged in a patent race overinvest in R&D 
(if we assume away the appropriability effect) and thus duplicate too much of the research effort”. 
27 Such differences between the private and public returns on investment can also result from public policy 
measures, first and foremost on the application of industrial property laws, including IPR and competition 
laws. See Régibau and Rockett, supra note 22 at p. 508.  
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2.1 The economic rationale of patents 
Economic studies have advanced various utilitarian rationales for patent 
protection28. The reward theory poses that IP rights, and specifically patent law, 
aims at giving incentives to innovate and thus, at encouraging investment in 
R&D activities. The general argument is that such incentives are necessary 
because information and knowledge-based products are public goods in an 
economic sense, which means that they are non-rival in their use and non-
excludable in the absence of IPR laws29. Since R&D activities entail sunk costs, 
absent patent protection, anyone could free-ride from another’s invention30. 
Since the process of inventing and developing innovative products is costly, 
incentives would be insufficient and there would be under-investment in R&D 
in the absence of appropriate incentive mechanisms31. The patent system is 
hence justified as providing the ex-ante incentives necessary for optimal 
investment in R&D while at the same time, it is acknowledged that patent rights 
cause a deadweight loss due to the temporary monopoly allowed under its 
span.  
 
                                                 
 
 
28 Other non-utilitarian theories that justify Intellectual Property Rights based their assertions on diverse 
concepts such as natural rights, unjust enrichment, personhood concept, libertarian ideals, distributive 
justice goals, democratic, radical, and socialist and ecologist theories. See Peter Menell, Intellectual Property: 
General Theories, 1600 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, available at: 
http://encyclo.findlaw.com/1600book.pdf at p. 156-163, discussing utilitarian and non-utilitarian 
theories.  
29 For the general concept of knowledge and information as public goods in the economic sense and the 
explanation of IPRs and patents as a mechanism to foster innovation incentives see SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, 
INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES, MIT Press (2004), at p. 31-32. For a general discussion on the economic 
theories of patent law see HAHN, ROBERT, ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN FRONTIER INDUSTRIES: SOFTWARE AND BIOTECHNOLOGY, AEI Brookings 
Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, Edited by Robert Hahn, at p. 14-16 and Peter Menell (2008), supra note 
28. 
30 This argument entails that: 1) sunk costs are significant as to affect innovation incentives, which means 
they are significant in comparison with prospective profits from the innovation, i.e. sunk costs will affect 
the decision whether to invest in R&D, which fairly depends on the technological sector; and 2) that 
anyone can “read” on the innovation, in the sense of reverse engineering and being able to imitate in a 
way that free rides on the effort by innovators. This latter requirement would mean that secrecy is not an 
option or first-mover advantages are not significant. In fact, as we will explain below, these two factors 
diverge across different industries, affecting innovation incentives and the role of patents in varying 
degrees.  
31 Economic studies also acknowledge the existence of alternative incentive mechanisms that coexist with 
IP rights (prizes, public-funded research), which have been deemed as potentially superior in specific 
cases such as life-saving drugs, drugs for neglected diseases and those mainly affecting poor countries. 
Since the focus of this Thesis is on the effects of specific patent doctrines in the design of optimal patent 
policy, we deliberately leave aside considerations about alternative incentive mechanisms. This choice is 
motivated on the one hand by the overwhelming presence of IP and patent rights in global and national 
laws and on the other hand by the necessity of confining the study within reasonable limits and is not 
meant to suggest that patents might or not be superior to other mechanisms under certain circumstances, 
even those similar to the ones presented in this study. For a general discussion on this matter see 
SCOTCHMER, supra note 29, p. 116.  
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Nevertheless, the causal relation between a stronger patent system and more 
innovation has been questioned in many industries. Reliance in patent rights 
seems to play its most significant role within the pharmaceutical, chemical and 
biotech sectors, where it is also said to be necessary in the light of the enormous 
costs of R&D and those related to screening efficacy of new products and 
obtaining their marketing approval32. Of course the subtle line of how much 
protection should the IP system give to right-holders is still imprecise. 
Paradoxically, the pharmaceutical and biotech sectors are involved in the 
production of potentially life-saving technologies; making patents more 
controversial exactly where they play a more fundamental role33.  
 
A second theory proposed to justify patents is the prospect theory, which 
sustains that patents are valuable because they facilitate efficient 
commercialization of technologies and hence provide a boost for follow-up 
innovation. The normative suggestion of this theory is that pioneers or first 
innovators should be granted broad and strong rights in order to foster 
subsequent development of technologies34. The theory assumes that social and 
private interests of the patentees are aligned; however these statements are 
controversial since stronger patents or more patents can on the one hand 
facilitate licensing while on the other hand they might block or deter further 
development of technologies35. Nonetheless, Kitch’s prospect theory 
approaches this problem by relying on an optimistic view about licensing that 
has been put into doubt36. 
                                                 
 
 
32 See Wesley M. Cohen, Richard R. Nelson & John P. Walsh, Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: 
Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not), NATIONAL BUREAU OF 
ECONOMIC RESEARCH, Working Paper No. 7552 (2000), (finding find that firms protect the profits of their 
inventions through patents, secrecy, lead time advantages and the use of complementary marketing and 
manufacturing capabilities and that secrecy and lead time tend to be emphasized most heavily whereas 
patents are the least emphasized in most manufacturing industries, with the exception of  and FREDERIC 
SCHERER, THE ECONOMICS OF HUMAN GENE PATENTs, 77 Academic Medicine 1348, 1353-54 (2002). 
33 As stated in supra note 31, some authors argue for the superiority of other incentive mechanisms to 
encourage R&D of live-saving drugs, especially those for neglected diseases. See also the WHO Report on 
the Commission on Innovation, Intellectual Property and Public Health, which specially emphasizes this 
problematic aspect of patent-driven incentives.  
34 See Edmund Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System. 20 JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, N° 2 
(1977):266.  
35 See SUZZANE SCOTCHMER, supra note 29, at p. 27-28, objecting that strong pioneer patents can pre-empt 
competition because prospectors might either avoid competition in the "innovation market" for second-
generation products or avoid competition among second-generation innovators after the second-
generation innovations exist and posing that the case for pioneer patents depends on whether the first 
innovation is costly, in which case the patent is indeed justified as a “reward”. See also Robert Merges and 
Richard Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW, VOL. 90, NO. 4, PP. 839-
960, (1990), at p.916, discussing the limitations of the prospect theory’ suggestion that broad scope should 
be preferred and highlighting that a broad patent might increase innovation incentives for pioneers 
however diminishing incentives “for others to stay in the invention game”. 
36 See Peter Menell and Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property, IN HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, 
VOL 1, ELSEVIER (M. POLINSKY AND S. SHAVELL EDS. 2007), at footnote 19, p. 26, arguing that Kitch was “the 
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A third justification of the IP system is to indicate the value of a firm. This 
signaling function is especially important with respect to patents and within 
industries where small firms play a key role37 as it is the case with biotech start-
ups which need to enter into alliances to complete their research projects and in 
general with new firms trying to gain access to financial markets.  
 
All these economic rationales attempt to justify patent protection based upon 
the role of patents in shaping incentives to invest in R&D, innovate and develop 
innovations. Yet, a balanced reading of the theories suggests that patent law 
aims at providing optimal or sufficient incentives to innovate and not simply at 
maximizing the rewards for patentees. The justification of the patent system 
would be rather to “align innovation incentives with the innovator’s 
contribution, while keeping in mind collateral damage ex post”38. Under an 
efficiency perspective, patent laws are justified precisely because the long term 
gains in dynamic efficiency terms must surpass the short term losses in static 
efficiency39. 
 
On the contrary, arguments in favor of allowing inventors to capture all gains 
from their inventions usually disregard the social costs of the patent system. 
Moreover, the increasing role of strategic reasons as a central motivation for 
pursuing and using patents stresses the importance of considering the net 
benefits of the patent system, either to justify patent rights in general, or more 
importantly, for the interpretation of specific patent doctrines in a reasonable 
way40. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
 
 
earliest, and perhaps most extreme, licensing optimist. See also the discussion below about cumulative 
innovation and incentives to hold-up, at infra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.  
37 Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625 (2002). 
38 See Thomas Cotter, Patent Holdup, Patent Remedies, and Antitrust Responses (Minnesota Legal Studies 
Research Paper No. 08-39, 2008), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1273293, at p. 20. Contrast 
with Einer Elhauge, Do Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking lead to Systematically Excessive Royalties? available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1139133 (July 22, 2008), quoted in Cotter which advances that an optimal 
system allows inventors to capture all gains from their inventions or risk providing insufficient incentives 
39 Economists compare the benefits and costs of alternative market structures by referring to the measures 
of total surplus, which corresponds to the sum of the consumer’s surplus and the producers’ surplus 
(‘‘PS’’). Nonetheless, there exists disagreement about whether it should be consumers’ surplus or total 
surplus that is to be protected from anti-competitive conduct. Similarly, patent law theories explain 
patents in terms of a tradeoff between dynamic and static efficiencies.  
40 See DOMINIQUE GUELLEC AND BRUNO VAN POTTELSBERGHE DE LA POTTERIE, THE ECONOMICS OF THE 
EUROPEAN PATENT SYSTEM: IP POLICY FOR INNOVATION AND COMPETITION, Oxford University Press, pp. 266, 
(2007) at p. 73-74, reviewing empirical studies on the reasons for patenting, economic value and 
performance of patents and concluding that: “patents are also taken for other reasons than simply 
avoiding to being copied, and it is to be expected that patents taken with these objectives in mind are 
much less socially beneficial than others”.  
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2.2 The economics of patent enforcement 
To enforce means “to execute a particular law, writ, judgment or the collection 
of a debt or fine”41. In order to attain the aims of substantive patent law, 
enforcement law aims at providing suitable rules to prevent infringement or 
obtain remedies if infringement has occurred. It is commonly acknowledged 
that substantive rights are of little value in the absence of effective procedures 
for their enforcement42.  
 
Legal studies approach infringement as the most common violation of a patent 
right, which affects the right to exclude and triggers the use of litigation43. 
Many economic studies face the problem of understanding infringement given 
that at first sight, it seems that firms would always be better off by settling and 
avoiding litigation costs and thus, it is often difficult to explain in economic 
terms why disputes would ever arrive to courts44. Moreover, economic studies 
also question why infringement would ever occur in equilibrium when parties 
know in advance whether remedies are weak or detection improbable, so that 
licensing would take place and parties will save on litigation costs45.  
 
However, patent litigation is prevalent and affects different industries in 
varying degrees. Additionally, the possibility of eroding profits through 
litigation might undermine innovation incentives and when asymmetries 
between small and large firms are significant, the market structure might 
importantly determine innovation incentives46. On the other hand, recent 
studies also warn about the effect of rising litigation costs on innovation that 
arise because innovators might inadvertently infringe47. Importantly, economic 
studies have also examined how much profit is dissipated through litigation as 
well as the prevalence of litigation according to industries and firm sizes and 
with respect to the value of innovations, concluding that litigation can largely 
affect the incentives set by substantive IPRs law: 
 
“Given the cost and prevalence of litigation, we can conclude that it constitutes 
an important modification to the profitability of intellectual property rights, and 
one that differs across different types of firms and technologies”48 
                                                 
 
 
41 See UNCTAD-ICTSD, RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT, Cambridge University Press (2005), 
at p. 575, recalling the definition of enforcement given in the Black’s Law Dictionary, sixth edition, 1990, at 
p. 528 
42 See Ibid at p. 634-635.  
43 See DONALD CHISUM ET AL. PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW, Foundation Press, New York, 3rd edition (2004) at 
p. 1284.  
44 See SCOTCHMER, supra note 29, at p. 201. 
45 Ibid at p. 201.  
46 Ibid p. 201.  
47 See BESSEN AND MEURER supra note 14 at  p. 130. 
48 See SCOTCHMER, supra note 29, at p. 204.  
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In the context of litigation, remedies are fundamental to achieve the goals of 
compensating for past infringement and preventing future infringement. The 
rules designed to govern litigation procedures including the remedies available 
in cases of infringement are able to shape the incentives of parties involved in 
patent disputes but also to generally affect incentives to innovate and incentives 
to strategically use such rules. The choice of remedies, thus, from an efficiency 
perspective should reflect a balanced IP system: one that provides sufficient 
innovation incentives while keeping the costs of the system at its lowest.  
 
2.3 The interface between substantive and enforcement patent law 
The literature on entitlement protection focuses on the choice between 
alternative rules to protect a given entitlement. This choice often refers to the 
remedy that a court can grant to right holders in case of violation or 
infringement. Additionally, patent law has specific mechanisms embedded in 
substantive law that establish either a system of property rules or a system of 
liability rules, e.g. compulsory licenses.  
 
Hence, in applying the insights of the entitlement literature to the case of 
patents, it is important to take into account both substantive and enforcement 
patent law. Moreover, it is important to examine the interaction between 
substantive and enforcement law in the light of the economic rationale of 
patents and hence, to examine the role and limits of each body of law. It is in 
this context that the question arises whether substantive law is the unique set of 
rules that aim at balancing innovation incentives and access to technologies. 
The alternative would be to consider that it is also desirable to strike a balance 
through enforcement law. These questions are especially important when 
substantive law is perceived to be unbalanced.  
 
A widely held view in economic studies is that enforcement law should be 
applied in a “neutral” way that assumes that the substantive law of patents has 
already stroke a balance between fostering innovation incentives and access to 
innovation49. This view is often motivated by the application of property law to 
IP, with the consequence that once it is decided that a particular matter 
                                                 
 
 
49 See Cotter, supra note 38, at p. 10, arguing that “courts applying patent remedies or antitrust doctrine 
should take substantive patent law as a given, meaning that in interpreting the law of patent remedies or 
antitrust doctrine they should attempt neither to subvert nor to enhance substantive patent law’s 
embedded incentive scheme”. 
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deserves protection, such protection should follow the logic of property, 
including the application of rules governing remedies50.  
 
Legal scholars who emphasize that patent balance is a competence of 
legislatures which a court should not attempt to modify but should rather take 
“as a given”51 also sustain that enforcement law should not attempt to alter the 
set of incentives as established in substantive law. Such position can also be 
found in countries such as the U.S. where many patent doctrines have been 
developed by courts52. Nonetheless, some authors arguing that courts should 
not attempt to strike a balance in patent policy through the use of enforcement 
law and specifically of remedies, have differentiated between damages as legal 
remedies and injunctions as an equitable relief: 
 
“…To deploy the law of patent damages to correct for perceived flaws in judge-
made substance would lack both transparency and candor; and, as is always a 
risk when courts resort to indirect methods of addressing a problem, may give 
rise to unintended consequences when the resulting modifications are applied 
in unexpected contexts. On other hand, nothing in substantive patent law 
requires that courts award injunctive relief to every prevailing patentee, 
regardless of consequences. To hold otherwise would elevate patents to a 
position of unique privilege in comparison with other forms of property”53 
 
Moreover, the view that problems with substantive patent law should not be 
dealt with the use of enforcement rules neglects two important points. The first 
is that patent strategic behavior and especially hold-ups probably arise not only 
                                                 
 
 
50 See for instance LANDES AND POSNER, supra note 15 at p. 8, arguing that “once a judgment is made that a 
particular “parcel” of intellectual property should be owned, the standard analysis of remedial options is 
applicable”.  
51 This view might be particularly influential in civil law countries where legislation is the primary source 
of law while judicial activity is often unbound by precedents and hence, the legal framework for remedies 
is perceived as more rigid and impeding, to a certain extent, the application of equity. See for instance, 
UGO MATTEI, COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS, University of Michigan Press (1998), at p. 78, arguing 
that: “according to traditional comparative law doctrine, the civil law is mostly a codified system where 
the role of bureaucratically recruited judges is to interpret and apply a written body of statutes. Common 
law, conversely, consists mostly of case law where technocratic judges are concerned with finding the 
applicable rule within the body of law made up by legal precedents”.  But see ibid, at p. arguing against 
such commonly held view: “if we consider the role of case law, we find more convergence between 
modern civil law and common law. In practice, courts in civil law countries make law just as much as 
courts in common law countries (...)”. 
52 In effect, even in a common law country as the U.S., the eBay decision, supra note 2 has been criticized 
on the grounds that it reflects an inappropriate judicial activism from the U.S. Supreme Court, in 
contradiction to prior precedent and legislation by the Congress. See Beckerman-Rodau, Andrew, The 
Supreme Court Engages in Judicial Activism in Interpreting the Patent Law in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.. 
TULANE JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY & INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, VOL. 10, NO. 1, 2007, available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1089537. See also Burk and Lemley, supra note 4, highlighting the role of courts 
in delineating patent policy.  
53 See Cotter, supra note 38, at p. 11 
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because of defects of substantive law but also due to the inappropriateness of 
some enforcement rules as applied to the patent field. The second point is that, 
even if a problem might be caused by a wrong substantive law design, a 
solution would still be needed. Hence, in the absence of substantive law reform, 
it is valid to examine whether enforcement law and the law of remedies leave 
enough discretion to deal with problems that might originate in substantive 
patent law and yet affect the patent system as a whole.  
 
An alternative is then to consider that patent law design occurs both at the level 
of substantive and enforcement rules. Obviously, there are multiple questions 
regarding the scope, if any, for a discretionary application of enforcement rules. 
This is especially the case with respect to remedies, both in common law 
countries but also in countries with civil law tradition, where no corresponding 
equitable doctrines for enforcement exist. The general question of whether 
courts could and should aim at striking the balance of a perceived unbalanced 
system through the use of enforcement rules entails several inter-related 
questions with regard to the interface between substantive and enforcement 
law. Firstly, it is important to examine the linkage between rights and remedies 
in the sense of whether the right determines the applicable remedy or the 
available remedy determines the type of right. This question necessarily require 
a preliminary reflection on the aims of enforcement law.  
 
Enforcement law could be either interpreted as guided by efficiency -in the 
sense of attaining a patent system that maximizes net benefits- or by cost-
effectiveness -enforcing patent law at the minimum possible cost-. If guided by 
cost-effectiveness, patent enforcement rules would aim at reducing wrongful 
behavior, i.e., patent infringement at the lowest cost. Law and economics 
analysis, which is guided by efficiency, often sustains that the aims of 
enforcement law are to deter wrongful behavior54. In addition, compensation is 
often cited both as a reflection of fairness concerns or as a goal complementary 
to deterrence. Such view, which often refers to public enforcement in the 
context of criminal law would be however incomplete in the case of patent law, 
since enforcement rules are never applied in a vacuum.  
 
Even if the aim of patent enforcement rules is to reduce patent infringement, 
such reduction should not be in contradiction with the aims of patent policy in 
                                                 
 
 
54 See Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare: Notes on the Pareto Principle, Preferences, and 
Distributive Justice. THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 32:1 (2003), at p. 292, arguing that “from the perspective 
of welfare economics, the central purpose of law enforcement is to reduce harmful activity. One way to 
accomplish this goal is through deterrence: the reduction in the commission of harmful acts through the 
threat of sanctions (...)”.Economic analysis refers to public enforcement in the sense of publicly prosecuted 
crimes, which society wants to minimize. Private enforcement is conversely dependent upon the action of 
private parties that seek relief on the courts, as it is the case with most patent law cases.  
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general, but rather interpreted in the context of providing optimal incentives for 
innovation. Hence, when patent infringement is harmless or when it produces a 
social benefit that surpasses any potential loss, efficiency would require 
limitations on enforcement. Examples are in fact abundant in substantive patent 
law where private and non-commercial uses are exempted and measures such 
as compulsory licenses in cases of public interest also allow exceptions to patent 
infringement. But of course, the question on the interface between substantive 
and enforcement law is whether is it sufficient to have such exceptions in 
substantive law or whether enforcement rules should also be interpreted in the 
light of the objectives of patent law.  
 
Scholars are divided with regards to this question as some authors assume that 
attempting to balance the patent system also through enforcement law would 
not be advisable55 and some others argue in favor of keeping the balance both in 
substantive as well as enforcement patent law56. Whereas the current 
international framework does not provide clear answers to such questions, 
especially as the answers might vary from country to country, article 41 of the 
TRIPS Agreement seems to favor a broader interpretation of the objectives of 
enforcement law in the light of the objectives of patent law in general:  
 
“Members shall ensure that enforcement procedures as specified in this Part are 
available under their law so as to permit effective action against any act of 
infringement of intellectual property rights covered by this Agreement, 
including expeditious remedies to prevent infringements and remedies which 
constitute a deterrent to further infringements. These procedures shall be 
applied in such a manner as to avoid the creation of barriers to legitimate 
trade and to provide for safeguards against their abuse” (emphasis added) 
  
With these premises, the following chapters examine the interface between 
substantive and enforcement patent law in more detail, focusing on the 
entitlements (patent rights) and how they are protected (remedies and other 
substantive rules referring to the property and liability rules debate). Such 
interface is described in the context of civil law and common law countries and 
explained through the application of law and economics insights in order to 
provide an answer to these questions both from a positive and a normative 
standpoint.  
                                                 
 
 
55 See for instance, infra note 52 and accompanying text.  
56 See Michael W. Carroll, Patent Injunctions and the Problem of Uniformity Cost, VILLANOVA UNIVERSITY 
LEGAL WORKING PAPER SERIES, WORKING PAPER 82 (July 2007), available at: 
http://law.bepress.com/villanovalwps/papers/art82, at p. 424 arguing that patent law is tailored 
through substantive and enforcement rules, including the availability of injunctions, in order to cope with 
the costs of uniformity of patent law, and highlighting how it is however impossible to perfectly tailor 
patent law on a case by case basis while arguing in favor of industry, technology and entity features that 
permit to develop guidelines for courts to decide in favor of a property or a liability rule.  
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3 Property Rules and Liability Rules 
One of the most important contributions of the law and economics movement 
has been to recognize the importance of transaction costs, i.e., costs arising out 
of economic exchanges through the market mechanism.  The theorem posed by 
Ronald Coase was that absent significant transaction costs, efficiency will be 
attained through bargaining in spite of the right’s initial allocation57. Hence, the 
necessary requirements for efficient exchanges are clearly defined property 
rights and zero or low transaction costs58. Under the label “transaction costs” 
scholars have included the costs arising out of the market’s price-mechanism, 
among others, the costs of finding the parties with whom to bargain, the costs 
of negotiating a deal -including the possibility of strategic bargaining, e.g. 
holdouts and hold-ups strategies- and the costs of enforcing and monitoring 
any subsequent arrangement59. 
 
                                                 
 
 
57 See Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm (1937), ECONOMICA, New Series, Vol. 4, No. 16 (Nov. 1937), pp. 
386-405, at p.392: “We may sum up this section of the argument by saying that the operation of a market 
costs something and by forming an organisation and allowing some authority (an "entrepreneur") to direct 
the resources, certain marketing costs are saved”. Although Coase did not use the name “transaction 
costs”, he referred to the “costs of using the market mechanism”, ibid at p. 403. See also Ronald Coase, The 
problem of Social Cost (1960), JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, 3, pp. 1–44, “Once the costs of carrying out 
market transactions are taken into account it is clear that such a rearrangement of rights will only be under 
taken when the increase in the value of production consequent upon the rearrangement is greater than the 
costs which would be involved in bringing it about”. Scholars, however, have diverse interpretations of 
“transaction costs”, and whereas a strand of literature focuses on the role that transaction costs play in 
determining the distribution of property rights, broadly defined as all laws, rules and even social customs 
or organizations that generate incentives for behavior – a concept used by the “law and economics” and 
“new institutional economics” movements, i.e. studies following the insights of the Coase Theorem-  
another approach uses neoclassical economics and defines transaction costs in a narrow way that equals 
such costs to transportation charges or taxes. See Douglas Allen, Transaction costs, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW 
AND ECONOMICS, 0740, available at: http://encyclo.findlaw.com/0740book.pdf. In any case, transaction 
costs do not constitute losses to subtract from expected benefits, but rather refer to the costs that preclude 
the formation of an agreement. 
58 Several authors argue that clearly defined rights and zero transaction costs are in fact the two sides of 
the same coin. The idea is that in the absence of transaction costs, property rights would always be clearly 
defined. This follows from a broad definition of property rights as “the ability to freely exercise a choice 
over a good or service” and the conception of transaction costs as those related to “the ability to freely 
exercise a choice over a good or service”. See Allen, supra note 57. 
59 “Transaction costs economics” is a study branch mainly developed by the studies of Oliver Williamson 
holds that the determinants of transaction costs are frequency, specificity, uncertainty, limited rationality, 
and opportunistic behavior. Different circumstances explain the choice between firms and markets as 
guided by the need of lowering transaction costs. This approach is based on the incompleteness of 
contracts that exposes parties making specific investments to holdups. Transaction cost economics 
investigate how different governance structures attempt to solve the problem of contract incompleteness. 
For a survey on the branch see Peter Klein. New Institutional Economics, 0530 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS. p. 467-468 at http://users.ugent.be/~gdegeest/0530book.pdf       
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Calabresi and Melamed60 (hereinafter C&M) devised a categorization of legal 
entitlements into property and liability rules building upon the concept of 
transaction costs and the relative circumstances in which each rule prevails in 
law61. Protecting a right through a property rule means that nobody can use or 
acquire such right without prior permission from the owner and thus, that a 
previous negotiation must take place62. As a consequence, if an entitlement is 
protected through a property rule, a court asked to enforce such right in cases 
of unauthorized use or infringement, should issue a mandatory order to stop 
infringement; what is usually called an “injunctive order”63. 
 
Liability rules operate under a different mechanism that protects entitlements 
but permits non-authorized use or taking as long as the owner is compensated. 
                                                 
 
 
60 See Guido Calabresi & Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of The 
Cathedral, 85 HARVARD LAW REV., 1972. Summing up the burgeoning literature on property and liability 
rules that began with the C&M article would go beyond the scope of this study. Hence, this section 
presents a brief summary of the propositions that directly affect the choice between property and liability 
rules in the area of patent law. For a survey on the property and liability rules literature see Matteo 
Rizzolli, The Cathedral: An Economic Survey of Legal Remedies (January 2008), available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1092144  
61 A third instance of entitlements exists in the form of inalienable rights: those for which no trade is 
allowed. In the patent law field this category might point towards discussion about the (un) patentability 
of certain fields such as genes or living organisms. In spite of the importance of this discussion, this Thesis 
focuses on the alternative protection for alienable entitlements, that is, whether after the issuance of a 
patent, the right-holder should be protected through a right of exclusive or remunerative content. 
Nonetheless, policy levers that tackle the issues here discussed such as enforcement and exceptions in 
patent law, are in some instances related to those used to deal with inalienability of rights (patentability 
requirements) insofar as policy-makers also have to decide about the convenience of assigning or not a 
property right in the first place. In this sense, liability rules can be viewed as a middle ground solution 
between a full right (under a property rule) and no right (under an inalienability rule that would follow 
from a finding of invalidity or non-infringement).  
62 C&M used the word “entitlement” to refer to any conflicting situation in which the State has to decide 
who shall prevail, i.e. who is entitled to prevail. Such decision is called of “first order” since it is the 
necessary premise for the actual enforcement. The “second order” decision regards the way of protecting 
the entitlement, e.g. through a property rule, a liability rule or an inalienability rule. Efficiency, they 
argued, “asks that we choose the set of entitlements which would lead to that allocation of resources 
which could not be improved in the sense that a further change would not so improve the condition of 
those who gained by it that they could compensate those who lost from it and still be better off than 
before”, that is, an application of the concept known as Pareto efficiency. See also Wesley Newcomb 
Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L. J. 16 (1913), classifying 
“jural relations” in rights, duties, privileges, no-rights, powers, immunities, liabilities and disabilities, each 
category having a co-related one. For instance, if X has a right against Y to stay out of his land that would 
mean that Y would have a duty towards X to stay out of that place. On the other hand, the right of X 
against Y to stay out of his land is accompanied by a privilege by X of entering the land.  Interestingly, 
Hohfeld focused in the structure of entitlements without regard for their protection whereas C&M focused 
on remedies disregarding the structure of entitlements. In fact, C&M did not refer to the categorization of 
legal concepts devised by Hohfeld. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Demystifying the Right to Exclude: Of 
Property, Inviolability and Automatic Injunctions, HARVARD JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY, Vol. 31, 2008 
(U of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 182) Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1016222  
63 Such order to desist on infringement activity is often called “injunction” in English and “inibitoria” in 
Italian as well as “cease and desist orders”. See infra note 317 with regard to the terminology used in 
different jurisdictions. 
Ex-post Liability Rules   
In Modern Patent Law  36  
 
 
Hence, the right to consensually and previously approve any unauthorized use, 
granting owners control over their rights is converted into a right to receive a 
monetary award, which grants no control but remunerates the owner. As a 
consequence, if an entitlement is protected through a liability rule it means that 
the relevant authority -whether a court or regulatory agency- would fix a 
compensation to be paid to the owner.  
 
C&M described four different rules responding to two different factors; to 
whom the right is allocated and whether the right is protected through a 
property or a liability rule64. An additional parameter that has been taken into 
consideration is which option, i.e. whether a “put” or a “call” is given to the 
entitled party. Under a “call”, the option is given to a party to take a thing 
under specific circumstances. A “put”, instead, gives the option to the entitled 
person to sell their right for a determined price. While both types of options are 
ordinarily present in market transactions, it is often claimed that legal rules are 
seldom developed as “puts” since liability rules are often adopted to counteract 
a monopoly position that might give raise to holdouts. In this sense, it is 
interpreted that whereas the owner of a non substitutable asset is in a 
monopoly position, the owner of money that is in the position of buying out the 
right is not65. Nonetheless, several studies have attempted to apply the rationale 
of financial markets’ and the alternatives of puts and calls into different law 
fields, in what is called “optional law”66.  
 
                                                 
 
 
64 See Carol Rose, The Shadow of The Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J., 1997, 2175-2200, at p. 2179, explaining how 
rules 2 and 4, which are examples of liability rules, are equivalent to splitting the value between the parties 
whereas a property rule does not allow the division of the entitlement. Moreover, she argues that rule 2, 
represented by the case of Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., poses the case of one single owner buying the 
right from a community whereas rule 4, represented by the case of Spur Industries v. Del E. Webb 
Development Co. illustrates the case of a community buying the right out from one single owner.  
65 See Richard Epstein, A Clear View of The Cathedral: The Dominance of Property Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2091, 
2093–96 (1997), at p. 2093-2094, explaining that “There is no reason to believe that if the holder of the asset 
is allowed to cash out safely from the transaction, he will foist the asset off on a party, arbitrarily chosen, 
that can make better use of it than he. Puts, therefore, are never imposed as a matter of law on strangers 
but are the outgrowth of consensual transactions over organized markets. As between strangers, liability 
rules, however sharply constrained, always take the form of calls: The person who has the cash can dictate 
that some asset be moved in his direction, where there is every reason to believe that he can make at least 
some intelligent use of it, perhaps better than his incumbent” 
66 See IAN AYRES, OPTIONAL LAW: THE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL ENTITLEMENTS, The University of Chicago Press 
(2005). See also Dan Burk, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Molecular Futures: Bargaining in the Shadow of the 
Cathedral, in GENE PATENTS AND CLEARING MODELS: FROM CONCEPTS TO CASES, Geertrui Van Overwalle, ed., 
Cambridge University Press, 2009; suggesting that a particular example of “puts” could be implemented 
in the case of a pharmaceutical research proposal for a library of receptors and ligands and citing that 
there is an example of a “put” system in the U.S. Statutory Invention Registration (SIR), which “allows 
inventors to publish enabling descriptions of an invention without receiving a patent, placing the 
invention into the public domain”. While this is a put that will be exercised at price of zero, particular 
examples could also be SSO’s commitments to license at RAND/FRAND or licenses of right.  
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Beyond its descriptive implications, the property and liability rules 
categorization has been highly influential and controversial at a normative 
level. C&M initially suggested that from an efficiency point of view, a property 
rule would be superior to a liability rule when transaction costs are low 
whereas a liability rule might be preferable when there are high transaction 
costs67. The latter situation is frequently found in the presence of multiple 
relevant parties with whom interested parties should bargain, risks of strategic 
bargaining, including hold-ups and high monitoring or enforcement costs of 
any possible agreement. With low transaction costs, parties might bargain 
between themselves to achieve the most efficient allocation. Conversely, if there 
are high transaction costs, efficiency requires that the right is allocated to the 
highest-value user: 
 
“Where transaction costs are high, the allocation of resources to their highest-
valued uses is facilitated by denying property right holders an injunctive 
remedy against invasions of their rights and instead limiting them to a remedy 
in damages68” 
 
The problem of hold-outs has been typically used to justify takings of private 
property under the power of eminent domain69. The emblematic example is a 
governmental taking of private properties for the development of a public 
interest project and where some of the involved owners whose property the 
government intends to take, might hold-out selling their properties in order to 
obtain a compensation that is higher than their true subjective valuation. A 
liability rule is logically justified in order to avoid the inefficiency of hold-outs, 
which are hence, the most common justification for eminent domain under a 
law-and-economics perspective under the application of the property and 
liability rules distinction.  
 
In this sense a hold-out might arise whenever the owner of a property right in 
general, delays or refutes a transaction given that he or she is the only one 
authorized to voluntarily agree to any use or transfer. Likewise, a hold-up may 
be considered as a specific variant of holdouts, wherein specific investments 
                                                 
 
 
67 C&M not only considered transaction costs and efficiency as normative thresholds but also discussed 
distributive concerns and notions of fairness that guide the choice between entitlement protection rules.  
68 RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1972), 1st Ed, Boston, Little Brown, p. 29.  
69 See Thomas Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, Takings, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, available at 
http://encyclo.findlaw.com/6200book.pdf at p. 330, claiming that “when the government is assembling a 
large amount of land to build a public project like a highway, individual owners whose land is necessary 
for the project acquire monopoly power in their dealing with the government. That is, they can hold out 
for prices in excess of their true (subjective) valuation of the land given that it would be costly, once the 
project is begun, for the government to seek alternative locations” ( emphasis added). Although the terms 
hold-out and hold-up are often used interchangeably, in the context of patents the literature refers mostly 
to hold-ups.  
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have been made and are considered as sunk costs, so that a trading partner is 
susceptible of being held-up by its counterpart in a bilateral monopoly due to 
such specific investments70. 
 
Subsequent work has suggested different extensions and criticized these basic 
statements. To start with, the property and liability rules literature attempts to 
bring together dissimilar fields of law as property, contract and torts under the 
unifying concept of entitlement protection rules but there is still disagreement 
among scholars about the convenience of extending normative suggestions 
from one field to the other71.  
 
Moreover, the underlying concept of transaction costs encompasses different 
types of costs that might be more or less relevant within different contexts. A 
typical categorization of transaction costs distinguishes between costs due to 
the number of parties and difficulty of ex-ante negotiating on the one hand and 
                                                 
 
 
70 See Richard Epstein, supra note 65 at p. 2092 explaining that “because property rules give one person the 
sole and absolute power over the use and disposition of a given thing, it follows that its owner may hold 
out for as much as he pleases before selling the thing in question” (emphasis added). He argues that 
“The standard practice in virtually all legal systems assumes the dominance of property rules over liability 
rules, except under those circumstances where some serious holdout problem is created because 
circumstances limit each side to a single trading partner. In these cases of necessity, the holdout 
problem could prove enormous, so that the strong protection of a property rule is relaxed. One person 
may be allowed to take the property of another upon payment of compensation, but only in a constrained 
institutional setting that limits the cases in which that right can be exercised and supervises the payment of 
compensation for it” (emphasis added). Whereas hold-outs, as Epstein explains might only create 
problems under special circumstances that limit “each side to a single trading partner”, this will always be 
the case in a hold-up, which could be viewed as a type of hold-out where parties are in a bilateral-
monopoly due to their specific investments, and it is thus a case calling for some type of intervention. See 
also Yeon-Koo Che & József Sákovics, Hold-ups in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS, Second 
Edition (2008), Edited by Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume), explaining that “hold up arises when 
part of the return on an agent's relationship-specific investment is ex post expropriable by his trading 
partner”.  
71 There are plenty of difficulties in this unifying exercise. For instance, see Rose, supra note, 64, criticizing 
the choice of using examples from the property field including the Boomer case (Boomer v. Atlantic Cement 
Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, N.Y. (1970)) in the work by C&M but also in the subsequent work by Ian Ayres and 
Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027 
(1995) and Kaplow and Shavell, infra note 76, on the grounds that it obscures their arguments. According 
to Rose, the work of  C&M had in mind a setting of accident law whereas Ayres and Talley developed their 
insights with respect to contract law and Kaplow and Shavell also probably worked in the “shadows” of 
accident law. This Thesis focuses only on the problems inherent to the IP and more specifically the patent 
field; however, at least some scholars have highlighted how the different logic of tort and property law 
was reflected differently in the statutes of unfair competition, patent and copyright law as well as the 
subsequent expansion of rights and remedies towards the logic of property law and the consequences of 
such mixed logic. In this sense, see Mark Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP 
Rights, STANFORD LAW REVIEW, VOL 61:311, at p. 312, arguing that “courts, lawyers, scholars and treatise 
writers argue over whether trade secrets are a creature of contract, of tort, of property, or even of criminal 
law”. See also infra note 92. 
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costs due to strategic bargaining, including hold-ups and hold-outs on the 
other72.  
 
An important corollary of the C&M framework is that property rules need less 
“collective intervention” from authorities such as courts, regulatory agencies or 
even legislators. In order to set a property rule, all authorities need to do is to 
allocate the right and protect it. Conversely, for a liability rule to work out, 
authorities shall allocate the right and also determine the compensation73.  
 
Economic studies on entitlements soon pointed out how any system of liability 
rules would entail significant assessment costs since authorities need to set the 
compensation of the right and can easily incur into errors in the process of 
assessment. As a consequence of the difficulty and costliness of such 
assessment, authorities could be induced to avoid the calculation of subjective 
values and to concentrate on the objective value of entitlements with the 
consequent risk that such assessment would under-compensate right holders 
and produce significant errors74.   
 
The evident presence of administrative costs and errors has been used to 
criticize any preference for a system of liability rules justified upon high 
transaction costs. The argument is that even if transaction costs are high, those 
                                                 
 
 
72 See e.g., Rose, supra note 64 (dividing transaction costs into type I and type II, which correspond to 
these two groups of costs). See also Mark Lemley & Philip Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules Govern 
Information? 85 TEXAS LAW REVIEW, 4, March 2007, p. 783-841, at p. 787, (adopting a similar categorization 
of transaction costs while arguing that the strategic use of injunctions is a particular transaction cost that 
“reflects the fact that certain conditions –including legal certainty-can increase the value of an entitlement 
and make a holdout strategy rational”). See also Rizzolli, supra note 60, referring the main contributions in 
the property and liability rules literature according to the type of transaction costs considered and the 
normative suggestions. Search costs are considered by C&M who argue for liability rules. Strategic 
bargaining costs are considered by Lucian Bebchuk, Property Rights and Liability Rules: The Ex Ante View of 
the Cathedral, MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW, 100(3), 601-39 (2001), who argues for property rules. James Krier and 
Stewart  Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 
LAW REVIEW, 440-483 (1995), argue for put-options liability rules whereas Ayres and Talley, supra note 71 
argue for liability rules. Administrative costs of litigation are considered among others by Smith, infra note 
92, arguing for property rules and by Kaplow and Shavell, infra note 76, arguing for liability rules. 
Enforcement costs are analyzed by Smith infra note 92 and Keith Hylton, Property Rules and Liability Rules, 
Once Again, REVIEW OF LAW & ECONOMICS, Vol. 2, 2, p. 137-191 (2006) who argue in favor of property rules 
and by Richard Brooks, The Relative Burden of Determining Property Rules and Liability Rules: Broken Elevators 
in the Cathedral, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 267, 289–90 (2003), who argues for liability rules. Rent seeking through 
multiple takings is examined by Kaplow and Shavell, ibid and Epstein supra note 65, who argue for 
property rules. Finally, denormalization costs, i.e. any expenditure made in anticipation of a possible 
taking are assessed by Hylton, ibid, who argues in favor of property rules.  
73 However, in the following sections we will show how the case might be different with IPR’s -and in 
general, with rights that have unclear boundaries- since in these cases, a court applying a property rule, 
has to identify the right and delimit it in order to avoid that a property rule might extend towards a non-
protected entitlement. Such activity also entails a significant –although different type- of collective 
intervention, or else risk to fail on efficiency terms. 
74 See also Krier and Schwab, supra note 72 and Hylton supra note 72. 
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costs must be compared against the costs incurred by authorities when 
calculating the compensation before suggesting any departure from a property 
rule75. 
 
Yet, some scholars argue that liability rules have the effect of harnessing 
information and can thus minimize information costs for courts. This would be 
possible because under a liability rule the court would only have to determine 
the damage to the victim, whereas in a property rule framework, courts will 
also have to know the prevention cost to the injurer76. Because liability rules 
entail a comparison of costs and benefits they oblige parties to compare their 
opportunity costs to an amount of damages representing the judge’s best 
estimate of them77. As a consequence, the proposition that property rules 
should be preferred when transaction costs are low has also been questioned78.  
 
Other scholars, however, have contended that property rules are superior to 
liability rules because, at least when it pertains to property, an “exclusionary 
strategy” generates informational advantages, based on the lower ex-ante 
transaction costs of establishing property rights79. A similar view sustains that 
valuation problems associated with liability rules which can lead to under-
compensation, make of property rules a superior option, by outweighing any 
potential cost from strategic behavior80. In addition, it has been pointed out, 
that under some circumstances, a comparative evaluation as required under 
property rules can be easier than absolute valuation under liability rules81.  
 
                                                 
 
 
75 Ibid. See also Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and 
Damage Remedies, 32 Stanford Law Review, 1075-1111, (1980), at p. 1111. See also Michael Krauss, Property 
vs. Liability rules, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, available at: 
http://encyclo.findlaw.com/3800book.pdf 
76 See Kaplow and Shavell, Property Rules and Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARVARD LAW 
REVIEW, 713, arguing that, under a property rule, the court would have to determine the cost of prevention 
and the victim’s damage and allocate the right to the intruder, only if the cost of prevention was higher 
than the damage, whereas under a liability rule, all the court has to know is the amount of damage. The 
authors make a distinction between “takings” (where property rules are superior due to the possibility of 
mutual reciprocal takings) and “externalities” (where liability rules will be superior). 
77 But see Krauss, supra note 75, at p. 780-790, saying that authors following the Austrian approach, for 
instance question the fact that authorities might discover information more efficiently (least costly) than 
the market. Moreover, in the light of the indeterminacy of choosing between property and liability rules 
on efficiency grounds, some scholars propose to base the choice on other criterion, such as justice. 
78 See Kaplow and Shavell supra note 76, at p. 718, claiming that: “In addition, we will cast doubt on the 
belief that property rules are best when transaction costs are low.” 
79 See Krier & Schwab supra note 72 at 459–64 arguing for property rules when administrative costs are 
high and and citing Smith, at 685–86 (suggesting variable measurement costs may favor property rules). 
See also Hylton, supra note 72, arguing that even if transaction costs are high, property rules are still 
superior to liability rules when right holders’ valuations are greater than potential takers. But see, e.g., 
Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 76, at 729, 750–51 (arguing that information about average harm can be 
developed at low cost and that information required for property rules is costly). 
80 See Epstein, supra note 65.  
81 See Brooks supra note 72. 
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Although the main normative implication of C&M is that in the presence of 
high transaction costs, bargaining would potentially breakdown82, scholars 
disagree about the magnitude of the problem in several areas and furthermore, 
there is theoretical disagreement about whether liability rules might help 
avoiding such breakdown or whether bargaining failures might be better solve 
under the shadow of a property rule.  
 
For instance, some scholars have argued that liability rules encourage two-way 
trading, which is the possibility to put an option in order to buy again an 
entitlement whereas property rules only allow one-way trading83. Yet other 
scholars have highlighted that even if the choice of legal rules does not matter 
for efficiency purposes when ex-post bargaining is possible, the choice has 
important distributive consequences, which at the same time affect the ex-ante 
decisions of the parties and hence also efficiency84.  
 
3.1 Property Rules and Liability Rules in IP  
The property and liability rules framework has also been functional to 
numerous discussions in the IP field. However plentiful, the insights developed 
to assess property and liability rules in IP are yet insufficient in contrast with 
the complexities of laws and judicial practice. Moreover, the majority of 
economic studies have focused on common law and particularly in U.S. law, 
hence missing the opportunity from comparing alternative rules.  
 
Given the enormous importance of economic analysis within the study of IP, 
the literature has tended to specialize and focus on multiple narrow subjects85. 
In this sense, the choice between property and liability rules can be understood 
as one out of many policy levers that contributes shaping the incentives for 
actors in a given industry or group of industries. Economists define the optimal 
design of the IP system as a “mix” of these inter-related policy-levers and tend 
to highlight for instance, how the use of such policy levers may transform the 
generality of patent statutes into a more industry-specific scheme86. Often, 
                                                 
 
 
82 See Hylton, supra note 72, at p. 142, explaining that bargaining failure is costly “because it results in 
forgone opportunities for both parties to enhance their welfare”. 
83 See Ayres & Talley, supra note 71.  
84 See Bebchuk, supra note 72. 
85 See Menell supra note 28 and Menell and Scotchmer supra note 36, explaining that during the 1900’s the 
economic analysis of IP tended to focus on the overall effects of IP, patents or copyrights whereas the 
literature initiated with the studies by Nordhaus and most recent literature has focused on narrow and 
more specialized issues of law design, and specific laws of patents, copyrights or trademarks.  
86 See Burk and Lemley, supra note 4, referring to “policy levers” as described by Pamela Samuelson & 
Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575, 1581 (2002). 
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however, such specific design of the policy levers is not necessarily the most 
efficient one87. 
 
However, a puzzling result has followed such transposition, which might 
derive from a theoretical disagreement about the nature of IP rights. In spite of 
the important influence of economic analysis in IP even before the works of 
“law and economics” scholars, IP rights are still viewed by a great amount of 
scholars –including in law and economics- as granting owners a right, which in 
case of infringement must be protected through remedies typical of property 
law88. This reasoning is often defended even in the context of sequential 
innovation or potentially severe bargaining collapse, instances in which it 
would be expected for economic studies to generally favor the application of 
Coase’s view of reciprocal externalities and C&M’s bilateral consideration of 
entitlement protection rules89.  
 
The overwhelming presence of economic analysis in IP law is at least in 
contradiction with the view –shared by many legal scholars- of IP entitlements 
as property rights protected only through property rules insofar as the latter 
view would limit the insights of economic studies that suggest the use of 
alternative protection rules according to the transaction costs and other similar 
considerations. A likely explanation for the contradictory presence of economics 
in IP law yet the “dominant” vie of IP entitlements as property rights could be 
due to the “special” rationale of IP protection as a mechanism of producing 
innovation incentives. However, such answer is unconvincing at least for three 
reasons. The first reason is that the infringer-owner dichotomy, typically found 
in scholarly comments is often unclear, especially in the case of sequential 
innovation and unclear IP rights. An infringer can at the same time be an 
innovator and infringement does not always occur willfully but is sometimes 
the result of failures in the patent system90. Secondly, whereas an ex-ante 
explanation for IP rights is compelling, it is typically based on a trade-off 
between ex-ante and ex-post efficiency put forward to justify IP rights. Thus, in 
spite of the importance of innovation incentives, IP systems need to balance 
                                                 
 
 
87 Ibid. p. 5.  
88 See for instance, Epstein supra note 65 and Kieff infra note 124.  
89 One of the path-breaking ideas advanced by Coase was to conceive that externalities are reciprocal in 
nature and hence, in the case of pollution, either the polluter could have the “right” to pollute or the other 
party could have the “right” to be free of pollution. C&M added to the decision on how to allocate the 
right, a further possibility of choosing between two types of rules, forming a matrix with four different 
rules.    
90 See BESSEN AND MEURER supra note 14, arguing that the patent system fails in giving proper notice of the 
boundaries of patent rights. See also Lemley & Weiser supra note 72 making a similar argument in the 
context of information rights, mostly protected through copyrights where uncertain boundaries give rise 
to similar problems of delineation.  
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both ex-ante and ex-post considerations91. Thirdly, if there is a legal field where 
entitlements are not so clearly defined as to call for clear rules for protection, it 
is precisely the IP field. In the following section, these considerations will be 
particularly applied to the patent law field.  
 
The most likely reason for such disagreement may come from the underlying 
controversy surrounding the nature of IP rights, a patched body of laws with 
dissimilar origins and heterogeneous functions, contents and performance. 
Patents, for instance, differ from copyrights, trademarks and unfair competition 
laws in functions, content of rules and the performance of the system in 
innovation and competition92. Whether patents are or should be assimilated to 
property law is not a completely resolved query.  
3.1.1 Descriptive studies 
It is often argued that with a few exceptions, property rules are the preferred 
choice for patent rights, that unfair competition laws give in many cases a right 
to be compensated and most copyright statutes around the world rely on 
property rules while containing specific liability rules93. A preliminary 
observation is that –as described by the property and liability rules literature for 
the case of torts, property and contracts- both types of rules co-exist within the 
IP field in varying degrees. 
 
However, studies are not unanimous in interpreting the prevalence and 
importance of property and liability rules in IP. Some studies highlight that 
property rules prevail in “property rights” contexts and hence, in IP94. 
                                                 
 
 
91 But see LANDES AND POSNER, supra note 15, at p. 11, arguing that most economic scholars have tend to 
oversimplify the problem of IP law to the tradeoff of incentives versus access with the consequence that 
the “continuity between physical and intellectual property” is obscured.  
92 See Henry Smith, Intellectual Property as Property, YALE LAW JOURNAL 116:1742, 2007, explaining the 
origin of IP in unfair competition laws and the differences between copyrights and patents upon 
information costs of delineation and enforcement of exclusion rights while differentiating between 
governance strategies that prevail in copyrights law and exclusion strategies that dominate patent law.  
93 Several law and economic studies have addressed the prevalence of property rules or liability rules in IP 
laws with results largely varying according to the different legal systems and fields under study. See in 
general, ROGER BLAIR AND THOMAS COTTER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: ECONOMIBC AND LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF 
RIGHTS AND REMEDIES, Cambridge University Press, 2005 at p. 38-40, referring to liability rules in diverse 
IPRs while claiming that “intellectual property law in general prefers property rules to liability rules and 
that -if the premises upon which the intellectual property system is based are sound – a rebuttable 
presumption in favor of property rules probably makes more sense than would a presumption favoring 
liability rules”. See also Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW 
(April 2004, Number 2) 465-548, at p. 469, referring to the “strictly exclusionary nature of the patent 
entitlement, unbroken by legal privileges or liability rules”. For an analysis about unfair competition see 
ANSELM KAMPERMAN, UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW, Oxford University Press, 1977, at chapter 3, “The 
economics of pre-emption and the abuse of a dominant position, at p. 97 ss.  
94 See Henry Smith, Property and Property Rules. NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, Vol. 79, pp. 1719-1798, 
2004, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=638723, (pointing out, that in spite of the fact that 
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However, it is important to mention that, firstly, in the context of property and 
liability rules and remedies literature, the notion of “property right” comprises 
different entitlements, not only property law95 and secondly, in the context of IP 
law, scholars have been increasingly divided as to whether IP is “property” and 
to what extent rules designing for tangible property should be applied to IP 
rights96.  
 
3.1.1.1 Compulsory licenses  
Notwithstanding the discussion about the prevalence of one type of rule or the 
other, the most common type of liability rules used in IP rights are compulsory 
licensing provisions. Under a compulsory license, the IP right, which is 
traditionally conceived as a right to exclude, is transformed in a right to receive 
compensation. Compulsory licenses, can be applied to different IP rights, might 
be designed in different ways and might be regulated by statutes or subject to 
case-by-case analysis as well as are justified upon different reasons. As a result, 
their economic effects might widely diverge according to these differences.  
 
Compulsory licenses can be classified according to multiple criteria. Based 
upon their justification, a compulsory license system might aim at (1) 
maintaining a healthy state of competition in the market97; or (2) be based on 
                                                                                                                                               
 
 
property rules are more abundant in statutes and practice, academics are inclined towards liability rules). 
See also Hylton, supra note 72 and Epstein supra note 65. 
95 See Balganesh supra note 62, at p. 609-610, footnotes 59-60 and accompanying text arguing that the 
entitlement literature contributed to shift away the focus from the concept of rights to the concept of 
remedies in the sense that property is not defined with respect to in rem rights or to ownership attributes 
but rather to the protection through a property rule.  
96 See Mark Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding. TEXAS LAW REVIEW, Vol. 83, p. 1031, 2005 
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=582602; arguing that the term intellectual property is quite 
recent, since it is probably traced to the foundation of the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO) by the United Nations in 1967, although there are some previous references in older literature. 
Such name suggest that such different area areas of protection such as copyrights, patents but also 
trademarks, geographical indications, industrial designs, layout designs and trade secrecy belong to the 
realm of property rights.  For the view of IP as property rights, see Epstein supra note 6565 and infra note 
131. For the contrary view see Lemley & Weiser, supra note 72, stating: “The founding vision of 
intellectual property (IP) viewed owners of governmentally conferred rights—in patent and copyright—as 
the beneficiaries of a government license and as entitled only to remedies sufficient to encourage 
innovation”. Among other critics, they highlight how this ‘law’ doesn’t take into account the difference 
between non-rival and rival entitlements and thus, the inherent difference between knowledge and 
information and other tangible (mainly real) property. 
97 See Anthony Taubman, Rethinking Trips: 'Adequate Remuneration' For Non-Voluntary Patent Licensing, 11 J. 
INT'L ECON. L. 927-970; discussing the use of such distinction during the Uruguay Round of negotiations 
and sustaining that: “Both forms of intervention override the exclusive rights under a patent, and thus 
constrain the commercial interest in the leverage in the marketplace afforded by exclusivity. But within 
national legal systems, they may have different legal bases, different administrative or judicial forms, and 
different economic dynamics, even though they overlap conceptually and are both intended to advance 
the public interest”. 
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overriding reasons of public interest, public non-commercial purposes and 
governmental uses98. Such distinction was already reflected in the Paris 
Convention, which addressed the first type of compulsory licenses whereas it 
left to national members the regulation of cases where public interest justifies 
the use compulsory licenses99. Of course, in the long run, all types of 
compulsory licenses tend to be justified as advancing the public interest. Yet, 
some compulsory licenses favor the public interest by creating static efficiency 
gains, whereas others are supposed to protect competition also by protecting 
dynamic efficiency gains, which in turn would presumably advance the public 
interest.  
 
Compulsory licenses based upon assuring a healthy competition in the market 
can also be read in transaction cost terms. They can be furthermore sub-divided 
on the basis of whether they are justified on high transaction costs due to (1) the 
complexity of relations, i.e. when there are many involved parties or it is too 
costly to monitor or clear the rights100; and (2) when transaction costs are due to 
the probability of strategic behavior and risk of hold-ups101. In the first group 
we can place the copyright statutory licenses which are usually grounded on 
the high costs of clearing and monitoring the rights whereas in the second 
group we may include compulsory licenses for failure to work a patent or for 
dependent patents102.  
 
Compulsory licensing provisions found in copyright statutes103 are in fact the 
provisions most widely covered by law and economics discussions. In fact, 
                                                 
 
 
98 Compulsory licenses based upon public interest concerns allow government use, crown use or public 
non-commercial uses and are subject to great discretion, especially with regards to the definition of 
“public interest”. Nonetheless they are currently subject to the requirements of the TRIPS Agreement, 
supra note 11, and especially of article 31 of the same, which establishes the requirements for compulsory 
licenses, also exempting the requisite of making prior efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder 
on reasonable commercial terms in cases of “national emergency or other circumstances of extreme 
urgency or in cases of public non-commercial use”. In addition, the TRIPS Agreement provided several 
safeguards for the use of public interest based compulsory licenses, which were also clarified in the Doha 
Declaration (Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/ DEC/2, adopted on 
14 November 2001, clarifying: that “the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent members from 
taking measures to protect public health”; and that countries have the right, inter alia: “to grant 
compulsory licences and the freedom to determine the grounds upon which such licences are granted”; 
and to determine what constitutes a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency”). See 
Friedrich-Karl Beier, Exclusive Rights, Statutory Licenses and Compulsory Licenses in Patent and Utility Model 
Law, IIC 1999, Heft 3, p. 261, discussing compulsory licenses in member States of the EU and citing cases of 
licenses based upon concerns of national defense, the environment, work’s safety and health. 
99 See Article 5-A of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, supra note 12. 
100 Type I transaction costs, see supra note 72. 
101 Type II transaction costs, see supra note 72.  
102 For the concept of “failure to work” a patent see supra note 12.  
103 See Tim Wu, Copyright's Communications Policy. MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW, Vol. 103, p. 278, November 
2004. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=532882, explaining liability rules in copyrights law 
“through a model of conflict that sees law emerging as a political reaction to changes in relative prices 
resulting from technological change” and analyzing the following compulsory licensing provisions in U.S. 
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most insights on IP liability rules have been developed with this specific type of 
licenses in mind, due to the fact that studies are typically based on U.S. law, 
where other compulsory licenses for patents were absent, at least until recently.  
 
Conversely, we can place the provisions that address the failure to work a 
patented technology by a patentee on the second category of compulsory 
licenses. These provisions have been described as a historical “leftover from the 
early days of the patent system and industrialization” in the sense that in their 
origin they were mainly motivated by protectionism104. However, this type of 
provisions are still important as the current debate surrounding the use of 
liability rules for patents centers on the question whether a patentee should 
ever be compelled to work her invention105. So even though non-working 
provisions were historically rooted in protectionism; with the implementation 
of the TRIPS Agreement, a possible reading of these compulsory licensing 
provisions is that the Agreement requires that a patent is not being worked -
under an “absolute” or “global” standard- meaning that the patented 
technology is not being worked at all for a compulsory license to apply. This 
could be a possible interpretation of the prohibition of discrimination with 
regards to the place in which the patented technology is produced that is 
established in article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement as well as the fact that national 
                                                                                                                                               
 
 
copyright law; Title 17 of the U.S. law includes compulsory licenses for: secondary transmissions, requiring 
re-broadcasters to pay a fixed fee for a license to rebroadcast copyrighted materials (section 111); digital 
audio transmission/webcasting license, which requires Internet “radio stations” to pay a statutory fee in order 
to rebroadcast copyrighted materials (section 114);  the mechanical license which allows anyone wanting to 
record a composed song to pay a fixed fee to the composer and also allows recording of “cover” versions 
of famous songs (section 115); the Jukebox negotiated licenses, which mandates negotiation for the licenses to 
play sound recordings of non-dramatic musical works on jukeboxes (section 116); the Public broadcast 
license  for the use of published non-dramatic musical works and published pictorial, graphic, and 
sculptural works in connection with non-commercial broadcasting (section 118); the Satellite retransmissions 
of television signals, which is similar to 111, but applies to satellite rebroadcast of content both from 
broadcasters and from cable operators (section 119); Satellite retransmissions of television signals into local 
markets, which grants satellite re-broadcasters a free compulsory license for local broadcasting, provided 
they agree to carry all television broadcast stations located within the local market (section 122). 
104 See infra note 204 and accompanying text. 
105 See Friedrich-Karl Beier supra note, 98 at p. 262, suggesting that “Compelling a patent holder to 
manufacture each protected product in every country, irrespective of the dimensions of the market 
concerned and the existence of the remaining framework conditions for economically sensible production 
or licensed production, would be utterly contrary to economic reason and to the principle of the 
international division of labor”. But compare for instance, Beier ibid at p. 263-264; highlighting how the 
U.S. or Germany, have “traditionally rejected the national obligation to work patents and the concept of 
compulsory licensing”; with Amir Attaran and Paul Champ, Patent Rights and Local Working Under the 
WTO TRIPS Agreement: An Analysis of the U.S.-Brazil Patent Dispute. YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
Vol. 27, p. 365, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=348660; at p. 366 and accompanying 
footnotes, quoting from several sources that by 1968, with the exception of the U.S. and the Soviet Union, 
all industrialized countries had had local working requirements, few countries changed their laws 
afterwards with this respect and by 1997, only the Netherlands and Switzerland had introduced some 
changes after the agreement with respect to local working requirements. 
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market needs could also be satisfied through importation106. As they currently 
stand, these compulsory licenses might sort out bargaining problems due to 
type II transaction costs. Another compulsory licensing provision aiming at 
solving a potential blocking is the one established for the case of patented 
technologies that might infringe on a previous patent, i.e. dependent patents107. 
 
A second possible categorization between compulsory licenses divides those (1) 
certainly designed ex-ante, in the sense that a regulation, for instance, statutes, 
provide for a uniform application in all cases, and sometimes even for the due 
compensation; and (2) compulsory licenses which are tailored ex-post, meaning 
that the grounds for granting a license and the royalty will be assessed ex post 
and on a case-by-case basis108.  
 
Table 1. IP liability rules: Before and after the TRIPS Agreement 
Liability rule Before the TRIPS  After the TRIPS 
Ex ante Patents 
Copyrights   
Copyrights  
Ex post Patents  
Copyrights  
Patents  
Copyrights  
 
Hence, another possible classification of compulsory licenses is based upon the 
IP right involved. We already mentioned the different cases of patent and 
copyright patents. Whereas compulsory licenses are not permitted for 
trademarks109, they might be used for other IP rights, such as design right. This 
                                                 
 
 
106 See article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement, establishing that patent protection: “shall be available and patent 
rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of technology and whether 
products are imported or locally produced”. See also infra note 264 and accompanying text.  
107 The TRIPS Agreement established in article 31, that in these cases, “(i) the invention claimed in the 
second patent shall involve an important technical advance of considerable economic significance in 
relation to the invention claimed in the first patent; (ii) the owner of the first patent shall be entitled to a 
cross-licence on reasonable terms to use the invention claimed in the second patent; and (iii) the use 
authorized in respect of the first patent shall be non-assignable except with the assignment of the second 
patent. Examples of such compulsory licenses include the Italian Code of Industrial Property in article 71 
and the Directive 98/44/EC of The European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the Legal Protection 
of Biotechnological Inventions, available at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:1998:213:0013:0021:EN:PDF, which establishes in 
article 12. 1, that a breeder can request a compulsory license when she cannot acquire or exploit a plant 
variety without infringing a prior patent. For other examples see Appendix.   
108 See Burk, supra note 66, making the point that any property or liability rules regime might be 
“determined by clear ex ante rules, or it may be determined ex post, after a taking, according to flexible 
standards”. It is important to notice how this consideration opens the possibility of applying the insights 
of the economic literature on standards v. rules to different IP liability rules. Nonetheless, the TRIPS 
Article 31 mandates that patent compulsory licenses are subject to the requirement any such authorization 
“shall be considered on its individual merits”, hence it seems that any compulsory license for patents 
would fall under this category –perhaps with the exception of public based compulsory licenses which we 
left aside for the moment- whereas the ex-ante category will mainly involve copyright statutory licenses. 
109 See article 21 of the TRIPS Agreement stating that: “Members may determine conditions on the 
licensing and assignment of trademarks, it being understood that the compulsory licensing of trademarks 
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is the case with design rights covering spare parts, which are subject, in some 
countries to a remunerative right as opposed to a right to exclude others110.  
 
Another possible way of classifying compulsory licenses asks whether it arises 
from a limitation or exception provision included in substantive law or whether 
it is the outcome of the law governing remedies, which pertains to the area of 
enforcement. In spite of the large amount of literature on the use of liability 
rules in IP, studies had largely ignored until recently these types of liability 
rules based upon remedies law. In addition, most of the economics literature on 
remedies had focused on the economics of damage calculation and much less 
on the choice of substituting injunctions with damages111.  
 
                                                                                                                                               
 
 
shall not be permitted”. Nonetheless, trademark law provides for the possibility of establishing exceptions 
to the rights conferred to trademarks owners as stated by article 17 of the same Agreement: “Members 
may provide limited exceptions to the rights conferred by a trademark, such as fair use of descriptive 
terms, provided that such exceptions take account of the legitimate interests of the owner of the trademark 
and of third parties” as well as requires, to a different extent, according with the legislation, the use of 
marks, now regulated by article 19 of the same Agreement: “if use is required to maintain a registration, 
the registration may be cancelled only after an uninterrupted period of at least three years of non-use, 
unless valid reasons based on the existence of obstacles to such use are shown by the trademark owner. 
Circumstances arising independently of the will of the owner of the trademark which constitute an 
obstacle to the use of the trademark, such as import restrictions on or other government requirements for 
goods or services protected by the trademark, shall be recognized as valid reasons for non-use”. 
110A particular problem of competition is posed in the so-called aftermarkets or markets for spare parts (a 
spare part is a part that serves to repair a complex product so as to restore its original look). Here, a 
primary market might exist which is competitive, yet, due to network effects and sunk costs, customers of 
the primary market might be locked-into the secondary market. In this latter, the owner of a patented 
technology, design right or copyright, could charge higher prices or refuse or insufficiently supply the 
products, undermining competition and also causing harm to consumers. The European Directive 
98/71/EEC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 1998 on the legal protection of 
designs refers to a complex product as one that is composed of multiple parts: "which can be replaced 
permitting disassembly and reassemble of the product", a definition that is particularly important for the 
car industry but also for other industries in which it is necessary to replace parts of the complex product. 
See ROGER VAN DEN BERGH AND PETER CAMASASCA, EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW AND ECONOMICS: A 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, Antwerpen: Intersentia, 2001, describing that:  “the essence of an aftermarket 
arises in those cases where a consumer, having chosen a specific brand at one point in time, may find it 
costly later on to switch to other brands“. With regard to the production of spare parts for cars, two 
important cases have addressed the problem of a dominant position acquired through a design right: 5 
October 1988, C-238/87 (Volvo), [1988] E.C.R. p. 6211 and Case 53/87 (Maxicar/Renault), [1988] E.C.R. 
The Directive 98/71/EC established a transitional provision in Article 14 which allows Member States to 
maintain their previously existing provisions relating to the use of the design of a component part used for 
the purpose of the repair of a complex product so as to restore its original appearance and such provisions 
may only be reformed if the purpose is to liberalise the market for such parts, the so-called “repair clause”. 
This problem might be solved through a liability rule regime for the rights covering products in a 
secondary market, so that a competitive market might emerge also in this market. See also the Proposal for 
a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 98/71/EC on the legal 
protection of designs, COM (2004) 582 final. See also infra note 522. 
111 Most studies analyze the economics of damages rules focusing on damages as complements of 
injunctive relief.  See e.g. BLAIR AND COTTER supra note 93, explaining that in U.S. law, patent and 
copyright owners are granted the greater between lost profits or a reasonable royalty for the unauthorized 
use of their works through a complex calculation, involving hypothetical answers about how markets 
would have evolved had infringement not taken place. 
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This has recently changed, in particular after the 2006 U.S. Supreme Court 
decision in the case of eBay112, which asserted that injunctions are an equitable 
remedy that should be granted or denied according to the specific 
circumstances of each patent law case and which also has had repercussions for 
copyrights and trademarks. Interestingly, the Supreme Court advised district 
courts to apply a four-factor test that balances the equities of the case in order to 
decide whether to protect a patent through an injunction (the paradigmatic 
property rule remedy). While such test centers around whether harm might be 
repaired, whether it might be substituted by monetary remedies and which 
party will suffer greater harms, the fourth aspect of the test asks about the 
public interest and whether this would be served or disserved by an injunctive 
remedy, hence mandating an analysis combining efficiency and public interest 
considerations in each particular case113.  
 
Finally, another possible category of patent liability rules might be in place 
outside of the patent system, as a result of the application of antitrust law, when 
a firm is obliged to license its IP rights, a rationale, however, that also responds 
to the restoration of healthy competition in the market.  
 
 Table 2: categorization of patent compulsory licenses 
Grounds 
of classification 
Type of compulsory license Relevant agreement or 
law 
Public interest TRIPS  Justification 
Competition TRIPS/ National or EC 
Antitrust laws 
Limitation (substantive law) TRIPS and National 
patent laws 
Patent law 
Remedies (enforcement law) Equity 
Ex-ante (information costs) Copyright laws Justification on 
transaction costs 
Ex-post (bargaining costs) Patent laws 
Patent law TRIPS Field of law 
Antitrust law National or EC Antitrust 
laws 
 
In spite of a landscape in which different types of liability rules exist in IP law 
and have been analyzed by scholars with dissimilar results one clear fact that 
                                                 
 
 
112 See eBay Inc. v. Mercexchange, supra note 2. 
113 Some scholars and court decisions have referred to the differences between a compulsory license and a 
decision denying injunctive relief. See Paice v. Toyota, concurring opinion. Under a law and economic lens 
it is however quite clear that in any case the denial of injunctive relief where the infringer is allowed to 
continue the infringement if it pays damages calculated by the court is a liability rule.  
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emerges is that liability-rules have had a longstanding presence in IP laws. This 
presence has occurred mainly in the form of compulsory licensing provisions, 
which have played an important historical role as well as remain the focus of 
much scholar and policy-making attention, revitalized after the signature of the 
TRIPS Agreement. Less precision surrounds the implications of applying the 
property and liability rules discussion to the IP field and the consequences in 
terms of understanding the main grounds suggested by economic theory to 
switch to a liability rule, i.e. transaction costs, as well as the main critiques 
formulated against the use of liability rules.  
3.1.2 Critics against IP Liability Rules  
One of the most significant discussions of the entitlement literature for the IP 
field is probably the one centering on administrative and error costs that pertain 
to the application of a liability rules system. IP liability rules schemes have been 
criticized –and property rules praised- because of the inherent problems of 
valuating assets by courts. The argument is often put forward that IP rights are 
even more difficult and costly to valuate than other assets114. 
  
“Whereas authors have highlighted, in the context of general studies, that 
liability rules have a potential information-facilitating effect, the case has been 
made that bargaining over the valuation of IP rights would only be possible if 
rights are protected through property rules.115  
 
This argument is reinforced by the above mentioned fact that liability rules in IP 
have been mainly studied with reference to statutory licenses for copyrights 
and related rights implemented by legislatures and widely differing from the 
C&M framework. Whereas compulsory licensing regimes for blocking or 
dependent patents might better reflect the type of reasoning of C&M in the 
sense of foreseeing the possibility of a bargaining breakdown due to important 
transaction costs116, the fact that such regimes were absent in U.S. patent law, 
                                                 
 
 
114 See Robert Merges, Contracting into liability rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights 
Organizations 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1293 (1996), available at: 
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/pubs/merges/contract.htm#FN62, arguing that “In light 
of the peculiar nature of intellectual property, the only way to get parties truly to bargain over the 
valuation of intellectual property rights is to make them into property rule entitlements”. 
115 See Merges, ibid.  
116 See Merges, ibid, citing the French Patent Law, Law No. 68-1 (1968), amended by Law No. 90-1052 (1990), 
IN 3 WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY LAWS AND TREATIES, 32-41 (1980 & 
Supp. 1991); Japanese Laws Relating to Industrial Property, PUBLISHED BY THE JAPANESE GROUP OF AIPPI, 1988 
Revision, Articles 83(1) and 93; Patent Law No. 121 (1959), amended by Law No. 27 (1987) in 4 WORLD 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY LAWS AND TREATIES (1980 & Supp. 1991). See 
also Walter, Compulsory Licenses in Respect to Dependent Patents Under the Law of Switzerland and other 
European States, 21 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 532, 533 (1990); Patents Act of the Kingdom of 
the Netherlands (1910), amended by The Act of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (1987) (Rijksoctrooiwet) 
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has lead most law and economics scholars to focus on copyright statutory 
licenses established ex ante117.  
 
In fact, such rules widely differ from the political economy explanations that 
some scholars put forward for other liability rules regimes and authors have 
indeed recognized the potential role of liability rules to prevent a bargaining 
breakdown118. Yet, many scholars insist on the intrinsic difference between IP 
and other assets to conclude that an important problem surrounds the valuation 
of any IP asset that almost always surpasses any risk and cost of bargaining 
failure and proposing that neither a legislature-made nor a court-tailored 
liability rule regime might work better than a property rule: 
 
“the costs of strategic bargaining are far different from the costs of transactions 
in markets where multiple IPRs are needed as inputs. Input markets are notable 
especially for the repeated costs of locating right holders and negotiating 
individual licenses. And, with respect to these negotiations, the single most 
difficult issue -- and hence the most costly to resolve -- is the valuation of each 
unique IPR” 119.  
 
In the following sections and chapters we will test such a general assertion in 
the context of patent law also challenging the assumption that valuation costs 
and errors will always surpass any potential cost from bargaining breakdowns. 
In particular, this chapter confronts the problem of patent valuation with the 
general context of bargaining problems in sequential and multi-component 
innovations. The following chapters also touch upon specific cases and 
problems surrounding the use of different rules by courts as an alternative to 
strong property rules, including for the valuation of infringed patents. 
 
Another focal point of disagreement regards the effects of entitlement 
protection rules on efficient bargaining. In the IP context proponents of both 
                                                                                                                                               
 
 
34, in 5 WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY LAWS AND TREATIES (1980 & 
Supp. 1991); New Zealand Patent Act, 46, 51 (1953), in BROWN & GRANT, THE LAW OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY IN NEW ZEALAND 6.67 (1989). 
117 See Merges, ibid, arguing that: “While the legislative liability rules described above are inferior to 
property rules, one might nonetheless argue that the legislature should have implemented a judicially-
administered liability rule, consistent with the teachings of Calabresi and Melamed. Such rules can be 
found in certain corners of foreign intellectual property systems, such as "blocking patents." In some 
countries, the holder of an improvement (or "subservient") patent has the right to license a pioneering (or 
"dominant") patent if a license is necessary to implement the improvement (footnotes omitted)” 
118 See Merges, ibid, referring to the possibility of "bargaining breakdown" that might occur through first 
(pioneer) and second (improver) negotiations for a license and to the role that a liability rule might play in 
preventing a social welfare loss that could follow such bargaining breakdown. 
119 Ibid, arguing that it might be the case that a “court-based liability rule” could be though as a “third-best 
solution”, that is, after property rights and after statutory compulsory licenses since the first two 
alternatives might better deal with the problem of the volume of transactions.   
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liability rules and property rules have based their arguments upon the effects of 
a rule on incentives to bargain, arguing from ex ante or ex post perspectives120.  
 
Scholars approaching remedies from an ex ante perspective focus on the effects 
of entitlement protection rules on deterring infringement and in setting the 
terms of ex ante licensing121. Under this perspective, the terms of a license that a 
potential licensee or a potential infringer accepts, would depend on the rule that 
would apply if infringement takes place. Moreover, bargaining under the threat 
of one or other rule differently affects the division of profits between a potential 
licensor and a potential licensee122.      
 
From an ex post point of view, other studies consider whether property rules, 
mainly in the form of injunctions, are more or less likely than judicially 
determined damages (liability) in order to encourage efficient bargaining. From 
the ex post perspective, these studies followed the main insights of the general 
property v. liability rules framework, which holds that property rules 
(injunctions) may be preferred when transaction costs of exchange are low and 
the costs of assessing violations of rights by courts are high123. Nonetheless, a 
usual argument in the IP context is that a property rule facilitates bargaining 
between the parties whereas under a liability rule, a potential infringer would 
have diminished incentives to bargain ex-ante124. This argument is moreover 
                                                 
 
 
120 See Menell and Scotchmer, supra note 36.  
121 See Menell and Scotchmer, ibid, at p. 19, arguing that these “set of arguments are not concerned with 
what would happen in the out-of-equilibrium event of infringement, but focus instead on how potential 
remedies affect equilibrium profits and the ex ante incentives for R&D”. 
122 See also Mark Shankerman and Suzanne Scotchmer, Damages and Injunctions in Protecting Intellectual 
Property, RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 32:1, 199-220 (2001), studying the choice between injunctions and 
damage compensation and focusing on rules for damage calculation and the role of property rules and 
liability rules in setting the threat points for parties bargaining in the biotechnology sector, specifically 
with regards to research tools. A relevant assumption of this study is efficient ex-ante bargaining and the 
conclusion is that if infringement leads to profit-eroding competition between the infringer and right 
holder, a wide range of remedies will deter infringement, at least for stand-alone innovations, and are 
therefore equivalent from an ex ante point of view. This does not necessarily apply, instead, in the case of 
research tools where infringement does not dissipate profit. Given the role of IP in the division of surplus 
and the incentives for private bargaining between early innovators and follow-on improvers they 
conclude that for the case of research tools neither rule deters infringement, yet a credible threat of 
infringement can benefit the patent holder. The study also interestingly points out that future economic 
research should aim at bridging the gap in studies assuming optimal ex-ante bargaining and those 
departing from bargaining failure (anti-commons), e.g. making the bargain process endogenous and 
analyzing how different rules affect the bargaining outcomes. 
123 See BLAIR AND COTTER, supra note 93. But see Ian Ayres and Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees' Market 
Power Without Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive 
Remedies, MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW, VOL. 97, 985, (1999), arguing, that “soft” remedies, which do not actually 
restore the proprietary price, can be socially beneficial because they increase consumers’ surplus without 
impinging much on profit, at least for small price reductions.  
124 See Scott Kieff, On Coordinating Transactions in Information: A Response to Smith’s Delineating Entitlements 
in Information, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 101 (2007) and Scott Kieff, Coordination, Property, and 
Intellectual Property: An Unconventional Approach to Anticompetitive Effects and Downstream Access, 56 
EMORY L.J. 327 (2006).   
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linked or used as a premise for arguing in favor of property rules that allow 
market players to organize themselves around contractual liability rules. 
3.1.3 Privately organized liability rules 
 
Several scholars have linked the problem of high transaction costs or a high 
likelihood of bargaining breakdown to the emergence of privately negotiated 
arrangements that create contractually based liability rules in order to solve 
such problems within the patents and the copyright areas. With such evidence, 
some studies argue for the use of market-arranged transactions and suggest 
that such arrangements would presumably be fostered by strong property 
rules: 
 
 “The organizations studied in this Article present what might seem to be a 
paradox in light of the literature on entitlements: they produce what appear to 
users as liability rules, but which are actually based on IPRs -- quintessential 
property rule entitlements”125 
 
These market-based arrangements arise because of the need of lowering 
transaction costs between users. The typical examples are collective 
organizations of copyrights, but a similar argument might be applied to 
clearinghouses and to patent pools126. In spite of the organizational differences, 
the most distinctive features of such arrangements is that they create a 
mechanism similar to a liability rule, which is collectively organized by its 
members instead of administered by a court or regulatory agency127. Although 
such mechanisms seems to solve a variety of problems, potential instances of 
strategic behavior might arise among its members and the organizations 
themselves have been occasionally accused of harming competition128.  
                                                 
 
 
125 See Merges, supra note 114. 
126 See Robert Merges, Institutions for intellectual property transactions: The case of patent pools, IN EXPANDING 
THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY (Dreyfuss, 
Zimmerman and First, eds. 2001), Oxford University Press, New York, 123–165. 
127 See Merges ibid, explaining that “In other words, the property rule entitlements granted at the outset 
actually lead to a liability rule-like regime, though one based on collective valuation by firms, rather than 
by an arm of government”. For an application to the biotechnological area see VAN OVERWALLE, G. (ED.), 
GENE PATENTS AND COLLABORATIVE LICENSING MODELS. PATENT POOLS, CLEARINGHOUSES, OPEN SOURCE 
MODELS AND LIABILITY REGIMES, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009. 
128 Se Ariel Katz, The Potential Demise of Another Natural Monopoly: Rethinking the Collective Administration of 
Performing Rights (2005). Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Vol. 1, No. 3, 2005; criticizing the 
justification of performing rights organizations on a natural monopolies (and transaction costs) 
explanation and suggesting that there are less costly alternatives for competition. 
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4 Property and Liability Rules in Patent Law 
Scholars have largely acknowledged that patent rights are mainly protected 
through property rules129. The underlying logic is that patents are conceived as 
granting a right to exclude –and not any right to use an invention- which makes 
them analogous to property rights130. This correspondence of patents to 
exclusive rights has lead to envisage patents as property and to the consequent 
application of the logic and legal conceptions of property in land to the patent 
realm131, which has nevertheless been criticized132. The quarrel originates from a 
disagreement about the nature of the patent right and hence, of the remedies 
used to protect the underlying right. In spite of the controversy, even the most 
representative critics against assimilation of patents to property in land have 
recognized the importance of property rules to protect patent entitlements as 
well as argued for the use of liability rules clearly defined and efficiently 
administered133. 
 
Hence, even if patents are widely discussed by both legal and economic 
scholars as exclusive rights, liability rules have been used since the inception of 
patent law, mostly in the form of compulsory licensing regimes. Nonetheless, 
the use of liability rules through the laws of remedies, i.e. when injunctive relief 
is denied for an infringed patent, had not received enough attention until 
recently –after the eBay case-.  
 
For these reasons, the most widely discussed regime of liability rules, namely 
compulsory licenses has been justified by law and economics scholars upon the 
presence of high transaction costs134. However, compulsory licenses are neither 
the only type of liability rules used in IP law nor are transaction costs their 
distinctive explanation. Transaction costs serve also to explain other doctrines 
                                                 
 
 
129 See Burk and Lemley, supra note 4, at p. 168, arguing that “patent rights are exclusive rights that fit the 
classic formulation of a “property rule”; however clarifying that this was due to the prevailing judicial 
practice of granting injunctions after any infringement case and predicting that such course of matter 
could change as it had already happened with preliminary injunctions and with copyright cases.  
130 See CHISUM supra note 43, explaining that “a patent gives an inventor the right to exclude. A patent does 
not give the inventor the positive right to make, use, or sell the invention.”). See also Adam Mossoff, 
Exclusion and Exclusive Use in Patent Law, HARVARD JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY, Vol. 22, No. 2, 2009 
(George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 08-49, August 19, 2008), available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1239182  
131 See Epstein, Richard, The Disintegration of Intellectual Property (August 29, 2008). U OF CHICAGO LAW & 
ECONOMICS, OLIN WORKING PAPER NO. 423, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1236273  
132 See Lemley & Weiser supra note 72. 
133 Ibid.  
134 See Robert Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase and intellectual Property, p. 2669, 94 COLUM. L. REV., 2655, 
2667 (1994), stating that “The conventional justification (for) compulsory licensing provisions (relies) on 
the basis of transaction costs”. 
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such as fair use in copyright law135 or prior user rights in patent law, two 
mechanisms that have been described as zero price liability rules136. 
Compulsory licenses, on the other hand, have been in place for a long period of 
time, justified on multiple grounds such as static efficiency, fairness, free trade 
and protectionist measures for national industries.  
 
As a result of the prevailing practice of U.S. courts favoring property rules for a 
long period of time as well as the absence of equivalent compulsory licensing 
mechanisms, a significant part of the patent literature has been biased against 
the use of liability rules for patents. Such bias is not even confined to the 
convenience –on efficiency or other terms- of liability rules in patent law, but 
has furthermore produced a mainstream view that suggest the absence and 
irrelevance of liability rules systems in patent law137. 
 
4.1 The case against liability rules for patent rights 
The majority of studies criticizing the use of liability rules for patents are based 
upon arguments similar to those described for the general IP case. The first 
main critic is that optimal compensation is too difficult to assess due to 
information costs and the likelihood that courts and agencies would 
systematically err in their appreciation of the patent’s value138.  
As a consequence of these errors and because courts would allegedly under-
compensate right holders, incentives to innovate would be undermined. 
However, it is not completely clear whether courts systematically under or 
over-reward in actual patent cases139. 
 
Secondly, a branch of literature argues against the use of liability rules for 
patents from the perspective of bargaining incentives. For these authors, patents 
have a value for the commercialization of innovations which would be 
                                                 
 
 
135 The fair use doctrine in copyright law allows the use of a fair quantity of copyrighted material without 
infringing copyright (17 U.S.C. §107).  
136 See Burk, supra note 66, at p. 12, mentioning the equivalence of prior user rights to compulsory licenses 
at “zero” price. See also Wendy Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the 
Betamax Case and its Predecessors, COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 82:1600-1655 (1982); explaining fair use as the 
answer to significant transaction costs. 
137 See U.S. decision in the case of Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., supra note1. 
138 See Epstein supra note 65. 
139 See Henkel, Joachim and Reitzig, Markus G., Patent Sharks and the Sustainability of Value Destruction 
Strategies (September 2007), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=985602, claiming that the patent 
system systematically over-rewards patent owners creating an incentive for patent trolls to proliferate. But 
see Shankerman and Scotchmer, supra note 122, finding that the lost profit/reasonable royalty rule can be 
too low that the threat of injunction can improve the first innovator’s bargaining position and thus his 
incentives to develop research tools (their main assumption is that licensing takes place frictionless and 
thus IP will not stifle development of downstream products). 
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dissipated if the patent is subject to a liability rule140 Although authors arguing 
for strong property rules in order to allow efficient negotiation of patents and 
the emergence of privately negotiated schemes such as patent pools and 
clearinghouses tend to acknowledge the difficulties and transaction costs in 
diverse industrial sectors, they commonly consider that such problems are less 
frequent than other pro-liability rules authors tend to describe.  
 
In this sense, it could be argued that scholars in favor and against the use of 
liability rules in patent cases hold controversial views with regard to the 
importance of transaction costs and the frequency of bargaining breakdowns as 
well as about the costs associated with administering a liability rule –mainly 
information and error costs- relative to the costs of property rights, especially 
under uncertain boundaries.  
 
The following sections attempt to address some gaps of the existing literature. 
Firstly, a more complete picture of the use and relative importance of liability 
rules in patent law emerges by putting together the literature on ex-post and ex-
ante liability rules used to address high transaction costs, strategic behavior and 
hold-ups in patent cases. Secondly, the costs of property rules, which have been 
largely neglected until quite recently in comparison to the purported costs of a 
liability rules system are also analyzed.  
 
4.2 The case for patent liability rules: transaction costs 
Even though the classic law-and-economics justification for the use of liability 
rules is based upon transaction costs141 the concept of transaction costs is not 
unanimous. Furthermore, the market for patented technologies and hence its 
inherent costs, have particular features that deserve discussion. In fact, a 
functioning market is a necessary prerequisite for the efficient use of patented 
technologies, especially with regard to the cases of complementary, sequential 
and incremental innovations. Conversely, empirical studies have pointed 
towards unrealized benefits in several technology markets and identified 
transaction costs as a significant obstacle for their development142. 
                                                 
 
 
140 See Kieff supra note 124 and Smith supra notes 92 and 94. 
141 For the definition of transaction costs see supra notes 57, 58 and 59, pointing out how different costs of 
fulfilling an arrangement encompass the cost of searching the parties with whom to bargain, the costs of 
bargaining and the costs of monitoring and enforcing any achieved bargain.  
142 See E.U. Commission, D.G. Internal Market Study on evaluating the knowledge economy: What are patents 
actually worth? Pat-Val EU survey: The value of patents for today’s economy and society, Tender n° 
MARKT/2004/09/E, Lot 2, Final Report, (23rd July, 2006), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/indprop/docs/patent/studies/final_report_lot2_en.pdf, referring 
that “that the willing-to-but-not-licensed patents are not less valuable than the actually licensed patents. 
This rules out that they are minor patents that were not licensed because they were less important or less 
usable. The main alternative hypothesis is that transaction costs in technology trade have impeded the 
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To understand the importance and complexity of bargaining in the context of 
patent law, it is useful to refer to the different role of sequential and incremental 
innovation within diverse industries. Economic analysis of patents has 
distinguished between the cases of (1) stand-alone innovations which have a 
value in spite of follow-on developments or improvements and (2) cumulative 
innovation, where innovations also have a value as inputs of further progress 
and innovations. In both cases, economic analysis centers on investigating a mix 
of policy levers, including their actual application by courts and hence, the 
enforcement dimension, in order to determine the profits granted to innovators 
by the IP system, which subject to the demand for the innovative product 
would set the incentives for innovators. In addition to designing laws that grant 
the optimal profits for innovators, when it comes to sequential innovation, 
policy-levers also have the daunting task of balancing the incentives of first and 
second innovators143.  
 
Studies show the complexity of tailoring patent policy under sequential 
innovation. Moreover, some studies focusing on certain features of patent law 
produce results that might either be unrealistic or cannot be adjusted by policy-
makers, as for instance, the duration of patents144. Furthermore, the 
assumptions about licensing are crucial for almost all economic models and 
scholars are largely divided over their view on the likelihood that licensing will 
                                                                                                                                               
 
 
technology transfer, a hypothesis consistent with other studies on the matter”.. See also the Gower’s 
Report, at p. arguing that While big firms seem to be better able to cope with the transactional obstacles to 
license they are less likely to do so; whereas smaller firms can be better able to license-out but have more 
difficulty in bargaining over and actually license their technologies. Licensing can also be costly and 
difficult due to the significant asymmetries between firms, as it is the case, for instance, in the biotech 
sector. 
143 The results of different economic studies are ambiguous as to which is the most efficient solution for 
problem of setting optimal incentives to innovate. See Robert Hahn, An Overview of Economics of Intellectual 
Property Rights, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN FRONTIER INDUSTRIES. ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY PROTECTION, at p. 17-20 comparing Scotchmer who argues that whereas a broad patent solves 
this first problem it could lead to incentive problems for sequential innovators; Gallini who suggests that 
patent length and scope could be used to prevent duplicative research (while longer patents encourage 
imitation, broad patents of finite duration might discourage imitation and encourage pioneering research);  
Green and Scotchmer who argue that patents should last longer when sequential research is not 
concentrated in one firm; and Shapiro who highlights the problem of overlapping patents (thickets) and 
hold-ups and while he argues that the problem of complements could be solved through cooperation, 
policy is needed to solve the problem of hold-ups, problems that are especially relevant for new industries 
such as information technology and biotechnology. 
144 For instance, the duration of patent protection, which is fixed under the TRIPS Agreement and most 
national laws in 20 years, and the possibility of varying the scope of patent protection, which imposes 
multiple and contradictory effects. See Nelson and Merges, supra note 35, at p. 840, making the claim –in 
1990- that “most theoretical writing on patents is directed toward issues that as a practical matter are 
considered largely settled. For example, several economists have explored the question of optimal patent 
duration”.  
Ex-post Liability Rules   
In Modern Patent Law  58  
 
 
take place smoothly145. Although some studies assume that bargaining will take 
place in many instances, some empirical studies point towards the limitations of 
assuming efficient ex ante bargaining in a significant number of cases so as to 
rule out problems related with the negotiation processes146.  
 
Although economic studies have significantly advanced towards a better 
understanding of the complex interaction of legal doctrines in setting the 
incentives for innovation as well as the specificities of sequential innovation, 
divergent views subsist on the economics of incremental innovation, which 
have largely produced conflicting policy recommendations for the use of 
liability or property rules147. 
4.2.1 Strategic Behavior and patent hold-ups 
A variant of the general problems of strategic behavior, hold-outs and hold-ups 
described above for the general case of any right protected through a property 
rule can occur in the specific context of modern technologies. Several scholars 
have increasingly expressed concerns about the growing magnitude of strategic 
behavior by firms who file patents and litigate them in a strategic way and the 
impact of such strategies in the adequate functioning of the patent system148. 
Similarly, the eBay decision by the U.S. Supreme Court highlighted the potential 
impact of the strategic use of injunctive relief in patent infringement cases149.  
 
Strategic behavior refers to the idea that a firm will take a decision according to 
the belief that the firm has about how the other firms would behave. This broad 
concept encompasses all kind of strategies that firms might adopt with regards 
to whether, how, and how much to patent; and how to use their patent(s), 
including decisions regarding the filing of applications, licensing and 
litigation150. 
 
                                                 
 
 
145 See for instance Menell and Scotchmer, supra note 36, at p. 26, arguing that “the literature draws widely 
differing conclusions about the optimal way to organize the rights of sequential innovations, largely 
because authors make different assumptions about when and whether licenses will be made, and who can 
be party to the negotiation”. 
146 See the EU PATVAL in footnote 34.  
147 See for instance, Cotter, supra note 38, arguing that the divergent opinions about hold-ups can be 
explained through divergent beliefs on the economics of patent improvement and how incremental 
innovation functions and suggesting that the question whether patent hold-ups should be considered or 
not as a market failure should be based on the insights of the economics of patent improvements.  
148 See James Bessen, Patent Thickets: Strategic Patenting of Complex Technologies (March 2003), available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=327760 and Bruno Van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, and Nicolas Van 
Zeebroeck, Filing Strategies and Patent Value (May 2008), Vol., pp. 2008, available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1143184, describing patent filing strategies. 
149 See eBay Inc. v. Mercexchange, supra note 2. 
150 See BESSEN AND MEURER, supra note 4. 
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Both the literature and policy discussions have described the strategies of firms 
patenting technologies for “defensive” or “offensive” purposes. In these cases 
firms respond to –unintended- incentives created by patent law, e.g. to keep 
competitors out of their market or to permit the firm’s survival in a market. 
Whereas it is arguable that in such cases patent law is performing its role of 
fostering innovation incentives, both strategies create specific problems.  
 
The first problem is that of negotiating through patent “thickets” or “clusters” 
151 which arises when each firm engages in an arms-race in technological area152. 
As a result, firms file patents not because they foresee any actual reward for any 
investment but rather to use them as “bargaining chips” with other firms. In 
these cases, a firm might file many patents while not exploiting them, because it 
needs to hold a certain number of patents in order to negotiate cross-licenses 
with other firms.  
 
In many cases, firms might engage in cross-licensing schemes allowing others to 
use their technologies as long as other firms allow them to do the same, a 
cooperative solution that would avoid any bargaining problem. However, it is 
dubious that such situation is preferable to the absence of defensive patenting. 
Although the burden to society of having too many patents protecting a great 
number of technologies might be difficult to measure, it is easy to see that in 
such scenario, some firms might be refrained from using technologies in order 
to improve them or to come up with new products because of the presence of 
“patent thickets”.  
 
Secondly, the defensive strategy might be transformed into an offensive 
strategy due to several reasons. For instance, a firm might be exposed to the ex 
post risk of hold ups by a patent on a technology153. This could happen under a 
                                                 
 
 
151 According to Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard-Setting. 
in Jaffe, A., Lerner, J., Stern, S. (Eds), INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY, MIT Press for the NBER, 
Cambridge, MA, 1; 119-50, a patent thicket is: “a dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that 
a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize a new technology”. See also EU 
Communication from the Commission, infra note 361, explaining that “one commonly applied strategy is 
filing numerous patents for the same medicine (forming so called "patent clusters" or "patent thickets")”.  
152 See Barr R., Testimony at the US Federal Trade Commission/Department of Justice Hearings on Competition 
and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based Economy, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT 
BERKELEY, (28 February 2002) at pp. 675–7, referring that: “Patents have not been a positive force in 
stimulating innovation at Cisco. . . . Everything we have done to create new products would have been 
done even if we could not obtain patents on the innovations and inventions contained in these products.... 
The only practical response to this problem of unintentional and sometimes unavoidable patent 
infringement is to file hundreds of patents each year ourselves, so that we can have something to bring to 
the table in cross-licensing negotiations”. 
153 See Barr, ibid, at pp. 679–80, arguing that “If we are accused of infringement by a patent holder who 
does not make and sell products, or who sells in much smaller volume than we do, our patents do not 
have sufficient value to the other party to deter a lawsuit or reduce the amount of money demanded by 
the other company “. 
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‘prisoner’s dilemma’ scenario that arises when many firms pursue patents 
under a defensive rationale and, due to several reasons, bargaining collapses154. 
Whereas all firms would be better off if they did not pursue any patent, 
cooperation might fail and firms might end up trapped in a patent thicket, 
hence under a prisoner’s dilemma picture. Moreover, the equilibrium of 
licensing-in and licensing-out of any system based upon cross-licenses could 
break due to the participation of firms that own patents but are not interested in 
licensing-in any other patented technology. This is the case of the so-called 
“patent trolls”, but could also be the case of owners of patents on another 
technological area155.   
 
What we can suggest is that social losses can arise, not only when bargaining 
fails because some parties in the “game” do not have anything to lose by 
adopting a litigation strategy but also and more generally whenever the patent 
system gives –unintended- incentives by permitting frivolous patenting and 
different filling strategies156.  
4.2.2 Patent Hold-ups 
The problem of patent hold-up typically arises when a patent is only one out of 
many components in a technology and the patentee takes advantage of the fact 
that the alleged infringer has already made some costs –which are hence sunk 
costs- asking for a payment that is higher than the value of her patent. This case 
has been characterized as a patent hold-up, a variant of the more general hold-
up referred by the law and economics literature. However, the definition and 
impact of hold-ups in the classic law and economics literature is highly 
debated157 and as it should be expected, its application to the patent field is also 
controversial:  
                                                 
 
 
154 See Cohen, Nelson & Walsh, supra note 32 at p. 28, referring that probably the “patent portfolio races 
observed in these industries reflect excessive patenting from a social welfare perspective (as would typify 
a Prisoners' Dilemma-like situation), and are thus raising the cost of innovation unduly”. 
155 Patent trolls have been often defined as patentees that do not only abstain from using their patents but 
rather wait until someone “infringes” and use litigation and the threat of litigation and injunctions to 
actively enforce their patents. See infra note 716.  
156 See Chapter IV infra, analysing the incentives for patent strategic behaviour and hold-ups.  
157 See the previous section discussing the general hold-up problem and in particular see Oliver E. 
Williamson, The Economic Institutions Of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting 52-56 (1985); 
Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral 
Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691, 692, 716-18 (1986), arguing that the risk of ex post opportunism, along 
with bounded rationality and asset specificity, may produce that suppliers ask for higher prices, in the 
absence of mechanisms suitable to reduce opportunism. For critics on the application of liability rules for 
the problem of hold-ups see Kieff supra note 124, arguing for strong property rights which facilitate the 
coordination between parties efficient bargaining and Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: 
Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742 (2007), arguing that the optimal tradeoff between 
coordination benefits and access costs is a question for empirical research.  See also Cotter, supra note 38, 
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“The hold-up problem pertains to problems of relationship-specific investment, 
whereas the hold-up contemplated here pertains to standards specific 
investment. The hold-up problem indicates the prospect of under-investment in 
collaborations in which parties must sink investments that are specific to the 
collaboration, investments that may be costly to redeploy or have a significantly 
lower value if redeployed outside of the collaboration. The potential for one 
party to hold up another party that has sunk investments specific to the 
relationship may discourage that other party from investing efficiently in the 
collaboration in the first place”158 
 
In these cases we can argue that the patent is being used strategically to extract 
a surplus that goes beyond its value. This can happen under the threat to 
shutdown a manufacturing system for a product by a court’ injunction and is 
fostered by the presence of firms ‘specializing’ in pursuing or buying patents to 
engage in such “rent seeking”, a situation also described by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in the eBay decision. A recent work analyzing patent hold-ups in the 
context of patent and antitrust cases claims that hold-ups impose static 
efficiency losses that are not justified by increases in dynamic and moreover, 
dynamic efficiency losses might emerge because of the reduction in the 
incentives to develop follow-on innovation giving rise to a potential market 
failure159. 
 
In the typical model studied by economic scholars, the infringer develops a 
product which uses a patented technology. Whereas the case is similar across 
all studies, there are important assumptions with regard to whether the 
invention can be easily invented around, whether infringement happens 
inadvertently, willfully or in between, and how costly is to redesign a non-
infringing alternative160. 
 
Whether hold-ups are indeed a market failure, which is the impact of such 
practices and whether any regulatory response should follow, are however, 
contentious issues undergoing wide debate. First, there is disagreement about 
                                                                                                                                               
 
 
citing and discussing the above mentioned studies and arguing that liability rules should play a role in 
overcoming holdout problems, even if subject to numerous caveats. 
158 See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (April 2007), available at: 
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/innovation/P040101PromotingInnovationandCompetitionrpt0704.pdf at 
footnote 11, p. 35 defining hold-ups in the context of SSO’s and patent standards. 
159 See Cotter, supra note 38, at p. 12, defining holdups with respect to static and dynamic efficiency losses 
and arguing that in both cases, losses might be enhanced by the Cournot complements or double 
marginalization. 
160 Vincenzo Denicolo et al., Revisiting injunctive relief: Interpreting eBay in high-tech industries with non-
practicing patent holders, JOURNAL OF COMPETITION LAW AND ECONOMICS  4 (3), 571-608. See also discussion in 
Chapter IV below. 
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whether holdups constitute a market failure161. Secondly, the incidence of 
holdups and their practical significance is also object of controversy162. Finally, 
another important controversy surrounds the estimation of the royalty 
benchmark that can determine when a patentee is “extracting” a quantity above 
the true value of its technology by means of a holdup163 and hence, whether 
patentees engaging in such strategy are over-rewarded164.  
5 The Modern Patent Landscape  
The natural question that follows is whether any of these problems are new or 
special in the patent field, or whether the traditionally conceived rules, with a 
strong preference for property rule protection might suffice to cope with such 
problems. In this sense, it is often said that new technological sectors such as 
                                                 
 
 
161 See Mark Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Reply: Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking. TEXAS LAW REVIEW, Vol. 85, 
2007, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1005727, arguing that “holdup is recognized as a form 
of market failure that leads to inefficiency, primarily by discouraging what would otherwise be socially 
desirable investments. An enormous literature explores holdup as a market dysfunction, typically 
emphasizing the ways in which private firms can manage their affairs to avoid holdup or mitigate its 
effects”. 
162 Compare for instance Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 
1991, (2007) at p. 1996-99 with Gregory Sidak, Holdup, Royalty Stacking and the Presumption of Injunctive 
Relief for Patent Infringement: A Reply to Lemley and Shapiro, 92 MINN.L.REV. 714 (2008) and Damien 
Gerardin, Anne Layne-Farrar, & A. Jorge Padilla, The Complements Problem within Standard Setting: 
Assessing the Evidence on Royalty Stacking, 14 BOSTON UNIV. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 144 (2008)  
163 See Lemley and Shapiro, ibid, at p. 1996-99; arguing that such benchmark is βθv, with β representing 
the patentee´s bargaining power with respect to the user; θ the probability that the patent is valid and 
infringed and v the per-unit value of the patent in comparison to the next best alternative, with the 
possibility that an “automatic right to injunctive relief” systematically over-rewards patentees of 
component technologies. But see Elhauge, supra note 38, referring that the correct benchmark should be θv 
and as a consequence, over-reward would only ensue in the case of “strong surprise patents”, and when 
“the fixed costs of a redesign exceed the expected value of the patent, taking into account the odds that the 
patent claim will be found invalid” whereas for “weak surprise patents” only when “lost profits from the 
lag time to redesign plus the fixed cost of a redesign exceed the value of the patent without any discount 
for its possible invalidity”; and with non-surprise patents only if β>θ. See also discussion in chapter IV 
below. 
164 See Cottter, supra note 38, referring that Elhauge finds that there is asymmetry of information because 
patent validity related information is publicly available while information about the infringer’s expected 
profit from the use of the patented technology is not and as a consequence of this asymmetry the Lemley & 
Shapiro model estimates too high a royalty that would be agreed in the shadow of injunctions. Elhauge 
also argues that the model L&S model “understates the true optimal benchmark for royalties” and 
“overstates predicted royalties from the threat of injunctive relief” while posing that most realistically, a 
study should assume “(1) that firms negotiate a series of patents when they make a multi-component 
product, (2) that firms using the patents have information about their operations that patent holders lack; 
or (3) that demand is not constant”. Furthermore, he argues that the model by Lemley and Shapiro 
“mistakenly concludes that measuring damages using past negotiated royalties increases 
overcompensation, when in fact it increases under- compensation” and shows also that “royalties are even 
more likely to be undercompensatory to the extent juries are inaccurate in measuring damages, whether 
their inaccuracies are systematic or balanced, which is another important reason not to shift from 
injunctive relief to damages” adding that “even if their holdup model were correct when there is both an 
upstream patent monopoly and a downstream product monopoly, it does not apply when either market 
level is competitive. See also discussion in chapter IV below. 
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information technologies and biotechnologies diverge in important ways from 
innovative industries in the past165. Whereas the paradigmatic patent at the time 
of the Paris Convention was granted for a mechanical innovation, new 
technologies have important new features. Probably the most important change 
for our discussion is that most patent nowadays construct over numerous 
previous patents and products involve many patented technologies166.  
 
The debate about whether and to what extent is the law able to adapt to 
changes in technology has accompanied patent law since its inception. This idea 
has permeated the debate about patent hold-ups and the justification for “new 
types” of liability rules, although it is not necessarily shared by the majority167. 
While economic theory suggests different solutions according to the patents’ 
value and market structure, the patent system is usually described as “one-size-
fits all”. Moreover, the burden of creating specially-tailored statutes for each 
industry could probably outweigh any gains and give rise to rent-seeking 
behavior. While law is constructed in this rather uniform way, legal doctrines, 
courts and antitrust agencies’ interpretations have in fact made patent law more 
in tune with these differences168. One possibility of achieving a differentiated 
application is precisely the use of property and liability rules and especially 
from a remedies-based perspective, which would permit courts to balance 
distorted incentives, especially in extreme cases. 
                                                 
 
 
165 See Lemley & Weiser, supra note 72, at p. 797 arguing that “the patent system is designed with a 
paradigm invention in mind –a new device or machine covered by a single patent. Historically, this 
paradigm was a fairly accurate portrayal of the typical patent” and citing also from John R. Allison & 
Mark Lemley, The Growing Complexity of the United States Patent System, 82 B.U.L. REV. 77,93, tbl. 1, 2002, 
that argues that most patents in the U.S. were granted until quite recently for mechanical innovations. But 
see John Golden, Patent Trolls' and Patent Remedies. 85 TEXAS LAW REVIEW, p. 2111 (2007), available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=991698, arguing that “As John Duffy points out, approval of the application of 
patent law to mere “improvements” of overall devices or processes—inventions whose “point of novelty” 
in Lemley and Shapiro’s terms presumably involves something less than the creation of a whole new 
product or process—had been explicit since at least the late eighteenth century”. Here it is probably 
important to point out the difference between mechanical innovations, which have in fact existed since 
long ago and more abstract technologies including software and business method patents. Whereas 
cumulative innovation has indeed existed since long ago, component and “complex industries” are a new 
feature of today’s patent system. See also Harhoff et al., Final Report, The Strategic Use of Patents and its 
Implications for Enterprise and Competition Policies, TENDER FOR N° ENTR/05/82 (July 8, 2007), available at: 
http://www.en.inno-tec.bwl.uni-
muenchen.de/research/proj/laufendeprojekte/patents/stratpat2007.pdf. 
166 See Lemley & Weiser, supra note 72, at p. 797, citing from Ted Sabety, Nanotechnology Innovation and the 
Patent Thicket: Which IP Policies Promote Growth? 15 ALB. L. J. SCI. & TECH. 477, 495-503, 2005 and referring 
the problem that arose in the 1920’s during the emergence of the radio industry while posing that 
nevertheless, such problems are more frequent in our days. See also chapter IV below referring to data 
from different industries including the pharmaceutical sector.  
167 See Richard Epstein, Steady the Course: Property Rights in Genetic Material (U Chicago Law & Economics, 
Olin Working Paper No. 152, March 2003), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=317101; arguing 
that all-or-nothing regimes -in this case either “full patent protection” under a strong property rule or the 
absence of patents- can accomplish first best solutions.  
168 See Burk and Lemley, supra note 72. 
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In fact, the issue of property and liability rules has emerged in several inter-
related discussions that either extend or overlap with the discussion about 
transaction costs, strategic behavior and hold-ups, which are here proposed as 
the economic justification for liability rules in patent law. The following section 
describes these discussions while relating them to the general research question 
of this Thesis on the efficiency of different protection rules for patents.  
5.1 Multi-Parties Negotiation: the Anti-Commons 
Mainstream studies on the economics of property rights pose that private 
property rights emerge due to changes in technology that make the benefits 
from having new rights surpass the cost of delineating and enforcing such 
rights169. This view often serves to explain the extension of patent rights over 
new subject matter, and in their several dimensions of duration, scope and 
enforcement170. However, the economics of property rights have also 
highlighted the benefits and costs of using alternative institutions to regulate 
the use of property. Property can actually be held in common with everyone 
having access to the resource and although rival goods held in common might 
give rise to a tragedy, public goods such as knowledge and information are non 
rival in consumption171. 
                                                 
 
 
169 See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, VOL. 57, NO. 2, 
PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC 
ASSOCIATION. (May, 1967), pp. 347-359. 
170 While Demsetz is said to propose an optimistic reading that explains the emergence of any new 
property right in terms of cost-minimization, the “pessimistic” school usually relies on a public choice 
explanation based upon interest groups lobbying for favorable legislation and the resulting potential for 
rent-seeking. 
171 See Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, SCIENCE 162, 1243 (1968), available at: 
http://www.sciencemag.org/sciext/sotp/pdfs/162-3859-1243.pdf, describing the problem of the 
commons, which arises where many agents have a right to use a resource but none has a right to exclude. 
As a consequence each agent will use that resource to maximize its private utility and the level of use 
chosen by each agent will be greater than the social optimum, thus creating a negative externality. See also 
Paul David, A tragedy of the Public Knowledge ‘Commons’? GLOBAL SCIENCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE 
DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY BOOMERANG, available at: http://siepr.stanford.edu/papers/pdf/00-02.pdf, 
explaining several purported solutions to the underuse of IP protected assets include the “open source” 
and its application to the biotech sector under a commons usage. However, the open source movement 
that has balanced the exclusiveness of IP protection in the software field is based on specific circumstances 
of this latter. While open source holds a fundamental role in preserving the knowledge commons it has 
important shortcomings given the great amount of investment that firms must undertake to develop an 
end-use product. See The Economist, Open, but not as usual (Mar 16th 2006), stating that “as open-source 
models move beyond software into other businesses, their limitations are becoming apparent” and see 
Suzanne Scotchmer, Open Source Software: the new Intellectual Property Paradigm (2006), NBER WORKING 
PAPER SERIES. P. 27-30, arguing that the importance of an “open” and “commons” paradigm might be 
greater in areas where IP incentives are weak; such as neglected diseases where potential buyers are too 
poor, when ease of copying decreases the value of protection or when licensing is precluded by high 
transaction costs.  
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It has been recently argued that the increasing privatization of IP rights, and the 
increasing trend of patenting several technologies, also related to basic research 
has led to an over-fragmentation of rights. The tragedy of the anti-commons -
which has found special applications in the patent biotechnology field-172 arises 
when many agents hold a right to exclude but none has a privilege to use. As a 
result, the resource will be under-used and the excessive proliferation of rights 
–probably due to a low threshold for patentability- might lead to over-
investment173. When technologies are complementary to each other, that means, 
that they yield a higher value when used together or when many 
complementary inputs are necessary to develop a product, precisely as it 
happens with many modern technologies.  
 
The empirical evidence on the emergence of anti-commons property is 
controversial174, although studies suggest that there is a potential and growing 
risk, especially in fields such as genetic testing175. Thus, there are indications of 
an under-use problem, sometimes described as anti-commons and other times 
used in slightly different meanings that might nevertheless get worse as the 
biotechnology industry evolves.  
 
The problems of under-use under the anti-commons theory, suggest that some 
type of middle-ground solution might deserve attention. In this context, 
                                                 
 
 
172 For the general theory of anti commons see Michael Heller The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in 
the Transition from Marx to Markets (1998), HARVARD LAW REV, N. 3, 111, 621-688; for an application to the 
biomedical sector and patenting see Michael Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? 
The anticommons in Biomedical Research. SCIENCE 280, 5364 (1 May 1998); both explaining how the tragedy of 
anti commons results in resources being prone to underuse because multiple owners on upstream 
technologies have a right to exclude use by others and none has a privilege to use the resources. 
173 Over-rewarding might give raise to rent-seeking activities where an agent engaging in patenting of 
certain technologies is not socially beneficial.  
174 Compare Scott Stern and Fiona Murray, Do Formal Intellectual Property Rights Hinder the Free Flow of 
Scientific Knowledge? An Empirical Test of the Anti-Commons Hypothesis, NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES, VOL. 
W11465, 2005, available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=755701, finding an anti-commons effect in citation 
rates after a patent is granted, with Walsh, Arora and Cohen, Working Through the Patent Problem, SCIENCE: 
VOL. 299. NO. 5609, (14 February 2003), at p. 1021 performed a survey among researchers and found that 
the IP system doesn’t preclude sequential innovation (researchers use interpret the research exemption in 
a broader way or simply infringe). See David, supra note 171, criticizing the methodological grounds of 
the Walsh study, among other reasons because of the ways in which the questions are posed that do not 
allow much room for researchers to express results otherwise. Furthermore, the Walsh study highlights 
severe problems related to patentability of research tools while distinguishing them from the anti-
commons concept whereas Heller and Eisenberg refer to both problems under an anti-commons label.  
175 Several institutions have undertaken efforts to study and tackle this issue; the OECD has issued 
guidelines on licensing of genetic technologies. See OECD. GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF GENETIC 
INVENTIONS (2006),available at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/39/38/36198812.pdf, referring that in a 
2002 workshop the conclusion was that the IP system applied to genetic inventions did not have a 
systematic breakdown in licensing, although specific concerns were made, especially regarding access to 
diagnostic tests. See also the GUIDELINES BY THE U.S. NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH (NIH) AND THE 
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, (similarly acknowledging these problems and recommending non-exclusive 
licensing, trusting however in market-based solutions. 
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limitations to exclusive rights that go beyond the traditional limits for all 
property rights such as public interest and necessity might be justified. Whereas 
patent rights are given in spite of the fact that they will produce some under-
use -which is still deemed to be socially efficient when balanced with the 
benefits of encouraging more innovation- exclusionary rights on products that 
have potential applications can lead to more under-use than optimal. Moreover, 
excessive fragmentation of property -the core of the anti-commons concept- is 
usually described as an irreversible process due to the surmounting transaction 
costs of re-uniting such dispersed assets176.  
 
The anti-commons literature has also described the problem of royalty stacking, 
which refers to multiple right holders in a complex technology each asking for a 
payment (royalty) probably in the light of a holdout power and the result that 
holds when such royalties must be aggregated. In the end, royalty stacking as 
well as holdouts preclude use because it would not be profitable to pay such an 
amount to use the associated technologies177.  
 
Although authors have used different frameworks to describe similar and inter-
related phenomena -anti-commons, hold-outs, hold-ups and royalty stacking- a 
noteworthy fact is that under any of these cases, the changing landscape of 
innovation has lead to question the current patent system. Moreover, under 
such special situations, courts can hardly assume an optimal design of the 
substantive IP or patent law. Therefore, the question is noticeably asked ex-post, 
usually by antitrust authorities or courts about to what extent it is desirable to 
intervene and fixed that substantive law.  
5.2 Network externalities 
Network externalities arise in markets where the use of a product by one 
consumer increases the value that other users obtain from the product178. The 
illustrative example is communication networks, in which the user can establish 
contact with other users of the network and adding an additional user increases 
the value that others might derive. Externalities can occur directly, as in the first 
case described, or indirectly, when the utility of the users of a network, for 
instance, an operating system, increases because the developers of application 
                                                 
 
 
176 See Francesco Parisi, Entropy in Property, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW, VOL. 50, NO. 3, PP. 
595-632.  
177 Douglas Lichtman, Patent Holdouts and the Standard-Setting Process, U CHICAGO LAW AND ECONOMICS, 
OLIN WORKING PAPER NO. 292 (2006), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=902646 (arguing that: 
“some resources actually come into efficient use precisely because there are so many patent holders who 
each can plausibly veto a particular party’s use”). See also Elhauge, supra note 38, arguing that Lemley 
and Shapiro fail to demonstrate that royalty stacking causes royalties above an efficient level and that 
instead, it tends to produce royalties that are at or below the optimal rate. 
178 See Menell supra note 28, at p. 141-142, citing and explaining the main studies with regard to network 
externalities and IP rights.   
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programs will produce more software for the operating systems that are most 
vastly used.  
 
With the development of information and communication technologies, 
network externalities have increasingly acquired a major role in current 
economies. The presence of network externalities has various important 
economic consequences. One question relates to the desirability of setting up 
standards that enable products “to speak with each other”, i.e. compatible 
standards179. The other question, directly related to this study refers to the 
effects of patent protection in industries featuring network externalities180. 
Some authors argue for a stronger standard for patent protection in order to 
give incentives to the adoption of standardized interfaces181. However, 
compulsory licenses may be justified in particular circumstances to enable the 
full realization of network externalities and to solve the problems of lock-in182.  
5.3 Uncertainty over rights 
Most scholars assume that property rights are clearly defined. However, when 
the property right’s boundaries are unclear, the costs of protecting a right with 
a property rule might be as high as protecting it through a liability rule. This is 
because the property rule should be designed to cover only the right and to 
avoid enjoining non-infringing uses. Such possibility exists in real property but 
is much more prevalent in the IP field, especially in patent law, where 
boundaries are frequently unclear.  
 
Whereas the examination of property rights in land is a well functioning system 
-“the process of examining property rights to land is routinely provided by a 
                                                 
 
 
179 See ibid, at p. 142, citing Katz and Shapiro, 1985a, who argue that a new entrant to a market might 
adopt a noncompatible product standard even though their adoption of a compatible standard would 
increase social welfare. This behavior is driven by possible strategic advantages of not enhancing the 
desirability of the rivals’ products to consumers valuing standardization; but also Farrell and Saloner, 1985 
showing a countervailing dynamic whereby the developers of improved standards may be unable to 
attract consumers   because of the high switching costs to shift to the new standard. 
180 Ibid, at p. 142, citing previous work by Menell that shows how intellectual property protection has 
important implications for the dynamics of network externalities by affecting the extent to which 
competitors can establish proprietary standards. 
181 Ibid, citing from Menell, 1987, who argued that “in markets featuring strong network externalities, the 
threshold for intellectual property protection should be higher than in traditional market settings so as to 
foster the adoption of standardized interfaces” 
182 Ibid at p. 142. See also Dreyfuss, Rochelle, Unique Works/Unique Challenges at the Intellectual 
Property/Competition Law Interface. EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 2005 - THE INTERCATION 
BETWEEN COMPETITION LAW AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Isabela 
Atanasiu, eds. (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2005), analyzing the problem that emerges when products are 
“unique” either because they “naturally” as it occurs with segments of DNA which must be used in order 
to develop further technologies and might not be substituted by any other such product, or because they 
have become “de facto” standards, as it happens when there are lock-in and network effects.  
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robust market that combines title examination with title insurance”- the same 
process is cumbersome for patents: 
 
“tipically, the risk of infringement that remains after a competent patent review 
is so unpredictable that it is virtually uninsurable. Similarly, uncertainty about 
scope and validity undermine the market for patent enforcement insurance”183. 
 
This result is due to the combination of fuzzy and unpredictable boundaries; a 
failure in the system of public access to boundary information; lack of use of a 
requirement of possession and the scope of rights and the patent flood: 
 
“if we use a broader definition of “troll” that includes al shorts of patentees 
who opportunistically take advantage of poor patent notice to assert patents 
against unsuspecting firms, then troll-like behavior might be a more important 
explanation. Indeed, if patent notice is poor, then all sorts of patent owners 
might quite reasonably assert patents more broadly than they deserve. But then 
it is more appropriate to attribute the surge in litigation to poor patent notice, 
not to trolls per se”184. 
5.4 Patent quality problems 
Poor quality patents may result from inadequate review of prior art during 
examination, poorly drafted claims, or lax standards (the height of the non-
obviousness threshold). They may undermine economic efficiency185 by 
restraining competition, raising transaction costs, and increasing litigation 
without promoting innovation. 
 
A proliferation of poor quality patents can choke entry and cumulative 
innovation. Ensuring quality patents, however, comes at a cost and hence, it is 
important to consider the relation between problems of patent notice and patent 
quality with the strategic use of patents and whether an ex ante or an ex post 
solution is to be preferred, especially from an efficiency standpoint. With this 
regard, several studies have addressed the problems related to the costs of 
patent examination from the perspective of the administrative costs as well as 
the social and private costs and benefits involved in such activity. 
                                                 
 
 
183 See BESSEN AND MEURER, note 14, at p. 51.  
184 See BESSEN AND MEURER, ibid, at p. 17. See also Lemley and Weiser, supra note 72. 
185 See Menell and Scotchmer supra note 36 at p. 35 
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6 Conclusions 
The literature on entitlements has greatly contributed to the understanding of 
the interaction between rights and remedies. From an efficiency-based 
perspective the choice of an entitlement protection rule is based on multiple 
considerations, including the difficulty or easiness of bargaining in the market 
and the incidence of transaction costs. In this sense, this chapter set up the 
framework for analyzing the use of liability rules in patent law by bringing 
together the insights of the entitlement literature and the economic analysis of 
IP and patent law. 
 
Modern patent law is facing severe challenges due to the overly complexity of 
innovations, especially in sequential and cumulative settings. It is often argued 
that firms are increasingly using patents for strategic purposes and engaging in 
costly litigation with the consequent risk of diminishing innovation incentives, 
especially for sequential innovators. 
 
Within this changing landscape, the controversy between property and liability 
rules has been addressed as a possible way out of some specific problems, 
especially due to strategic behavior of patentees and patent hold-ups. This 
chapter sought to review the literature regarding these problems in order to 
highlight possible misunderstandings. Among the findings are some 
interpretations on the use of property and liability rules in IP and patent law -
mostly reflecting a view where the nature of the right dictates the nature of the 
remedy- which are in contrast with the conception of property and liability 
rules as alternative rules advanced by the entitlement literature.  
 
In addition, authors arguing for the use or maintenance of strong property rules 
for patents have tended to apply an incomplete picture of the existing liability 
rules for patent law, mostly due to a limited focus on U.S. law. This restricted 
view could be enriched with a comparative analysis of other systems outside 
the U.S. and by bringing together insights from the literature constructing on 
substantive law with the most recent literature discussing remedies-based 
liability rules, which is the object of the next chapter. Whereas this chapter 
sought to analyze the economic arguments advanced by the law and economics 
literature for and against the use of liability rules in patent law, the following 
chapters will assess the main insights from economic studies against historical 
evidence and the legal context, including the most recent decisions addressing 
similar problems.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
EX-POST LIABILITY RULES: A 
HISTORICAL VIEW 
 
  
 “Law wants inventions to be worked...It is 
only through working that inventions are 
indeed turned into advantages for the public, 
lack of working would only cause protection 
to retard its general use and to preclude the 
progress that could derive from them” 186. 
1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the historical evolution of patent liability rules, including  
compulsory licensing provisions and other forms of non-authorized access to 
patented inventions, e.g. when the award of injunctive relief is subject to equity 
considerations. Whereas the next chapter focuses on the legal aspects of these  
types of patent liability rules, the limits between the two chapters, as the limits 
between historical and legal analysis are arbitrary. In effect, many historical 
arguments will directly be reflected in the legal provisions examined in next 
chapter whereas the historical overview of this chapter will certainly touch 
upon important insights from the legal perspective. A further arbitrary choice 
was to focus this chapter on the overview of ex-post liability rules from an 
international perspective whereas the next chapter analyzes the particularities 
of each country under study. 
 
The chapter proceeds as follows. The second section briefly describes early 
patent times as they reflect different justifications for patent protection –
economic and non-economic- as well as a search for balance between different 
policy goals. The section particularly reviews the origin of compulsory licensing 
                                                 
 
 
186 TULIO ASCARELLI, TEORIA DEI BENI IMMATERIALI (1960, Dott. A. Giuffre Editore, Milano), p. 619, free 
translation: (“Il diritto vuole che l’invenzione venga attuata…E solo attraverso la sua attuazione che 
l’invenzione invero si risolve in vantaggio per la comunità, ché se essa potesse non venire attuata, la tutela 
concessa servirebbe solo a ritardarne la generale utilizzazione e allora proprio a precludere quel progresso 
che potrebbe derivare dall’attuazione dell’invenzione …”). 
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during the patent abolitionist movement during the XIX century which 
culminated in patent harmonization processes and specifically on the Paris 
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property. The third section reviews 
the antecedents and the process of patent harmonization that lead to the TRIPS 
Agreement and also discusses the main provisions regarding ex-post liability 
rules for patents there contained.  The fourth section discusses the post-TRIPS 
landscape and some of the multiple controversies generated by the adoption of 
substantive and enforcement patent law standards as they refer to patent 
liability rules. The fifth section reviews the landscape of patent remedies 
outside patent law with the aim of searching for spaces affecting or permitting 
the use of patent liability rules in civil law and common law countries. A brief 
overview of the European patent landscape is separately provided in order to 
discuss the specific context of European harmonization with respect to patent 
substantive and enforcement standards. 
2 Compulsory Licensing In International History 
2.1 Early patent times 
Since their inception, IP laws have attempted to pursue a balance between 
diverse driving forces. Industries were flourishing and innovators rewarded by 
means other than patents, at least until the 1400’s, when the use of patents 
extended across the mining and maritime districts of Venice and Germany187. 
However, the growing abuses of patents and privileges granted by governors 
prompted the need for statutes or decrees restricting the issuance of patents, 
primary to new inventions. Statutes soon started to establish other limits and 
requirements with regards to the duration of the patent as well as with respect 
to examination, granting and in general, the protection of inventions188. 
However, these first statutes were limited in scope and patents were more 
                                                 
 
 
187 See Frank Prager, Historic Background and Foundation of American Patent Law, THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF 
LEGAL HISTORY, VOL. 5, p. 309-310. See also Fritz Machlup and Edith Penrose, The Patent controversy in the 
Nineteenth Century, THE JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC HISTORY, VOLUME X AND SUPPLEMENT, May 1950, N° I, at p. 2, 
explaining that: (“apart from its expression in statute form, the patent system is not chiefly an English 
creation. It was developing simultaneously in several countries at about the same time, though not at the 
same rate”). 
188 Ibid, p. 310. See also PENROSE, THE ECONOMICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYSTEM, Johns Hopkins 
University Studies in Historical and Political Science, 1951, at p. 4-6, explaining how the failure of James I 
to regulate monopoly grants according to the common law made it necessary to enact 1623 Statute of 
Monopolies, since: “the granting of patents for the encouragement of industry and the public welfare was 
a recognized part of the royal prerogative; the creation of monopolies in opposition to the public interest 
and without any “consideration passing to the public” was in violation of the common law”. Hence, many 
patents granted by the Queen were illegal because they violated common law, which caused a tension 
between the Crown and the Commons, also reflected in the case of Darcy v. Allin, deciding in 1602 that 
“under the common law exclusive grants to exercise a trade for private gain are against the “liberty and 
benefit of the subjects” and against the common law”.  
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directly recognized by customary or common law189. This situation soon lead to 
the important question -still reflected in contemporary research- of whether 
patents could be justified as an inherently owned reward to inventors or as an 
incentive to encourage the science and arts. Closely related was the problem of 
whether patent rights were equitable in nature or could be assimilated to 
“property”190. 
 
Hence, in their origin, patent statutes were an attempt to control the excesses of 
arbitrary privileges, i.e. they acted as competition law191. In fact, the English 
Statute of Monopolies of 1623, allowed the granting of patents “to the true and 
first inventor and inventors of such manufactures, which others at the time of 
making such letters patents and grants shall not use, so as also they be not 
contrary to the law nor mischievous to the State, by raising prices of 
commodities at home or hurt of trade, or generally inconvenient” (emphasis 
added)192. 
 
The mismatch between the origin of patent rights and their mainstream 
justification has important consequences with regards to how patent rights 
“should” be protected and yet, it is often ignored. The history of IP shows an 
early and widespread use of several tools to curb the possibility of abuses and 
over-extensions of monopolies. For instance, a mandatory remuneration system 
was used in the privilege granted in 1460 by the Venetian Senate to German 
national Jacobus de Valperga on a water pump invention, which extended for 
all his life but was subject to an obligation of licensing to whoever offered 
“reasonable royalties”. Although this practice remained largely isolated193, 
patent statutes around the world tended to preserve certain rights to the State in 
                                                 
 
 
189 Ibid, p. 313.  
190 See Ibid, at p. 314, arguing that “In various parts of the world, notably including for instance France, 
society gave increasing approval, during the eighteenth century, to the view that the rights of authors and 
inventors rest on customary law, the continent equivalent of common law –not basically on statutes or 
codes (a creation of later times), and certainly not on royal grants (in spite of surviving formalities)” and 
arguing that “a common law right is likely to be implemented and interpreted more liberally”… 
191 See MACHLUP AND PENROSE, supra note 187, p. 2, arguing that “If some conclusion might be inferred is 
not, at least not only, that the patent system evolved in order to provide exclusive rights to inventors but 
rather that it did in order to contain and rationalize the grant of previously abused privileges”. See also 
Taubman, supra note 97, arguing that “the roots of patent law lie in the law of competition and protection 
of the freedom to ply one’s trade. The English Statute of Monopolies, frequently cited as a foundational 
patent statute, is in essence competition law, aimed at harmful monopolies and illegitimate restraints on 
trade based ‘upon misinformation and untrue pretences of public good’ while identifying patents of 
invention as legitimate exceptions to a general rule against monopolies”.  
192 See PENROSE, supra note 187, at p. 7, arguing that “This Statute of Monopolies has been called the 
Magna Charta of the rights of inventors, not because it originated patent protection of inventors but 
because it was the first general law of a modern state lo lay down the principle that only a “first and true 
inventor” should be granted a monopoly patent”. 
193 ERICH KAUFER, THE ECONOMICS OF THE PATENT SYSTEM, Harwood Academic Publishers GmbH, V. 30, 
1989, at p. 4.  
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as an attempt to balance incentives to innovate and access to new knowledge, 
especially by local inventors194.  
2.2 The first compulsory licensing provisions 
Allowing nationals to use and adapt new technologies developed by foreigners 
was a primordial concern of early patent statutes195. In fact, since their 
inception, different national patent systems included obligations to “work” the 
invention, which were understood as compelling patentees to produce 
nationally or locally196. Afterwards, such requirements were more generally 
used in order to support the development of national industries.197 However, 
compulsory licenses were a latecomer in the arsenal of tools used to balance the 
public and private benefits of patents198. Although the origin of compulsory 
licenses is debated and generally linked to the patent controversy of the 
nineteenth century; an earlier antecedent actually arose during the discussion of 
a proposal for amendment to the U.S. patent law of 1790 by the U.S. Senate: 
 
“And be it further enacted, that whenever the grantee of such patent shall 
neglect to offer for sale within the United States a sufficient number of any 
                                                 
 
 
194 See PENROSE, supra note 187, at p. 162 arguing that “in order to ensure that any conflict between the 
private interest of the patentee and the “public” in whose interest the laws were allegedly established is 
not always resolved in favor of the former, most governments have reserved the right under certain 
circumstances either to revoke the patent or to permit others to use the invention patented, this altering 
the right granted from that of an exclusive monopoly in the use of the invention to a right to receive 
royalties for its use”. The case of Britain is mentioned since “early letters patent contained provisions for 
the cancellation of the grant if it was found to be “prejudicial or inconvenient to the realm”, ibid at p. 163.  
195 See also Zorina Khan, Intellectual Property and Economic Development: Lessons from American and European 
History, Study Paper 1a, Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, available at: at p. 11, arguing that 
interpretation of the “first and true inventor” included individuals importing inventions created abroad, 
which probes that “the primary emphasis of this feature of the patent grant was on diffusion, rather than 
on incentives for creativity”. 
196 See PENROSE, supra note 187, at p. 137-138 arguing that “the theory that all patent should be worked 
within the country that granted them arose when the encouragement of industrialization was the chief aim 
of the patent system. Patents were granted because countries wished to develop their natural resources, 
and to increase their supply of technicians and skilled labor, and the number and variety of their 
manufacturing concerns. The purpose was the immediate establishment of a new industry. The question 
was not one of “rights of inventors” but of industrial development, and so long as each grant was in fact a 
special act of grace of the sovereign, there was usually a direct understanding that the obligation of the 
patentee was to put a specific innovation into effect (…) Hulme shows that in England “the undertaking to 
work the grant constituted the essential consideration of the early monopoly system”. Ibid at p. 139 “The 
idea that the patent was granted on consideration that a new industry be established or a new art put into 
practice was for all practical purposes abandoned without statutory change and was not to become 
important again until the beginning of the 20th century”.  
197 See Michael Halewood, Regulating Patent Holders: Local Working Requirements And Compulsory Licences At 
International Law, OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL, Vol. 35 NO. 2 at p. referring how working provisions were 
already incorporated for instance in the Venetian Patent Act of 1474, the English Statute of Monopolies in 
1623, U.S. and French statutes. 
198 See PENROSE, supra note 187,  at p.  163, arguing that “while the right to revoke the patent has always 
been a recognized right of the state, the power to issue a compulsory license is apparently of relatively 
recent origin”. 
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such Manufacture, Engine, Machine, Art or Device, or any improvement therein 
or shall sell the same at a price beyond what may be judged an adequate 
compensation, the Supreme Court of the U.S. or any two justices thereof…on 
complaint made to them in writing…are…authorized to inquire…into the 
justness of the said complaint; and if the same be found to be true, to take 
sufficient recognizance and security of the grantee…that he…within such 
reasonable time as the Court of Justices shall prescribe, offer for sale within the 
U.S. a sufficient number of such Manufacture, Engine, Machine, Art, or Device 
or Improvement therein, at such reasonable prices as the said Court or Justices 
shall on due consideration affix; and if the grantee…shall neglect or refuse to 
give security as aforesaid, the said Court of Justices are hereby authorized to 
grant to the complainant a full and ample license to make, construct and vend 
such Manufacture, Engine, Machine, Art, or Device, or improvement…”199 
(emphasis added). 
 
Whereas such proposal was rejected, it can still be considered the first reference 
to compulsory licenses of patents which supposedly borrowed from the 
copyright laws of some of the States of the Union. But compulsory licensing 
was actually incorporated in several national patent laws only after the 
controversy of the XIX century. The anti-patent or abolitionist movement 
emerged in Europe during the 1800’s, following the free trade thoughts inspired 
by Adam Smith, which opposed tariffs and privileges including patents. At that 
time, patents were seen by many as barriers to free trade200. Patent abolitionism 
was especially influential in Austria, Prussia and the U.K. while it similarly 
prevented the adoption of patent legislation in the Netherlands and 
Switzerland201.  
                                                 
 
 
199 See PENROSE, supra note 187,  at p. 166, quoting the proposed amendment which was reproduced in 
Record of the Proceedings in congress Relating to the First Patent and Copyright Laws, printed by the 
Patent Office Society, 1940, with an introductory note by P.J. Federico.  
200 See KAUFER, supra note 193, at p. 8, explaining how in Austria and in Prussia, “monopoly privileges had 
been established in many trades as the nineteenth century dawned. There, as in the western European 
lands, they were widely disliked as misuses of royal prerogative. This association between patents and 
monopoly privileges gave birth to an energetic anti-patent movement”. Ibid at p. 9 arguing that “Tension 
rose as Prussia began to dominate policy among the German territories. In 1806, after its defeat by 
Napolean, Prussia instituted reforms under which a new kind of civil servant, nourished inter alia on the 
ideas of Adam Smith, gained power. The Prussian government pushed for free trade among the German 
territories, and as remnants of mercantilist policy, patents were seen as a barrier to free trade. By 1862, all 
tariffs had been abolished inside Germany. In that same year, a free trade treaty with France marked the 
high point of the free trade movement’s influence. The Prussian government argued concurrently that all 
patent laws in the German territories should be abolished”. But see Menell, supra note 28, noticing that 
Adam Smith “while generally critical of monopoly power as detrimental to the operation of the ‘invisible 
hand’, nonetheless justified the need for limited monopolies to promote innovation and commerce 
requiring substantial up-front investments and risk”.  
201 See Khan, supra note 195, at p. 29, explaining how the abolitionist movement was, for a short period of 
time “strong enough to obtain support in favour of dismantling the patent system in countries such as 
England, and in 1863 the Congress of German Economists declared “patents of invention are injurious to 
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Nevertheless, it could be argued that similar economic thoughts were used to 
support both countries adopting patent protection as well as those opposing 
patents. The ultimate goal of most countries was in any case to protect their 
national industries, although this was done through different means. For 
instance, Britain made use of compulsory working provisions to protect its 
industries from foreign competitors202 and many countries limited the 
possibility that foreigners could obtain patents in the same way as nationals or 
conditioned their patents to national or local working provisions. In fact, it is 
argued that both protectionist and free traders welcomed the new compulsory 
licensing provisions: while “protectionists” interpreted the move as a “great 
protectionist idea”; “free traders” found that the introduction of “compulsory 
licensing” as a measure aiming at enhancing free trade”203. 
 
Hence, it could be argued that free trade and protectionism were walking side 
by side with regard to compulsory licensing and that such mechanism was 
viewed either as a way to promote or to react against protectionist measures204. 
Several circumstances related with the oscillation of countries between 
protectionist and free trade measures are pointed out as having converged to 
originate compulsory licensing provisions. Firstly, the rapid evolution of the 
German territories and especially of Prussia, from agricultural states to 
industrialized nations during the 1850 and 1870205. Secondly, the increasing 
importance of  world exhibitions, which created the need to protect the 
inventions to be exhibited and the compromise achieved in the light of the 1873 
Vienna exhibition, where the patent congress proposed to introduce 
compulsory licensing principles in national patent laws, hence undermining the 
objection that patents were to be considered only as “mercantilist monopoly 
privileges206. Thirdly, the lack of consistency in the free trade movement in 
Prussia207. And finally, the fact that 1873 set also the beginning of a worldwide 
                                                                                                                                               
 
 
common welfare.” The movement achieved its greatest victory in Holland, which repealed its patent 
legislation in 1869” 
202 See PENROSE, supra note 187, at p. 140, referring that: “Even Britain, the home of the free traders, became 
alarmed at the use of foreign patents and inserted a compulsory working provision in her patent law. The 
industry most affected was the chemical industry and the competition most feared was German; but other 
industries joined the chemical industry in requesting compulsory working. It was pointed out that nearly 
half the patents granted in Britain were granted to foreigners and it was alleged that these patents had 
“completely wiped out” many British industries”. 
203 See PENROSE, ibid, at p. 140.  
204 See KAUFER, supra note 193, at p. 9 explaining how Austria adopted a development policy in order to 
favor its national industry but that also the adoption of a free trade area was a tactic used by Prussia to 
exclude Austria from the German union. 
205 Ibid at p. 9. 
206 Ibid at p. 9.  
207 Ibid at p. 9, explaining the creation of a German free trade area as a political tactic used by Prussia for 
excluding Austria from the German union, given that Austria had adopted a strongly protectionist 
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depression that facilitated a movement against free trade and embracing 
protectionist movements where tariffs and patents played an important role.  
 
The increasing participation of the –then- developing countries in world 
exhibitions, and especially the pressure of American inventors willing to go to 
the Vienna exhibition of 1873 only if protection for their technologies was 
assured by the German authorities, were among the reasons that prompted the 
need for harmonized patent standards. Following negotiations, patent 
protection was given to foreign patents under strict compulsory licensing 
provisions, a compromise that protected national industries while providing 
some flexibility to allow the use of patented technologies by local inventors208. 
After 1873, and also as a result of the world economic depression, which 
reinforced protectionist trends, patents were largely used together with tariffs 
in order to protect national industries. Still it is worth recalling that, at least for 
some scholars, the absence of patent protection was essential for the successful 
development of some national industries209. More in general, the adoption of 
compulsory licensing provisions is viewed as a compromise between no 
protection of patents and full protection through a right to exclude210. 
 
These trends evidence the importance of national self-interest, along with –and 
probably even more important than- the desire to protect the rights of inventors 
or to foster scientific progress as motivations for enacting and curbing patent 
protection. The reaction against and the final defeat of the abolitionist 
movement was followed by pressures to adopt an international patent regime 
that could also control for excesses such as the automatic forfeiture or 
revocation of patents in cases of failure to work inventions locally. This was an 
important incentive for endorsing the Paris Convention for the Protection of 
Industrial Property of 1883, which finally prohibited the automatic forfeiture of 
patents in case of lack of working, although it affirmed the obligation of 
patentees to work their patents locally where such requirement existed in 
national law.  
                                                                                                                                               
 
 
development policy under the Habsburg monarchy. This also explains that after achieving the goal of 
excluding Austria, the free trade movement lost momentum.  
208 Ibid. p. 8-9. 
209 This is for example the case of Switzerland, which excluded protection for the pharmaceutical and 
chemical industries during the years when these were developing. See Khan, supra note 195, at p.29 “it 
was only in response to international pressures that Switzerland adopted measures to recognize patent 
rights”. 
210 See PENROSE, supra note 187,at p. 167, explaining that such compromise arose “between the patent 
advocates and the anti-patent, free trade group who opposed the entire patent system because of the 
restrictions it placed on the freedom of trade”; and also quoting the work of R. BECK VON MANAGETTA, DAS 
NEUE OSTERREICHISCHE-PATENT-RECHT (Wien, 1897) at p. 17, that attributed “the defeat of the anti-patent 
movement in Germany to the compromise on the idea of compulsory licensing”. See also ibid at p. 164 
explaining that “the continental writers for the most part traced its origin to the controversy about patents 
in the middle of the 19th century”. 
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Nonetheless, compulsory licensing211 was not included in the 1883 Paris 
Convention but only introduced in the 1925 Hague Revision as a means to 
restrict the use of patent forfeiture in the cases of failure to work or other 
“abuses which might result from the exclusive rights conferred by the patent”. 
This reform prohibited countries from imposing forfeiture unless they had first 
attempted to remedy the “abuse” through the grant of a compulsory license, 
hence recognizing failure to work as an “abuse” of international patent law but 
introducing a less harsh measure as compulsory licensing.  
 
Following the Convention, countries identified other abuses that justified 
compulsory licensing and also included in their national laws other grounds 
different than abuse. This was the case with compulsory licensing provisions 
motivated by the “public interest” and their specific variants of “national 
emergency” or “public health” issues212 as well as compulsory licenses for 
dependent patents. A particular provision was adopted for instance in 
Germany, which allowed for the use of compulsory licenses, subject to the 
condition that the “public interest” necessitated such measure213. In the period 
preceding the TRIPS Agreement, the enactment of national laws was subject to 
wide discretion as the interpretation of possible abuses and the same notions of 
public interest, as well as other grounds for the use of compulsory licenses was 
left wide opened in the words of the Paris Convention.  
 
A glimpse into history shows that failure to work has been considered a 
potential “abuse” of patent protection while local or national working had been 
deemed as a requirement for patentees during a long period of patent history 
and at least until the TRIPS agreement. Indeed, until the early 1990s, almost 
every country in the world (except for the U.S.) had local working requirements 
and the desire of achieving a compromise with this regard was an important 
reason of the adoption of compulsory licensing. Whereas one of the most 
important principles laid down by the Paris Convention was non-
                                                 
 
 
211 For the general concept and categories of compulsory licenses, see Section 3.1.1.1 of Chapter I.  
212 See GEORG BODENHAUSEN, GUIDE TO THE APPLICATION OF THE PARIS CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF 
INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY AS REVISED AT STOCKHOLM IN 1967, BIRPI (WIPO Publication N° 611 (E), Geneva: 
1968), at p. 70, arguing that: “The member States are therefore free to provide analogous or different 
measures, for example, compulsory licenses on conditions other than those indicated in paragraph (4), in 
other cases where the public interest is deemed to require such measures. This may be the case when 
patents concern vital interests of the country in the fields of military security or public health or in the case 
of so-called ‘dependent patents’”. 
213 See Gianna Julian-Arnold, International Compulsory Licensing: The Rationales and the Reality, 33 IDEA: J.L. 
& Tech. 349 (1993), citing provisions previous to the TRIPS Agreement and HARACOGLOU IRINA, 
COMPETITION LAW AND PATENTS: A FOLLOW-ON INNOVATION PERSPECTIVE IN THE BIOPHARMACEUTICAL 
INDUSTRY, (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2008), at p. 66, Table 3.2, citing “European National Provisions for 
compulsory licensing and on the experimental use exemption”. See also Compulsory licensing provisions 
in Latin American countries at: http://www.managingip.com/Article.aspx?ArticleID=1321873 
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discrimination between nationals from members of the Union, provisions 
requiring local working could discriminate against foreign patents which are 
the most likely to be worked abroad, hence giving rise to a de facto 
discrimination214. Economists soon recognized that a compulsory license 
provision for working failure might also create such de facto discrimination 
resembling the rough effects of compulsory working215 while being an 
inefficient and incomplete way of dealing with the general problem of the costs 
of patenting216. In addition, many criticisms against compulsory licenses were 
soon centered on the problem of calculating a reasonable royalty payment that 
we will discuss below.  
2.3 Origins of the principal national patent systems 
2.3.1 U.K. 
As it was described above, the UK patent system had an early origin in the first 
common law developments which latter ended in the enactment of the 1624 
Statute of Monopolies. Several features of the UK patent system were soon 
object of debate such as the high cost and limited access to patent protection217 
as well as the uncertain application of patent doctrines which lead to the belief 
that patents could not be considered as “settled unless the patent had been 
contested in court with a favourable outcome”218. Such uncertain landscape 
along with unclear rules with regard to licenses and assignments was probably 
                                                 
 
 
214 See PENROSE, at p. 169. 
215 The welfare effects of either a face or a de facto discrimination have been analyzed for long. See for 
instance, PENROSE, at p. 170 explaining that “this sound like a compulsory working requirement, which we 
found in the last chapter was an early, and indeed primitive, approach to the problem of reducing the 
costs to an economy of granting foreign patents. Compulsory working is not only ineffective but does not 
directly attack the real source of the cost of foreign patents to an economy –the restrictions placed on the 
use of new techniques…”. 
216 Ibid at p. 170, “But if the sole criterion for revocation or compulsory licensing is whether the patent is 
worked domestically, the provision is too wide and at the same time, too narrow. It is too wide because, in 
itself, the working of a patent in the country granting it is not necessarily desirable; it is too narrow 
because the patentee’s failure to work is only one-and probably the least- of the costs of granting foreign 
patents”.  
217 The significant barriers in terms of costs to apply for patents have been discussed by scholars and even 
reflected in more general literature work (Charles Dickens in “A poor’s man tale of a patent”). See Khan, 
supra note 195,  at p. 11. See also Works of Jeremy Bentham, cited in Moureen Coulter, Property in Ideas, 
p. 76, describing the costly process that an inventor should face to obtain patent protection as “a tax levied 
upon ingenuity”.  
218 See Khan, ibid, at p. 12. A similar argument has been recently the object of modern critics in studies 
considering patents as probabilistic rights, that is, rights which value depends on the probabilities that it 
will survive challenges of validity, see for instance, Lemley and Shapiro, infra note 608. However, the 
claim made during the 1800’s in the UK referred most directly to the fact that many patent doctrines were 
often interpreted in arbitrary ways.  
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the cause of a limited commercialization of patents during that period219 and 
also gave rise to various attempts at reforming the system220.  
 
In fact, one of the first patent “reform movements” occurred in England “chiefly 
because of complaints that the procedure for obtaining a patent was expensive, 
clumsy and uncertain”221. Such reasons responded to concerns by interest 
groups of inventors. However, patent reform ignited a counter-movement that 
rapidly spread throughout England and abroad and in fact, the UK was 
particularly receptive and active in the patent controversy that took place 
during the XIX century.  
 
By the year 1870, innovation in Britain lagged behind the U.S. in terms of 
innovation and number of patents and a number of factors converged to make 
possible a major patent reform in 1883. The reform simplified certain 
procedures, introduced the possibility of opposition to patents and importantly, 
it also enshrined compulsory licensing provisions for the first time.  
 
As already discussed above, patents were conceived as a due reward for 
inventors which was however to be limited in a way that it did not harm trade 
or become an unreasonable monopoly. In this sense, the 1883 Act conceived 
compulsory licensing as a “limitation of the patent right to safeguard its 
reasonableness”222. Compulsory licenses were established for the following 
situations in which the patentee was considered to have “defaulted” the patent 
system (i) when the patent was not worked in the United Kingdom; (ii) when 
reasonable requirements of the public could not be supplied; (iii) when 
someone was prevented from using an invention to the best advantage; and (iv) 
in cases of Crown use, that is, use by the Crown and its agents without the 
authorization of the patentee223. 
 
Compulsory licenses for non-working were included to substitute earlier 
working provisions as well as to attain a compromise between the anti-patent 
movement as well as pro-patent interests224. Moreover, this substitution 
                                                 
 
 
219 See Khan, supra note 195, at p. 13, arguing that “it is therefore not surprising that the market for patent 
rights seems to have been somewhat limited, and even in the year after the 1852 reforms only 273 
assignments and licences were recorded as the law required”.  
220 See Khan ibid, at p. 13. In 1852 the patent reform bill included an examination system that was 
afterwards eliminated. The 1883 patent act included a limited examination to ensure the invention was 
patentable and described whereas only in 1950, the UK system included an examination of novelty.  
221 See MACHLUP AND PENROSE, supra note 187, at p. 3.  
222 See Oliver Brand, The Dawn of Compulsory Licensing, I.P.Q. 2007, 2, 216-235.  
223 Ibid at p.  218. 
224 Ibid, at p. 219, arguing that: “the adoption of compulsory licensing of patents for non-working in 
subs.(a) of s.22 of the 1883 Act has to be seen against a wider background as a climax of three interwoven 
developments: the decline of compulsory working, the need for a compromise with the anti-patent free 
trade movement, and a sudden call for protectionism in late Victorian Britain”.   
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reflected a gradual change that took place with regards to the consideration in 
exchange for patent protection. At the beginning of the patent statute, it was 
widely understood that patents were monopolies granted in order to encourage 
new inventions and thus, the written disclosure of the invention was not 
required, a quid pro quo of the granting of patent rights was the working of the 
invention225.  
 
Later on, the specification or written disclosure of inventions was imposed as 
the consideration in exchange for the grant of patent rights, a change that was 
also facilitated by the perception that compulsory working was an inefficient 
measure226. This change of consideration for patent rights was accompanied by 
the gradual transformation in the conception of patents from privileges to 
property rights227. As a consequence of conceiving patents as a property rights, 
courts were increasingly hesitant in compelling patentees to work their 
inventions228. By 1829, it was debated whether to sanction non-working with 
the revocation of patents, as it happened in other countries or whether to 
compel patentees that did not work their inventions to license them229. But 
compulsory licensing was still not accepted at that time. It is interesting to recall 
the pressure exercised by engineer John Farey in favor of using the equitable 
nature of injunctions in order to deny this remedy and limit relief to nominal 
damages in cases in which the patentee did not worked her invention230.  
                                                 
 
 
225 Ibid at p. 219 “In the early seventeenth century, the Crown granted monopolies for inventions by 
favour to encourage the introduction of new methods of manufacture within the realm. Neither a 
specification nor a written disclosure of the invention was required as "consideration" of the patentee for 
obtaining his or her grant. Instead, as we learn from Darcy v Allyn and The Clothworkers of  Ipswich case, 
the patentee had to "work" the new invention within the country --alternatively to employ and educate 
native artisans in the working of the invention ("apprenticeship clauses"). This was common practice in 
Europe at the time. In England, the patentee bound himself to work his invention in the recitals of his 
grant. Breaching such a promise-- as he would know--was deceiving the monarch, which would render 
the grant void”. 
226 Ibid at p. 220-221.  
227 See ibid, at p. 221, arguing that: “The effect of this "change of consideration" was compounded by the 
second event. In the late eighteenth century the patent grant transformed from a privilege to a property 
right”, See also Arkwright v Nigthingale [CP 1785] Dav. Pat. Cas. 37. 
228 Ibid, explaining that both a change in consideration of patents as well as a change in their own 
conception as property, made courts to be “increasingly reluctant to require a patentee to work his or her 
invention, especially when after the Napoleonic Wars the rules of patent law became obscured by 
confusion. Witnesses before the 1829 Select Committee were uncertain whether English law compelled 
patentees to work their inventions”.  
229 Ibid at p. 221, explaining that: “the 1829 committee contemplated nullity as remedy for non-working of 
the invention, finding support in the patent laws of the leading countries of the age--including France, 
England's principal economic and military rival but remained inconclusive. As a complementary scheme, 
the committee suggested to compel patentees, who granted licences at all, to license the public without 
distinction”. 
230 Ibid, at p. 221, referring how John Farey, an influential engineer p. 557-559: “gave extensive evidence, in 
common with other witnesses recommended relying on the efficiency of the existing practice of the courts 
rather than compelling the patentee to work or to license. The courts would--up to the enactment of the 
1883 Act award only nominal damages for the violation of a patent that was not being worked and would 
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In addition to these changes, the influence of copyright provisions on 
compulsory licenses was possible due to the gradual disappearance of 
compulsory working provisions as well as the growing importance of the free 
trade movement that was soon used by patent abolitionists to argue against 
patent protection. The victory of patent supporters was however negotiated, 
upon the arousal of compulsory licensing provisions. According to scholars on 
patent history, it was the confluence of “the decline of compulsory working in 
Britain”, “the rise of compulsory licensing as an alternative” but also of the 
diminishing trust in “common law and equity for non-working”231 that made 
the introduction of compulsory licensing provisions by the 1883 Act possible. 
However, compulsory licenses in the 1883 Act were very limited, only to be 
applied for patents granted after that year and the Act was soon repealed in 
1902232.  
 
So, at the time of the negotiations of the Congress of Vienna in 1873, the 
possibility of enshrining compulsory licensing provisions had already been 
discussed by the U.K. Parliament. The Vienna Congress, which is considered to 
have settled the dispute between abolitionists and supporters of patent 
protection during the XIX century patent controversy, adopted an indefinite 
resolution authorizing the use of compulsory licenses233:  
 
"... it is advisable to establish regulations, according to which the patentee 
should be compelled, in cases in which the public interest may require it, to 
allow the use of his invention to all responsible applicants, for an adequate 
compensation."234 
 
Although the origins of compulsory licensing provisions been largely 
associated with the anti patent movement, as it was discussed in the previous 
                                                                                                                                               
 
 
not award the equitable remedy of an injunction, because the non-working or refusal to license others 
would render the patentees hands "unclean” ”. 
231 Ibid at p. 225 “That changed shortly thereafter, when the courts did not exercise their discretion 
concerning injunctions and damages any longer and the free trade movement rose to dominance”, 
especially after Hopkinson v St James [1893] 10 R.P.C. 46 at 62. 
232 Ibid referring only two cases accounted with respect to non-working: Continental Gas Glühlicht, etc., 
Petition [1898] 15 R.P.C. 727; Levinstein's Petition [1898] 15 R.P.C. 732 (742) and two other cases that were 
based on the ground that the reasonable requirements of the public were not being met: Hulton & 
Bleakley's Petition [1898] 15 R.P.C. 749; Barlett's Patent [1899] 16 R.P.C. 641. 
233 Ibid, at p. 225, explaining that “The proponents carried the day with compulsory licensing playing a 
vital role: two German academics, Klostermann and Langen--well aware of the British reflections on 
compulsory licensing as well as the corresponding ones of the German lobby group "Patentschutzverein" -
-led the congress against some initial resistance of the American delegation”.  
234 Ibid, at footnote 83, quoting from HILDEBRANDT, THE INTERNATIONAL PATENT CONGRESS IN VIENNA, 1873 
(Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1875), p.41. 
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section, some scholars argue that it was protectionism, supported also by British 
Delegates, which rather pressure for the adoption of this measure:  
 
“Ironically, it was not the free trade movement that had called so vocally for 
compulsory licensing in case of non-working, which finally brought it into the 
British statute books, but rather the exact opposite. The British delegates to the 
Vienna Congress secretly admitted that it was the growing domestic call for 
protectionism, which convinced them to support compulsory licensing for non-
working”235. 
 
Compulsory licenses were latter strengthened under the introduction of licenses 
of right in 1919. The reason was allegedly the “fear that foreign inventors might 
injure British industry by refusing to grant other manufacturers the right to use 
their patent”236. However, it is also important to add that patent protection was 
excluded for chemical products, during the period from 1919 to 1949, 
purportedly to “counter the threat posed by the superior German chemical 
industry” and meanwhile, “licenses of right enabled British manufacturers to 
compel foreign patentees to permit the use of their patents on pharmaceuticals 
and food products”, until the next reform in 1977. 
2.3.2 U.S.  
The U.S. has probably one of the most successful and influential patent systems 
in the world not only in terms of numbers of patents issued but also in terms of 
achieving to an important degree –at least until quite recently- proper 
incentives for inventiveness237. The U.S. firstly established a Patent Act in 1790 
based upon the Constitutional mandate of promoting the progress of the 
science and the arts. Although the justification for granting patents was based 
upon similar goals to the U.K., the U.S. system differed in the important concept 
of the consideration given in exchange of patent grants. It was implied that in 
consideration for patents, the benefit received by the public followed from the 
disclosure of the innovation and hence, the justification of creating exclusive 
rights was to allow inventors to profit from their inventions238. The system has 
                                                 
 
 
235 See Brand, supra note 222, at p. 226.  
236 See Khan, supra note 195, explaining that in 1907, patentees manufacturing outside the country were 
required also to produce nationally.  
237 See Ibid, at p. 20. See also A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, STEPHEN MERRILL,  RICHARD LEVIN, 
AND MARK MYERS, EDS., (Committee on Intellectual Property Rights in the Knowledge-Based Economy, 
National Research Council: 2004) at p. 8, explaining that “Since its creation more than 200 years ago, the 
U.S. patent system has played an important role in stimulating technological innovation by providing 
legal protection to inventions of every description and by disseminating useful technical information 
about them”.  
238 See Whitney et al. v. Emmett et al., 29 F. Cas. 1074; 1831 “With the constitution, the English statute and the 
adjudication upon it before them, Congress have declared the intention of the law to be to promote the 
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been considered by many scholars as modern and differing in many important 
respects from other previously existing system as well as supported by a 
judicial system that endeavored to solve complex questions under an 
economically oriented approach and with the goals of promoting economic 
growth and social welfare239. 
 
One of the most important and distinguishing characteristics of the system was 
the early presence of examination of patents with a policy of checks and 
balances as well as mechanisms to constraint the ability of examiners to act 
arbitrarily, including the prohibition for them to apply for patents. The U.S. 
patent law allowed the possibility to apply for a patent for the “first and true 
inventor", but the requirement of novelty was interpreted in the sense of 
requiring inventions to be original in the entire world and not only in the 
U.S.240. During a period that extended until 1861, patent rights were available 
for U.S. citizens and foreigners upon different fees and hence the treatment was 
at times discriminatory but it was early replaced by the 1861 which declared 
patent rights available to all applicants on the same basis without regard to 
their nationality241 
 
Another important feature of the U.S. patent system was its low patent fees and 
hence the desire that inventors could apply for patents at reasonable prices. 
These features are said to produced a system that was “transparent and 
predictable”242. Accompanied with the publication of annual lists of granted 
patents, the system was characterized by the diffusion of information243.  
 
                                                                                                                                               
 
 
progress of the useful arts by the benefits granted to inventors; not by those accruing to the public, after 
the patent had expired, as in England. This is most evident from their imposing as conditions, that the 
invention must be new to all the world, and the patentee be a citizen of the United States. If public benefit 
had been the sole object, it was immaterial where the invention originated, or by whom invented; but 
being for the benefit of the patentee, the meritorious cause was invention, not importation, and the benefit 
was not extended to foreigners, in which respects the law had been otherwise settled in England”. See also 
Khan, supra note 195, at p. 22-23 “The American patent system was based on the presumption that social 
welfare coincided with the individual welfare of inventors. Accordingly, legislators emphatically rejected 
restrictions on the rights of American inventors. However, the 1832 and 1836 laws stipulated that 
foreigners had to exploit their patented invention within eighteen months. These clauses seem to have 
been interpreted by the courts in a fairly liberal fashion, since alien patentees “need not prove that they 
hawked the patented improvement to obtain a market for it, or that they endeavored to sell it to any 
person, but that it rested upon those who sought to defeat the patent to prove that the plaintiffs neglected 
or refused to sell the patented invention for reasonable prices when application was made to them to 
purchase.” 
239 Ibid, at p. 20-21.  
240 Ibid, at p. 22, explaining how: “unlike in England, the phrase was used literally, to grant patents for 
inventions that were original in the world, not simply within U.S. borders” 
241 Ibid at p. 22-23.  
242 Ibid, at p. 23.   
243 Ibid at p. 22.  
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Finally, and as it will be often highlighted in this Thesis, the U.S. patent system 
has only rarely used working requirements or compulsory licensing provisions 
for the failure to exploit a patented invention. For instance, between 1932 and 
1836, U.S. laws required foreign patentees to exploit their patented inventions 
within eighteen months. Nonetheless, these provisions seemed to have been 
interpreted quite narrowly by courts and then to have disappeared from latter 
patent law reforms. This narrow exceptions to the rights of patent owners have 
been explained as responding to a view of social welfare that coincides with the 
private welfare of inventors, in the sense that the benefit from inventors will 
translate in the progress of the science and the arts, which would warned 
against establishing restrictions upon the private rights of inventors244.  
 
2.3.3 France 
This brief account of the main features of the French patent system responds to 
the need of referring to several distinguishing characteristics of this system 
which were also transplanted in other jurisdictions. In general terms, and 
comparing it with the U.S. system, the French patent system preceding the 
French revolution co-existed with a large variety of other rewards and 
incentives beyond patents245. With respect to the patent grants and their scope, 
the system relied on a case-by-case approach that undermining predictability 
and certainty often responded to other non-economic reasons. This permitted 
on the one hand to apply equity considerations for the patent grants and the 
fees asked for patents, for instance, if an inventor was poor, but on the other 
hand it also allowed arbitrary decisions with respect to such grants.  
 
After the French Revolution, the patent laws of 1791, amended in 1800 and 1844 
were aimed at abolishing the prerogatives under the old regime and declared 
“the natural right of the inventor to obtain property rights in patents”. 
Nonetheless, patent scholars have highlighted that the recognition of a natural 
right to inventors did not necessarily mean a complete break with mercantilist 
policies used in the past246. For instance, French patent legislation prohibited 
until 1844 that an inventor could attempt to obtain a patent on the same 
invention abroad. However, the system allowed for the existence of patents of 
importation, which gave the possibility that the first to introduce an invention 
patented abroad could enjoy a similar natural right as if it were the patentee of 
such invention. In addition, fees continued to be relatively high even after the 
                                                 
 
 
244 Ibid at p. 24. 
245 Ibid at p. 14.  
246 Ibid at p. 16. 
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1791 legislation and case-by-case reasoning as well as arbitrary decisions have 
been also accounted after such reform.  
 
With regard to the specification of the patents, the French system was also 
based upon the belief of a bargain happening between the State that grants the 
patent and the patentee having to disclose her invention in a way that allows 
another person skilled in the art to replicate that invention. Nonetheless, in the 
absence of provisions for the publication of the description of patents, it is said 
that such statutory clause was dead letter247. 
  
Finally, and of great importance for this analysis, the French patent system 
established working requirements on the basis that “it would be injurious to 
society at large, to allow any one individual to cramp the efforts and attempts of 
more industrious inventors by obtaining a patent upon which he did not intend 
to work” 248. 
2.3.4 Germany  
As it was previously referred, the German Empire was importantly involved in 
the controversy of the XIX century about patents. Such debates reflected an 
internal tension between the Empire, whereby for instance, Alsace-Lorraine 
favored the French patent system and other states such as Hamburg and 
Bremen did not provide for any patent protection at all. In 1877, a national 
patent act unified the patent system, creating a centralized procedure for the 
grant of patents249.  
 
The German patent policy is said to have given incentives for economic growth 
and innovation, targeting such effects within specific industries and mixing a 
policy of granting patent rights for some inventions and for instance, avoiding 
patent protection for food, pharmaceutical and chemical products while 
providing for the possibility of process patents in such areas. The publication of 
patent information, including the claims and specifications of patent documents 
was an important feature that contributed to the diffusion of knowledge. The 
German patent fees were high in order to avoid incentives for patenting trivial 
inventions. In general, it is argued that the German patent system differentiate 
from the U.S. system in that, on average, there were fewer patent grants of 
higher quality.250  
 
                                                 
 
 
247 Ibid at p. 17. 
248 Ibid at p. 16, quoting from Antoine Perpigna, The French Law and Practice of Patents for Inventions, 
Improvements and Importations (1852), at p. 29.  
249 Ibid at p. 19. 
250 Ibid at p. 19-20. 
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Finally, and with respect to this analysis, the German patent system provided 
for the possibility of working requirements. This meant that a patent could be 
revoked after three years elapsed, if such patent was not being worked or if the 
owner refused to grant licenses for the use of the patented invention that was 
considered in the public interest and also in the case where the invention was 
mainly used outside Germany, although in most cases a compulsory license 
was deemed as sufficient to remedy the above mentioned circumstances.   
 
Table 3: Comparative historical overview 
 US UK FRANCE GERMANY 
Patent policies 
 
Incentives to 
inventors 
The public 
benefits 
when 
patent 
expires 
Justice and 
natural rights 
1877 Diffusion 
and innovation 
of specific 
industries 
Who could patent? U.S. citizens (up 
to 1861) 
N/A N/A N/A 
Patents of importation No Yes Yes  N/A 
Novelty Global National N/A N/A 
Fees Moderate, only 
to cover 
administrative 
expenses, 
consideration for 
patents is 
disclosure 
High High High to 
prevent trivial 
inventions 
Working requirements No; 
Only on 
foreigners (1832-
1836) 
Yes Yes Yes 
Compulsory Licenses 
for non-working 
No  Yes 
1883 
 Yes 
Patent Notice Clear Not clear Statutory but 
dead letter 
Publish claims 
and 
specification 
before granting 
Patent Examination A primary 
feature since 
1790 
Not 
properly 
until 1905 
Not until late Initially 
examined by 
consultants; 
examiners 
became 
permanent 
employees of 
the Patent 
Office in 1891 
Commercialization More than 9000 
per year (1870’s) 
Only 273 
after 1852 
Reform 
Cumbersome 
due to uncertain 
rights 
 
Source: Zorina Khan and own elaboration 
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3 Ex post liability rules in the TRIPS Agreement 
The Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement is 
the outcome of multilateral negotiations that took place during the Uruguay 
Round of negotiations on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT)251. In 1994, the Marrakech Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), which complemented the 1947 GATT and created an 
institutional body, the WTO as well as achieved liberalization in other areas 
apart from trade in goods. Before the entry into force of the Marrakech 
Agreement and its important Annexes, to which the TRIPS Agreement is part as 
Annex 1C, the GATT system did not establish IP provision with the narrow 
exceptions explained below. The most important international instruments 
before the TRIPS, were the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
Property and the Berne Convention on Literary and Artistic Works, 
administered by the International Bureaux for the Protection of Intellectual 
Property (known for its acronym in French BIRPI) and which was substituted 
by the WIPO.  
 
As the result of long and controversial negotiations, the TRIPS Agreement laid 
down minimum substantive and enforcement standards for the multilateral 
harmonization of IP rights. Nonetheless, the Agreement left the possibility for 
countries to use several exceptions and limitations to the standards there 
established as well as provisions open for the interpretation of each national 
law. These spaces where multilateral harmonization was not completely 
achieved and which are often mentioned as a potential flexibility for the 
implementation of the Agreement include the possibility of using ex post 
liability rules. This possibility derives either from the highly debated 
framework of articles 30 and 31 or from the spaces left by the enforcement 
section and especially by article 44, which deals with injunctive relief. The 
following section examines the reasons that motivated the negotiation of the 
TRIPS Agreement and its final design with a focus on these provisions.  
 
                                                 
 
 
251 The GATT is a trade liberalization Agreement coming into force in 1947 and signed by 23 countries, 
which contained tariff concessions and rules aiming to prevent the frustration of such concessions by 
means of restrictive trade measures. The contracting parties were involved in the efforts by the United 
Nations Economic and Social Council in 1946 to agreed upon an International Trade Organization (ITO) 
that would work along with the other post-War economic agencies (International Monetary Fund and the 
International Bank for Reconstruction - later the World Bank). See World Trade OrganizationFiftieth 
Anniversary Of The Multilateral Trading System-Press Brief". 
http://www.wto.org/english/theWTO_e/minist_e/min96_e/chrono.htm, retrieved on 15-12-2009. On 
January 1, 1995, the World Trade Organization Agreement entered into force, complementing the 1947 
GATT with further trade concessions as wells as with new areas of trade liberalization, namely trade in 
services covered by the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), the Trade-Related Investment 
Measures (TRIMS) and the TRIPS Agreement.  
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Besides attempting to set up a comprehensive set of global minimum standards 
of protection for all IP rights, one of the most fundamental changes introduced 
by the TRIPS Agreement was bringing IP into the Dispute Settlement of the 
WTO, as this latter was perceived as a “more effective” forum for the protection 
and enforcement of rights252. Before the TRIPS Agreement, the GATT did not 
directly regulate IP and the few references to IP actually addressed the clash 
between free trade which was GATT's main guiding principle on the one hand, 
and IP as exclusive rights that restrict competition but are justified on a 
dynamic or long run perspective on the other hand253. A few relevant 
provisions with this respect were Article IX which was limited to marks of 
origin; a general exception to the GATT principle of free trade in place for 
patents, trademarks, copyrights and prevention of deceptive practices in Article 
XX (d)254 and other general provisions applied to different fields as well as to 
IP255. In the words of TRIPS and IP expert, Daniel Gervais:  
 
"By and large, however, intellectual property was basically considered in the 
GATT context as an "acceptable obstacle to free trade, at least until the Tokio 
Round. During that Round, held between 1973 and 1979, trade in counterfeit 
(trademark) goods had started to emerge as a serious issue. Attempts to agree 
common rules to stop trade in counterfeit goods failed at the end of that Round 
but efforts to include a specific discipline within the GATT framework 
continued. Invoking their right to protect intellectual property under Article 
XX(d), a number of contracting parties prepared an "Agreement on Measures to 
                                                 
 
 
252 See DANIEL GERVAIS. THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS. (1998, Sweet & Maxwell), 
explaining that the process bringing IP to the WTO framework has been described as an example of forum 
shifting, a strategy put forward to substitute the WIPO with the WTO, due to this latter’s enhanced 
probabilities of enforcement through the mechanisms of dispute settlement and retaliation. Another –
complementary- explanation of the occurrence of the TRIPS was the possibility that arose during the 
negotiations of the Uruguay Round, of combining different areas for trade concessions. This strategy, 
known as “trade linkage” is said to have facilitated reaching consensus among countries with widely 
divergent views on IP due to concessions obtained in exchange in other negotiation areas. For a concept of 
trade linkage see Andrew Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1823 
(2002).  
253 For instance, article XX(d) of the GATT  allowed parties to adopt and enforce measures aiming at 
ensuring compliance with its own laws, provided they were not inconsistent with the Agreement, and 
"including those relating to the protection of patents, trademarks, copyrights and the prevention of 
deceptive practices" 
254 See GERVAIS, supra note 252, arguing that this “'general exception` to the GATT principle of promoting 
free trade was invoked in two disputes brought before GATT panels. The exception was used in the case 
of United States-Imports of Certain Automotive Spring Assemblies, the first patent infringement case in 
GATT history. The panel concluded that patent protection was an area in which contracting parties could 
take measures which otherwise would not be in conformity with their GATT obligations"  
255 Article III requiring national treatment and protection of domestic production was arguably applicable 
to IP before the TRIPS. See GERVAIS, ibid, arguing that this article applied to products, not to persons; 
articles XXII and XXIII related to consultations and dispute settlement, and XII(3)(c)(iii) and XVIII(10) 
which could be applied when import restrictions prevent a trademark owner from meeting the use 
requirement to maintain its right. 
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Discourage the Importation of Counterfeit Goods", a draft of which was 
circulated in 1979 and 1984”256. 
 
A decision of the Ministerial Declaration on November 29, 1982 set up 
consultations with the WIPO in order to analyze the trade related aspects of 
trade in counterfeit goods. In this decision, the GATT Council received a 
mandate to analyze such questions, decide on the appropriateness of  measures 
in the context of the GATT and if judged appropriate, to propose the modalities 
of such action. During 1984, a group of trade experts was set up with the 
intention to examine the consolidated Secretariat documentation, assisted by an 
expert nominated to the WIPO Governing Bodies257. At that time, negotiations 
still focused on an initial proposal which only mentioned international trade 
related aspects of IP258. Indeed, the document that launched the Uruguay 
negotiations stated: 
 
"Negotiations shall aim to develop a multilateral framework of principles rules 
and disciplines dealing with international trade in counterfeit goods, taking into 
account work already undertaken in GATT"259.  
 
Such a restricted mandate was in line with the notion of international trade 
related aspects of IP. However, the same document expressed that 
“negotiations shall aim to clarify GATT provisions and elaborate as appropriate 
new rules and disciplines". It was indeed the second part of this phrase, which 
allowed the entrance of a thorough and elaborated set of IP rules within the 
GATT –now the WTO- framework. As Daniel Gervais has explained: 
 
"One could thus say that the entire TRIPS Agreement, with the possible 
exception of enforcement provisions destined to curb trade in illicit goods 
(which had been previously envisaged in GATT) rests on the final words on the 
first paragraph: "and elaborate as appropriate new rules and disciplines". Even 
there, a limitation was added, by using the words "as appropriate" although, 
upon reflection, appropriateness was such a subjective criterion in this context 
that it was not a real restriction to the negotiators' brief".  
 
                                                 
 
 
256 Ibid.  
257 Ibid, explaining that at the fortieth Session in November of 1984, such group of experts was set up, 
marking the intention of seriously negotiate an IP Agreement. The group of Experts on Trade in 
Counterfeit Goods met on six occasions in 1985 and presented its report on October 9, 1995. See documents 
L/5878 and the Secretariat note dated January 10, 1985, MDF/W/19.  
258 The process of negotiations during the Uruguay Round is available through several documents, starting 
from the drafts of "an Agreement on Measures to Discourage the Importation of Counterfeit Goods" 
referred as L/4817 and L/5382 and draft which circulated between 1979 and 1984 following a failure to 
agree on common rules to address these issues during the Tokyo Round.  
259 Document MIN.DEC of September 20, 1986, pp. 7-8 
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During the contentious process of negotiations that followed, several clashing 
issues emerged. Among them, compulsory licenses, one out of the available 
mechanisms to balance the growing protection to IP rights with other national 
and economic interests posed a challenge for the final Agreement. Many 
controversial issues were of a North-South nature, although conflict was also 
present due to the different legal traditions, for instance, between the U.S. and 
countries of continental Europe260.  
 
3.1 Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement 
The title of article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement, which refers to “other use 
without the authorization of the right holder” already reflects its debated 
nature and the intent of differentiating the use of compulsory licenses from 
other exceptions established by article 30261.  Prior to the TRIPS Agreement, the 
use of compulsory licenses was regulated at the international level by the Paris 
Convention. Yet, the controversy generated by the use of compulsory licenses 
was allegedly one of the main reasons that triggered discussions on the TRIPS 
Agreement, given the existent divergences between countries and the pressure 
of developing countries to revise the Paris Convention262. 
 
The final text of article 31 established several important requirements for 
compulsory licensing provisions, including the need to give adequate 
compensation for the patent owner, that prior efforts to obtain a license on 
reasonable commercial terms take place before any compulsory license is issued 
                                                 
 
 
260 See GERVAIS, supra note 252, arguing that: "Compulsory licensing of patents was already at centre stage. 
Brazil and Korea argued in favour of compulsory licensing while Austria and Hong Kong pleaded for 
restrictions, arguing that procedures should include judicial review and provide for a limitation to the 
domestic market (limiting exports of material produced under a compulsory license), non-exclusivity 
(allowing other licenses to be granted) and appropriate compensation for the right holder whose industrial 
property right was subject to the compulsory license".  
261 See UNCTAD-ICSTD, supra note 41 at p. 462, indicating that the title reflects “the effort by the drafters 
to distinguish between “limited exceptions” that are authorized under Article 30, and compulsory 
licensing authorized under Article 31. Article 31 (compulsory licensing) addresses the interests of patent 
holders in particular cases – a compulsory licence is directed to an identified patent and authorized party – 
while Article 30 exceptions may involve legislation of more general effect on patent holders and 
authorized parties”. Still, many scholars are of the opinion that a compulsory licensing system should 
comply both with article 30 and 31. Conversely, the case-by-case nature and other limitations put forward 
by article 31 to compulsory licensing would make it redundant to subject any such regime also to the 
discipline of article 30. 
262 Ibid, explaining the pressure put forward by developing countries during negotiations on the revision 
of the Paris Convention and their demand for a “new International Economic Order” which included 
greater access to technology; “These negotiations broke down in 1982, in significant part because of 
competing demands concerning compulsory licensing. The failure of these negotiations convinced 
industry interests that they would not succeed in solving what they viewed as the “intellectual property 
problem” at WIPO. This led to a refocusing of IPR efforts towards the GATT”. 
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and that the use of licenses be limited predominantly to the domestic market263. 
The last two requirements might be waived by member states when 
compulsory licenses are applied as a remedy to correct anti-competitive 
practices which have been determined after judicial or administrative 
procedures. The need to engage into prior efforts to obtain authorization might 
also be waived in the case of national emergencies or circumstances of extreme 
urgency or cases of public non-commercial use. 
 
As discussed below, the grounds for granting compulsory licenses as well the 
interpretation with regard to the requirements of article 31 is far from settled 
and their application in practice continues to raise great controversy. Moreover, 
with the coming into force of the TRIPS Agreement, it could be argued that 
discrimination is now definitely banned and working requirements could only 
be imposed at a global level, meaning that a patent sufficiently worked in one 
member country of the WTO shall be deemed to be sufficiently worked in any 
country264. However, it is important to recall that the Paris Convention still 
remains in force and has also been incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement265, 
hence amplifying the number of signatory countries while maintaining the 
possibility of having working requirements and compulsory licenses to remedy 
non-working, as long as national laws provide for these measures266.  
 
Furthermore, non-working as a ground for compulsory licensing remains 
important for several reasons. Although it is only one out of many possible 
                                                 
 
 
263 The complete requirements of Article 31 that: non-authorized uses should be considered on their 
individual merits; the proposed user should have made prior efforts to obtain authorization in reasonable 
commercial terms; the scope and duration of authorization is limited for the purposes authorized; the 
license is non-exclusive and non-assignable; the license is predominantly for the supply of the domestic 
market; the license is conditioned to be terminated when the circumstances that originated the 
authorization cease; adequate remuneration is paid; and decisions regarding the legality of authorization 
and the remuneration are subject to judicial or independent review. In addition, for compulsory licenses 
granted in order to allow the exploitation of a patent which is dependent upon a previous innovation: the 
second innovation must involve an important technical advance of considerable economic importance; the 
owner of the first (dominant) patent shall be entitled to a cross-license on reasonable terms and uses 
authorized with respect to the first patent shall be non-assignable except if assigned with the second 
patent.  
264 This interpretation in based upon article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement, establishing that patents “shall be 
available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of 
technology and whether products are imported or locally produced”. See also supra note 106 and 
accompanying text. 
265 Article 2 of the TRIPS Agreement establishes that “In respect of Parts II, III and IV of this Agreement, 
Members shall comply with Articles 1 through 12, and Article 19, of the Paris Convention (1967)” 
266 On May 30, 2000, the U.S. requested consultations with regard to provisions in Brazil’s patent law, 
which established working requirements conducive to the possible application of compulsory licenses and 
it was afterwards joined by the EC. The U.S. requested a Panel to be established on January 9, 2001. See 
Brazil, Measures Affecting Patent Protection, Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the U.S., 
WT/DS199/3, available at: http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_home.asp. Nonetheless, the U.S. withdrew its 
request and notified that a mutually agreed solution had been reached on July 19, 2001. See also Attaran 
and Champ, supra note 105.  
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grounds, this form of patent abuse has exercised an enormous influence in 
other compulsory licensing regimes as well as being the object of much 
criticism. Secondly, and as we mentioned, non-working could now be evaluated 
in global terms and hence, represent a case of patent abuse similar to patent 
suppression. In fact, one relevant aspect discussed in the eBay as well as other 
cases was precisely whether patentees should ever be obliged to work their 
patents. In a post-TRIPS world, the value of a compulsory licensing for non-
working cases could be precisely to impede that patented technologies remain 
idle, whereas it could hardly be supportive of national in discrimination of 
foreign firms267:  
 
“A major issue in a case such as that brought by the United States against Brazil 
is whether Article 27.1 was intended to prohibit WTO Members from adopting 
and implementing local working requirements, and effectively to supersede the 
Paris Convention rule. The negotiating history of TRIPS indicates that Members 
differed strongly on the issue of local working. Several delegations favoured a 
direct prohibition of local working requirements, but TRIPS did not incorporate 
a direct prohibition. Instead, it says that patent rights shall be enjoyable without 
discrimination as to whether goods are locally produced or imported. Under 
the jurisprudence of EC-Canada, this leaves room for local working 
requirements adopted for bona fide (i.e., non-discriminatory) purposes”268 
 
Although no case has so far directly addressed article 31 of the TRIPS 
Agreement, in the EC-Canada, a panel addressed the scope of a limited 
exception under article 30 finding that while such article recognized that the 
extent of patent rights would need to be balanced, the limiting conditions forth 
by the article signified that the intention was not “to bring about what would be 
equivalent to a renegotiation of the basic balance of the Agreement269.  
 
                                                 
 
 
267 Arguable exceptions are the provisions admitting compulsory licenses when national or domestic needs 
are not met, however, this case could be considered as preserving the interest of the public rather than as a 
protectionist measure.  
268 THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM: 1995-2003, FEDERICO ORTINO AND ERNST-ULRICH PETERMANN EDS., 
(Kluwer Law International, 2004) at p. 440.  
269 See Canada – Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DS114/R, 17 March 2000 (EC-Canada) case, 
at paragraph 7.26. See also Ibid at p. 7.45, addressing the interpretation of article 30 of the TRIPS 
Agreement and concluding, among other things, that the exception contained in the Canadian law, which 
included the activities of seeking product approval in foreign countries could be considered as a “limited 
exception”: “the exception is ‘limited’ because of the narrow scope of its curtailment of Article 28.1 rights. 
As long as the exception is confined to conduct needed to comply with the requirements of the regulatory 
approval process, the extent of the acts unauthorized by the right holder that are permitted by it will be 
small and narrowly bounded”.  
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3.2 Article 44 of the TRIPS Agreement 
Enforcement provisions were almost nonexistent in internationally harmonized 
IP before the TRIPS Agreement and still, the standards achieved by the TRIPS 
are comparatively few in comparison with substantive law. The fact that 
enforcement rules, including remedies, widely diverge among countries, 
created some difficulty during the Uruguay Round of Negotiations that settled 
the TRIPS Agreement. However, it is said that difficulties were relatively easier 
to overcome in comparison with the obstacles faced during negotiations of 
substantive standards270. This was a predictable outcome as the TRIPS, in spite 
of setting for the first time multilateral rules dealing with enforcement has 
maintained a vague language that favors open standards over rigid rules271. 
This, however, does not necessarily mean that harmonization of enforcement IP 
and patent law will not continue as it is part of an undergoing process272.  
 
Remedies are a fundamental piece of enforcement law and the TRIPS 
Agreement provides that member states shall make injunctions and damages 
available, among others measures for patent infringement cases273. Although 
the title of Article 44 refers to injunctions, this concept does not have a uniform 
meaning across different legal traditions, as it will be explained with greater 
detail in the sections examining national practices. Hence, negotiators preferred 
                                                 
 
 
270 See UNCTAD-ICTSD, supra note 41, at p. 579 referring: “The comparatively uncontroversial nature of 
the negotiations stood in contrast to the fact that significant differences in enforcement rules existed 
amongst legal systems and national laws, and that many developing countries participating in the 
negotiations actually lacked the infrastructure and resources to apply higher standards for the 
enforcement of IPRs”. See also DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS, 
(3rd edition, Sweet & Maxwell, 2008), at p. 440-441, referring that “the two principal stumbling blocks 
during the TRIPS discussions were the ironing out of differences amongst legal systems and the need to 
take account of many developing countries’ availability of resources”. Article 41(5) is said to address this 
latter concern by establishing that “this part does not create any obligation to put in place a judicial system 
for the enforcement of intellectual property rights distinct from that of the enforcement of law in 
general…” whereas the concern about maintaining the own legal traditions embedded in procedural rules, 
including remedies, was tackled through the avoidance of specific remedies in particular cases. 
271 See GERVAIS, supra note 270, at p. 441, highlighting the use of open-standards in the TRIPS section on 
remedies that he defines as “empowerment norms” requiring authorities to have the authority of ordering 
certain remedies, including damages and injunctions. 
272 See next section below. See also infra note 290 and accompanying text with regards to the proposal of 
ACTA. 
273 Articles 41 to 61 contain the enforcement rules that countries shall implement in the context of 
remedies, including the obligation to provide for expeditious remedies to prevent infringement and 
remedies which constitute a deterrent to further infringements (article 41); among others, injunctions 
(article 44) and damages (Article 45). A balance with the general objectives of the GATT and the TRIPS 
Agreement is embedded in the provision that enforcement procedures should avoid the creation of 
barriers to legitimate trade and provide safeguards against such abuse (Article 41.1) without forcing 
countries into “any obligation to put in place a judicial system for the enforcement of intellectual property 
rights distinct from that for the enforcement of law in general”. Likewise, the preamble of the TRIPS 
mentions that countries recognize the need for new rules concerning “c) the provision of effective and 
appropriate means for the enforcement of trade-related intellectual property rights, taking into account 
differences in national legal systems” (emphasis added).  
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to define the scope of the measure in article 44 (1) as "an order to desist from an 
infringement". Article 44 establishes the obligation to provide the judiciary with 
authority to award injunctions, inter alia, to prevent the entrance “into the 
channels of commerce in their jurisdiction of imported goods that involve the 
infringement of an intellectual property right, immediately after customs 
clearance of such goods”274. The TRIPS provisions on enforcement are generally 
applicable rules, in spite of the fact that the original motivation of the 
Agreement was to solve specific IP problems related to international 
exchanges275. Hence, the phrase “inter alia” used in article 44 serves to highlight 
that importation of infringing goods is only one out of many cases in which 
injunctive relief could be granted. 
 
The article applies to infringing activities that have started, since otherwise the 
infringer could not desist, and hence it does not refer to provisional or 
preliminary injunctions, which are found in article 50 (1) and aim at preventing 
further damage by infringing activities but rather to final or permanent 
injunctions. The article also provides that for "innocent infringement", such 
measure should not necessarily be available. 
 
Throughout the TRIPS negotiations, the availability of injunctive relief was 
highlighted as an important tool to deter infringement276. Due to the fact that 
the TRIPS Agreement does not require countries to award punitive damages 
and has a relatively flexible approach towards criminal sanctions, scholars have 
largely considered that the deterrent effect of injunctions plays a central role in 
patent enforcement277. However, article 44 states only that "judicial authorities 
shall have the authority" to grant injunctive relief. The question remains in 
which cases and under which circumstances could judicial authorities deny 
such remedy278.  
 
Beyond this minimum level, there is a wide scope for implementation of the 
article and hence, for the discretionary grant of injunctions by courts. Article 44 
(2), moreover, introduces the possibility of denying injunctions and links this 
case to the more classic framework of compulsory licenses established in article 
31:  
 
                                                 
 
 
274 Article 44 of the TRIPS Agreement makes reference to “injunctions” in the title of the article and then 
refers to an “order” for a party “to desist from an infringement”. 
275 See GERVAIS, supra note 270 at p. 450. 
276 See Heath, infra note 397.  
277 Ibid.  
278 See GERVAIS, supra note 270, arguing that this phrase "sets the level of the obligation imposed on WTO 
Members: judicial authorities must have the power to order the measures specified". 
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“(2) Notwithstanding the other provisions of this Part and provided that the 
provisions of Part II specifically addressing use by governments, or by third 
parties authorized by a government, without the authorization of the right 
holder are complied with, Members may limit the remedies available against 
such use to payment of remuneration in accordance with subparagraph (h) of 
Article 31. In other cases, the remedies under this Part shall apply or, where 
these remedies are inconsistent with a Member’s law, declaratory judgments 
and adequate compensation shall be available”.  
 
This paragraph was the result of discussion between developing and developed 
countries. The most salient feature it presents is the use of the word "adequate" 
remuneration, which is not common within the IP field and is only used in 
article 48 and 45 (adequate damages) and distinct from the standards of 
“reasonable” and “just” or “appropriate” compensation”279. However neither of 
these standards would necessarily be simpler to interpret280.  
4 A post-TRIPS landscape 
The ratification of the TRIPS Agreement was followed by widespread 
discussions about the scope for compulsory licenses, principally with respect to 
the problems faced by developing and least developed countries, which had to 
adapt their IP laws to the minimum –yet higher to previously existing- 
standards developed by the Agreement. Closely related to this discussion was 
the possible use of the “flexibility” left by the same Agreement in order to 
incorporate limitations and exceptions into national laws that could guarantee a 
national implementation suitable to each country’s level of development281. The 
debate specially focused on whether compulsory licenses could still be used 
after the TRIPS Agreement and in which term. A matter of particular concern 
was that some developing and least developed countries lacked the 
manufacture capabilities to produce nationally, so that in case they resort to 
compulsory licenses, the limitation of paragraph (f) of article 31 of the TRIPS 
Agreement establishing that “(f) any such use shall be authorized 
                                                 
 
 
279 See GERVAIS, supra note 270, at p. 205-206 and accompanying footnotes, arguing that: "While it is used 
in many articles of the GATT, only once it refers to appropriate compensation (Article XXVIII(4) (d), where 
the expression "adequate compensatory adjustment", is used in relation to balance of payments (BOPS). 
280 See Taubman, supra note 97, analyzing the different standards for remuneration and compensation of 
right holders as provided for by various International Law fields.  
281 With regard to the problem of implementing the TRIPS Agreement in developing and least developed 
countries as well as the effects of IP protection on economic development see Commission on Intellectual 
Property Rights, Integrating Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy, Final Report, UK Commission 
on Intellectual Property Rights, London (2002), available at: 
http://www.iprcommission.org/graphic/documents/final_report.htm. See also INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
AND DEVELOPMENT: LESSONS FROM RECENT ECONOMIC RESEARCH, CARSTEN FINK AND KEITH MASKUS EDS. 
(World Bank and Oxford University Press, 2005).  
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predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of the Member 
authorizing such use” could in fact hinder the use of compulsory licensing. This 
is because in case these countries authorize the use of a patented technology 
under a compulsory license, they would not be able to manufacture the 
product(s). 
 
These concerns and the lack of understanding about whether compulsory 
licensing could still be used are of special importance with respect to 
pharmaceutical patents which often clash with public health debates. In fact it 
was in this field that a crisis originated with the enactment of a patent law in 
South Africa in 1997, entitling the government to issue compulsory licenses and 
allowing parallel imports in order to face the health crisis related with the 
spread of AIDS and the high cost of patented drugs used for the treatment of 
this disease282. On February 1998, a group of 39 pharmaceutical companies 
initiated a lawsuit  against the government of South Africa challenging its 
“Medicines and Related Substances Act”, which in its Amendment 15(c) 
allowed for such compulsory licensing and parallel import provisions to be 
applied to pharmaceuticals. However, in 2001, an after an intense international 
campaign on the issue of patents and public health, the pharmaceuticals 
companies abandoned their cases. The surmounting pressure generated by this 
case, created momentum for the claims of developing and least developed 
countries, which led to a Declaration during the Doha Ministerial Conference 
with respect to the issue of public health and IP regulation.  
 
A paradox has taken place after the enactment of the TRIPS Agreement with 
regards to the interpretation of exceptions, grounds and limits for using 
compulsory licenses and especially with respect to the uncertain and diverging 
views as to their potential use to protect public interest. In fact, whereas at the 
multilateral level, this controversy has been increasingly addressed in multiple 
forums, such as the WTO283, the World Health Organization284, the WIPO285, 
and other international organizations along with the participation of Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs); at the bilateral and regional level, TRIPS-
plus standards have been approved through presumably non-transparent 
                                                 
 
 
282 See Carlos Correa, Investment Protection in Bilateral and Free Trade Agreements: Implications for the 
Granting of Compulsory Licenses, 26 Michigan Journal of International Law 331, 333 (2004), at p. 13. 
283 See the Doha Declaration, available at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.htm and the Cancun 
Declaration, available at: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/implem_para6_e.html   
284 SEE THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION COMMISSION ON INNOVATION, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND PUBLIC 
HEALTH, FINAL REPORT (2007) Available at: 
http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/report/en/index.html  
285 See discussions related with the Proposal for a Development Agenda within the WIPO, 2004. Available 
at http://www.wipo.int/ip-development/en/agenda 
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negotiations286. An important but still uncertain part of this movement is the 
increase in number of investment agreements addressing IP through TRIPS-
plus standards as well as the application of investment protection to IP rights. 
This trend could contradict the efforts taking place in multilateral organizations 
and in various other forums to facilitate the involvement of civil society in IP-
related decision-making to thereby address such issues from a multifaceted 
viewpoint and thus create a more balanced IP rights system.   
 
This paradox is also illustrated by the developments subsequent to the Doha 
Declaration, which created a transitory exception for compulsory licenses 
issued by countries lacking manufacture capabilities that was later incorporated 
in the first amendment –still to be enacted- of the TRIPS Agreement287. 
However, the system, which still exists on a transitory way, and which could be 
widely used by developing and least developed countries, has only been used 
once. The only notification on the use of the TRIPS exception mechanism has 
been made by Rwanda, a country that was however, not obliged to notify since 
it is a least developed country288.  
 
The deficient use of such a complicated and controversial system might be 
interpreted on the one hand as a failure, based upon arguments similar to those 
raised with respect to the lack of use of compulsory licenses in general. The 
counter argument often made is that any such system has important bargaining 
effects. For instance, countries such as Brazil have reiteratively used threats to 
issue compulsory licenses for different drugs and then they have negotiated for 
better prices with the involved pharmaceutical companies. However it would 
seem that only a few privileged countries could benefit of such bargaining 
position that allows them to make a credible threat. It is in this sense that the 
exception for countries lacking manufacturing capacity should improve their 
position. Nevertheless, it is also necessary to have an exporting country willing 
to use the system, in some cases at the cost of amending their own laws289.  
                                                 
 
 
286 See David Vivas-Eugui, Regional and Bilateral Agreements and a TRIPS-plus World: The Free Trade Area of 
the Americas (FTAA) (July 2003), available at: http://www.quno.org/geneva/pdf/economic/Issues/FTAs-
TRIPS-plus-English.pdf, at p. 6, defining TRIPS-plus Agreements as “commitments that go beyond what is 
already included or consolidated in the TRIPS Agreement” and explaining that such commitments may 
consist on: (1) the protection of a new area of IPRs; (2) the implementation of a more extensive standard; 
and (3) the elimination of an option for Members under the TRIPS Agreement by which such member 
could provided for a lower level of protection. See also ibid at p. 15 referring to the problem of 
undemocratic and non-transparent negotiations of the prospected FTAA and the U.S.-Chile FTA. 
287 See decision WT/L/641, on the Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, 6 December 2005, available at:  
 http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_E/trips_e/wtl641_e.htm 
288 See the text of the notification of importing country Rwanda, available at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/public_health_notif_import_e.htm. See also the text of 
the notification by exporter country Canada, the solely to have given such communication so far, available 
at: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/public_health_notif_export_e.htm  
289 A threat needs to be serious and credible in order to trigger a process of negotiation, which would 
probably be the case when the country has a large market and the capacity to manufacture. Examples 
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In parallel, and although most patent enforcement issues remain subject to 
national law, there is a surmounting pressure to agree on more harmonized and 
rigid standards290. While recent proposals might suggest that a global or a 
multilateral treaty could be achieved soon, the desirability of higher 
harmonized standards is uncertain -especially in the light of the problems that 
the eBay case in the U.S. and other discussions have evidenced-. In Europe, a 
similar controversy as to whether it would be desirable to agree upon higher 
harmonized standards for IP and patent enforcement surrounded the 
negotiations of the European Enforcement Directive and it has also been raised 
with respect to the negotiations on a community patent and the EPLA291.   
 
In brief, discussions on the use of compulsory licenses on the one hand and 
enforcement on the other have continued to occupy a central place even after 
the enactment of the TRIPS Agreement. Yet discussions have largely focused on 
a public interest dimension narrowly conceived as protecting public health in 
emergency cases. Public interest might be also affected through the blocking of 
innovation by patent strategic behavior, with some cases reflecting anti-
competitive pursuits while some others directly offending the balances 
entrenched in patent law.  
5 Remedies for patent infringement 
Remedies are part of procedural law, and in many cases pertain to general 
procedural laws rather than to IP or patent statutes. Nevertheless, a “special” 
treatment has often been offered to IP rights, with ambiguous consequences, at 
least from an efficiency viewpoint. In opposition to the history of compulsory 
                                                                                                                                               
 
 
include the controversial move of Thailand when it issued compulsory licenses on various drugs, 
including one for a heart disease (arguably not an emergency case), giving rise to a wide discussion on 
many legal subtleties of the interpretation of article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement. On precedent occasions, 
Brazil has also issued compulsory licenses and threats of issuing compulsory licenses that have 
subsequently led to renegotiations of the prices of medicines for AIDS treatment, showing a potentially 
welfare-enhancing effect of a credible threat to apply a liability rule. For an overview of these and other 
compulsory licenses see James Love, Recent examples of Compulsory licenses on patents. KEI RESEARCH NOTE 
2007:2, available at www.keionline.org. The examples of Brazil and Thailand could show that a serious 
threat in the international context is regrettably linked to the manufacturing capacity of the country and 
other factors which might not induce such countries that are probably most in need to use this system. 
290 See the recent efforts on the negotiation of Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement ACTA by the G-8 
members. This move has, however been criticized, among other reasons for the lack of transparency in 
negotiations. Although there are not available official texts, several organizations have published 
presumptive drafts. See http://ipjustice.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/ACTA-discussion-paper-1.pdf  
291 See Marco Ricolfi, The Proposed IP Enforcement Directive: Tough on Legitimate Competitors, Weak Against 
Pirates, ITALIAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, Giuffrè, 2004/1 arguing that the proposed Directive “fails to draw 
the most crucial of the distinctions relevant for designing optimal deterrence in the field of IP 
infringements, the distinction between pirates and legitimate competitors”. See also Cornish et al., infra 
note 366. 
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licensing, patent remedies and hence, the possibility that courts choose between 
a property and a liability rule in patent infringement cases, has predominantly 
remained subject to national law, even after the TRIPS Agreement. This section 
briefly discusses the common origin of the rule for equitable relief in the U.K. 
and the U.S. that permits to substitute injunctions –the quintessential property 
rule remedy- with damages. Then, the historical origins of the legal equivalents 
to property rules remedies in civil law countries, taking the example of Italy, 
which is shared –with some differences- by countries with a similar law 
tradition are described. A description of the most important historical 
developments of the law of remedies is however, only possible by making 
reference to the specific legal systems of different countries, something that is 
developed in more detail in the subsequent chapter. 
 
The goal of remedies and enforcement law are fundamentally alike throughout 
countries, i.e., to provide for a relief in case of infringement and to enforce or to 
act the principles expressed in substantive law. This apparently simple goal can 
be nevertheless achieved through rather different ways. Another question that 
emerges several times along this study is whether and to which extent can the 
“law of remedies” alter or attempt to re-adjust any balance pursued in 
substantive –patent- law. These aspects also imply the question of whether 
patent remedies should be different and in which sense they should differ from 
ordinary procedural law. As stated by a legal scholar from the U.S. that 
accounts for the history of remedies in order to find a modern proposition of 
this body of law: 
 
“The law of remedies is trans substantive, meaning that it cuts across other 
areas of substantive law. Remedies must be adjusted as necessary to take 
account of substantive policy goals, but remedies scholars start from a base of 
broadly applicable remedial principles. There is no reason to have a different 
law of damages, or a different law of injunctions, for each cause of action, as 
though we had never abandoned the writ system”292. 
 
5.1 Common law countries 
Common law countries have a particular approach toward remedies that allows 
wider discretion to choose between a property and a liability rule. In fact, the 
most recent developments towards the use of liability rules for patents have 
taken place in the U.S. where injunctions are considered an equitable remedy 
                                                 
 
 
292 Douglas Laycock, How Remedies Became a Field: a History, 27 REVIEW OF LITIGATION 161 (Winter 2008), 
161-267, at p. 165. 
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due to the historical division between common law and equity courts293. In their 
origin, common law courts were only competent to award damages providing 
retrospective compensation for past wrongs. Consequently, cases involving 
continuing wrongs posed the need for additional relief. It was precisely this 
restriction of common law courts that created the necessity for courts of equity. 
Conversely, courts of equity were able to give prospective relief through the 
grant of injunctions or specific performance but they could not award 
damages294. 
 
Such contradiction, however, ended with the enactment of the Common Law 
Procedure Act in 1854, which gave courts of common law a limited power to 
grant equitable relief as well as damages and finally with the Chancery 
Amendment Act 1858 -also known as Lord Cairns’ Act- which empowered the 
Court of Chancery, and by extension, other similar courts, to award damages: 
 
“In all cases in which the Court of Chancery has jurisdiction to entertain an 
application for an injunction against a breach of any covenant, contract, or 
agreement, or against the commission or continuance of any wrongful act, or 
for the specific performance of any covenant, contract, or agreement, it shall be 
lawful for the same Court, if it shall think fit, to award damages to the party 
injured, either in addition to or in substitution for such injunction or specific 
performance; and such damages may be assessed in such manner as the Court 
shall direct”295 (emphasis added) 
 
Thus, the wording of Section 2 of Lord Cairns’ Act not only enabled courts to 
award damages as a retrospective remedy and injunctions to restrain unlawful 
conduct in the future but also allowed them to award damages instead of an 
injunction, i.e., granting courts the discretionary power to award or deny 
injunctive relief296. The most important reason that courts initially considered to 
                                                 
 
 
293 See FRANCIS HILLIARD, THE LAW OF INJUNCTIONS, (Law Publications of Kay and Brothers: 1852), at p. 1, 
defining an injunction “as a prohibitory writ, specially prayed for by a bill in which the plaintiff’s title is 
set forth, restraining a person from committing or doing an act…which appears to be against equity and 
conscience”. See also Jaggard v Sawyer [1995] 2 All ER 189, Court of Appeal, 18 July 1994 at p. 1, classifying 
injunctions as mandatory which “require the defendant to observe a legal obligation or undo the effects of 
a past breach of legal obligation” or negative which “would restrain a defendant from committing 
breaches of legal obligation in future”. 
294 Ibid.  
295 See the Chancery Amendment Act 1858. Whereas the Common Law Procedure Act 1854 gave common 
law courts some power to award equitable remedies, the Chancery Amendment Act 1858 gave the 
Chancellor the power to grant damages in addition to, or in substitution for, an injunction or a decree of 
specific performance. 
296 See Jaggard v Sawyer, supra note 293, quoting from Jolowicz, Damages in Equity - A Study of Lord Cairns’ 
Act CLJ 224, 1975, who argued that “Despite the repeal of Lord Cairns’ Act, it has never been doubted that 
the jurisdiction thereby conferred on the Court of Chancery is exercisable by the High Court and by 
county courts”. 
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award of permanent injunctions was the inadequacy of other remedies 
available at law297. Whereas injunctions were firstly directed towards the 
protection of property, the concept of property rights rapidly evolved to 
encompass business interests and rights including personal and business 
reputation. Since it was a remedy of equity, judges had extensive discretion to 
award injunctive relief but limits were soon established through the 
development of –binding- precedents in order to avoid abuse of discretion298. 
 
The U.S. transposed these principles from the U.K. in a sequential process with 
the intervention of the Constitution, the Congress and the Courts299. The 
Constitution gave Congress the authority to create Federal Courts and the 
Congress then enacted the Judiciary Act of 1789, which created Federal Courts 
granting them original jurisdiction in common law or equity suits although 
limiting the use of equity to those cases where there was no “plain, adequate 
and complete remedy”300. In parallel, the U.S. Congress also enacted the Patent 
Act of 1790, which granted to “petitioner or petitioners, his, her or their heirs, 
administrators or assigns for any term not exceeding fourteen years, the sole 
and exclusive right and liberty of making, constructing, using and vending to 
others to be used, the said invention or discovery”301 as well as remedies for 
patent infringement302. 
 
The current U.S. Patent Act establishes a general requirement that patentees 
shall have remedies for patent infringement303. According to the Patent Act, 
                                                 
 
 
297 See London and Blackwall Ry. C. Cross (1886), 31 Ch. D. 354 at 369, where Judge Lindley affirmed that 
“the very first principle of injunction laws is that prima facie you do not obtain injunctions to restrain 
actionable wrongs, for which damages are the proper remedy”, quoted in ALDO FRIGNANI, L’INJUNCTION 
NELLA COMMON LAW E L’INIBITORIA NEL DIRITTO ITALIANO, Milano, Giuffrè (1974), at p. 145. 
298 See Doherty v. Allman (1878), 3 App. Cas. 309, p. 728-729, quoted in FRIGNANI supra note 297, at p. 156 
299 See Robinson v. Campbell, 16 U.S. 3 Wheat. 212 212 (1818), available at: 
http://supreme.justia.com/us/16/212/case.html, which ruled that “the remedies in the courts of the 
United States at common law and in equity are to be not according to the practice of state courts, but 
according to the principles of common law and, equity, as distinguished and defined in that country from 
which we derive our knowledge of those principles”.  
300 See Tomas Gomez-Arostegui, Prospective Compensation in Lieu of a Final Injunction in Patent and Copyright 
Cases, FORDHAM LAW REVIEW VOL. 78. (2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1355464  
301 See the U.S. Patent Act of 1790, available at: http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Patent_Act_of_1790. See 
also the current 35 U.S.C. 154(a)(1); U.S. Patent Act as modified in 1952 and granting patentees the "right to 
exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United 
States". 
302 Section 4 of the 1790 U.S. Patent Act established that “if any person or persons shall devise, make, 
construct, use, employ, or vend within these United States, any art, manufacture, engine, machine or 
device, or any invention or improvement upon (…) without the consent of the patentee or patentees (…) 
every person so offending, shall forfeit and pay to the said patentee or patentees, his, her or their 
executors, administrators or assigns such damages as shall be assessed by a jury, and moreover shall 
forfeit to the person aggrieved, the thing or things so devised, made, constructed, used, employed or 
vended, contrary to the true intent of this act, which may be recovered in an action on the case founded on 
this act”. 
303 35 U.S.C. 281. 
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damages should be “adequate to compensate for the infringement” at least 
corresponding to a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the 
infringer and may, in appropriate cases, be multiplied up to three times304. 
Injunctions were enshrined as a remedy for patent infringement since 1819305. 
However, initially injunctions were unavailable if the parties in litigation were 
from the same State306. Since then, U.S. law has reiteratively empowered courts 
with the possibility to grant injunctions307.  
 
With time, U.S. courts granted injunctions in patent infringement cases upon 
varying grounds, e.g. the necessity of avoiding repeated actions for each 
infringement308, the conception of rights and remedies as intrinsically linked 
and the “exclusive”309 and “property” nature of patents310. A more 
“economically based” justification based upon the error and information costs 
that courts would have to face were they to attempt substituting market 
bargaining outcomes in the calculation of damages has been more recently 
                                                 
 
 
304 35 U.S.C. 284. Moreover, successful plaintiffs are entitled to recover their costs and "in exceptional 
cases," may recover reasonable attorney fees, 35 U.S.C. 285.  
305 Act of Feb. 15, 1819, ch. 19, 3 Stat. 481 (providing that the federal courts adjudicating patent disputes 
"shall have authority to grant injunctions according to the course and principles of courts of equity."). 
Injunctions were included as a possible remedy for patent infringement in The Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 
§ 17, 5 Stat. 117 ("courts shall have power, upon bill in equity filed by any party aggrieved…to grant 
injunctions, according to the course and principles of courts of equity"); Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 55, 16 
Stat. 206 ("the court shall have power, upon bill in equity filed by any party aggrieved, to grant injunctions 
according to the course and principles of courts of equity"); Patent Act of 1897, ch. 391, § 6, 29 Stat. 694 
("The several courts vested with jurisdiction of cases arising under the patent laws shall have power to 
grant injunctions according to the course and principles of equity, to prevent the violation of any right 
secured by patent, on such terms as the court may deem reasonable."); Patent Act of 1922, ch. 58, § 8, 42 
Stat. 392 (same); Patent Act of 1946, ch. 726, 60 Stat. 778. See U.S. Brief eBay vs. MercExchange, op cit, at p. 
But see U.S. Brief for respondent in eBay vs. MercExchange at p. 22, explaining that “Although the Patent 
Acts of 1790 and 1793 did not explicitly authorize federal courts to issue injunctions in cases where they 
exercised subject matter jurisdiction arising under the patent laws, state equity courts could hear and issue 
injunctions in patent cases (until 1870), as could federal courts, sitting in diversity, on the "equity (…) side" 
306 See CHISUM supra note 43, quoting from William C. Robinson, The Law of Patents for Useful Inventions, § 
1082-83 (1890).  
307 Currently, the Patent Act 1952 (35 U.S.C. 283) establishes that: “The several courts having jurisdiction of 
cases under this title may grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the 
violation of any right secured by patent, on such terms as the court deems reasonable”. 
308 See Motte v. Bennett, 17 F. Cas. 909, 910-11 (C.C. D.S.C. 1849), ruling that (“the inventor…might be 
ruined by the necessity of perpetual litigation, without ever being able to have a final establishment of his 
rights”).  
309 See Continental Paper Bag co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 423-25, 430 (1908), “the inventor is 
one who has discovered something of value. It is his absolute property. He may withhold a knowledge 
from the public…From the character of the right of the patentee we may judge of his remedies. It hardly 
needs to be pointed out that the right can only retain its attribute of exclusiveness by a prevention of its 
violation…” (emphasis added).  
310 Matter of Mahurkar Double Lumen Hemodialysis Catheter Patent Litig., 831, F. Supp. 1354, 1397 (N.D. 
III. 1993), aff’d, 71; “the injunction creates a property right and leads to negotiations between the parties”. 
–substitute with a court decision -  
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adopted311. 
 
In spite of the varied interpretations with respect to the aims of injunctive relief, 
courts converged in a rather uniform reading of the adequacy of issuing 
injunctions after final determinations of infringement312. Such view continually 
narrowed the factual considerations of traditional equity courts into the 
assertion that injunctions should follow any finding of infringement which 
threatens to continue, a criterion similar to that applied in Italy and the UK, as 
described below. Such convergence in the application and interpretation of 
patent standards and the increasingly protective interpretation seems to have 
especially followed the creation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
in 1982313. It is in this context that we might include the practice of automatic 
grant of injunctions, which was in place until 2006 when the U.S. Supreme 
Court decided on the eBay case314.  
5.2 Civil Law countries 
The historical path of IP rights protection and of civil remedies in general, 
differs widely in civil law countries such as Italy with respect to common law 
countries. Even the linguistic terms use to describe the rights, their content and 
                                                 
 
 
311  Ibid, asserting that: “A private outcome of these negotiations whether they end in a license at a 
particular royalty or in the exclusion of an infringer from the market – is much preferable to a judicial 
guesstimate about what a royalty should be” 
312 See CHISUM supra note 43, chapter 10 “Remedies”. 
313 See Rochelle Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identity: The Federal Circuit Comes of Age (August 14, 
2008). BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL, VOL 23, 787 (2008), available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1226432, explaining the reasons that lead to the institution of the CAFC, among 
others, the perceived need for a specialized and more exactly a centralized court that could manage and 
improve the quality of decisions in the patent area and quoting also the opinions raised during the 
discussions preceding the establishment of the CAFC in Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Hearings 
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
97TH CONG., 42-43 (1981). 
314 Ibid, at p. 765, referring to a “reversing trend” that has occurred during the last few years where several 
important decisions of the US Supreme Court have signalled a disagreement with the position of the 
CAFC: “Perhaps most damning, the Supreme Court’s unprecedented activity in the patent arena indicates 
that it too is concerned about the Federal Circuit’s performance”.  Among such decisions are: MedImmune, 
Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764 (2007), KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007), Microsoft 
Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007) and KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) reversing 
the CAFC decision; eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006); Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. 
Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006) and Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005) vacating the 
CAFC decision; Lab. Corp. of Am. v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124 (2006), with a writ of certiorari 
dismissed as improvidently granted and a dissenting opinion by Justice Breyer; and Quanta Computer, Inc. 
v. LG Elec., Inc., 555 U.S. , 128 S. Ct. 2109 (2008), reversing the CAFC decision and expanding the 
application of the exhaustion or first sale doctrine. Probably the most important and widely discussed 
decisions have been KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) at p. 1730, where the Supreme Court 
rejected the rigid approach of the CAFC in interpreting the non-obviousness standard as be "inconsistent 
with § 103 and this Court's precedents"; MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764 (2007) where the 
Supreme Court also reversed the position adopted by the CAFC, which denied standing for declaratory 
actions to patent licensee’s and the eBay decision which is thoroughly  throughout this Thesis.  
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nature, remedies and actions are hardly equivalent. For instance, scholars of 
civil law countries have largely focused on the concept of diritti soggettivi -a 
concept that could be hardly translated as individual or subjective rights, or 
roughly approximated to the concept of “entitlements”315- in order to determine 
the remedies available to different rights. Furthermore, the independent study 
of rights and remedies and the pre-eminence of the former over the latter, has 
allegedly lead to comprise under the label of diritti soggettivi, such rights 
protected either by property rules, liability rules and even rights lacking any 
type of protection316. Likewise, the term inibitoria -understood as a remedy or a 
decision that bans or puts an end to infringing activities317- differs in important 
ways from its common law counterpart, the injunction, mainly because it does 
                                                 
 
 
315 A first difficulty in this comparative analysis regards the term “diritto soggettivo”, which is often 
translated either as subjective, individual or absolute right but might be more exactly described as the 
facultas agendi, which is the right, as opposed to the “diritto oggettivo” or norma agendi, which consist on 
the law. This is because, conversely to what happens in other languages where both terms tend to coincide 
(Italian “diritto”, Spanish “derecho”, German “recht” and Latin “ius”), both terms (right and law) are 
separate in English. Nonetheless, none of these terms completely grasps the meaning of the term, which is 
also complicated by the fact that there are several different meanings of “diritto soggettivo” and for this 
reason the term will be often referred to in Italian. Moreover, the enormous discussion surrounding the 
concept of “diritti soggettivi” falls out of the scope of this Thesis, especially when we take into account 
that the property and liability rules categories do not need the underlying right to be defined as a 
subjective right in order to apply. In one of its multiple meanings, a subjective right is understood as a 
right granting the owner the possibility of obtaining an order to stop the interference or infringement of 
her right, for others it is equivalent to the entitlement to a right. See UGO MATTEI, TUTELA INIBITORIA E 
TUTELA RISARCITORIA, CONTRIBUTO ALLA TEORIA DEI DIRITTI SUI BENI, Giuffre, 1987, at p. 248 on the concept 
of subjective rights and at p. 253, disagreeing on the equivalence between “diritto soggettivo” and 
entitlement:  a “subjective right” is in fact, in the European tradition, a paradigm of two different reactions 
of the legal system, as “tutela reale” (with the consequent application of a property rule) and “tutela 
aquiliana (with the consequential application of a liability rule). For these reasons, the concept of 
subjective right cannot be usefully applied to study conflicts between different property rights owners, 
given that in these cases, all property right owners are obviously entitled to such “subjective right” (free 
translation of the original text: “il diritto soggettivo e, infatti, nella tradizione europea, paradigma di due 
reazioni dell’ordinamento assai differenti fra loro come la tutela reale (conseguenza: property rule) e la 
tutela aquiliana (conseguenza: liability rule), cosa che non lo rende utilizzabile nello studio del conflitto fra 
proprietari contrapposti entrambi, ovviamente, titolari di diritti soggettivi”). 
316 See  MATTEI, ibid, at p. 252 arguing that the reiterative use of the concept of diritti soggettivi has led to 
neglect the concrete method of protection for such rights and as a result the entitlement of rights is 
considered as irrelevant, due to the fact that in many cases no specific advantage follows from the 
ownership of rights (free translation of the original text: “Per molto tempo l’aver descritto il sistema come 
fondato sull’ascrizione di diritti soggettivi ha comportato la disattenzione per il concreto modello di tutela, 
cosa che ha reso del tutto irrilevante per un soggetto sapersi titolare o meno di un diritto, visto che alla 
qualificazione non consegue, in molti casi, alcuno specifico vantaggio”); and at p 247 arguing that the 
concept of absolute rights, characteristic of Continental Law countries, does not permit to differentiate 
between property rules (tutela reale)  and liability rules (tutela aquiliana), given that it does not devote any 
attention for the remedy. 
317 See FRIGNANI supra note 297, at p. 242, mentioning the interchangeable use of the terms “azione 
inibitoria”, “inibitoria”, “interdizione” and “azione in cessazione” and defining all of them as a final 
decision aiming at stopping an activity or a situation that violates another’s right, or stopping the 
continuation or even the beggining of such situation; (free translation of the original text: “l’inibitoria che 
noi studiamo e una sentenza di condanna, mirante e far cessare un’attivita o uno stato lesivo del diritto 
altrui, o a inibire la continuazione o anche solo la commissione di tali atti”).  
Ex-post Liability Rules   
In Modern Patent Law  105  
 
 
not encompass all the possible orders that a common law judge might act 
through an injunctive order318.  
 
Therefore, legal analysis in civil law countries has focused much more on the 
study of rights rather than on remedies319. Remedies have instead occupied a 
central role in common law countries, probably due to the direct influence of 
Roman law that was perpetuated in countries that did not go through a process 
of codification320. Several scholars have highlighted how Roman Law was much 
more focused on the actions and remedies rather than on creating individual 
rights321 and how common law was especially influenced by the establishment 
                                                 
 
 
318 See UGO MATTEI, supra note 315, at p. 257, arguing that even though the inibitoria could be negative or 
mandatory, an injunction has a variable content which is able to adapt to the particolar circumstance, 
hence covering a more varied set of potential cases, which in the Italian system, are instead tackled 
through different legal institutions or doctrines. As a result, whereas it is easy to recognize a property rule 
in the injunction, this cannot be done with regard to the “inibitoria” (free translation of the original text: 
“(l’injunction) si sostanzia in un ordine dal contenuto variabile secondo lo scopo che e necessario 
raggiungere. In tal modo e idonea a coprire situazioni cui, nel sistema italiano, presiedono una pluralita di 
diversi istituti. Mentre quindi era possibile sostenere che il paradigma positivo della property rule si 
riscontra nell’injunction, altrettanto non sarebbe corretto fare riguardo all’inibitoria nella indagine sul 
sistema italiano”). However, the inibitoria, which we is often translated as injunction, should not to be 
confused with the term “ingiunzione”, which is a special procedure used to execute a debt and established 
by articles 633 ss. of the Italian Civil Procedure Code or with the “inibitoria processuale”, which is used to 
suspend the provisory execution and established by article 351 of the Italian Procedural Code. 
319 See UGO MATTEI, supra note 52 at p. 251, arguing that such attention for the remedy was conversely 
absent from the European legal tradition, whereby the “diritti soggettivi” were never conceived as a 
decentralized instrument for decisions and consequently, the concrete content of the rights has been never 
grasped, (free translation of the original text: (“L’ attenzione per il remedy e viceversa mancata nella 
tradizione europea. I diritti soggettivi non sono mai stati pensati come strumento di decentramento per le 
decisioni, e conseguentemente, non si e mai giunti ad un contenuto concreto dei diritti stessi”). 
320 See ADOLFO DI MAJO, LA TUTELA CIVILE DEI DIRITTI, (2nd Ed. Giuffre, 1993), at p. 64, explaining that the 
Roman Law tradition was perpetuated in the Common Law system, which did not experience the 
phenomenon of codification. Until the nineteenth century, English law was characterized by a rigid system 
of typical actions (forms of action), which were almost real “molds” within which the claims of individuals 
(each action) had to fit, and whereby each action was characterized by a its own discipline and procedure 
(eg. the real action in defense of real property as well as the action of debt which occurs whenever 
someone had a sum of money to other one, (free translation of the original text: “L’impianto del sistema 
Romanistico si e perpetuato com’e noto, nei sistemi di Common Law ossia in quei sistemi che non hanno 
conosciuto il fenomeno della codificazione. Fino al diciannovesimo secolo il diritto inglese era 
contraddistinto da un sistema rigido di azioni tipiche (forms of action), quasi dei veri e propri «stampi» 
entro i quali dovevano essere «calate» le pretese dei soggetti, ciascuna (azione) caratterizzata da una sua 
propria disciplina e procedura (ad es. la real action a difesa della real property cosi come l’action of Debt 
che ricorreva ogni qualvolta taluno doveva una somma di danaro ad altri...)”. 
321 See DI MAJO, supra note 320, at p. 64 explaining that the well-known maxim "ubi jus ibi remedium” 
might be easily transformed in that of "ubi jus ibi remedium "... in old legal systems (eg. Roman Law), 
individual rights were laid down from the various remedies (...) For instance, the property concept in 
Roman Law, whereby an individual could be recognized as the owner of a property was deducted from 
the typical remedy of legis actio sacraments (...) In this sense, Roman law did not recognized a protection 
for property rights in abstract, (free translation of the original text: “Il brocardo notissimo “ubi jus ibi 
remedium potrebbe essere con facilita capovolto in quello “ubi remedium ibi jus”...In ordinamenti del 
passato (ad es. In quello romanistico), la enunciazione dei diritti del singolo si e andata formando in via di 
derivazione dai vari rimedi, prima privati e poi giudiziali, previsti a tutela di determinati interessi. Nel 
diritto romano ad es. La tutela dell’interesse del singolo ad essere riconosciuto quale dominus di un bene 
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of a rigid number of forms of actions, each one following its own procedures 
and formalities322. With time, such formalities were softened but their effect still 
endures on a legal reasoning that conceives rights as the result and not the 
premise of remedies323.  
 
Conversely, countries with a civil law tradition lived an early process of 
transformation, especially with the work of the glossators that gave precedence 
to rights and little attention to remedies324. The glossators interpreted the 
categories of actions in rem and actions in personam as deriving the categories of 
diritti reali e diritti di credito so that different actions to protect rights transmuted 
into categories of rights325 and in fact, the categories of tutela reale and tutela 
personale are more directly related to the type of right –reale or personale- rather 
than the type of remedy granted.  
 
Nevertheless, the remedy of inibitoria has a remote antecedent in the actio 
negatoria of Roman law, through which the owner could obtain protection 
against disturbances on her possession. In fact, the term negatoria is still used to 
refer to the inibitoria in order to highlight its origin rooted in Roman law and 
probably also the equivalence between negatoria and inibitoria326. In addition to 
                                                                                                                                               
 
 
veniva desunto da quel rimedio tipico di tutela che era la legis actio sacramenti...Il diritto romano non 
conosceva una enunciazione della proprieta in astratto”).  
322 See ibid, at p. 70, applying the same arguments to the process of codification in France.  
323 Ibid at p. 65, arguing that even though the forms of action disappeared from substantive English Law, the 
system kept an important track of them. In this system, the configuration of abstract claims, that is, of 
“diritti soggettivi”, is the result and not the premise of the different type of typical and atypical remedies 
that the system provides; (free translation of the original text: “the remedies for protection, and typical or 
atypical, which administers the system and widening or “anche con la scomparsa del sistema delle forms of 
action il diritto sostanziale inglese ha mantenuto tracce non indifferenti di esso. In esso la configurazione di 
astratte pretese ossia di diritti soggettivi e il risultato, non la premessa, dei rimedi di tutele, tipici e/o atipici, 
che il sistema somministra"). 
324 See MATTEI, supra note 315, at p. 250 quoting from Lawson-Markesinis, TORTIOUS LIABILITY FOR 
UNINTENTIONAL HARM IN THE COMMON LAW AND IN THE CIVIL LAW, Cambridge, 1982, at p. 37 which puts 
forward the argument that the evolution from an approach based upon the remedies (legis actions) to a 
substantial approach had initiated in the Civil Law system in the historical period which coincided with 
the work of the post-glossators and which was completed by the work of the Natural Law school, (free 
translation of the original text:  “l’evoluzione da un approccio remediale (legis actions) ad uno sostanziale 
sarebbe iniziato nei sistemi di civil law nel periodo coincidente con l’opera dei post glossatori e sarebbe 
stato complete con la classificazione dei giusnaturalisti”. See also DI MAJO, supra note 320, arguing that the 
right and the remedy lost contact in the Civil Law tradition and as a consequence a trend emerged that 
focused on the right. Conversely, this trend is absent from the Common Law tradition, (free translation of 
the original text: “perso il contatto fra right e remedy e fiorita una tendenza a declamare sui rights; tale 
tendenza e assente nella tradizione del common law”). 
325 See Ibid, at p. 73.  
326 See FRIGNANI supra note 297, at p. 242. See also Cristina Rapisarda Sassoon, Profili della tutela inibitoria 
atipica nell’esperienza germanica, RIVISTA DI DIRITTO PROCESSUALE , VOL. 38 (1983), p. 93-129, at p. 101, 
explaining that this configuration is highly correlated to the azione negatoria against the violation of a 
property right as it was extended throughout the experience of the Common Law, where, as it is well-
known, distance was taken from the Roman Law tradition of the negatoria servitutis in order to embrace 
with this action, any interference against a property right that would not fall under the rivendica. This 
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the negatoria, which served to protect a property right from disturbances, its 
counterpart within Roman Law, the actio confessoria, allowed the owner of an 
easement to assert her right against the owner327.  
5.2.1 Creation of rights and choice of remedies 
Except for the abovementioned differences with the common law injunction, 
the inibitoria still confers protection through a property rule. Hence, some 
scholars have justified the use of the inibitoria as the proper remedy for absolute 
rights that is, for rights valid erga omnes and granting their owner a ius 
excludendi alios328. In more general terms it is also argued that such vision would 
a priori set the remedy according to the right ascribing to remedies only a 
secondary and instrumental role with respect to the right itself329. Finally, it has 
                                                                                                                                               
 
 
correlation is mainly due to the fact that the negatoria was codified in this ample aception in § 1004 del 
B.G.B., (free translation of the original text “questa configurazione e strettamente correlata alla azione 
negatoria contro la violazione del diritto di proprieta cosi come era venuta estendendosi nel corso 
dell’esperienza del diritto comune, ove come, noto, ci si era allontanati dal modello romanistico 
tradizionale della negatoria servitutis, per abbracciare, con questa azione, ogni interferenza al diritto di 
proprieta, che non trovasse gia sulla sua strada la reazione della rivendica. Tale correlazione e da 
imputarsi in maniera principale al fatto che la negatoria venne codificata in questa ampia estensione al § 
1004 del B.G.B”. Ibid, concluding that, a historical consequence of these developments, is that the 
requirement of damage was not necessary when the holder is protected through a property rule and 
conversely, only prove of the infringing behavior is enough to obtain such protection.  
327 This aspect resembles the bi-directional nature of disturbances highlighted in Coase and C&M 
reasoning, which refers to the fact that any situation can be analyzed both from the perspective of the 
plaintiff and from that of the defendant and hence the right that would be protected through a liability or a 
property rule can be allocated to either one of the parties. Roman Law already provided for a remedy 
suitable for either party to protect her right. 
328 See Cristina Rapisarda Sassoon, Voce Inibitoria, DIGESTO DELLE DISCIPLINE PRIVATISTICHE, SEZIONE CIVILE, 
IX, UTET, Quarta Edizione, at p. 484 arguing that the link between the protection through the “inibitoria” 
and absolute rights was already affirmed implicity under the 1865 Civil Code. Faced with the absense of 
legal provisions on the admissibility of the actio negatoria for the property right holder, the majority of 
legal scholars were in favor of granting it on the basis of art. 439 of the Civil Code, even though this latter 
refer explicitly only to the action of rivendica, based upon the exclusive nature of property rights. In this 
way, the conception of the inibitoria as the protection of the ius excludendi, which is implicit in the 
structure of absolute rights made its way, (free translation of the original text: “Il collegamento tra la tutela 
inibitoria e i diritti assoluti era gia stato implicitamente affermato sotto il vigore del codice civile del 1865. 
Di fronte al silenzio della legge sull’ammissibilita di un’actio negatoria del proprietario, la maggioranza 
degli interpreti si mostro infatti favorevole a concederla sul fondamento dell’art 439 c.c., che pur si riferiva 
espressamente alla sola azione di revindica, sul presupposto del carattere esclusivo del diritto di proprietà. 
Si era gia fatta strada, in questo modo, la concezione dell’inibitoria come proiezione processuale dello ius 
excludendi implicito nella struttura del diritto assoluto…”. 
329 See Rapisarda, ibid, at p. 485, arguing that this approach is on the one hand outdated, given that it 
assigns a secondary and instrumental role to the protection of the right and on the other hand it is 
methodologically wrong since it theoretically deduces the protection from an apriori definition of the 
right, (free translation of the original text: “(...) da un lato storicamente superato, poiche attribuisce alla 
tutela un ruolo secondario e strumentale rispetto alla titolarita del diritto protetto, e dall’altro lato 
metodologicamente scorretto, poiche desume astrattamente la tutela da una definizione aprioristica delle 
situazioni giuridiche protette”). 
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been also pointed out that such rigid conception could thwart the adaptation of 
remedies to emergent needs330.  
 
The current Italian Civil Code provides for actions as rivendicazione and 
negatoria that, in the absence of unified principles, have to be interpreted by the 
judges always by reference to the underlying rights331. In addition, the 
provisional measures established by article 700 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 
present a particular case, since the categorization of rights as absolute or 
relative can in principle only be given by law332 whereas such provisional 
measures applicable to all civil law litigation have been widely extended by 
judicial interpretation333. In fact, the provisional measures of article 700 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure have been considered by scholars as an equivalent to 
common law injunctions334. The importance of this legal provision has 
surpassed the initial intention of the legislator and has –perhaps improperly- 
been extended to cases in which a petition for a preliminary measure hides the 
need for a prompt final decision335.  
                                                 
 
 
330 See Rapisarda, ibid, at p. 485 arguing that the conception of the inibitoria as the protection for absolute 
rights hardly allows the remedy to be adapted to the demands of protection that progressively emerge 
with time, (free translation of the original text: “la concezione dell’inibitoria come tutela dei diritti assoluti 
rende difficilmente adattabile il rimedio alle esigenze di tutela progressivamente emergenti”). 
331 See DI MAJO, supra note 320, at p. 66, arguing that differently than in the past, this discipline is currently 
interpreted by judges in a case-by-case basis giving rise to atypical remedies created by the method known 
as “diritto pretorio”.  
332 See DI MAJO, ibid, at p. 12, arguing that in Common Law countries, remedis are chosen by judicial 
decisions whereas in Civil Law countries, this decisioni s made by the legislative branch, which is in 
charge of attributing rights, a fact that helps explaining why the protection of rights in Common Law 
countries is espresse through remedies and nto through rights, (free translation of the original text: ”Nel 
sistema di Common Law il giudizio di rilevanza degli interessi che si intendono proteggere e dato dai 
giudici e cio in occasione della concessione del rimedio mentre, nel sistema di Civil Law, questo giudizio 
promana dal legislatore ed ha la veste, si e detto, della norma attributiva di diritti. Il che dovrebbe spiegare 
la ragione per cui, nel sistema di Common Law, la forma di protezione dell’interesse e espressa in termini 
di rimedi e non di diritti”).  
333 See Ibid at p. 67, arguing that judges have often come up with rights and the qualification as diritti 
soggettivi in order to guarantee a protection for certain rights, as it happened for instance with the right to 
a personal identity. 
334 See MATTEI, supra note 315 at p. 260, referring to article 700 of the Civil Procedural Code, which has 
been recently examined by judges and scholars and has progressively assumed a role in practice that can 
make it assimilable to the Common Law injunction.  
335 See MATTEI, ibid at p. 261, referring the use of this article even outside of the context of provisional 
measures and with the aim of obtaining a property rule precisely in those cases where it is most doutbful 
that this would be convenient, (free translation of the original text: “E ormai notorio che quest’articolo 
viene utilizzato sempre piu al di fuori dallo schema interlocutorio, allo scopo di ottenere la 
formalizzazione di un property right proprio in quei casi in cui l’assetto e piu dubbio”); and at p. 264, 
concluding that from a functional point of view –which often prevails in comparative law studies- it is 
legittimate to draw analogies between the injunction and the action provided by art. 700 of the Code of 
Civil Procedure, (free translation of the original text: “da un punto di vista funzionale, appare piu che 
legittimo, in un’analisi comparativa, evidenziare, come e stato fatto, l’analogia fra la injunction e l’azione 
ex art. 700 c.p.c.”. See also AIELLO, GIACOBBE, PREDEN, GUIDA AI PROVVEDIMENTI DI URGENZA, Milano, 1982, at 
p. 299 ss, arguing that it is well-known between practitioners of the industrial law field that, hiding behind 
the scheme of provisory measures, plaintiffs are really seeking a final measure or remedy for the 
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Likewise, the use of final orders of inibitoria in the industrial property336 realm 
has followed both legislative action and judicial interpretation337. Scholars have 
provided, among others, two explanations for the supremacy of the azione 
inibitoria for industrial property rights that seem compatible to one another. The 
first is the the need of protection which is said to be particularly important in 
this field due to the nature of the rights, that is, a rights-centered explanation 
and a second explanation is based upon the influence of foreign laws where 
similar rules have flourished338.  
5.2.2 The inibitoria in the Industrial property context  
Since the availability of the inibitoria has been mostly decided from the 
perspective of the category of right protected it is important to point out that IP 
rights including patents, have been mostly considered among continental 
Europe countries as absolute rights339. This conception corresponds to the 
prevailing justification of IP rights proposed from different perspectives that 
combine economic as well as well as non-economic rationales340. In fact, the 
industrial laws of continental Europe were influenced by theories justifying the 
                                                                                                                                               
 
 
protection of their rights, (free translation of the original text: “chiunque abbia un minimo di esperienza 
del sistema di relazioni industriali sa benissimo che qui, occultandosi dietro lo schema formale di un 
sistema cautelare in via di anticipazione, il ricorrente cerca in realta di soddisfare un’esigenza di tutela 
definitiva”).  
336 The reference to industrial property follows the choice of the Italian Legislator which grouped all 
intellectual property rights with the exception of copyrights and related rights into a sole Code of 
Industrial Property in 2005. This choice has been criticized especially because it does not follow the latest 
trend marked by the TRIPS Agreement of including all intellectual property rights categories together.  
337 Previous laws also provided for this remedy, including article 83 of the (R.D. 29 giugno 1939, n. 1127, 
Testo delle disposizioni legislative in materia di brevetti per invenzioni industriali for patents; and article 
66 of the Regio decreto 21 giugno 1942, n. 929, Testo delle disposizioni legislative in materia di marchi 
registrati for trademarks.  
338 See FRIGNANI supra note 297, at p. 300, referring that the debated nature of industrial property rights 
and quoting authoritative authors such as: Franceschelli, Struttura monopolística degli istituti di diritto 
industriale, in Riv. Dir. Ind., 1956, I, p. 137 (as monopoly rights); ASCARELLI, TEORIA DELLA CONCORRENZA 
(developing a competition based theory); ROTONDI, DIRITTO INDUSTRIALE, pp. 95, 112 ss., 194 ss. 311 
(denying the autonomy of trademarks and considering these as accessories to the rights of the 
firm’owner).  Frignani argues that such scholarly debate do not seem to lead to any practical consequence 
with respect to the means of protection for which it is necessary to refer to the law and quoting as 
supportive the decisions of several courts which basically base their arguments on the conception of 
intellectual creations as intangible rights.  
339 See ASCARELLI, supra note 186, at p. 317. 
340 See ASCARELLI, supra note 186 at p. 305, arguing that it is necessary to identify the right over the 
intangible good with the patrimonial or economic right whereas the moral rights belong to the general 
protection belonging to each individual and also existing with respect to intellectual creations, (free 
translation of the original text: “ritengo invece necessario identificare il diritto sul bene immateriale in 
quello patrimoniale, mentre la generale tutela morale di ogni soggetto per ogni sua azione e poi invocabile 
anche per gli atti di creazione intellettuale (…)E appunto questa speciale disciplina (che poi segna, a mio 
aviso, una sicura superiorita della tradizione dell’Europa continentale, rispetto a quella angloamericana) 
che, in sostanza, si vuole indicare facendo capo all’esistenza di un diritto morale”).  
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granting of IP rights as a means to appropriate the fruits of one’s labor341 as well 
as those based upon the necessity of giving incentives for the progress of the 
science and the arts. Probably as a consequence, rights have been largely 
conceived as absolute and at the same time limited under an apparent 
contradiction that is however understandable in the light of the public 
interest342. The public interest requires that incentives are in place for progress 
yet at the same time calls for limiting the exclusive rights not only in terms of 
duration but also and importantly through requirements such as the actual 
working of inventions and the remedies granted in cases of infringement of 
such rights343. 
 
The interest that the legislator seems to protect in creating such absolute rights 
is the public interest to foster innovation and progress which might benefit 
from the fact that the inventor profits from her invention344. This vision of rights 
over intellectual creations as absolute is at the same time a limited approach, 
which is compatible with the view that IP rights might be substituted or 
complemented with other reward mechanisms as prizes and public financing 
and also transformed into a right to receive remuneration as it happens 
precisely under compulsory licensing provisions345. In particular, compulsory 
                                                 
 
 
341 See Ibid, p. 305 ss, referring to the theory developed by Locke and which can also be found in the 1776 
Virginia Declaration of Rights. A critique of Lockes’ theories is found in ASCARELLI, ibidd, at p. 305, 
arguing that Locke only presents a iusnaturalist point of view, which apart from its historical value with 
respect to abolishing a system of arbitrary privileges has the defect of defending a natural right, which is 
out of historical context, (free translation of the original text: ”non fa che presentare un’istanza 
giusnaturalista che –a parte il grandissimo valore che le si deve riconoscere sul terreno storico quale arma 
che venne usata per far venir meno un sistema di privilegi discrezionalmente concessi dall’autorita- ha il 
vizio di ogni istanza giusnaturalista e cioe quello di postulare un diritto fuori della storia del quale quello 
storicamente attuato non sarebbe che uno specchio”). 
342 Ibid, at p. 307, arguing that the ultimate justification of any type of protection is always the public 
interest, which serve sto justify the existence of an absolute right to use these intellectual creations. 
343 ASCARELLI, supra note 186 at p. 308 the problem that legislators have with regard to absolute rights to 
use intellectual creations shall always refer on the one hand to the need of protection and on the other 
hand to the limits that should be given to that protection, in order to attain the goals of fostering progress, 
which justifies such protection, and precisely the remedies granted against the infringement of such 
rights, (free translation of the original text: “il problema legislativo in temi di diritti assoluti 
all’utilizzazione di creazioni intellettuali deve far sempre capo, da un lato a una tutela e dall’altro pero ai 
limiti che a questa devono porsi, perchè venga raggiunta quella finalita di progresso che poi giustifica la 
tutela, onde appunto le sanzioni poi a volte dettate per la mancata attuazione della creazione 
intellettuale” (emphasis added) 
344 See ASCARELLI, supra note 186, at p. 309, describing the content of this absolute right as entitling the 
owner with probability of profit from the use of the intellectual creation. 
345 Ibid, at p. 311, arguing that defining the interest protected by the absolute right to use intangible goods 
in the probability of profit from the use of the intangible goods explains how the exclusive right of use can 
sometimes substitute a prize by the state (.. .) or how the absolute right could consist on remuneration 
obtained from the users (...) In the above mentioned considerations we can also find an explanation for the 
recognition of an absolute right reconciled with a compulsory licensing for use, (free translation of the 
original text: “L’identificazione dell’interesse tutelato dal diritto assoluto di utilizzazione dei beni 
immateriali in quello della probabilita di guadagno realizzabile nell’utilizzazione della creazione tutelata, 
spiega poi come al diritto esclusivo di utilizzazione possa a volte sostituirsi un premio da parte dello stato 
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licensing has been considered as an important policy tool to handle the 
accumulation of protected inventions that can interfere with a competitive 
structure of the market and retard progress346. This “balanced” view on the 
interface between competition and IP rights reflects indeed an early attempt to 
balance the conflicting interests involved in these two legal disciplines347.  
 
The absoluteness of IP rights and especially of patents –even within the above 
described limits- and their exclusive nature –ius excludendi alios-, naturally led to 
their conceptual approximation with the legal theory of property348, under a 
view that departed from the English and U.S. traditions of considering IP as 
monopolies or privileges349. Under a property conception of the intellectual 
creations, the infringement is actually banned with respect to the right itself, 
that is as a good, which can be the object of property rights and not with respect 
to the actvitities that are pursued by infringers350. At the same time, however, 
scholars recognized how the conception of property could allow a level of 
protection higher than necessary351 and hence warned against any attempt to 
                                                                                                                                               
 
 
(...) o come il diritto assoluto possa concernere, anziche l’utilizzazione, un compenso da parte degli utenti 
(...) Egualmente ritroviamo nelle considerazione anteriore la spiegazione del come il riconoscimento di un 
diritto assoluto possa essere conciliato con l’obbligatorieta di licenze per l’utilizzazione”). 
346 Ibid, at p. 312 highlighting how the concentration intellectual property rights, especially in the hands of 
a few, can accentuate the problem of monopolies and how such problem might risk to block progress 
precisely in a discipline that is supposed to foster it; whereas the problem might necessitate solutions as 
the use of compulsory licenses to any interested party. 
347 It is indeed interesting to highlight how this view coincides with current explanations based upon 
dynamic efficiency that seek to approximate the goals of competition law and IP law.  
348 See ASCARELLI, supra note 186, at p. 318, explaining how rights over intellectual creations had been 
approximated to property rights since the intangibile goods were identified as the good over which the 
owner could enjoy ownership.  
349 Ibid at p. 318-319, arguing that this was indeed the argument advanced by the same historical claim on 
continental Europe of a discipline of absolute rights to use of intellectual creations, overcoming on the 
French tradition (...) the ambiguity still present in the law of the United States. This framework has been 
indeed affirmed, precisely in contrast to a system of monopolies and privileges claiming the freedom for to 
market access and competition and against which the absolute right of authors of intellectual creations 
was precisely based on objective grounds namely on the existence of an independent and individualized 
good (free translation of the original text, (free translation of the original text: “E stata questa invero la tesi 
avanzata con la stessa affermazione storica sul continente europeo di una disciplina dei diritti assolutti 
all’utilizzazione di creazioni intellettuali, superandosi, nella tradizione francese (e in connessione, 
noteremo trattando del diritto d’autore, con la formazione di una intellettualita laica percio rivendicante la 
«sua proprieta») l’ambiguita tutt’ora presente nel diritto degli Stati Uniti. Questa disciplina si e invero 
affermata appunto in contrasto con un sistema di monopoli e privilegi rivendicando la liberta d’accesso al 
mercato e di concorrenza, liberta nei cui confronti il diritto assoluto degli autori di creazioni intellettuali 
veniva fondato appunto su presupposti oggettivi e cioe sull’esistenza di un bene autonomo e 
individualizzato”). 
350 Ibid, at p. 320, arguing the object of a monopoly right is an activity whereas an absolute right over 
intellectual creations is always referred to the intangible good.   
351 Ibid, at p. 322, arguing that this transformation is characterized on the one hand by a higher protection 
of the right holder who will be protected against any use of the good by anyone else regardless of the 
subjective possibility of having suffered any damage, and on the other hand by the identification of a safe 
criterion of delimitation of the right, (free translation of the original text: “Questo passaggio si traduce da 
un lato in una maggiore tutela del titolare del diritto che sara cosi protetto in relazione a qualsiasi 
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disregard the underlying –and ultimate- public interest purpose of IP right 
protection352. In a sense, it is however, contradictory, how the “property” thesis 
has been defended on grounds similar than the critics now posed against it353. It 
would seem that defining the right as a monopoly or as property might be 
irrelevant and what matters are the consequences deriving from either 
proposition in terms of patent design354. In fact, Italian scholar Ascarelli, while 
defending the “property” approach nevertheless recognized that defining IP 
rights as property would not necessarily mean the absence of limits given that it 
is the structure of IP that resembles property whereas its function is inherently 
conditioned to the attainment of public interest purposes355. Moreover, the 
recognition that the object of IP protection differs from tangible property356 and 
                                                                                                                                               
 
 
utilizzazione del bene, a chiunque altro preclusa e indipendentemente da esame di requisiti soggettivi 
dell’altrui comportamento o di possibilita di danno, dall’altro nell’identificazione di un sicuro criterio di 
delimitazione del diritto stesso”). 
352 Ibid, at p. 323, defending the theory of property as an important evolution in the justification of this 
discipline but nevertheless highlighting that an important distinguishing feature of the angloamerican 
system is the ultimate justification upon the progress of the sciences and the arts.   
353 See ASCARELLI, supra note 186, at p. 323 arguing that this demonstrates the inappropriateness of making 
use of the monopoly to explain these rights. In fact, the reference to monopoly entails a general prohibition 
of carrying out activities with respect to such monopoly whereas the theory of intangible rights 
accentuates the general freedom to exercise any economic activity and with an exceptional prohibition 
with carrying out the activities with regard to the owner of a right (…) the theory of monopoly emphasizes 
an exceptional right to use instead of an exceptional prohibition, something that is explained by the origin 
of the discipline which aimed at abolishing a general system of monopolies instead than affirming a 
general principle of freedom, but it is currently  improper, (free translation of the original text: “Questo 
aspetto (…) torna tuttavia proprio a dimostrare l’infelicità del ricorso allo schema del monopolio (…). 
Invero il richiamo al monopolio presuppone un generale divieto di esercizio di una attività nei cui 
confronti allora si pone una eccezionale libertà della stessa; la disciplina dei beni immateriali si coordina 
invece con una generale libertà di esercizio di attività (...) e con un eccezionale divieto di detto esercizio in 
casi determinati nei confronti di chi non sia il titolare del diritto (...) parlando di monopolio si finisce per 
porre l’accento su una eccezionale facoltà, anziche su un eccezionale divieto, ciò che riesce spiegabile 
tenendo presente l’origine dell’istituto (sorto piuttosto in connessione con l’abolizione di un generale 
sistema di monopolio, anzichè con l’affermazione di un generale principio di libertà), ma attualmente 
invece incongruo”.  
354 Ibid, at p. 325, criticizing the property theory advanced by French scholars on the grounds that in spite 
of using the logic of property it makes reference to the a right over the market, hence reproducing the 
rationale of IP as monopolies, (free translation of the original text: “E il rimprovero che, a mio avviso, puo 
muoversi alla dottrina francese ora dominante che, nel conciliare il tradizionale ricorso francese alla 
proprieta con gli aspetti funzionali della disciplina, fa poi capo alla configurazione dei diritti sui beni 
immateriali come diritti alla clientela (...) In sostanza la tesi del diritto alla clientela non fa che riprodurre, 
in termini di proprieta, quella del diritto di monopolio”).  
355 Ibid, at p. 324, distinguishing between the functional and structural aspects, whereby the legal 
discipline of intangible goods legal belongs to competition law and hence is functionally related to the 
protection of the probability of profit from the market; whereas structurally, such exclusive rights can be 
framed under the discipline of property rights understood as absolute rights over a good.  
356 Ibid, at p. 325 ss., highlighting the important difference between tangible and intangibile goods, which 
is rightly grasped in the concept of economic “public goods”. In this sense, Ascarelli already sustained that 
the conception of absolute rights over intangibile goods is an indication of the formal characteristics of the 
right but should lead to neglect the differences between tangible goods and intellectual creations, (free 
translation of the original text: “Il ricorso alla proprieta nella configurazione del diritto assoluto di 
utilizzazione sui beni immateriali (…) al quale si e fatto capo in queste pagine vuole invero indicare solo le 
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that excesses might derive from the “property” logic applied to IP rights, is 
sensible to modern patent controversies. Two important consequences were in 
fact put forward early on, by Italian scholars. The first is that IP can be also 
protected through appropriate compensation357 and the second is that even 
under the label “absolute”, IP rights are limited in various important ways358. 
Scholars such as Ascarelli warned on the perils of identifying IP rights with 
“property” and forget about the intrinsic nature of intellectual creations, which 
differently to tangible property, can be the object of simultaneous enjoyment359, 
as it is now the standard argument with respect to IP rights as public goods in 
the economic sense. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
 
 
caratteristiche formali del diritto; non deve far dimenticare la differenza e anzi la contrapposizione tra cose 
materiali (e energie) da un lato e creazioni intellettuali dall’altro”). 
357 See ASCARELLI, supra note 186, at p. 331, explaining how these absolute rights to exclude could be 
substituted by a compensation whereby such right to receive a compensation would be nevertheless an 
absolute right.  
358 Ibid at p. 333, explaining that the law protects only certain types of intellectual creations; and then it 
grants a right only over such intellectual creation in an specified and individualized manner, in contrast 
with property rights over tangible goods which are appropriable by nature and such individual character 
that tangible goods is taken into account by the law rather than created by the law, (free translation of the 
original text: “il diritto cioe si preocuppa da un lato della tutelabilita di alcuni tipi (e solo alcuni tipi) di 
creazioni intellettuali; si preocuppa poi dell’individuazione di quel bene specificato che solo puo essere 
oggetto di diritto assoluto (non potendo il diritto assoluto avere per oggetto che un bene individualizzato, 
specificato) e cio in contrasto con quanto avviene per cose materiali (...) nei cui confronti da un lato il 
diritto parte da una generale appropriabilita (...) dall’altro prende atto della individuazione naturalistica 
della cosa, anziche disciplinare normativamente lo stesso procedimento di individualizzazione del bene 
singolo”). 
359 Ibid at p. 334-335: (“Il pericolo della formulazione corrente circa l’identificazione del diritto sui beni 
immateriali con la «proprietà» … cosi come quello del ricorso alla tutela del lavoro quale giustificazione 
della disciplina o quello dell’identificazione della disciplina dei beni immateriali con una tutela della 
clientela, e sempre quello di dimenticare la natura delle creazioni intellettuali, creazioni dell’uomo 
suscettibile di solidale godimento come strumento di un’attività e non cose preesistenti e godibili sono in 
funzione di una ripartizione; di dimenticar cosi anche come non sia la semplice sussistenza di una 
creazione intellettuale che ne giustifica  la tutela”). See ibid at p. 335, arguing that neither the mere 
existence of intellectual creations (as postulated by the property theory) nor an absolute right over the 
fruits of one’s labor (as postulated by the labor theory), can justify the creation of exclusive rights (…) it is 
only on the public interest that such exclusive rights might be ultimately justified and it is precisely 
because of the public interest that none absolute right could be recognized because otherwise the cultural 
and technical progress could be blocked, (free translation of the original text: “Non e infatti la semplice 
esistenza della creazione intellettuale che ne giustifica un diritto di esclusiva utilizzazione (come finisce 
per postulare nella formulazione corente la teoria della proprieta), o un diritto assoluto a compenso verso 
chiunque la utilizzi (come finisce per postulare la teoria che fa capo al lavoro)…e solo in quanto il diritto 
assoluto trovi una sua giustificazione ultima nel pubblico interesse che esso puo essere riconosciuto, e nei 
riguardi delle creazioni intellettuali il pubblico interesse esclude appunto il riconoscimento di un diritto 
assolutto su qualunque creazione intellettuale (...) perche nell’uno e nell’altro caso verrebe 
pericolosamente irrigidita la struttura economica e frenato il progresso culturale e tecnico”). This 
reasoning is similar to the arguments recently developed for instance by Lemley and Weiser, supra note 
72. 
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5.3 The European landscape with respect to IP remedies 
This section provides a brief overview of the European landscape with regard 
to the enforcement of IP rights, focusing on patents and on hence, on the few 
harmonized standards with regard to the enforcement of patents at the 
European level. In spite of the entry into force of the European Patent 
Convention360 and the existence of a European Patent Office, the patent 
landscape in Europe remains primordially national and fragmented361. The EU 
Enforcement Directive harmonized various aspects of IP rights enforcement 
within the European Member States362 and was justified upon the need to 
ensure the effective application of substantive IP rights, which were at the same 
time viewed as having paramount importance for the development of the 
internal market363. Among the pointed reasons were, that in spite of the TRIPS 
Agreement, considerable differences in enforcement subsisted between Member 
States:  
 
“It emerges from the consultations held by the Commission on this question 
that, in the Member States, and despite the TRIPS Agreement, there are still 
major disparities as regards the means of enforcing intellectual property rights. 
For instance, the arrangements for applying provisional measures, which are 
used in particular to preserve evidence, the calculation of damages, or the 
arrangements for applying injunctions, vary widely from one Member State to 
another”364.  
 
The recitals of the Directive pointed out that disparity in IP enforcement in 
different member states weakens substantive IP rights and prejudices the 
achievement of the internal market by causing a loss of confidence in the 
market and decreasing investments in innovation and creativity. In addition, 
the presence of organized crime and the impact of piracy and counterfeiting 
were deemed as a potential threat to the internal market. The Directive thus, set 
up the goal of approximating the laws of member states in order to ensure “a 
high, equivalent and homogeneous” level of IP rights protection in the internal 
                                                 
 
 
360 See the EUROPEAN PATENT CONVENTION, 13th edition entered into force on the 13th of December, 2007, 
available at: http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legal-texts/epc.html  
361 For an overview of the IP harmonization at the European level with respect to Industrial Property 
Rights, see Communication From The Commission To The European Parliament, The Council And The 
European Economic And Social Committee, An Industrial Property Rights Strategy For Europe”, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/indprop/docs/rights/communication_en.pdf 
362 Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April of 2004, on the 
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, official text available at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/pri/en/oj/dat/2004/l_195/l_19520040602en00160025.pdf, hereinafter the Enforcement 
Directive. 
363 See the Directive 2004/48/EC, at L 195-16 paragraphs 1 to 5  
364 Directive 2004/48/EC, Ibid, at L 195-17, recital 7.  
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market365. However, critics have pointed out that the rules should have better 
tackled piracy and counterfeiting activities while providing less harsh remedies 
for instance, in the cases of unintentional infringement366.  
 
Nevertheless, the Directive acknowledged the need to take into due account the 
specific characteristics of each case, with regard to the measures, procedures 
and remedies to be applied, therefore recognizing exceptions for the application 
of remedies in cases of unintentional or non-commercial scale infringement367 as 
well as the application of rules of competition and in particular, articles 81 and 
82 of the EC Treaty368. In particular, the Directive cites the possibility for 
Member States to provide for pecuniary compensation as an alternative remedy 
to injunctions and other corrective remedies in cases of unintentional 
infringement369. Hence, the general spirit of the Directive was to encompass all 
IP rights and to ensure an effective IP rights substantive protection in spite of 
the recognized differences among member states370.  
 
Among other features, the Directive requires EU Member States to provide the 
courts with the possibility of issuing injunctions371. The wording of the 
Directive is similar to Article 44 of the TRIPS Agreement in that it mandates 
countries to make injunctive relief available but does not make such choice 
mandatory in all instances372.  As a consequence, the important differences that 
exist in the national legislation of member states with regard to the use of 
                                                 
 
 
365 See recital 10 at p. L 195-17 
366 See William Cornish et al., Procedures and remedies for enforcing IPRs: the European commission's proposed 
Directive (2003),  E.I.P.R. 2003, 25(10), 447-449, criticizing the PROPOSAL FOR A DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL ON MEASURES AND PROCEDURES TO ENSURE THE ENFORCEMENT OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: COM (2003) 46 FINAL, January 30, 2003 because it unduly established 
special rules for all type of infringements, even if the proposal was initially justified upon the fight against 
piracy and counterfeiting and doubting about the effectiveness of introducing procedural measures while 
warning about the increasing fragmentation that could result from establishing a specific body of IP-
specific rules. See also Ricolfi, supra note 291. 
367 See recitals 13 and 17 at p. L 195-17 
368 See recital 12 at p. L 195-17 
369 See recital 25 at p. L 195-18 adding however, that such possibility shall not apply when the infringing 
activities also (“constitute an infringement of law other than intellectual property law or would be likely to 
harm consumers”).  
370 See recital 13 at p. L195-17 “It is necessary to define the scope of this Directive as widely as possible in 
order to encompass all the intellectual property rights covered by Community provisions in this field 
and/or by the national law of the Member State concerned. Nevertheless, that requirement does not affect 
the possibility, on the part of those Member States which so wish, to extend, for internal purposes, the 
provisions of this Directive to include acts involving unfair competition, including parasitic copies, or 
similar activities” 
371 DIRECTIVE 2004/48/EC, Ibid, at L 195-23, article 11, ruling that “Member States shall ensure that, where 
a judicial decision is taken finding an infringement of an intellectual property right, the judicial authorities 
may issue against the infringer an injunction aimed at prohibiting the continuation of the infringement” 
(emphasis added). 
372 Article 44 of the TRIPS establishes that the “judicial authorities shall have the authority to order a party 
to desist from an infringement…” 
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permanent injunctions seem compatible with both the TRIPS Agreement and 
the European Enforcement Directive.  
 
Even though the Enforcement Directive applies to all IP rights, the general 
landscape of substantive and enforcement law remains highly fragmented 
according to the divergent degrees of harmonization of each right. For instance, 
community regulations are in place in the fields of trademarks and industrial 
designs, which create a uniform regime. The situation is in contrast with the 
patent area, where harmonization is still to come.  
 
Hence, in order to fully interpret the current European harmonized rules with 
respect to IP rights enforcement, it is necessary to distinguish between 
community rights and, as it is the case with patents, national rights. It is in this 
light that a recent decision taken by the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities, concerning a community trademark, should be read373. The 
Court tilted in favor of injunctive relief, based upon the interpretation of Article 
98(1) of the Community Trade mark Regulation374, which regulates the issuance 
of injunctions by establishing that: 
 
“1. Where a Community trade mark court finds that the defendant has 
infringed or threatened to infringe a Community trade mark, it shall, unless 
there are special reasons for not doing so, issue an order prohibiting the 
defendant from proceeding with the acts which infringed or would infringe the 
Community trade mark. It shall also take such measures in accordance with its 
national law as are aimed at ensuring that this prohibition is complied with” 
(emphasis added).  
 
The court, in considering the interpretation of “special reasons”, ruled that: 
“the mere fact that the risk of further infringement or threatened infringement 
of a Community trade mark is not obvious or is otherwise merely limited does 
not constitute a special reason for a Community trade mark court not to issue 
an order prohibiting the defendant from proceeding with those acts”. 
 
The court likewise considered that the general prohibition of infringement 
activity and the possibility that further infringement is penalized, does not 
amount to special reasons in the sense required by article 98 (1) in order to deny 
an injunctive order. Such decision affirming the pre-eminence of injunctive 
orders, by limiting the interpretation of the special circumstances in which these 
prohibitory orders might be denied, could also be considered as compatible 
                                                 
 
 
373 See Nokia Corp. v. Wärdell, 14 December 2006, C-316/05, available at: 
http://oami.europa.eu/en/mark/aspects/pdf/JJ050316.pdf  
374 Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 of 20 December 1993 
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with the words of article 21 of the TRIPS Agreement, which precludes the 
possibility of compulsory licenses for trademarks375. Nevertheless, the 
possibility of finding special circumstances in which an injunction could be 
denied, without the need to issue a compulsory license, still exists376. 
 
This decision interprets a rule that pertains only to the community trade mark 
field and could not possibly be extended to the patent realm, at least, in the 
absence of further harmonization377, which has for a long time stagnated.  
However, the intention to re-launch negotiations about the community patent 
and a European Patent Litigation Agreement (EPLA)378 was expressly 
mentioned in a recent communication of the European Commission379. Still, the 
latest EPLA draft establishes a similarly vague language for injunctions in 
article 62380. Probably the most impacting change if the EPLA is agreed upon 
would be the introduction of a European Patent Judiciary dealing with 
infringement and validity of patents. A common judiciary would presumably 
help to fulfill the goals of the agreement, inter alia, to improve the enforcement 
                                                 
 
 
375  See article 21 of the TRIPS Agreement: “Members may determine conditions on the licensing and 
assignment of trademarks, it being understood that the compulsory licensing of trademarks shall not be 
permitted and that the owner of a registered trademark shall have the right to assign the trademark with 
or without the transfer of the business to which the trademark belongs” (emphasis added). 
376 See Nokia Corp. v. Wärdell, ibid, at paragraph 35, adding that the circumstances given by the Court, 
(“obviously do not preclude a Community trade mark court from not issuing such a prohibition were it to 
find that further infringement or threatened infringement on the part of the defendant was no longer 
possible. That would apply in particular if, after the commission of the acts in question, an action were 
brought against the proprietor of the mark infringed which culminated in a revocation of his rights”). 
377 See Von Muhlendahl, Alexander. “Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights-Is Injunctive relief 
mandatory?”, in IIC, Nº 4/2007 – Verlag, Munich, arguing that: “As far as community-wide rights are 
concerned, the ECJ clearly favors a general rule which obliges the courts to grant injunctive relief unless 
there are circumstances specific to the case which would allow a conclusion that further infringements will 
not occur. The enforcement Directive is obscure as regards its mandatory nature, but one can have the 
hope that the ECJ will interpret Art. 11 of the Directive similarly broadly. As for the United States, it is 
unfortunately once again going its separate ways in an important field of intellectual property protection”. 
378 See the Proposal for a COMMUNITY PATENT, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/indprop/patent/index_en.htm  and the last DRAFT AGREEMENT ON 
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A EUROPEAN PATENT LITIGATION SYSTEM (December 2005) is available at: 
http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legislative-initiatives/epla.html). Both projects are still under 
discussion. 
379 See the COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL - 
ENHANCING THE PATENT SYSTEM IN EUROPE- (COM (2007) 29-03-07), available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/indprop/patent/index_en.htm, setting patent harmonization as a 
key objective for Europe in the light of the renewed Lisbon agenda (“Many stakeholders continue to 
support the Community Patent as the approach which will yield most added-value for European industry 
under the Lisbon strategy…As to reforms of the existing European patent system within the framework of 
the European Patent Convention (EPC), numerous stakeholders support a rapid ratification of the London 
Agreement and adoption of the European Patent Litigation Agreement…)”. 
380 “The European Patent Court may order a party infringing or threatening to infringe a European patent 
to cease and desist from any act infringing the patent under Articles 33 or 34” (emphasis added). In the 
opinion of the German, French, MC and Dutch delegations, included in the draft, it was important to 
further discuss whether the right to request an injunction should expire after a certain time period, a 
limitation to possible over-extension of patent rights in time.  
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of European patents, enhance legal certainty and promote the uniform 
application and interpretation of European patent law381.  
 
In fact, injunctions have been described as particularly prone to problems of 
forum shifting between member states, which was reflected in the controversy 
about the possibility of awarding cross-border injunctions382 and also in the use 
of delaying strategies such as torpedoes legislations383 . However, it is probably 
important to recall how similar arguments were put forward during the debate 
preceding the creation of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 
1982384. After some decades, the salutary effects of a unique Court of Appeals 
with competence in patent cases are subject to controversy385. The debate then 
should really focus on estimating whether the advantages of having a 
specialized court might have been offset by their costs while avoiding that the 
move towards a unified approach in patent substantive law (community 
patent) and patent litigation (EPLA) affects the balances between the interest of 
patentees and society that should be incorporated in patent law.  
 
In addition, the Communication from the Commission has already warned 
about the problems related to the dubious quality and increasing number of 
granted patents but concludes without applying these warns into the proposals: 
                                                 
 
 
381 See DIETMAR HARHOFF, ECONOMIC COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF A UNIFIED AND INTEGRATED EUROPEAN 
PATENT LITIGATION SYSTEM, FINAL REPORT, Tender No. MARKT/2008/06/D (26 February 2009),  available 
at: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/indprop/docs/patent/studies/litigation_system_en.pdf  
382 See ibid at p. 17-18, explaining how cross border injunctions were initially granted by Dutch and then 
adopted by other courts. Patentees could start infringement proceedings in a Dutch court, even for other 
national patents derived from the same European patent and –Dutch- court assumed jurisdiction when the 
infringer was domiciled in the Netherlands or the Dutch patent was being infringed, applying then the 
law of the country where the patent was in force and where the plaintiff sought to obtain an injunction 
and often granting a cross-border injunction based upon article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention (currently 
Regulation 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters). The practice came to an end by two decisions of the European Court of Justice; GAT 
v. LuK (case C-04/03, ECJ Report 2006, I, 6509) where the ECJ declared that national courts of the State of 
registration of a patent have exclusive jurisdiction over all proceedings relating to the validity of that 
patent and Roche v. Primus and Goldberg (case C-539/03, ECJ Report 2006, I, 6535)  that finally ended the 
granting by national courts of cross-border injunctive relief for the infringement of European patents.  
383 Ibid at p. 18, defining torpedoes as “actions for declaration of non-infringement in court systems which 
are known or alleged to work very slowly”. This strategy s based upon article 27 of Regulation 44/2001 
which establishes that any court not fist seized with an action must decline jurisdiction or stay the 
proceedings and in these cases, hence, while a declaratory statement is pending in the “slow” court, an 
infringement action in other courts is blocked. 
384 See Fanelli et al., Patent Law Decisions of the Federal Circuit, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 821, April, 2008, citing also 
the S. Rep. No. 97-275, at 5 (1981) (arguing that the uniformity of the Federal Circuit could prevent forum 
shifting in litigation). See also FRANK  CIHLAR, THE COURT AMERICAN BUSINESS WANTED AND GOT: THE 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 11 (1982), at p. 11 (highlighting  effects of 
uncertainty and forum shopping to patent law, where stability and predictability provide the basis for 
reasoned business judgments). 
385 See Dreyfuss, supra note 313, analysing the reasons that justified the creation of the CAFC as well as the 
most recent decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court reversing many important interpretations of the CAFC 
with regard to patent law.  
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“…concerns have been raised that a spiralling demand for patents could result 
in increased granting of low quality patents. This is one of the reasons that 
could lead to the emergence of "patent thickets" and "patent trolls” in Europe. A 
high quality patent regime in the EU is an essential instrument to prevent such 
innovation hampering and to avoid destructive behaviour in Europe” 
(footnotes omitted)386.  
 
Until more substantive harmonization is accomplished within the EU, national 
practices continue to be widely different in member states. In the following 
chapters, a comparative landscape about the approach towards ex-post liability 
rules within the U.K. and Italy is presented and contrasted with the U.S. case. 
6 Conclusions  
This chapter aimed at identifying the evolution of ex-post liability rules in 
history. The chapter examined the main compulsory licensing provisions in a 
historical context, focusing on the international context of patent law and then 
described the main features of remedies in the IP field in the context of common 
law countries and civil law countries. There are several observations that 
emerge from the historical account of the provisions under analysis. The first 
sections highlighted the early appearance of compulsory licensing provisions, 
that in spite of originating on dissimilar intentions, could be considered as an 
attempt to balance the exclusive nature of IP rights with their social function. 
The evolution of compulsory licensing provisions in history ends with the 
analysis of the TRIPS Agreement and the post-TRIPS landscape, which has 
largely constraint the use of compulsory licensing although there are still 
important spaces for their use.    
 
Different than substantive patent law harmonization, enforcement is a late 
comer in the international context and remains mostly a national issue that 
depends on each country’s legal system and traditions. In particular, the 
possibility of denying injunctions, subjecting them to equitable considerations 
that vary case-by case is rooted in the common law distinction of courts of 
equity and courts of common law. The chapter briefly discussed the historical 
origins of such rule while leaving the particular developments of the rule for 
the following sections that analyze the cases of U.S. and U.K. and contrast them 
to the case of a civil law country as Italy.  
 
The first observation that emerges is that common law countries have 
historically conceived injunctions as an equitable remedy and have hence 
                                                 
 
 
386 See ENHANCING THE PATENT SYSTEM IN EUROPE, supra note 379, at p. 13.  
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subjected the award of this remedy to a factual test that aims at striking a 
balance between the particular circumstances of the case. The situation is, in 
appearance, outstandingly different in civil law countries, due to a diverse 
conception over both rights and remedies. Injunctions are not considered an 
equitable remedy and patent statutes as well as procedural laws do not 
condition their award to a factual inquiry.  
 
Understanding the dynamics of remedies is not only important and difficult in 
the light of the remarkable differences between different countries, but also 
with regard to its theoretical treatment, where remedies are often categorized 
either as a procedural matter or as part of substantive law: 
  
“Part of the difficulty with conceptualizing remedies as a field has been that 
remedies fits uneasily between the categories of substance and procedure. 
Remedies are central to litigation, but except for details at the edges, like the 
procedural rules for preliminary relief, remedies in the modern idea are not 
part of the law of procedure. The Supreme Court has correctly held that the 
measure of damages is substantive for Erie purposes. The same should be true 
of the standards for granting injunctions, although that question appears not to 
have been litigated. What or how much a plaintiff recovers is part of plaintiff's 
substantive entitlement and not simply a rule for processing disputes”387 
 
A second observation regards the importance of taking into consideration the 
interface between rights and remedies in order to understand this enhanced 
concept of compulsory licenses. A remarkable difference between civil law and 
common law countries with regard to the legal treatment of rights and remedies 
is precisely whether it is the remedy or the right that sets the starting point for 
such analysis. In spite of such marked difference, none form of reasoning –
either one focusing on remedies or one focusing on rights- could be a priori 
judged as more efficient. As it has been already noticed, it would be rather the 
context in which the rule is applied -in the case of patent law the dynamic 
evolution of science and technology dramatically affects such context- that 
could determine whether a system that focuses on the remedy or one that 
focuses on the right is better able to cope with such new necessities388. A similar 
argument could be made with regard to the choice of each country of having 
one or another type of compulsory licenses or both, as in the U.K. case.   
                                                 
 
 
387 Laycock, supra note 292, at p. 166 (footnotes omitted).  
388 See DI MAJO, supra note 320, at p. 15, arguing that a reasoning starting from the remedy does not 
necessarily lead to a better solution than a reasoning starting from the rights (...) The results rather depend 
on the capacity of adaptation that the legal system has in order to qualify the rights and grant the 
appropriate remedies, (free translation of the original text: “Non e detto, ad esempio, che ragionare per 
rimedi porti, in punto di tutela, a maggiori progressi rispetto al ragionare per diritti (…) Tutto sta nel 
vedere con quale capacita di adattamento l’ordinamento dato e disposto a qualificare diritto un 
determinato interesse oppure ad apprestare per esso un rimedio adeguato di tutela”). 
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CHAPTER III 
EX-POST LIABILITY RULES 
A COMPARATIVE LEGAL VIEW 
 
 
“From the character of the right of the 
patentee we may judge of his remedies” 
U.S. Supreme Court, Continental Paper Bag Co. V. 
Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405 (1908) 
 
“The existence of a right to exclude does 
not dictate the remedy for a violation of 
that right” 
Justices Kennedy, Stevens, Souter and Breyer, 
concurring opinion in eBay v. MercExchange, 547 U. 
S.05-130 (2006) 
1 Introduction 
It has been recently argued that some modern patent systems have “failed”, are 
“broken” or have somehow lost their underlying balance by providing 
incentives for strategic patenting and litigation389. These assertions have been 
specifically applied to the preference for property rules manifested in the 
automatic use of injunctive relief in patent infringement cases. The questions of 
whether and how injunctions might be denied in specific circumstances have 
generated increasing scholarly and policy interest, evidenced in cases involving 
                                                 
 
 
389 For critics on the U.S. patent system see among others, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 5; 
NATIONAL ACADEMIES OF SCIENCE, supra note 5; ADAM B. JAFFE AND JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS 
DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO 
DO ABOUT IT, Chapters 1 and 2 (2004).  See also BESSEN AND MEURER, supra note 14, at p. 2, claiming that the 
patent system has failed mainly because of a deficiency in the notice system with the consequence that “a 
defective property system discourages trade and investment not just by property owners, but also by those 
who inadvertently face the threat of property related lawsuits”. 
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the BlackBerry device390 and the eBay website391 as well as prior discussions392. 
These discussions have been also growingly recognized outside of the U.S.393  
  
Indeed, to protect a patent through a property rule means –in procedural terms- 
granting an injunction and other measures that aim at preventing infringement 
to continue. While damages are most of the times awarded in tandem with 
injunctions to compensate for past losses; economic reasons call in certain 
instances for switching to a liability rule and substituting a permanent 
injunction with damages394. A similar outcome arises, when a compulsory 
license is put in place through specific provisions of substantive patent law. 
 
This chapter aims at examining the use of ex post liability rules administered by 
courts by analyzing law provisions and case law allowing the switch from a 
property to a liability rule ex-post395. The chapter proceeds as follows. The first 
section explains the concept of ex-post liability rules. The second, third and 
fourth sections briefly describe ex post liability rules in the U.S., U.K. and Italy, 
respectively while discussing aspects of particular importance for each country. 
The chapter concludes by highlighting the similarities and differences between 
the systems under study. 
                                                 
 
 
390 See NTP, Inc. V. Research In Motion, ltd., 03-1615, US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 418 F.3d 
1282; (2005). 
391 See eBay Inc. v. Mercexchange, supra note 2. 
392 See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 5, at p. 38–39.  
393 See for instance Dietmar Harhoff, Patent Quantity and Quality in Europe – Trends and Policy Implications, 
in ADVANCING KNOWLEDGE AND THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY, MIT Press (B. Kahin and D. Foray eds., 2006), 
p.331-350, arguing that “the stability of the European patent systems may be threatened by a strong 
increase in the number of patent applications, increased patent complexity and lower patent quality”. See 
also Christian Le Stanc, Les malfaisants lutins de la forêt des brevets, à propos des ‘patent trolls ‘, REVUE 
PROPRIETE INDUSTRIELLE, éd. Lexisnexis, févr. 2008, Etude 3, arguing that it is expected that this practice can 
be exported on the old continent and especially in France, even if the patents are said to be more seriously 
issued by the European Patent Office, even if the judges, specialized, may be more vigilant on the 
patentability of inventions and scope of the patents and even if the costs of litigation may be more modest. 
We will observe without doubt, today or tomorrow, some patent troll, acclimatized in our countries and 
pledging patents in force in France, (free translation of the original text: “Il est à prévoir cependant que 
ladite pratique puisse s'exporter sur le vieux continent et spécialement en FranceNote 20, même si les 
brevets sont, dit-on, plus sérieusement délivrés à l'Office européen des brevets ; même si les juges, 
spécialisés, peuvent être plus vigilants sur la brevetabilité des inventions et la portée des titres ; même si 
les coûts des contentieux peuvent être plus modestes. On observera sans doute, aujourd'hui ou demain, 
quelque patent troll, acclimaté dans nos contrées et nanti de brevets en vigueur en France…)” 
394 See discussion on Chapter I. 
395 The term ex-post refers to the application of a liability rule ex-post with respect to the decisions taken by 
the patent owner, including that of investing in R&D and filing a patent. An alternative would be ex-post 
with regard to the infringement, which would include the cases analysed within the U.S. precedent of 
eBay. However, in this case we would leave aside the cases of compulsory licenses for dependent patents 
and lack of working where infringers are usually forbidden to use these provisions, so that the liability 
rule is only applied ex-post with respect to the above mentioned decisions of investing and filing a patent.  
See section 5 below, discussing a recent reform in Italian legislation, allowing good faith infringers to 
apply for compulsory licenses.   
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2 Ex-Post Liability Rules 
The preferential use of property rules to protect patent rights has often been 
advanced by arguing that patent rights grant a right to exclude others, rather 
than any direct right to use an invention396. In addition, injunctions, which 
consist in a judicial order to stop an infringing activity, have been often 
identified as the prime or solely appropriate remedy for patent infringement397. 
This predominant view across several jurisdictions has been accompanied by an 
absence –of statutory patent provisions in the U.S. case- or an increasing 
limitation –in the international system- on the use of patent compulsory licenses 
that has largely permeated law and economics analysis. 
 
Such preference for property rules might actually respond to either one or both 
of the following explanations. A first explanation could be based upon the 
growing assimilation of IP rights to traditional property, for which injunctive 
relief is the standard remedy398. This argument, hence, concentrates on the 
nature of the right. The second explanation might be based upon the economic 
view, that has exercised an important influence among law and economic 
scholars and which sustains that injunctive relief is less costly to administer 
than damages, principally due to the difficulty of calculating the optimal 
amount of damage awards399. Hence, this explanation is predominantly focused 
                                                 
 
 
396 The argument is typically explained by patent scholars, as supported by three facts. First, a patent right 
entitles the patentee to exclude others but not necessarily to use her invention, since use might be subject 
to different requirements, for instance in the case of previous marketing authorization for chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals. Secondly, it is highlighted that an inventor using a previously patented technology, 
would require authorization from the first patentee and the second patent does not grant any direct right 
to use the first innovation. Thirdly, it is said that any inventor can use her invention even without a patent. 
397 See Christopher Heath, Comparative Overview and the TRIPS Enforcement provisions, in Patent Enforcement 
Worldwide: A survey of 15 countries, IIC STUDIES, WRITINGS IN HONOUR OF DIETER STAUDER, HART PUBLISHING 
(2004) at p. 6-7; (observing that of all remedies, injunctions were the most commonly sought and arguing 
that the importance of injunctions stems out of 1) the need to avoid market confusion or erosion of the 
owner’s competitive position in trademarks and unfair competition cases; 2) the need to preserve the 
owner’s exclusive right and 3) the difficulty to prove damages). See also Marshall, The enforcement of patent 
rights in Germany, SAME VOLUME at p. 135 claiming that in Germany (“the most important remedy in a 
patent infringement case is the claim for cessation of further infringement (injunctive relief)”). Similarly, 
see Brinkhof, The Enforcement of Patent Rights in the Netherlands, p. 185, SAME VOLUME, highlighting that in 
the Netherlands “in almost all cases, the patentee requests an injunction against the infringer” which is 
accompanied by a judicially imposed sum in case of contempt (“dwangsom” corresponding to the French 
“astraintes”) and as a consequence “an injunction is an effective means for stopping infringement”; and 
Blumer, The Enforcement of Patent Rights in Switzerland, SAME VOLUME, at p. 227 claims that “in practice, 
injunctive relief is more relevant than damages”.  
398 See Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1246-47 (Fed. Cir. 1989); holding that the “right to 
exclude recognized in a patent is but the essence of the concept of property”. Compare with Geragosian v. 
Union Realty Co., 289 Mass. 104, 193 N.E. 726, ruling in a case of encroachment upon land property that: 
“The general rule is that the owner of land is entitled to an injunction for the removal of trespassing 
structures”. 
399 See above, section 3.1.2 “Critcs against Liability rules and section 4.1. “The Case against Liability Rules 
for Patent Rights, Chapter I.  
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on the remedy. Efficiency reasons can nevertheless suggest that in some cases a 
patent should be protected through a liability rule either under a rights’ or a 
remedies’ perspective400.  
 
Until the U.S. Supreme Court decision in the eBay case, most law and economic 
analysis –constructing on U.S. law- assumed that an injunction will always 
follow any judicial decision asserting validity and infringement. In fact, 
permanent injunctive relief had received far less attention in studies about 
patent enforcement, compared for instance, to the study of damage 
compensation or preliminary measures401. Moreover, studies on patent 
compulsory licensing often referred the absence of such provisions in U.S. 
patent law, concluding also that it was neither possible nor desirable to compel 
patentees to work their inventions.  
 
The 2006 U.S. Supreme Court decision in the case of eBay v. MercExchange402 
declared that the four-factor test to guide the award of injunctions was also 
applicable to patent cases and hence admitted the possibility that district courts 
could deny this remedy under certain circumstances. This decision opened the 
door for the use of ex-post liability rules imposed by courts in patent 
infringement cases, which were possible in other countries under different 
compulsory licensing systems. Conversely, liability rules were practically 
absent from U.S. patent law and confined to antitrust cases. This decision 
therefore marks an important policy change in a country that had for a long 
time opposed the use of liability rules both in judicial decisions and proposals 
for patent law reform. 
 
Ex post liability rules are judicially-administered and taken on a case-by-case 
basis regardless of whether they are included in law provisions or case law.  
Thus, the probability that a patentee obtains injunctive relief in a case in which 
the patent is found to be valid and infringed will be lower than one. As a 
consequence, courts will face similar obstacles when determining through a 
case by case reasoning if damages can substitute the injunctive order or 
whether the requirements for a compulsory license are satisfied, in spite of 
deciding such different cases. In doing so, courts shall assess whether the 
specific case calls for this switch by analyzing both the legal basis and –when a 
balance between the interests of the parties is allowed- by incorporating such 
                                                 
 
 
400 See chapter I, section 4.2. “The Case for Patent Liability Rules: Transaction Costs”. 
401 See BLAIR AND COTTER, supra note 93, at p. 2 noticing that “even within the burgeoning literature on the 
law and economics of Intellectual Property Rights (IP rights), there is, still relatively little discussion of the 
appropriate remedies for the infringement” while concentrating in the study of damage rules and claiming 
that there is consensus about the use of injunctions, “there is, to be sure, a fairly widespread consensus 
that an injunction –an order to cease infringement- is the appropriate remedy in most cases”. 
402 See eBay Inc. v. Mercexchange, supra note 2. 
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examination. Additionally, Courts will face the difficult task of fixing the 
amount of compensation.  
 
Ex-post liability rules, as described here, hence resemble much more accurately 
the type of liability rules used in the entitlement literature, in comparison, for 
instance with ex ante compulsory licenses403. This latter type of compulsory 
licenses is often grounded on transaction costs due to the presence of multiple 
owners and many rights, each having a relatively low value404. Patent ex-post 
liability rules would be instead justified on the need to avoid strategic behavior 
and bargaining collapse.  
 
For the purposes of examining and comparing ex-post liability rules in different 
jurisdictions, three particular cases will be examined405. A first type of ex-post 
liability rule is applied when a court denies injunctive relief for infringed 
patents with the clearest example found in common law countries which deem 
                                                 
 
 
403 Legal scholars however, disagree about whether denial of injunctions in fact amounts to a compulsory 
license. See GERVAIS, supra note 270, at p. 450, arguing that “the systematic impossibility to obtain an 
injunction and to obtain only actual damages could amount to a compulsory license”. See also Christopher 
Cotropia, Compulsory Licensing Under TRIPS and the Supreme Court of the United States' Decision in eBay v. 
MercExchange, PATENT LAW: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH, Toshiko Takenaka & Rainer 
Moufang, eds., (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1086142,  arguing 
that “while eBay speaks to patent remedies, the de facto effect of an injunction denial is, by definition, a 
government allowed compulsory license” but making the claim that while damages establishing a high 
royalty rate are antithetical to the aims of compulsory licenses, the use of reasonable royalties “brings eBay 
in line with the definition of a compulsory license”. But see Paice LL.C, v. Toyota Motor Corp., et al. CV-211-
DF., 16, August 2006, arguably wrongly explaining that: “We use the term ongoing royalty to distinguish 
this equitable remedy from a compulsory license. The term “compulsory license” implies that anyone who 
meets certain criteria has congressional authority to use that which is licensed”. 
404 Neil Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, HARVARD JOURNAL 
OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY 17:1-84 (2003), at p. 25, arguing that: “a proliferation of copyright holders’ 
proprietary rights can also make it prohibitively expensive for prospective licensees to obtain all the 
permissions needed to use, modify, or distribute creative expression. Transaction costs are especially high 
with respect to motion pictures, sound recordings, and other expression that comprises a number of 
copyrighted works, each of which must be licensed (…)”. See also Merges, supra note 114, comparing the 
case of compulsory licensing for blocking patents and compulsory licenses for copyrights (statutory 
compulsory licenses and arguing that: “…the costs of strategic bargaining are far different from the costs 
of transactions in markets where multiple IPRs are needed as inputs. Input markets are notable especially 
for the repeated costs of locating right holders and negotiating individual licenses. And, with respect to 
these negotiations, the single most difficult issue -- and hence the most costly to resolve -- is the valuation 
of each unique IPR”.  
405 See KONRAD ZWEIGERT AND HEIN KÖTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW, (3rd revised ed., Oxford, 
Clarendon press, 1998), at p. 34, explaining that: “the basic methodological principle of all comparative 
law is that of functionality. From this basic principle stem all the other rules which determine the choice of 
laws to compare, the scope of the undertaking, the creation of a system of comparative law, and so 
on…the only things which are comparable are those which fulfill the same function”. In this sense, Law 
and Economics adds to the Comparative Law method by clarifying on the underlying purposes of certain 
rules, even if they pertain to different legal areas, as it is the case with the rules regulating patent remedies 
and compulsory licenses. In all cases, liability rules can be though as aiming to cope with the problem of 
efficient bargaining in the presence of high transaction costs, by “forcing” a transaction that would 
otherwise not occur. 
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injunctions as an equitable remedy, hence allowing judges to substitute 
injunctions with damage awards in accordance with the equities of the case. 
Although no equivalent rule considers the granting or denial of injunctions to 
fall plainly within the discretion of the judges; there are several spaces left for a 
flexible use of property rules also in civil law countries. In order to compare this 
type of liability rule with countries from such dissimilar law traditions, the 
following analysis centers on the reasons for denying injunctions in common 
law countries –most of them discussed by the U.S. Supreme Court eBay decision 
and follow-on cases and commentary- and examines the scope for judicial 
discretion with regard to remedies in patent infringement cases in the other 
countries406.  
 
A second type of ex-post liability rule applied by courts are compulsory licenses 
addressing similar situations to the first case and contained in the patent laws 
of several countries. In this sense, there are compulsory licensing provisions 
addressing subservient or dependent patents and aiming at avoiding a potential 
“bargaining breakdown”, a situation clearly under the C&M framework of high 
transaction costs. Another type of compulsory license applies for patents that 
have not being worked, a provision which is historically rooted in industrial 
policies favoring national industries407 but that has been recently raised during 
the debate surrounding the eBay decision in spite of the fact that the U.S. had 
largely opposed patent compulsory licensing and specially non-working 
provisions. Although, the final decision of the U.S. Supreme Court did not 
                                                 
 
 
406 The analysis that follows mostly focus on a –typical- case where a plaintiff claims that her patented 
invention is infringed by a product or process used by a defendant either in an infringement case or as a 
defense during an invalidity procedure or a declaration of non-infringement. For the purposes of this 
debate it does not matter whether infringement is literal or through the application of the doctrine of 
equivalents, which allows courts to declare infringement even when the infringing device or process does 
not literally fall upon the literal scope of claims but nevertheless is equivalent to said claim or claims. The 
reverse doctrine of equivalents could play a closely related role to that of denying an injunction in the 
sense of allowing the use of a patented invention, however denying any relief for the patentee. 
Nonetheless, its use remains limited in practice. See Roche Palo Alto v. Apotex Inc, (CAFC), 2008-1021, 
available at: http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/opinions/08-1021.pdf  explaining how the doctrine of reverse 
equivalents “is an equitable doctrine designed “to prevent unwarranted extension of the claims beyond a 
fair scope of the patentee’s invention” citing the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. 
Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608-609 (1950), holding that “Where a device is so far changed in 
principle from a patented article that it performs the same or similar function in a substantially different 
way, but nevertheless falls within the literal words of the claim, the [reverse] doctrine of equivalents may 
be used to restrict the claim and defeat the patentee’s action for infringement”. The CAFC held the 
doctrine is rarely applied and that the CAFC itself has never applied it and highlighting that defendants 
have to clearly meet their burden of proof in asserting whether the device “has so far changed in 
principle”, not being possible to prove such fact only through experts’ declarations but through the 
specification, prosecution history and prior art. 
407 Under the requirements of the WTO and the TRIPS Agreement, a non-working provision might 
currently apply only if a patent is not being worked in any member country of the WTO, which is almost 
equivalent to say if the patent is not-worked or insufficiently worked in absolute terms. Hence, in our 
view, this provision might also encompass cases similar to eBay in the U.S. with the caveats explained 
below, principally the fact that many patent laws forbid infringers to apply for a compulsory license.  
Ex-post Liability Rules   
In Modern Patent Law  127  
 
 
explicitly address the issue, it clearly departed from any categorical rule, hence 
denying that either non-working would be a compelling reason to deny 
injunctions in all cases or that it will not be a compelling reason in some cases. 
Moreover, non-working or insufficiently working a patent could arguably fall 
under the concept of strategic use of a patent, with the consequence that the 
insights developed by the property and liability rules framework could also be 
applied to this case. 
 
Bringing together these apparently dissimilar cases can contribute to the 
understanding on the use of liability rules in patent law as some important 
insights in this area were indeed developed with a shortsighted view that 
considered most compulsory licensing provisions as not applicable or not 
advisable for application within patent law. Similarly, studies on compulsory 
licensing can shed light on the relatively “new” issue brought forward by the 
eBay case, which however, has already been faced by patent law at different 
times of history. The legal systems examined here are compared under two 
different perspectives with regard to the interface between rights and remedies. 
Under the first perspective, it is the right that determines the remedy whereas 
under a second perspective, it is the remedy that leads the treatment of the legal 
right. In the analysis that follows, both a “rights’” and a “remedies’” approach 
to the study of ex post liability rules will be used.  
3 U.S. Ex-Post Liability Rules 
It is commonly argued that courts applying the factual test to grant injunctions 
rapidly arrived to the conclusion that when a final decision on an infringement 
is taken, an injunction would always be necessary408. U.S. courts often reasoned 
that exclusive rights such as patents and copyrights would be deprived of their 
significance if the owner’s right to exclude was not protected through an 
injunctive order but limited to a monetary award; and that this will create a 
need for continuous litigation in the absence of a meaningful mechanism of 
deterrence409.  
 
                                                 
 
 
408 See Balganesh, supra note 62, at p. 49. See also Herbert F. Schwartz, Injunctive Relief in Patent 
Infringement Suits, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 1025, 1041-42 (1964) (arguing that by the mid-nineteenth century, a 
permanent injunction was considered to be the only remedy adequate to protect a patent owner's right to 
exclude, and thus courts often granted injunctive relief "as a matter of course") quoted by Elizabeth 
Millard, Injunctive Relief In Patent Infringement Cases: Should Courts Apply A Rebuttable Presumption Of 
Irreparable Harm After eBay Inc. V. Mercexchange, L.L.C., 52 St. Louis U. L.J. 985.  
409 Ibid at p. 49, quoting from 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE: AS ADMINISTERED IN 
ENGLAND AND AMERICA 612 (14th ed. 1918); explaining how (“it is quite plain that if no remedy could be 
given in cases of patents and copyrights than an action at law for damages, the inventor or author might 
be ruined by the necessity of perpetual litigation, without ever being able to have a final establishment of 
his rights”). 
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As a result, U.S. courts developed a strong presumption in favor of property 
rules for patents, in spite of the traditional equitable nature of injunctions. 
Moreover, the establishment of the Federal Circuit in 1982 is usually associated 
with the development of an “automatic injunction rule”410. The CAFC  
reiteratively interpreted that injunctions should be automatically granted and 
that a presumption of irreparable harm held in any case of patent infringement 
of a valid patent. This interpretation furthermore reflected a patent policy 
transcending court remedies. In fact, the U.S. patent law and case law often 
rejected compulsory licenses for cases on non-use, and such view also prevailed 
at international IP rights negotiations: 
 
“Patent laws outside the United States depart from the all-or-nothing principle 
by providing compulsory licenses in prescribed categories of cases, effectively 
depriving patent owners of injunctive relief and remitting them instead to 
court-ordered reasonable royalties. (Courts rarely have to order these payments 
because patent owners, knowing that only such limited relief is in prospect, will 
negotiate for reasonable rates).”411 
3.1 The eBay case 
During the last few years, scholars and policy makers have increasingly 
debated about the consequences of the strategic use of litigation and specifically 
about the possibility that patent holders might use permanent injunctions to 
hold infringers up412. The matter is contentious, and still, part of the literature 
                                                 
 
 
410 See Balganesh, supra note 62, at p. 51. See also the CAFC decisions: Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 
F.2d 1226, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Smith Int'l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 1580-81 (Fed. Cir. 1983) 
Teledyne Indus., Inc. v. Windmere Prods. Inc., 433 F. Supp. 710, 741 (S.D. Fla. 1977) and Zenith Labs., Inc. v. Eli 
Lilly & Co., 460 F. Supp. 812, 825 (D.N.J. 1978), on the practice or presuming irreparable harm and hence, 
automatically awarding injunctive relief. 
411 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE TOUGH NEW REALITIES THAT COULD MAKE OR BREAK YOUR 
BUSINESS, (New York Portfolio, 2007) at p. 59-60.  
412 See Burk and Lemley, supra note 4, at p. 168-174, arguing that the baseline remedy for patents should 
remain a general property rule given that IP assets are very hard to valuate while highlighting that certain 
instances such as antitrust issues and holdups are preferably dealt by liability rules. For instance, they 
argue that compulsory licenses are more important within industries characterized by anti-commons 
problems where patentees may hold out for a disproportionately high royalty and obstruct downstream 
production and for patents that important products for society (pharmaceuticals and food products) that 
should be available at lower prices through the use of subsidized compulsory licenses. See also Shapiro, 
supra note 5, at p. 1, stating that the: “patent system systematically over-rewards the owners of patents in 
the information technology sector who license rather than practice their patents. These over-rewards are 
greatest for the owners of weak patents that cover minor features of complex products sold at prices well 
above marginal cost. Holders of such patents are over-rewarded relative to a natural normative 
benchmark primarily because of their ability to obtain injunctions in the event they prevail in patent 
litigation” (emphasis added) 
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continues to defend and highlight the importance of strong property rules to 
protect patents413.  
 
The debate progressively focused on the adequacy of a strong property rule in 
the form of an “automatic right” to injunctive relief. Some key patent cases 
increasingly echoed these concerns calling the attention of scholars, 
policymakers and the public opinion414. In 2006, NTP Inc, the owner of patents 
on the BlackBerry wireless device threatened the manufacturer Research In 
Motion Ltd. (RIM) that it would shut down the production and 
commercialization of this system by asking the court an injunctive relief 
order415. This threat was based upon the fact that RIM used some of the patents 
held and not commercialized by NTP Inc. Under the automatic award of 
injunctive relief and especially, the presumption of irreparable harm that was 
interpreted by the CAFC as following any finding of validity and infringement, 
it was possible for a non-manufacturing company to threaten another company 
with stopping all production related with the patent or patents under 
controversy. However, the case ended with a settlement in which supposedly 
NTP Inc. received $ 612.5 million, an amount that is said to have reflected the 
potential disruption that an injunction could have caused. Nevertheless, the 
Blackberry controversy ended without a court decision addressing the 
convenience of using permanent injunctions in similar cases. 
 
Shortly after, in the case of eBay vs. MercExchange, the U.S. Supreme Court was 
asked to analyze the conditions under which district courts should grant 
injunctions against infringers. The case involved the company eBay which 
operates an Internet website that allows private sellers to list goods they want 
to sell, and MercExchange, the holder of patents over a business method patent 
to facilitate the online sale of goods. After unsuccessful attempts to negotiate a 
licensing agreement, MercExchange sued eBay and obtained a decision that 
declared the patent valid and infringed. The jury awarded damages, but the 
district court denied MercExchange's motion for permanent injunctive relief. In 
addition to the automatic granting of injunctions under the emerging practice of 
the CAFC, at the time of the eBay controversy, a ruling from 1908 suggested that 
injunctions were always an appropriate remedy for patent infringement even if 
a patentee did not work his patent, and judges followed this precedent almost 
                                                 
 
 
413 See, among others, Denicolo et al., supra note 160, at p 571-608; Epstein, supra note 65 and Kieff, supra 
note 124. 
414 See Dolak & Blaine Bettinger, eBay and the Blackberry®: A Media Coverage Case Study (December 11, 2007), 
available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1082220, analyzing the public attention granted to these cases and 
also noticing that the main arguments put forward by the media were expressed in the concurring opinion 
of Judge Kennedy in the eBay decision, supra note 425. 
415 See NTP, Inc. V. Research In Motion, ltd, supra note 390. 
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invariably416. The CAFC applied such precedent and reversed the ruling of the 
district court, under the principle that “courts will issue permanent injunctions 
against patent infringement absent exceptional circumstances”. In effect, such 
exceptional circumstances had been interpreted in a narrow way, -especially by 
the same CAFC- covering cases that involved public interest, and more 
precisely when health or environmental issues were at stake417. Only a few 
decisions had denied injunctive relief upon circumstances different than these418  
 
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide about the appropriateness 
of that general rule and decided that consistent with principles of equity, in the 
U.S., a plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test 
demonstrating: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies 
available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for 
that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff 
and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest 
would not be disserved by a permanent injunction419. The Supreme Court 
                                                 
 
 
416 Continental Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 422-430 (1908), actually rejected the contention that a court of 
equity has no jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief to a patent holder who has unreasonably declined to 
use the patent. Compare with decisions at infra note 417. 
417 See Hybritech, Inc. v. Abbott Lab., 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001 (C.D. Cal. 1987), where it was held that the public 
interest in the availability of medical test kits justified a denial of a preliminary injunction), aff’d, 849 F.2d 
1446, 1458 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Vitamin Technologists, Inc. v. Wis. Alumni Research Found., 64 U.S.P.Q. 285 (9th 
Cir. 1945), deciding that the public interest warranted refusal of injunction on irradiation of oleomargarine;  
City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, Inc., 69 F.2d 577, 593 (7th Cir. 1934), denying an injunction that would 
have required the city to close a sewage plant, "leaving the entire community without any means for the 
disposal of raw sewage other than running it into Lake Michigan, thereby polluting its waters and 
endangering the health and lives of that and other adjoining communities"; Ethicon Endo-Surgery v. U.S. 
Surgical Corp., 855 F. Supp. 1500, 1517 (S.D. Ohio 1994), deciding to decline an injunction that would have 
created "a serious disruptive effect on surgical practice" because doctors distinctly preferred the 
endoscopic surgical cutters at issue and had trained with them extensively. 
418 See Nerney v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 83 F.2d 409, 411 (2d Cir. 1936), denying a permanent injunction 
to a railroad company where it was “recognized that the only real advantage to a plaintiff in granting the 
injunction would be to strengthen its position in negotiating a settlement.” See also Foster v. American 
Machine & Foundry Co. 492 F.2d 1317, 1324 (2d Cir. 1974) denying a permanent injunction to a non-
manufacturing company because such “injunction to protect a patent against infringement, like any other 
injunction, is an equitable remedy to be determined by the circumstances. It is not intended as a club to be 
wielded by a patentee to enhance his negotiating stance. Here, as the District Court noted, the [defendant] 
manufactures a product; the [plaintiff] does not. In the assessment of relative equities, the court could 
properly conclude that to impose irreparable hardship on the infringer by injunction, without any 
concomitant benefit to the patentee, would be inequitable”. See also Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens 
Ford Co., 758 F.2d 613, 628 (Fed. Cir. 1985) where the CAFC upheld a 5% court-ordered royalty, based on 
sales, "for continuing operations." The parties contested the amount of the royalty, styled a "compulsory 
license" by the court but there was no dispute as to the district court's authority to issue such remedy. See 
also United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 410 U.S. 52, 59, 93 S. Ct. 861, 35 L. Ed. 2d 104 (1973), granting 
"mandatory sales and reasonable-royalty licensing" of relevant patents for an antitrust violation and 
describing remedies as "well-established forms of relief when necessary to an effective remedy, 
particularly where patents have provided the leverage for or have contributed to the antitrust violation 
adjudicated".  
419 But see Laycock supra note 292, at footnote 13, arguing that the Supreme Court confused the tests for 
permanent and preliminary injunctions while “announcing a "familiar" four-part test that the Court had 
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reiterated that the decision to grant or deny permanent injunctive relief is an act 
of equitable discretion of the district court, subject to appeal for abuse of 
discretion since the Patent Act expressly provides that injunctions “may” be 
issued “in accordance with the principles of equity”420. Likewise, the Copyright 
Act gives the right holder a “right to exclude others from using his property”421 
while it provides that courts “may,” grant injunctive relief “on such terms as it 
may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright”422. 
 
In the final decision on the eBay case, the U.S. Supreme Court adopted a middle 
ground position. On the one hand it did not rule that lack of use of its patents 
by the right holder would necessarily preclude her right to an injunction, 
clarifying that patent holders, such as university researchers or self-made 
inventors, whom often license rather than work their patents may be able to 
satisfy the four-factor test. But on the other hand, the Court sustained that an 
injunction will not necessarily follow the finding of patent infringement and 
that either the categorical denial or grant of such relief by the District Court and 
the Court of Appeals were erroneous applications of the law. The Supreme 
Court hence rejected the use of categorical rules and tilted towards the use of 
standards to appropriately decide the grant or denial of injunctions for 
infringed patents423.  
 
The standard governing injunctions is expressed in the four-factor test. Yet, the 
U.S. Supreme Court decision in eBay contained two concurring opinions offering 
contradictory views on how to read such test. Justice Robert’s opinion424 
                                                                                                                                               
 
 
never before applied”. See also Douglas Laycock, Modern American Remedies: Cases and Materials 52-53 
(Supp. 2007), discussing the case and the confusion of the Court with regard to the “traditional” test.  
420 Section 283, of the U.S. Patent Act, which is found in Title 35 of the U.S. Code (hereinafter U.S.C.), 
provides that “[t]he several courts having jurisdiction of cases under this title may grant injunctions in 
accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right secured by patent, on such 
terms as the court deems reasonable.” 
421 See Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932). 
422 17 U.S.C. § 502(a). 
423 An important number of law and economics scholars have discussed the relative costs and benefits of 
adopting rules v. the adoption of standards, including the costs regarding norm-specification, case 
adjudication and the costs of compliance with legal norms. The rules v. standards debate might also be 
referred to the balance of competences between the legislator and the judiciary. See for instance, Louis 
Kaplow,  Rules  versus  Standards, An  Economic Analysis, DUKE  LAW  JOURNAL,  pp. 557-629; Carol Rose, 
Crystals and Mud in Property Law, STANFORD LAW REVIEW, 1998 pp. 577-610 and, Hans-Bernd Schäfer, Legal 
Rules and Standards, GERMAN WORKING PAPERS IN LAW AND ECONOMICS, VOL. 2002, NO. 2, 2002, available at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=999860. Hence, whereas the analysis done here refers mainly to the question of 
property or liability rules for patent protection, it also regards a choice between rules or open standards. In 
this discussion, a basic trade-off exists between the legal certainty that follows from the use of rules and 
the potential for adapting to changing (technological) circumstances that is possible with the use of 
standars. 
424 See eBay Inc. v. Mercexchange, supra note 2, at p. 1841-42, (Roberts, C.J., concurring), a concurring 
opinion by Justices Roberts, Scalia and Ginsburg that clearly favors the use of rules and privileges legal 
certainty as well as it considers that property rules are in the vast majority of cases (with the exception of 
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highlighted that injunctive relief was the remedy in the majority of patent cases 
“from at least the early 19th century”, and justified this choice as correct due to 
the “difficulty of protecting a right to exclude through monetary remedies that 
allow an infringer to use an invention against the patentee's wishes”.  
 
Contrary to this approach, three important reasons were given to support a 
move towards a more discretional use of injunctive relief by courts, all based 
upon the fact that the nature and economic function of patents has evolved425. 
Hence, Justice Kennedy’s opinion argues that injunctions were the preferred 
choice not primarily because of intrinsic valuation problems associated with the 
use of liability rules, but rather due to the prevailing historical context, which 
has greatly changed over the last years, at least within the U.S. patent system.   
 
A first concern expressed in this opinion, regarded the increasing risk of 
holdups by owners of patent rights on small components of a product given 
that these players can use the threat of enjoining the whole product as a 
bargaining tool. This case stems out of the increasing number of products 
reading on multiple patents as opposed to the traditional pattern of one-patent 
one-product. In such cases, damage awards may be sufficient to compensate 
and more in tune with public interest. 
 
Secondly, the opinion warned about the emergence of a business strategy in 
which firms use their patents for obtaining licensing fees, rather than for 
marketing innovative products or services. The emergence of such business 
entities (e.g. patent trolls) was acknowledged as a problematic outcome of the 
automatic grant of injunctions in patent cases: 
 
“For these firms, an injunction, and the potentially serious sanctions arising 
from its violation, can be employed as a bargaining tool to charge exorbitant 
fees to companies that seek to buy licenses to practice the patent”426. 
 
Finally, the opinion emphasized the fact that patent quality has decreased, 
leading to a growing number of vague and suspiciously valid patents. This was 
mentioned in the opinion as an aggravating fact that could also weight against a 
strong property rule or against its “automatic” use in patent cases. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
 
 
extreme circumstances) the best way to protect patent entitlements, a fact, the concurring Judges argue, 
evidenced by history.  
425 Ibid at supra note 2, p. 1842–43 (Kennedy, J., concurring), a concurring opinion by Justices Kennedy, 
Stevens, Souter and Breyer. Conversely, this opinion highlights the ability of legal standars to cope with 
the challenges of adapting to new technologies and evolving business practices.  
426 Ibid at p. 1843, also quoting from the report by the FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 5. 
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The Kennedy’s opinion importantly stressed that “equitable discretion over 
injunctions, granted by the Patent Act, is well suited to allow courts to adapt to 
the rapid technological and legal developments in the patent system”427. By 
interpreting that judges have more discretion, the Court in fact allowed district 
courts to switch to a liability rule. In this sense, the opinion can be read a under 
the classic C&M framework where liability rules are more efficient in the 
presence of high transaction costs, especially the likelihood of strategic 
bargaining, since it acknowledged that a new set of firms devoted to hold 
patents, use them as: “bargaining tools to charge exorbitant fees to companies 
that seek to buy licenses to practice the patent”. 
 
Commentators echoing the concurring opinion of Justice Roberts (with Scalia 
and Ginsburg) in eBay have warned against the expansion of ex post liability 
rules as suitable remedies for patent infringement cases. In favor of maintaining 
injunctive relief as the paramount remedy in patent infringement cases is the 
need to provide patent holders with strong protection, which is often seen as 
the only way to sufficiently encourage welfare-enhancing investment in R&D428. 
Critics also highlight the drawbacks of switching to a liability rule because of 
the implied valuation and error costs429 as well as point to district courts 
decisions after eBay, which have purportedly put non-practicing entities at a 
disadvantage vis-à-vis would-be licensees and granting an unintended 
competitive advantage to large companies over smaller research-based 
companies430. On the other hand, several commentators have argued that the 
primacy of injunctive relief in IP infringement cases should be relaxed, 
especially in modern knowledge-based industries, where IP rights often overlap 
and mingle into a “thicket”431 and where purported trolls have enhanced 
chances to act strategically and secure appealing settlement terms. As rational 
investors would anticipate a leakage of profits due to strategic suit and 
settlement, incentives to invest in R&D would be significantly reduced. In this 
context, patent holders should also be worried about excessive protection, 
especially when inventors are inadvertent or there are innocent infringers432. 
                                                 
 
 
427 See eBay Inc. v. Mercexchange, supra note 2, at p. 1843.  
428 See among others Golden, supra note 165. 
429 See also Kieff, supra note 124 and Epstein, supra note 131.    
430 See Denicolo et al., supra note 160 and Golden supra note 165, analyzing this case for non-practicing 
entities which are research centers. See also James McDonough, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An Alternative 
View of the Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy. EMORY LAW JOURNAL, Vol. 56, p. 189 (2006) 
available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=959945, pointing to the efficiency brought by patent dealers.  
431 See Shapiro, supra note 5, and Lemley and Weiser, supra note 72.  
432 See Christopher Cotropia and Mark Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, STANFORD PUBLIC LAW WORKING 
PAPER NO. 1270160, available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1270160, finding a small percentage of patent 
infringement cases involving an allegation of copying and an even lower percentage finding a proof of 
copying. See also BESSEN AND MEURER, supra note 14, arguing that inadvertent infringement is an 
important component of the failure of the U.S. patent system due to the malfunction of the patent notice 
mechanisms.  
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3.2 Post eBay interpretation of the four-factor test 
 
Discretion over the grant or denial of injunctions was said to be governed by an 
equitable test that is applicable to all disputes, including those involving patent 
law433. The test is composed of the above mentioned four-factors434. Out of these 
four-factos, the first and the second directly refer to whether the right to 
exclude should be limited or not, in the sense of whether it should be protected 
by injunctive relief or not in a particular case. In fact, after the U.S. Supreme 
Court decision, the district court deciding on the remanded case of 
MercExchange v. eBay, emphasized this close relationship and almost identical 
meaning of the first and second factors: 
 
“The irreparable harm inquiry and remedy at law inquiry are essentially two 
sides of the same coin; however, the court will address them separately in order 
to conform with the four-factor test as outlined by the Supreme Court”435.   
 
The third factor performs a balancing test, similar to the “balance of 
convenience” that is described below with respect to the U.K. system. 
Conversely, the fourth factors was already incorporated in earlier court 
decisions which had denied injunctive relief for public interest purposes, 
because an injunction would impose a disproportional burden on society. 
Decisions denying injunctive relief upon this factor are hence, similar to 
different patent law provisions such as compulsory licenses granted for public 
interest reasons. The following sections describe these four-factor test in more 
detail and according to the interpretation of several district courts and the 
CAFC, after the U.S. Supreme Court decision in eBay436. 
3.2.1 Irreparable harm 
Under this factor, courts are called to examine whether the harm suffered by 
patentees is reparable or not in monetary terms and, as mentioned above, this 
first factor, along with the second factor, directly address whether the IP right 
                                                 
 
 
433 But see Laycock supra note 292, arguing that the test in fact did not exist before the eBay decision.  
434 A  plaintiff that wishes to obtain a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test in order to show: 
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, 
are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the 
plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be 
disserved by a permanent injunction. 
435 See MercExchange, LLC v., v. eBay Inc., supra note 3, at footnote 11, p. 16.   
436 For a summary of the cases analyzed here, see Appendix Chapter III. 
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to exclude should be protected by injunctive relief437. Until the 2006 eBay 
decision, the CAFC and district courts tended to apply an almost non-
rebuttable presumption that harm would be irreparable if a valid patent was 
infringed. As a consequence, absent exceptional circumstances, courts always 
found irreparable harm in patent infringement cases. Although most post-eBay 
decisions seem to reflect that the presumption not longer exists, some decisions 
have not even attempted to analyze the issue and have reasoned that the loss of 
a right to exclude always imposes an irreparable harm438. 
 
District courts have vacillated in interpreting this first prong, holding in some 
cases that the eBay decision should not be read as stating that losing the right to 
exclude could not per se constitute an irreparable harm439. In this view, the 
Supreme Court in eBay basically rejected the judicial practice that the patentee’s 
right to exclude should always lead to injunctive relief: 
 
“Prior to applying the facts of the instant matter to the four-factor test, the court 
must consider whether a presumption of irreparable harm upon a finding of 
validity and infringement survives the Supreme Court’s opinion remanding 
this case. Although the parties did not perform extensive briefing on such issue 
and the Supreme Court’s opinion does not squarely address it, a review of 
relevant caselaw, as well as the language of the Supreme Court’s decision, 
supports defendants’ position that such presumption no longer exists”440. 
 
Other courts have noticed how the right to exclude is generally inadequately 
protected by damages but have asked plaintiffs to meet a burden to offer 
specific reasons why infringement cannot be compensated for with a monetary 
award, including such reasons as losing market share or opportunities or the 
difficulty of calculating damages, the most important arguments given for the 
award of injunctions441. By so doing, some courts seem to be moving away from 
categorical rules and conclusive presumptions towards a factual and evidence-
based consideration of each particular case. 
                                                 
 
 
437 See MercExchange, LLC v., v. eBay Inc., supra note 3, at p. 16, footnote 11. 
438 See Millard, supra note 408, discussing the presumption of irreparable harm and arguing that eBay 
should be read as allowing a rebuttable presumption of irreparable harm, which could be precisely 
rebutted in cases of holdups.  
439 See Novozymes v. Genencor, No. 05-cv-160-KAJ (D. Del. 2007), available at: 
http://patentdocs.typepad.com/patent_docs/files/Nozozymes.pdf, granting an injunction in favor of 
Novozymes. 
440 MercExchange, LLC v., v. eBay Inc., 2007 WL 2172587, No. 01-736 (E.D. Va. July 27, 2007), available at 
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/law/MercExchange.pdf.pdf.  
441 See Praxair, Inc, and Praxair Technology Inc, v. ATMI, Inc. and Advanced Technology Materials, Inc. Civ. No. 
03-1158-SLR (D.C. Delaware, Mar 27, 2007), where the court ruled that  Praxair failed to prove why it 
would have difficulties calculating damages going forward and how money damages could not 
adequately compensate for “lost market share” or any “lost research opportunities”. 
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3.2.2 Inadequate remedies  
 
The second factor of the test considers whether other remedies, mostly 
monetary awards, would be adequate or not to compensate for the 
infringement. Courts have again fluctuated in their view about the correct 
interpretation of this factor after the eBay case. Some courts have gone as far as 
to acknowledge that any harm from future infringement could be compensated 
through a reasonable royalty given that the right to exclude alone is not 
sufficient and cannot lead to conclude that remedies other than an injunction 
cannot adequately compensate a patent holder442.  
 
However, most courts have given weight to cases involving loss of market 
share, goodwill or reputation of patentees443 in order to establish whether other 
remedies would be inadequate. The majority of decisions have granted 
injunctions to competitors of the infringer by reasoning that competitors are 
likely to suffer irreparable harm, in the form of losses in market shares, 
commercial reputation and the like444. 
 
In addition, courts have identified as problematic, cases in which damages are 
difficult to prove or when, for instance, the measure of lost profits is not 
available to plaintiffs445. As in the case of the irreparable harm prong, a relevant 
consideration for some courts is the evidence needed to show the inadequacy of 
                                                 
 
 
442 See z4 Technologies Inc., vs. Microsoft Corporation and Autodesk, Inc, U.S. District Court for the Eastern 
District of Texas, 6:06-CV-142, available at: http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/injunctionDenied.pdf, 
where z4 had argued that monetary damages for future infringement were not an adequate remedy 
because they could not compensate z4 for the loss of “its right to exclude Microsoft” whereas the Court 
emphasized that z4’s argument implied “that a violation of the right to exclude under the patent act can 
never be remedied through money”. 
443 See z4 v. Microsoft ibid, identifying such cases where damages were to be held inadequate when “an 
infringer saturates the market for a patented invention with an infringing product or damages the patent 
holder’s good will or brand name recognition by selling infringing product or damages”.  
444 See Douglas Ellis et al, The Economic Implications (And Uncertainties) of Obtaining Permanent Injunctive 
Relief After eBay V. Mercexchange 17 FED. CIR. B.J. 437, 442 (2008), accounting that district court have referred 
to these losses in terms of: "market share," (Novozymes, Smith, Tivo and Wald) "sales," (Verizon, Litecubes 
and Wald) "customers," (Market Biosciences) "profits," (Smith) "opportunities," (Verizon and O2) 
"reputation" (MPT, Black & Decker and Robert Bosch) and "brand name." (Smith). See also Commonwealth 
Sci. & Indus. Research Organisation v. Buffalo Tech. Inc., granting injunction to a non-competitor (Australian 
research center). A noticeable exception is Praxair v. ATMI, where a direct competitor was denied 
injunctive relief and the court also required proof that losses might not in fact be sufficiently compensated 
with money awards, evidencing the application of a different interpretation with regard to the burden of 
proof that falls on patentees. 
445 In the Novozymes case, supra note 439, the court specifically considered that legal remedies were not 
adequate to compensate the patent owner for infringement because lost profits was unavailable (given that 
the patentee had licensed its rights to a subsidiary) and the right to exclude could not, under these 
circumstances be equated to its monetary equivalent.  
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legal remedies446. Any loss of market share, reputation or goodwill should be 
documented by patentees in order to successfully argue that damages are 
inadequate; however, the standard of proof remains largely variable from court 
to court.  
 
Overall, the analysis of the first two factors centers on the questions of how 
much reward is needed to encourage innovation and whether should patentees’ 
sometimes be limited to monetary awards without damaging such incentives447. 
The most interesting change in policy after the eBay decision is that the question 
can be addressed according to the circumstances of each case whereas before 
eBay, categorical considerations prevailed, by equating the character of patents 
as exclusive rights with the fact that they cannot be protected if they are not 
fully enjoined against non-authorized use. In this sense, after the eBay decision,  
the interface between rights and remedies is more clearly delineated. 
  
3.2.3 Balance of hardships 
Under the “balance of hardships” test, courts are called to consider any reasons 
that might impose greater burdens on infringers than on patentees such as to 
turn the balance in favor of denying injunctive relief. Courts are thus called to 
assess and balance the expected costs and expected benefits of a permanent 
injunction, a difficult task for which they usually rely on other considerations 
related to the first and second factors. In fact, one finding in the examination of 
the cases here described is that courts have often inclined towards denying or 
granting injunctive relief on the basis of the first and second factors while 
giving only secondary consideration to the balancing of the interests of 
infringers and patentees.  
 
                                                 
 
 
446 See Praxair v. ATMI, supra note 441, where the court denied an injunction in favor of Praxair because 
company “has not provided or described any specific sales or market data to assist the court, nor has it 
identified precisely what market share, revenues, and customers Praxair has lost to ATMI” and comparing 
to Novozymes, where “evidence demonstrated that plaintiff originally secured an 80% market share with 
its patented product, which fell to approximately 50% after infringing competitor’s market entry”. See also 
Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling Inc. v. Globalsantafe Corp., No Civ. A. 03-2910, 2006 WL 3813778, *4 
(S.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2006), granting a permanent injunction where the customer base is small and the 
defendant has not only used the infringing technology to compete for the same customers and contracts as 
plaintiff but also to win contracts over competing bids from plaintiff; Tivo Inc. V. EchoStar Communications 
Corp., 446 F. Suppl. 2d 664, 669-70 (E.D. Tex. 2006), arguing that the burden of proof could be met by 
showing that plaintiff was “a relatively new company with only one primary product” and the parties 
agreed that customers tend to stick to the company from which they obtained their first DVR recorder, 
“shaping the market to plaintiff’s disadvantage and resulting in long-term customer loss”.  
447 Praxair stated “that it spends $75 million per year inR&D and that denying protection to its rights to 
exclude through injunctions it would have “no incentive to innovate” and its patents “would be effectively 
meaningless”. The court however reasoned that “Praxair does not explain why money damages could not 
suffice to compensate for any lost opportunities to conduct research due to budgetary constraints”. 
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Courts have also evaluated under this test the importance of the patented 
technology in relation to infringing products, and especially the question 
whether products are of a multi-component nature and if the patent covers only 
a small part of them448. This was one of the important considerations given by 
Kennedy’s opinion in the eBay case which reflects economic insights about the 
optimal reward to innovators. Nevertheless, courts have recognized the 
“speculative” nature of such balancing test449: 
 
“With the future so speculative in this continually-developing, complex 
scenario, the court cannot confidently determine in which party's favor the 
balance of hardships tips”450. 
 
As we will see in the comparative section (Italy and UK), similar tests are 
present in other legislations, even in different legal areas and with regard to 
other compulsory measures supporting injunctive relief, as destruction or 
confiscation. 
3.2.4 Public interest 
The interest of public has been traditionally considered as an important limit to 
the exclusive nature of patents and even before the eBay decision in 2006; 
several district courts had denied injunctions upon considerations of public 
interest451. There is a wide contradiction however, in the interpretation of public 
interest, as some courts continue to plainly affirm that public interest is always 
better served by issuing an injunction and thus, maintaining the correct 
functioning of the patent system452.  
                                                 
 
 
448 In the z4 case, the court discussed how “product activation” (the z4 patent) is a very small component 
of the software products that infringe upon this patent. Given this condition, the court went on to explain 
that the allegedly damage hardship that z4 will suffer should be balanced with the harms caused to the 
infringer, in this case, Microsoft. The court found that “the potential hardships Microsoft could suffer if the 
injunction were granted outweigh any limited and reparable hardships that z4 would suffer in the absence 
of an injunction”. See also Amado v. Microsoft Corp., 517 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 26, 2008), concerning a 
patent that covered a very small component of the infringing products (claim 21 was infringed which 
covers a single feature linking Access and Excel) and Paice L.L.C. v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1315 
(Fed. Cir. 2007), concerning patents on part of the hybrid transmission system incorporated in cars 
manufactured by Toyota.  
449 See MercExchange v. eBay case, supra note 3, where the court considered firstly that potential hardships 
for MercExchange were likely to be low because the company was willing to license its patents and was 
not competing with eBay. It also ascertained that the harm of a dubious patent (still the process before the 
U.S.P.T.O. is ongoing) would impose on the defendant was important. Nevertheless, the court recognized 
that the third prong did not clearly favor any party because of the uncertainty surrounding the validity of 
the patent, whether they had been designed around and whether the plaintiff could, in association with 
other companies, start competing with eBay as well. 
450 Ibid at p. 39. 
451 See supra note 417.  
452 See TiVo Inc. v. EchoStar Commc’n Corp., 446 F. Supp. 2d, 664, 670 (E.D. Tex. 2006) at 670, expressing that 
“the public has an interest in maintaining a strong patent system” and also concluding that in that specific 
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Such view would again end-up in a categorical rule that denies courts the 
possible, yet difficult exercise of balancing the interest of the public in a healthy 
patent system. With this regard, the district court in MercExchange v. eBay, 
concluded that: 
 
“However, while preserving the integrity of the patent system will always be a 
consideration in the public interest analysis, it cannot be allowed to dominate 
such analysis lest a presumption results. Accordingly, the court considers the 
type of patent involved, the impact on the market, the impact on the patent 
system, and any other factor that may impact the public at large and concludes 
that, on these facts, the public interest weighs against the entry of an 
injunction”453. 
 
 Nevertheless, it has been widely acknowledged that attempting to strike a 
balance with public interest concerns by assessing the expected outcomes with 
or without an injunction is indeed a difficult task for courts. Hence, several 
courts have attempted again to speculate on the probabilities that a given 
outcome would result and the expected costs and benefits from this probable 
outcome in order to examine the potential impact that an injunction or the lack 
of one, would have on the interest of the public: 
   
“Although it is impossible to determine the actual events that would follow the 
deactivation of Microsoft’s product activation serves, it is likely that the market 
would see an increase in pirate versions of the software”454.  
 
3.3 The post eBay decision landscape 
 
The aftermath of eBay has been characterized by astonishing legal uncertainty. 
In spite of a great controversy generated both in legal and economic terms, most 
commentators however, agree on some points. First, that eBay has represented 
an important transformation on the way patent remedies were routinely 
awarded and conceived and overall an important patent policy change in the 
                                                                                                                                               
 
 
case, “public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction” as “the infringing products are 
not related to any issue of public health or any other equally key interest; they are used for entertainment”. 
453 See MercExchange v. eBay, supra note 3 at p. 39 
454 See z4 v. Microsoft, supra note 442, where the Court balanced the potential costs and benefits, 
concluding that an injunction could have increased the risks that some public users suffer negative effects 
whereas no effects might befall the public in the absence of an injunction. Although these effects were 
somewhat speculative, they weighted against granting an injunction. 
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U.S.455. Secondly, however, the decision did not provide enough guidance for 
district courts relative to the daunting task imposed upon them, which has 
given rise to uncertainty and conflicting decisions456. Moreover, the concurring 
opinions gave some contradictory suggestions, which have in practice been 
followed by district courts, producing a number of inconsistent decisions457. 
However, a number of interesting features can be identified in the set of cases 
following the eBay decision458. These features are briefly described in this 
section459.  
 
A first observation is that the majority of decisions after eBay, have granted 
injunctions to competitors of the infringer. The reasoning is that competitors are 
likely to suffer irreparable harm, in the form of losses of market shares, 
commercial reputation, business goodwill and similar business values. In spite 
of this pattern, a noticeable exception is Praxair v. ATMI, where a direct 
competitor was denied injunctive relief. In this case, the court also required 
proof that such losses might not in fact be sufficiently compensated with money 
awards. This evidences the application of a different interpretation with regard 
to the burden of proof that falls on patentees if they seek injunctive relief. In 
fact, if the Supreme Court decision on eBay is read as imposing the use of a 
standard to decide upon the award of injunctions, it would not be sufficient to 
prove that a patent owner competes in order to ask for injunctive relief. 
Nonetheless, the existence of such a standard does not preclude the emergence 
of rules of interpretation and presumptions such as the one that holds that a 
competitor would be presumably suffer an irreparable harm in the absence of 
injunctive relief. A further complication however, is to determine which type of 
competitor the patent owner should be in order to suffer such irreparable 
harm460.  
                                                 
 
 
455  See Kieff, supra note 124, arguing that eBay the long-standing practice that made injunctions a credible 
threat available to patentees. See also Amado v. Microsoft, supra note 448, holding that “because eBay 
represents an intervening change in law, the Court finds it appropriate to revisit the propriety of the 
injunction in this case”). 
456 See Millard, supra note 408, highlighting the contradictory decisions by different district courts with 
regards to the presumption of irreparable harm that follows from a finding of validity and infringement.  
457 See Benjamin Diessel, Note, Trolling for Trolls: The Pitfalls of the Emerging Market Competition Requirement 
for Permanent Injunctions in Patent Cases Post-eBay, 106 MICH. L. REV. 305, 311, arguing that district courts 
have followed a “market competition requirement”, precluding injunctive relief for non-competitors.  As 
we described below, courts have mostly based their decisions on whether patentee competes with 
infringer with some outliers but important cases at the margin.  
458 The set of cases corresponds to the result of an automatic search on West Law performed during 
January 2008 until December 2008. The cases were subsequently revised and confronted with other articles 
reviewing post-eBay cases. See for instance, Ellis et al, supra note 444. 
459 For an overview of the cases under analysis see Chapter III Appendix.  
460 For instance, should the patent owner compete in the same market or markets, be a current or a former 
competitor and to what extent should the patent owner and infringer compete in order for there to be a 
presumption of irreparable harm. Moreover, if a “market competition” requirement emerges in order for 
patent owners to obtain injunctive relief, some patent owners might initiate commercial activities only 
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A second trend that emerges is that most cases denying injunctions concerned a 
non-practicing entity. Most non-practicing entities cannot in fact compete with 
the infringer, a reason used by district courts to hold that harm was not 
irreparable and that other remedies available at law could be adequate. An 
exception was the case of Commonwealth Sci. & Ind. Research Org. v. Buffalo Tech 
Inc.461, where a non-practicing entity obtained an injunction. In this case the 
court highlighted the importance of granting injunctive relief to a research 
institution, which finances its R&D activity through the commercialization of its 
patents and how obtaining an injunction would help it to continue a successful 
licensing program. This case is exceptional in the sense that a national 
(Australian) research center was involved and comity implications might have 
also played a role. 
 
A rather expansive reading of the possibility to substitute injunctions with 
damage compensation was given in the CAFC decision on the case of 
Innogenetics v. Abbot Labs462. Whereas the district court had granted an 
injunction463, on appeal the CAFC reversed, based upon the argument that 
when a jury awards damage compensation that includes a market-fee entry 
plus ongoing royalty, this might be considered to be sufficient to ensure the 
plaintiff’s relief. In this case, the CAFC admitted that forward-looking damages 
are a good substitute for injunctive relief.  
 
The cases analyzed here, show that district courts (and the CAFC) have applied 
different reasoning while deciding cases especially upon the fact of whether the 
patentee is a direct competitor of the defendant. Additionally, some cases have 
denied injunctions when the patent concerned a small component of the 
infringing product464. 
 
Nonetheless, the prevailing uncertainty in the interpretation of the four-factor 
test is manifested in its dissimilar application by District Courts. For instance, in 
interpreting the irreparable harm prong, even though courts have ascertained 
factual considerations such as whether the plaintiff would face losses of market 
                                                                                                                                               
 
 
aiming at obtaining injunctive relief within their infringement cases, giving rise to potentially inefficient 
commercial activities. 
461 See Commonwealth Scientific & Indus. Research Organisation v. Buffalo Tech. Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 600, 600–
02 (E.D. Tex. 2007), granting injunction to a non-competitor (Australian research center). 
462 See Innogenetics v. Abbot Labs 512 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2008), available at: 
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/opinions/07-1145.pdf  
463 See Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs., No. 05-C-0575-C (W.D. Wis.). 
464 See for instance, Amado v. Microsoft, supra note 448, which concerned a patent covering a very small 
component of the infringing products (claim 21 was infringed covers a single feature linking Access and 
Excel). Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp, concerned patents on part of the hybrid transmission system 
incorporated in cars manufactured by Toyota. z4 Techs. v. Microsoft Corp. concerned a patent on a 
product activation /anti piracy software.  
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share or reputation, they have made general and contradictory statements. 
Some courts have argued that a patentee has suffered irreparable harm solely 
because of the infringement of her right to exclude others from practicing its 
patent465,that is, still confusing the right with the remedy awarded.  
 
Other courts interpreting the inadequacy of available remedies have expressed 
that “the statutory right to exclude represents a benefit that, under these 
circumstances, cannot be equated by an award of cash”466 or that “the statutory 
right to exclude represents a tangential benefit associated with patent rights 
that cannot be quantified in monetary damages”. Such cases underline how a 
multi-criteria test might benefit from economic analysis, which is absent in 
virtually every post-eBay case467.  
 
3.4 Willful v. inadvertent infringement 
 
When infringement happens intentionally or willfully, it implies the possibility 
of having to pay enhanced damages468. Accordingly, a court has to firstly 
determine whether the infringer is guilty, by proving that he or she acted in bad 
faith, either by engaging in vexatious litigation or willful infringement. 
Subsequently, the court discretionally establishes whether to increase damages 
and how much, in a decision that must take into account all the 
circumstances469.  
 
An important object of critique about the denial of injunctive relief for some 
patentees is the possibility that such denial could give incentives to infringe as 
potential infringers would anticipate that in case the court decides that the 
patent was infringed, it might nevertheless limit relief to the payment of 
reasonable royalties. With this respect, however, other scholars argue that 
inadvertent or innocent infringement happens in an important number of 
                                                 
 
 
465 See Novozymes v. Genencor, supra note 439. 
466 Ibid.  
467 Chapter IV 
468 See U.S.C. 35 § 284, establishing that: "the court may increase the damages up to three times the amount 
found or assessed". Enhanced damages are punitive and not merely compensatory. Hence, they are only 
awarded upon a finding of culpability of the infringer. See also Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1570 
(Fed. Cir. 1996). 
469 See Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826 (Fed. Cir. 1992) arguing that the most important factor to 
determine willfulness is the egregiousness of the defendant's conduct based on all the facts and 
circumstances, although providing an illustrative set of factors to take into consideration “(1) whether the 
infringer deliberately copied the ideas of another; (2) whether the infringer investigated the scope of the 
patent and formed a good faith belief that it was invalid or not infringed; (3) the infringer's behavior as a 
party to the litigation; (4) the defendant's size and financial condition; (5) the closeness of the case; (6) the 
duration of the defendant's misconduct; (7) remedial action by the defendant; and (8) the defendant's 
motivation for willfully infringing.  
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cases470. Some proposals to cope with this problem refer the possibility of 
establishing an independent inventor-defense in order to avoid inadvertent 
infringers to become victims of patent troll-behavior.  
 
Rules on willful infringement aim at deterring wrongful behavior. However, it 
has been posed that such rules, as interpreted by the courts have actually 
provided incentives for avoiding a proper search before infringement occurs471. 
The recent decision in Re Seagate472, changed the way in which the CAFC 
interprets the standard for willfulness, now requiring a much higher standard 
to prove that an infringement was in effect willful. Whereas the standard 
previous to Seagate only required a proof akin to negligence, the court raised 
such threshold:   
 
“Accordingly, we overrule the standard set out in Underwater Devices and hold 
that proof of willful infringement permitting enhanced damages requires at 
least a showing of objective recklessness. Because we abandon the affirmative 
duty of due care, we also reemphasize that there is no affirmative obligation to 
obtain opinion of counsel”473 
 
A question posed after the eBay case and which still has not received any 
definite answer is whether injunctions should be denied in cases of willful 
infringement. Although the threat of enhanced damages in the U.S. might 
suffice as a deterrent for infringement, this question is still subject to 
controversy. The U.S. Supreme Court did not give any guidance with regard to 
this question, but at least one court has found willful infringement yet denied 
injunctive relief for the owner474.  
 
                                                 
 
 
470 See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 14, warning about the risks of inadvertent infringement and the 
possibility of its prevalence due to decreasing quality of patents, uncertain borders and an overall failure 
of the patent notice system in the U.S. See also Chapter IV below, on the law and economic analysis of 
inadvertent infringement within the choice between property and liability rules.  
471 See Note, The Disclosure Function Of The Patent System (Or Lack Thereof), 118 Harv. L. Rev. 2007 (2005), 
available at: 
http://www.harvardlawreview.org/issues/118/April05/Notes/Disclosure_FunctionFTX.pdf, arguing 
that: “The Federal Circuit’s will-ful infringement rules, for example, encourage innovators to protect 
themselves from treble damages by remaining “willfully ignorant” of the patents in their field” 
472 See Seagate Technology, LLC, 2007 WL 2358677 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 20, 2007). 
473 Ibid at p. 5.  
474 See Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corporation, Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Co., 2006 WL 2385139, (E.D. Tex. 
Aug. 16, 2006), vacated and remanded, where the District Court of Texas found that Toyota willfully 
infringed Paice's patent but it deemed an injunction was not an appropriate remedy because Paice did not 
compete with Toyota. The court ordered that each future sale of a vehicle by Toyota be subject to a $25 per 
vehicle royalty to Paice, based on a hypothetical bargain approach. The decision of Toyota to continue the 
infringement would probably be taken into account in the calculation of royalties -Add the appellate 
decision which revised only the ongoing royalty issue, not the denial of injunctive relief- 
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3.5 Preliminary Injunctions 
In the U.S., preliminary injunctions are subject to a test considering whether the 
plaintiff might prove the following conditions: (1) a reasonable likelihood of 
success on the merits; (2) irreparable harm; (3) the balance of hardships; and 
(4)the public interest475. 
 
Although the eBay ruling directly refers to permanent injunctions, it raised 
doubts about whether the insights of the decision might be applied to 
preliminary injunctions. Some district courts have ruled in this sense, by not 
holding a presumption of irreparable harm upon a considerable likelihood of 
validity and infringement476.  
 
3.6 Other liability rules in the U.S.  
 
It has been widely suggested that compulsory licenses for patents are higly 
exceptional or completely absent from U.S. patent law. A precedent from 1908 
held that even if competitors are excluded from the use of the new patent, such 
exclusion is on the very essence of the right conferred in the patent act and that 
it is the privilege of any owner, to use or not to use her property477. 
 
In addition, several antitrust cases have expressed the U.S. view on compulsory 
licensing as opposing such provisions either in the context of debates for 
potential reforms of the Patent Act as well in the context of international 
negotiations. In effect, the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged in 1945 that:  
 
“A patent owner is not in the position of a quasi-trustee for the public or under 
any obligation to see that the public acquires the free right to use the invention. 
He has no obligation either to use it or to grant its use to others (…) Congress 
has repeatedly been asked and has refused to change a statutory policy by 
imposing a forfeiture or by a provision for compulsory licensing if the patent is 
not used within a specified time. Statutory compulsory licenses are only 
provided for in the US in the Atomic Energy Act (42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2184) and the 
Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1857 h-6), i.e., in cases where there is a particular 
public interest”.478 
                                                 
 
 
475 See Hybritech Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 849 F.2d 1446, 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
476 John M. Griem Jr. and Anna Brook, 'Ebay' and Preliminary Injunctions Feature, Special to The National 
Law Journal, The NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, VOL. 30, NO. 35, May 12, 2008.  
477 Continental Paper Bag v. Eastern Paper Bag 
478 See Hartford-Empire v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945). See also Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 
448 U.S. 176, 215 (1980); where the Court held that: "although compulsory licensing provisions were 
considered for possible incorporation into the 1952 revision of the patent laws, they were dropped before 
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However, it is often acknowledged that compulsory licenses have been widely 
used by antitrust authorities as a remedy against violations of antitrust law, 
especially during the 1940s479. These cases however, mainly concerned patents 
abused by cartels or for the purpose of obtaining or maintaining a monopoly 
position which had been attained for other reasons. These cases, however, 
mainly concerned patents abused by cartels or for the purpose of obtaining or 
maintaining a monopoly position which had been attained for reasons other 
than the “mere failure to work or refusal to license a patent”. Moreover, under 
the evolving and conflicting view about the interface between patents and 
antitrust law, such cases of antitrust compulsory licenses have diminished 
during the recent decades480.  
4 U.K. 
4.1 Injunctions as an equitable remedy 
As an equitable remedy, an injunction is subject to the discretion of courts481, 
which may award damages as a substitute of an injunction based upon the 50 
Supreme Court Act of 1981. In practice, U.K. courts have only denied 
                                                                                                                                               
 
 
the final bill was circulated." Id. at 215 n.21, citing House Committee on the Judiciary, Proposed Revision 
and Amendment of the Patent Laws: Preliminary Draft, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 91 (Comm. Print 1950). The 
Court characterized antitrust law and patent law as equivalents in importance: "The policy of free 
competition runs deep in our law .... But the policy of stimulating invention that underlies the entire 
patent system runs no less deep." See Ibid at p. 221. 
479 See Frederic Scherer, The Political Economy of Patent Policy Reform in the United States, (October 2007). 
KSG WORKING PAPER NO. RWP07-042, available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=963136, referring that: 
“between 1941 and the late 1950s, compulsory licensing decrees had been issued in settlement of more 
than 100 antitrust complaints, covering inter alia AT&T's transistor and other telecommunications 
apparatus patents, IBM's computer patents, and DuPont's nylon and other synthetic fiber patents. The 
cumulative number of patents affected is estimated to have been between 40,000 and 50,000”. 
480 See Beier, supra note 98, at p. 264-265 and accompanying footnotes; discussing the absence of 
obligations to work or license a patent both in U.S. and German Law, and citing, among others, section 
24(1) of the 1981 German Patent Act which established that “a compulsory license may only be granted if 
the use of the invention is indispensable in the public interest” and “the patent owner refuses to permit the 
party seeking a license to use the invention against payment of a reasonable license fee and security”; 
acknowledging also the opinions of several scholars, according to which: “failure to work or insufficient 
working of the invention, just as mere dependency, will not justify the grant of a compulsory license if 
there is no public interest in the invention being used”. See also Makan Delrahim, Forcing Firms To Share 
The Sandbox: Compulsory Licensing Of Intellectual Property Rights And Antitrust, Presented at the British 
Institute of International and Comparative Law, London, England, May 10, 2004, available at: 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/203627.htm, analyzing compulsory licenses in the context of 
antitrust remedies and arguing that they should be draft as narrowly as possible but can be nevertheless  
useful for merger cases as a complement or alternative to divesture, or in non-merger cases when other, 
less restrictive remedies would most likely fail to address anticompetitive conduct by a defendant. 
481 See DAVID BAINBRIDGE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, (Pearson Education Limited, Sixth edition. 2006), p. 460-
461. 
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injunctions under unusual circumstances482. Further exceptions are however 
provided by the same Patent Act, for instance, when a license of right has been 
filled.483  
 
Injunctions are generally awarded when two conditions are met484: 1) that 
invasion of a property right is demonstrated and 2) that repetition is 
threatened485. Nonetheless, courts have considered that even if such conditions 
are met, injunctions should not be granted if their effect would be oppressive486, 
but they have been precautious in finding “oppressive” effects and have usually 
avoided a test to balance the convenience of an injunctive order487.  
 
Nevertheless, nothing prevents judges to discretionally balance the interest of 
the parties and the public interest488. Courts also enjoy significant discretion to 
grant a stay of any injunction where there is an appeal489.  
                                                 
 
 
482 See Banks v. EMI Songs Ltd (No.2), [1996] EMLR 452, a musical copyright case described by its own trial 
judge as “wholly exceptional”. 
483 See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 481, at p. 463, describing how an injunction will not be granted against a 
defendant that had applied for such license and the amount of damages will also be limited recoverable 
against him is limited to a maximum of double the amount that he would have paid had the infringing 
acts all been done under the license. However, if the infringer did not have a license and failed to 
undertake to apply for a license of right an injunction could be imposed and damages would not be 
limited but set at the actual amount caused to the plaintiff. 
484 See Navitaire Inc v. Easyjet Airline Co. Ltd. (No. 2), [2006] RPC 4, where judges concluded that because 
the copyright infringement only related to minor aspects of the software, an injunctive order was too 
extreme: “Generally, an injunction will be granted where the invasion of a property right is demonstrated, 
and where repetition is threatened.  
485 Such requirements are similar to the Italian test for granting injunctive relief and also present in certain 
U.S. decisions  For instance, in Mershon v. O’Neill (1934, CA2 NY) 73 F2d. 68, it was held that absent threat 
of further infringement, there was no basis for injunction. Compare with Crier v. Innes (1909, CA2 Vt) 170 F 
324 (superseded by statute and American Medical Sys. v. Medical Eng’g. Corp. (1993, CA FC 6 F3d 1523, 28 
USPQ2d 1321) holding that an injunction would not necessarily be prevented if defendant had ceased to 
infringe and promised not to infringe in the future. For more cases see also LEXSTAT 35 USC 283, at lexis; 
p. 26-27 US Decisions; find Italian decisions on the matter.  
486 See Navitaire v. Easyjet; supra note 484, quoting from Jaggard v Sawyer, supra note 293, which cites the 
working rule laid by A.L. Smith in Shelfer v. City of London Electric Lighting Co. (1895), and arguing that: 
“an exception to the general rule is that an injunction will not be granted where the effect of the grant of 
the injunction is oppressive”. 
487 Ibid, stating that: “…my understanding of the word “oppressive” in this context is that the effect of the 
grant of the injunction would be grossly disproportionate to the right protected. The word “grossly” 
avoids any suggestion that all that has to be done is to strike a balance of convenience”. A working test to 
evaluate the circumstances of the case was developed in Shelfer v. City of London Electric Lighting Co l (1895, 
1, Ch. 287), by Smith LJ and re-affirmed by Aldous J. The working rule states: “If the injury to plaintiff’s 
legal rights is small; and is one which is capable of being estimated in money; and is one which can 
adequately be compensated by a small money payment; and the case is one in which it would be 
oppressive to the defendant to grant an injunction”. 
488 See Chiron Corp v. Organon Teknika Ltd (No. 10), 1995, FSR 325, arguing that “However the Court's 
discretion under the section is not limited. Therefore the court should in appropriate circumstances take 
into account the interests of persons who would be affected by the grant of the injunction. That may 
involve considering the interests of the public”. 
489 See the opinion by Buckley LJ in Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co. V. Johnson & Johnson Ltd. (1976, 
RPC 72), stating that consideration should be given to whether the appeal was made in good faith, the 
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4.2 Discretion to award damages in lieu of injunctions 
U.K. courts hence enjoy ample discretion to award damages instead of 
injunctions, that is, the possibility of awarding ex-post liability rules in the sense 
used here of switching from a property to a liability rule. A working test to 
identify cases in which damages could substitute an injunction was developed 
in the Shelfer case: 
 
“If the injury to plaintiff’s legal rights is small; and is one which is capable of 
being estimated in money; and is one which can adequately be compensated by 
a small money payment; and the case is one in which it would be oppressive to 
the defendant to grant an injunction”490. 
 
However, the Shelfer case included three separate judgments; two of which 
expressing rather divergent views. The verdict by Lindley warned that 
injunctions should not be denied in order to grant infringers the possibility to 
buy-out their infringement but only under exceptional circumstances. In citing 
such exceptional circumstances, Justice Lindley included trivial and occasional 
nuisances, cases in which the claimant has shown that he only wants money, 
vexatious and oppressive cases and cases where the claimant has so conducted 
himself as to render it unjust to give him more than pecuniary relief, thus 
describing a broader set of cases in which injunctions could be denied in order 
to avoid patentee’s strategic behavior491.   
 
In contrast, the opinion by Judge Smith’s laid down a narrow and cumulative 
set of standards, which has been however read as being non-exhaustive. In 
general, it is argued that when the criterion of Smith’s test is met, U.K. courts 
are very likely to refuse an injunction whereas if it is not met, courts would 
refuse injunctions only in exceptional circumstances. Nevertheless, such 
circumstances have encompassed cases when “the claimant may have no real 
objection to the defendant’s use of the work other than the fact that it is not 
licensed”; “the claimant's main aim may be to prevent competition by putting 
the defendant out of business”; where “the claimant has only offered a license 
at an unreasonably high fee” or when the infringer acted in “good faith and in 
ignorance of the rights (of the claimant), and thereby inadvertently placed 
himself in a position where the grant of an injunction would either force him to 
                                                                                                                                               
 
 
likelihood of the appeal being successful, damage caused to the parties in each case and more in general, 
the particular facts of the case.  
490 See Judge Smith’s opinion in Shelfer v. City of London Electric Lighting Co. (1895, 1, Ch. 287). 
491 See Gwilym Harbottle, Permanent Injunctions in Copyright Cases: When Will They Be Refused. EUROPEAN 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REVIEW, 23(3), 2001.  
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yield to the (claimant’s) extortionate demands or expose him to substantial 
loss"492.  
 
However, it is widely understood that the mere fact that the defendant is 
willing to pay damages does not free him from the threat of an injunction, since 
that would simply grant the infringer a license legalizing the misconduct: 
 
“Accordingly the grant or refusal of a final injunction is not merely a matter of 
the balance of convenience. Justice requires that the court observe the principles 
enunciated in Shelfer’s case and remembers that if the effect of the grant of an 
injunction is not oppressive the defendant cannot buy his way out of it, even if 
the price, objectively ascertained, would be modest. My understanding of the 
word “oppressive” in this context is that the effect of the grant of the injunction 
would be grossly disproportionate to the right protected. The word “grossly” 
avoids any suggestion that all that has to be done is to strike a balance of 
convenience”493 (emphasis added) 
 
In a recent case concerning a copyright infringement on computer software and 
databases, and involving Navitaire Inc v. Easyjet Airline Co., a U.K. court found 
that the balance tilted against a permanent injunction494. Whereas the claimant 
owned the copyright in various works embedded in the source code of a 
ticketless airline booking system called “OperRes”, Easyjet had taken a license 
of the OperRes system. After two years of the licensing agreement, Easyjet 
decided to develop its own booking system given that the claimant could not or 
was unable to modify the module giving access to the world-wide-web. The 
copyright owners were successful only in establishing infringement in minor 
aspects of the software and hence, the remedy was deemed to be too extreme.   
Mr. Justice Pumfrey expressed:  
 
“Generally, an injunction will be granted where the invasion of a property right 
is demonstrated, and where repetition is threatened. An exception to the 
                                                 
 
 
492 See Isenberg v. East India House Estate Co. Ltd, (1863) 3 De G. J. & S. 263 at 273, cited by Millett L.J. in 
Jaggard v Sawyer, supra note 293, at p. 207 and stating that “it is the duty of the court not to deliver over the 
defendant to the claimant bound hand and foot in order that the defendant may be made subject to any 
extortionate demand that the claimant may seek to make. If the court granted injunctions in such 
circumstances it would effectively make itself an instrument of oppression”. See also the decision in 
Jaggard, Ibid, arguing that a defendant may have acted in good faith or inadvertently and “the grant of an 
injunction would either force him to yield to the [claimant]'s extortionate demands or expose him to 
substantial loss". Similarly, the decision in Banks cited as one of the reasons why the court refused an 
injunction  when “the claimant had made it plain that what she really wanted was money”. 
493  See Navitaire Inc v. Easyjet Airline Co., supra note 484, citing and following the precedent of Shelfer v. 
City of London Electric Lighting Co., [1895] 1 Ch 287. 
494 Ibid.  
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general rule is that an injunction will not be granted where the effect of the 
grant of the injunction is oppressive”495  
 
Injunctions have also been denied in cases regarding confidential information 
under the application of a balance of convenience 496. In one of these decisions, 
Judge Megarry J’s discerned a number of circumstances according to which it 
might be appropriate to make the defendant pay only for what he had taken: (1) 
When defendant was copying only subconsciously or for some innocent reason; 
(2) According to the gratuitous manner of plaintiff’s communication; (3) When 
the defendant was not himself using the idea but pursuing an alternative in 
collaboration with another producer; (4) The extent of defendant’s own 
contribution to the design of successful product; (5) Whether information was 
economic or personal; (6) The relatively mundane or subsidiary character of the 
information that was copied and (7) The fact that the information had become 
public497. 
 
Such working rule might be complemented by third parties or the public 
concerns. Courts also enjoy significant discretion to grant a stay of any 
injunction where there is an appeal498. Considerable discretion also surrounds 
the granting of injunctive relief and the design of injunctions; meaning not only 
that injunctions might be limited or denied but also they might be awarded in 
cases where other jurisdictions do not. The High Court in the Patents Court 
interpreted that Section 37 of the U.K. Supreme Court Act 1981 gave the court 
the jurisdiction, inter alia to grant post-expiry injunctions, especially when an 
infringer holds an advantage over its competitors, case in which the court 
deemed that forbidding use for further 12 months would put the patentee in the 
position it would have been, had her patents rights been respected499.  
 
                                                 
 
 
495 Ibid following Jaggard v Sawyer, supra note 293, and also citing the working rule laid by Justice A.L. 
Smith in Shelfer v. City of London Electric Lighting Co. (1895). 
496 See WILLIAM CORNISH AND DAVID LLEWELYN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, 
TRADEMARKS AND ALLIED RIGHTS, London Sweet & Maxwell, 5th edition, (2003), at p. 329, fifth edition, 
citing Seager v Copydex N° 1, 1967 2, All E.R. , 415 at 418 where the court of appeal refused injunction and 
left defendant to relief in damages and Coco v. Clark, 1964, R.P.C. 41 at 50, idem.  
497 See Judgment of Megarry J’s in Coco v. AN Clark (Engineers), 1964, R.P.C. 41 at 50, cited in CORNISH AND 
LLEWELYN, supra note 496, at p. 329-330. 
498 See supra note 489. 
499  See Crossley v. Derby Gas Light Co., 1834, 4LT Ch 25 and confirmed by Dyson Appliances Ltd. V. Hoover 
Ltd N° 2., in BAINBRIDGE, supra note 481, at p. 454. In this case, a large quantity of infringing vacuum 
cleaners was sold and stocked and the High Court in the Patents Court interpreted s 37 of the Supreme 
Court Act 1981 to give jurisdiction, inter alia, to grant post-expiry injunctions. See also Kirin-Amgem Inc. v. 
Transkaryotic Therapies Inc. (N° 2) 1998, FSR 1. Compare with other countries that reject the award of post-
expiry injunctions. But see also Ibid, at p. 458, arguing that “if secondary damages were recoverable, an 
injunction was unnecessary, providing these damages could be assessed” This reasoning is similar to those 
of some U.S. Courts, such as that of Innogenetics v. Abbott, supra note 462. 
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In addition, designing the appropriate scope for an injunction might be an 
important policy lever for cases in which a patent covers minor parts of a 
complex product and thus, injunctions might give raise to holdups500.  
4.3 The rationale of ex-post liability rules in the U.K.  
U.K. courts have tended to limit the circumstances in which damages might 
substitute injunctions, however recognizing the possibility that plaintiffs might 
use an injunction to extract a royalty fee greater than the value of the right, or to 
extort the defendant. In the Shelfer case, the decision by Lindley L.J., 
emphasized the attention that should be paid during the exercise of discretion 
to well-settled principles, in particular the principle that the court will not 
"allow a wrong to continue simply because the wrongdoer is able and willing to 
 pay for the injury he may inflict"501.  
 
Scholars have also described how several cases reflect the principles of Shelter 
while other cases have denied injunctions in a broader set of circumstances502. 
This latter group of cases reflects the importance of discretion to encompass 
new situations where injunctive relief might result too costly or give raise to 
strategic behavior503. As Millett L.J. pointed out in Jaggard, this does involve the 
                                                 
 
 
500 See Coflexip SA v Stolt Comex Seaway MS Ltd500 which changed the judicial practice of granting broad 
injunctions that basically repeat the terms of the patent’s claims. Compare with U.S. scholars F. Scott Kieff, 
Richard A. Epstein, and R. Polk Wagner, Various Law & Economics Professors as Amicus Curiae in the U.S. 
Supreme Court Docket #  05-130, eBay v. MercExchange (2006), arguing that: “No court should issue an 
injunction unless it is possible for the enjoined party to know what conduct is prohibited and what is not. 
Overbroad injunctions improperly curtail the defendant’s right to conduct its own business as it sees fit, so 
any system of discretion must necessarily see that the remedy in question is tailored to the underlying 
wrong” and citing Fuji Photo Film Co., Ltd. v. Jazz Photo Corp., 394 F.3d 1368, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2005), where 
the court of appeals held that: “The district court determined that Fuji’s proposed injunction lacked 
specificity and reasonable detail as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)”.  
501 Such exceptional cases in which an injunction could be denied would be the following: when the 
infringement consist on a trivial and occasional nuisance; when the claimant has shown that he only wants 
money; in vexatious and oppressive cases; and in such cases where the claimant’s behavior has been such 
as to render it unjust to give him more than pecuniary relief. 
502 See Harbottle, supra note 491, at p.  154-155. 
503 Ibid, referring the hypothesis that would likely be considered by courts in order to (exceptionally) deny 
injunctive relief:  1) cases where the claimant does not have a bona fide exception against the defendants’ 
use of its work “as in Ludlow or Banks, the claimant may have no real objection to the defendant's use of 
the work other than the fact that it is not licensed or, as in Ocular Sciences, the claimant's main aim may be 
to prevent competition by putting the defendant out of business. In such circumstances the court will lean 
against the grant of an injunction; 2) Where “the claimant has only offered a licence at an unreasonably 
high fee, the court may decide merely to award damages, provided of course the defendant is solvent and 
willing to pay a reasonable fee (…); 3) As Millett L.J. made clear in Jaggard v Sawyer, supra note 293, it may 
be that the defendant acted "openly and in good faith and in ignorance of the [claimant]'s rights, and 
thereby inadvertently placed himself in a position where the grant of an injunction would either force him 
to yield to the [claimant]'s extortionate demands or expose him to substantial loss". 
4) In Banks, “The claimant's copyright in the lyrics of a song performed by the band UB40 had been 
infringed. Jacob J. refused an injunction and ordered damages to be assessed. He gave two reasons. One 
was that the claimant had made it plain that what she really wanted was money…” 
Ex-post Liability Rules   
In Modern Patent Law  151  
 
 
court giving its sanction to the expropriation of the claimant's rights504. On the 
other hand, courts have also acknowledge the perils of strategic behavior, 
which could allow a claimant to extort a defendant:  
 
“it is the duty of the court not to deliver over the defendant to the claimant 
bound hand and foot in order that the defendant may be made subject to any 
extortionate demand that the claimant may seek to make”505. This set of cases 
resembles factual considerations in eBay and related cases506 in the sense of 
preventing extortionist behavior and the use of patents as bargaining chips 
instead than as mechanism to provide innovation incentives.  
 
Moreover, given the fact that injunctions are equitable in nature, innocent 
infringers could, according to the circumstances of the case, fall into an 
exceptional denial of injunctions. For instance, whereas the standard remedies 
in cases of infringement were provided for in the old section 18(1) of the UK 
Copyright Act 1956507, however, such remedy was considered as “being grossly 
unfair in many cases, treating the infringing articles as having belonged to the 
plaintiff”508. The Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 limited such remedy 
in subsection (2) such that “damages for conversion are not to be awarded if the 
defendants believed and had reasonable grounds for believing that the articles 
so made or intended to be made were not or (as the case may be) would not be, 
infringing copies”509. 
 
4.4 Other ex-post liability rules: compulsory licenses  
Most commentators agree that, amidst considerable discretion to deny 
injunctions, this happens only in few cases, mainly upon public interest and 
especially public health reasons510. A possible explanation as to why courts do 
                                                 
 
 
504 See Jaggard v Sawyer, supra note 293. 
505 See the opinion by Lord Westbury in Isenberg v. East India House Estate Co. Ltd. 
506 See Harbottle, supra note 491, at p. 155-156.  
507 The copyright Act established that “Subject to the provisions of this Act, the owner of any copyright 
shall be entitled to all such rights and remedies, in respect of the conversion or detention by any person of 
any infringing copy ... as he would be entitled to if he were the owner of every such copy or plate and had 
been the owner thereof since the time when it was made...”  
508 See Banks v. EMI Songs Limited (Formerly CBS Songs Limited) and Others (No. 2), [1996] E.M.L.R. 452, at p. 
2. 
509 Ibid at p. 2-3. 
510 In Biogen Inc v. Medeva plc (1992, Chancery Division), the defendant claimed that the grant of an 
injunction would lead to loss of human life and/or avoidable damage to human health. The patent related 
to a vaccine for Hepatitis B. In Rousell-Uclaf v. G D Searle & Co Ltd, 1977, FSR 125 at 131, it was held that “a 
life saving drug is in an exceptional position…it is at the least very doubtful if the court in its discretion 
even ought to grant an injunction”. In Chiron Corp v. Organon Teknika Ltd., supra note 488, the defendant 
argued that an injunction would be contrary to the public interest. The patent in question related prevent 
the public having access to the kits and would hinder research and development.  
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not often substitute injunctions, and which is also plausible for other countries, 
was provided by the decision of Chiron v. Organon511. The judge referred to the 
exceptions and limitations established in the Patent statutes, including license 
of rights and other compulsory licenses, highlighting how public interest might 
be better served through these means: 
 
“For instance, the Crown can authorise the use of the patent in certain 
circumstances. That suggests that the interests of the public will normally be 
protected by the provisions of the Patents Act 1977 and an injunction should 
normally be granted restraining infringement unless the contrary is indicated in 
the Act. Thus it is a good working rule that an injunction will be granted to 
prevent continued infringement of a patent, even though that would have the 
effect of enforcing a monopoly, thereby restricting competition and maintaining 
prices. Something more should be established before the Court will depart from 
the good working rule suggested in the Shelfer case”512.  
 
Such view is nonetheless in contradiction to a previous case, which held that 
injunctions should be rarely given for a life-saving drug: 
 
“A life-saving drug is in an exceptional position. There are often cases where a 
number of drugs exist alongside each other and are in general all equally 
efficacious for a particular ailment or disease. If the evidence shows it to be the 
fact that there may well be cases where it would make little, if any, difference to 
the public, apart from satisfying personal preference, whether a particular drug 
was no longer available or not, then in such a case it may well be proper to 
grant an injunction. At the other end of the scale, however, there is the unique 
life-saving drug where, in my judgment, it is at least very doubtful if the court 
in its discretion ever ought to grant an injunction and I cannot at present think 
of any circumstances where it should. There are infinite variations between 
these two limits”513. 
 
Nonetheless, the U.K. Patent Act establishes several compulsory licensing 
provisions. Firstly, for the case of lack of working or inadequate working of a 
patent, it is possible to ask for a compulsory license after three years have 
                                                 
 
 
511 See Chiron Corp v. Organon Teknika Ltd, supra note 488. 
512 See Chiron Corp v. Organon Teknika Ltd., supra note 488. Conversely, a previous case held that 
injunctions should be rarely given for a life-saving drug, at least when there are no substitutes (Roussel-
Uclcaf v. GD Searle Co Ltd, 1977 FSR 125 at 131): “A life-saving drug is in an exceptional position. There are 
often cases where a number of drugs exist alongside each other and are in general all equally efficacious 
for a particular ailment or disease…At the other end of the scale, however, there is the unique life-saving 
drug where, in my judgment, it is at least very doubtful if the court in its discretion ever ought to grant an 
injunction and I cannot at present think of any circumstances where it should. There are infinite variations 
between these two limits”. 
513 See Roussel-Uclcaf v. GD Searle Co Ltd, 1977 FSR 125 at 131.  
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elapsed from the patent grant514. In addition, U.K. law also provides for 
compulsory licensing to be used in the case of a dependent patent. This 
provision might be used after three years from the patent grant, and it allows 
any interested person to obtain a compulsory license if the working of an 
invention which makes a substantial contribution to the art is hindered and if 
the patentee refuses to license the required patent. Both compulsory licensing 
provisions as well as other provisions were reformed to adapt to the standards 
established by the TRIPS Agreement515. 
 
In addition, among the possible remedies for anticompetitive behavior, there is 
the possibility of using compulsory licenses. The legal basis for the application 
of Antitrust or Competition Law to patent cases is found on article 82 of the EC 
Agreement. In fact, a compulsory license might constitute a remedy for 
different types of anti-competitive behavior, including, a unilateral refusal to 
deal deals with the duty to provide access that might in some cases relate to a 
patent. In effect, article 82 (b) of the EC Treaty, provides that behavior 
consisting on “limiting production, markets or technical development to the 
prejudice of consumers” might be considered as an abuse of a dominant 
position. A Discussion Paper on Article 82, authored by the DG Competition 
and which opened a wide discussion on these matters, expressed that “a refusal 
to supply may be classified as an exclusionary abuse”516.  
 
In the framework of article 82 of the EC Agreement, a U.K. court ordered in a 
relatively recent case517 that the competition aspects were to be treated 
separately from the patent law issues518. After failed negotiations between the 
parties, the patentee refused to grant a license519 and as a consequence, the 
                                                 
 
 
514 See Section 48B of the U.K. Patents Act.   
515 See the U.K. Patents Act 1977 (as amended), comparing new provisions introduced after the enactment 
of the TRIPS Agreement, expanding the countries assimilated to the domestic markets, available at: 
http://www.ipo.gov.uk/patentsact1977.pdf  
516 See DG COMPETITION, DISCUSSION PAPER ON THE APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 82 OF THE TREATY TO 
EXCLUSIONARY ABUSES, 2005, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/discpaper2005.pdf, at paragraph 210, and opened for 
public consultation, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/contributions.html.  
517 See Intel Corporation v. Via Technologies Inc. and HC 01 C 04136 Intel Corporation v. Via Technologies Inc. 
[2002] EWHC 1159, where “Jacob J. ordered that the competition law aspects of both infringement actions 
should be tried together, but separately from the patent law issues. Trial on the competition law aspects 
was therefore set down in the Patents Court list for May 2003, following trial on infringement and validity 
which was set down for December 2002 (chipset action) and February 2003 (CPU)”. The case is currently 
under appeal. 
518 See ibid, supra note, arguing that: “The same practice was adopted in the earlier case of Philips v. 
Ingman, where Laddie J. ordered that the competition issues should be tried only after liability for patent 
infringement had been established. This approach has the virtue that the significant costs of disclosure and 
trial of the competition law defences are avoided in cases where the patent is invalid or the acts of the 
defendant do not fall within the scope of the claims”. 
519 Ibid at p. “The details of the allegations of breach of Article 82 were different in the two actions. 
However, Via essentially relied on Intel's refusal to grant a patent licence. In the CPU action, Via 
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defendant argued that this decision would force consumers to adopt a more 
expensive standard520. According to UK case law such compulsory licenses 
have been interpreted as confined to exceptional circumstances and as a 
consequence:  
 
“any defendant that seeks a compulsory licence under a patent on the grounds 
that the situation is exceptional will have to plead explicitly the essential facts 
that comprise the exceptional circumstances. Otherwise the defence will be 
disposed of summarily”521.  
 
Many open questions in fact surround the application of article 82 of the EC 
Treaty to patents, especially in the context of patent infringement cases. The 
approach is variable from country to country, as it has also varied along the 
time in the decisions of the same European Court of Justice. In Volvo/Renault, 
the Court of Justice applied a cautious approach to the possibility of using a 
compulsory license for design rights522. While the court ruled that IP right 
owners are free to refuse a license as this constitutes a core part of their right to 
exclude, the court also acknowledged that the exercise of an exclusive IP right 
can still be abusive when particular circumstances are in place523.  
 
In a subsequent case, however, a more aggressive application of article 82 took 
place when the court decided to uphold a duty to license an IP right. The case 
concerned precisely broadcasters of the UK and Ireland that separately 
published weekly television guides524. Magill was interested in publishing a 
                                                                                                                                               
 
 
complained that Intel refused to continue to license its CPU patents covering the Socket 370 features on the 
microprocessor. As a result, micro-processors that could be inserted into the Socket 370 on existing 
motherboards would be removed from the market even though there was still demand for them. 
520 This would hinder existing owners of PCs from upgrading their processors and would force them to 
adopt the more expensive Pentium 4 technology. In the Chipset action, Via complained about Intel's 
refusal to license the Intel patents covering the interconnect between the Pentium 4 processor and the 
chipset, which was a de facto industry standard. This meant that Via could not sell chipsets compatible 
with the Pentium 4 microprocessor. Via was willing to pay substantial royalties for the compulsory 
licences that it sought from the court. Intel in fact offered Via a limited licence to manufacture chipsets 
compatible with the Pentium 4 processor, but only on terms that would have prevented Viafrom offering 
the most advanced products in this class. Via declined the offer. 
521 See Brand supra note 222, at p. 5, citing judgments of Laddie J. in Philips v. Ingman, n. 6 above, at para. 
63; and Neuberger J. in Sandvik v. Pfiffner, n. 8 above. 
522 See AB Volvo v. Erik Veng (UK) Ltd (1988) ECR 6211 and Case 53/87, Consorzio Italiano della componentistica 
di ricambio per autoveicoli and Maxicar v. Regie nationale des usines Renault (1988) ECR 6039, both decided on 
similar substantial reasons. The main issue in this case was that the exclusiveness of design rights over 
components of a complex product, such as automobiles might preclude the production and 
commercialization of such spare-parts by other manufacturers. Such exclusiveness can originate or extend 
a monopoly over the aftermarket for spare parts. See also supra note 110, on the problem of aftermarkets.  
523 See Case 53/87, supra note 522, at paragraphs 15-16 deciding that “the exercise of the exclusive right 
may be prohibited by article 82 if it gives raise to certain abusive conduct on the part of an undertaking 
occupying a dominant position”.  
524 See Magill TV Guide/ITP, BBC and RTE, OJ 1989 L 78/43, case T-69/89, Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) v. 
Commission (1991) ECR II-485, confirming the case on appeal. 
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comprehensive weekly guide that included all broadcasters but the information 
necessary to develop such product was denied by each broadcaster. The 
Commission decided to accord a duty to license and the Court of First Instance 
also upheld the decision. The Court of Justice finally held that the refusal to 
license an IP could not be considered as a general abuse although it could 
constitute such abuse in “exceptional circumstances”. Three reasons were 
argued for such decision: (1) that a new product for which there is consumer 
demand is prevented; (2) that the IP holders kept the secondary market for 
themselves and excluded all competition and (3) that there was no objective 
justification for such refusal. These brief overview only shows the controversial 
and still open debate that surrounds the use of compulsory licenses for patent 
rights as the application of antitrust law525.  
5 Italy 
Italian patent law has recently undergone several reforms including the coming 
into force of the Code of Industrial Property (hereinafter CPI) 526. The drafting of 
a unique Code was justified by the increasing and dispersed amount of IP laws 
and hence the necessity to simplify rules and procedures527 as well as a political 
determination to protect private investment and market competition528. The CPI 
set aside copyrights and related rights, a choice that was criticized especially 
because it was in contrast with the model set for by the TRIPS Agreement 
which regulates all IP fields529.  
                                                 
 
 
525 The literature on this matter is profuse and characterized by wide divergences. Nonetheless, the focus 
of this thesis is on patent law provisions that allow the switch from a property to a liability rule, hence the 
brief reference to the application of article 82 of the EC Treaty, which would require further consideration.  
526 See the Legislative Decree N. 30 of February 10, 2005 (hereinafter Industrial Property Code) and 
Legislative Decree, March 16, 2006, n.140, implementing Directive 2004/48/CE on the Enforcement of 
Intellectual Property Rights introducing some modifications, especially with regard to remedies.  
527 See for instance, Alessandro Albini, in http://www.ubertazzi.it/it/censnorme/censimentobrevetti.pdf, 
quoted by UBERTAZZI (ED.), COMMENTARIO BREVE ALLE LEGGI SU PROPRIETÀ INTELLETTUALE E CONCORRENZA, 4 
ed., (Cedam, Padova, 2007), pp. 3037, accounting for 360 different sources of law applicable to patents, and 
finding at least 205 provisions from 1859 to 2001. See also UBERTAZZI at p. 166-167, providing as a second 
motivation for the CPI the heterogeneous character of IP provisions, and how the interpretation of rules 
was often difficult due to the coexistence of different regulations conceived in different historical times as 
well as the international and European laws also applicable to these matters; a third explanation provided 
by this author is regulatory competition which produces deregulation and at the same time a trend of 
simplification of applicable laws accompanied by the political will of the Italian government at the time of 
discussion of the CPI in subjects related to the regulation of the market, competition and industrial 
property rights.  
528 See UBERTAZZI, supra note 527, at p. 167, arguing that  the Legislative Decree 273/2002, gave priority to 
the protection of private rights, enterprises and market competition, responding to political objectives of 
the government (free translation). 
529 See UBERTAZZI, ibid, at p. 168-169, criticizing the decision of leaving copyrights and related rights out of 
the CPI; “Anzitutto la scelta di escludere dal codice i diritti d’autore e connessi non e condivisibile sul 
piano sistematico (…) in secondo luogo l’esclusione dei diritti di autore e connessi dal progetto di codice 
comporta una serie di inconvenienti sui diversi piani del diritto materiale e di quello processuale (...)” 
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In terms of procedural law, including remedies, the CPI did not introduce as 
many changes as the subsequent reform pursuant to the EU Directive on 
Enforcement530. With regard to remedies, the CPI explicitly sets up the 
possibility for courts to issue preliminary and final injunctions, delivery up, 
seizure and other corrective measures. As a consequence, remedies that were 
previously available only for certain rights, are now also applicable to IP rights 
in general531. However, such extended application of remedies to all IP rights 
had also prevailed before the enactment of the CPI although with some 
contrary decisions and scholarly debate532.  
 
Nevertheless, when small procedural changes such as making injunctions and 
other corrective measures available for all categories of IP rights are integrated 
with the entire reform of substantial IP law, they could be arguably understood 
as following an expansionist view over IP rights as well as the evidence of an 
increasing IP protectionist trend. This trend seems to respond to the view of IP 
rights as property over intangible rights that deserve all the remedies available 
for real property and in general, to the view –shared by other countries as the 
case of U.S.- that since IP fosters innovation, more IP protection would always 
foster more innovation. 
 
In fact, a clearly related question that emerges is whether procedural rules in IP 
and patent law are –and whether they should be- autonomous with respect to 
general –civil- procedural rules533. This is part of the broader debate about 
                                                 
 
 
530 See Marco Spolidoro, Profili Processuali del Codice della Proprieta' Industriale, DIRITTO INDUSTRIALE, 2008, 2, 
174, arguing that few changes were introduced at the procedural level by either the CPI and the 
Enforcement Directive; (free translation of the original text: “se si eccettua infatti l'estensione alle materie 
di competenza delle sezioni specializzate del c.d. processo societario (estensione poi caduta sotto la scure 
della Corte costituzionale, con generale soddisfazione dei pratici), si può anzi dire che le novità di 
maggiore importanza sono arrivate dopo l'emanazione del codice, con l'attuazione della Direttiva 
2004/48/CE sul rispetto dei diritti di proprietà intellettuale”). 
531 See Adriano Vanzetti, RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INDUSTRIALE04, I (2007), 102 sustaining that article 124 of the 
CPI extends the possibility of obtaining final injunctions for all industrial property rights, which would 
strengthen protection for IP rights for “diritti non titolati” or atypical rights, in particular the “ditta” and 
“insegna “. 
532 See infra note 535.  
533 See Spolidoro, supra note 530, arguing in favor of the autonomy of procedural IP rules; (“Le conclusioni 
cui siamo pervenuti partendo dal concetto dell'autonomia del diritto processuale industriale sono dunque 
due: - inammissibilità del ricorso agli istituti del diritto processuale civile comune dove esistano istituti del 
diritto processuale della proprietà industriale e intellettuale che, anche in senso lato, adempiano la stessa 
funzione; - impossibilità di una commistione (o contaminazione) della disciplina delle misure di tutela 
proprie del diritto industriale e del diritto della proprietà intellettuale con la disciplina delle (omologhe) 
misure del diritto processuale civile”); however recognizing that procedural IP rules are not complete and 
hence might be supported by the general procedural rules; (“ L'asprezza di queste conclusioni deve essere 
tuttavia mitigata dall'ovvia considerazione che il diritto processuale della proprietà industriale e 
intellettuale è sì un sistema, ma non è completo: esso si appoggia, per così dire, sul tronco del diritto 
comune, che gli fornisce sostanza e forma”) and moreover, making a distinction between the influence of 
general procedural rules on IP procedural rules at the legislative level, which he judges as harmful 
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whether the treatment of IP shall or not be different than that granted to other 
property rights, and if the answer is affirmative, whether such treatment shall 
be more or less protective.  
 
With respect to compulsory licensing provisions, the CPI did not introduce 
major reforms as these were mainly incorporated at the time of implementing 
the TRIPS Agreement. A minor reform was introduced with respect to the 
prohibition for infringers to opt for a compulsory license in the sense of 
reaffirming the prohibition unless infringers are in good faith. Although the 
possible practical impact of such reform might be minimal, it is discussed in 
more detail below.  
 
5.1 Property rules: final injunctions 
The Italian CPI establishes that the decision ascertaining the infringement of an 
industrial property right might include an order known as inibitoria to prohibit 
the fabrication, commercialization and use of infringing goods and also a 
permanent order to withdraw the infringing goods from the channels of 
commerce534. Before the CPI, Italian law only explicitly regulated preliminary 
injunctions, although judges and scholars in general admitted the use of 
permanent injunctions535. Hence, for a long time scholarly discussions centered 
on whether judges could grant permanent injunctions in patent cases, given 
that they were not explicitly established in the industrial property laws.  
 
Within this debate, scholars also disagreed about the nature of inibitoria and 
specifically about whether this measure should be considered a mere 
declaration of infringement or susceptible of being executed as a judicial 
decision. The principal result of considering injunctions as a judicial decision is 
                                                                                                                                               
 
 
whereas at the level of application –and interpretation- of the rules such influence is deemed as less 
harmful. (“In effetti, come già detto, se le norme processuali ora dettate dal Codice della Proprietà 
Industriale (e dalla legge sul diritto d'autore) costituiscono un sistema autonomo, esse non sono tuttavia 
complete. Perciò, se l'interpretazione, condotta sulla base del microsistema del diritto industriale, non 
conduce a risultati certi, è legittimo, anzi doveroso, rivolgersi al diritto comune”).  
534 See CODICE DELLA PROPRIETA INDUSTRIALE, article 124: “Con la sentenza che accerta la violazione di un 
diritto di proprieta industriale possono essere disposti l’inibitoria della fabricazione, del commercio e 
dell’uso delle cose costituenti violazione del diritto e l’ordine di ritiro definitvo dal commercio delle 
medesime cose nei confronti di chi ne sea proprietario o ne abbia comunque disponibilita...”. 
535 See UBERTAZZI, supra note 527, at p. 606, referring that previous laws did not explicitly provide for 
permanent injunctions -although article 2599 of the civil code on unfair competition was applicable to non 
registered marks-. Ubertazzi also refers how scholars had for long accepted the jurisdiction of judges to 
grant permanent injunctions and citing FRIGNANI supra note 297, at p. 309; Marco Spolidoro, Le misure di 
prevenzione nel diritto industriale, Milano 1982, at p. 111; and judicial decisions by Trib. Vicenza 6-10-1990, in 
GADI 91, 295 (“la misura della destruzione ha carattere restitutorio, mirando ad eliminare lo stato di fatto 
contrario al diritto venutosi a creare per effetto della contraffazione”); App. Catania 12-9-1984 ivi 84, 606. 
Decisions against this position are few and isolated, for instance, Trib. Bari 10-6-1974 ivi 74, 815.  
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that non-compliance would constitute an offense –one potentially giving rise to 
administrative sanctions equivalent to the contempt of court of common law 
countries- with the additional obligation to pay a monetary sanction or penalita 
di mora, equivalent to the astraintes of French Law. Some authors have even also 
sustained that non-compliance could give rise to criminal sanctions established 
by article 388, c. 1, of the criminal code536.  
 
Judicial decisions frequently cite as requirements for granting injunctions the 
repeated violation of a right and the risk of continuous repetition of such 
violation537. However, the majority of scholars and decisions have held that it is 
not necessary to prove any objective harm or any subjective element or 
intention in order to obtain an injunction, requirements that would only be 
necessary in order to obtain an award of damages538. Injunctions have been 
hence denied in cases lacking the abovementioned requirements –as considered 
by judicial decisions and scholar’s work-. An ulterior case of denial regards 
patents or other IP right that are about to expire. In this way, an extension of 
protection over IP rights beyond their statutory duration is avoided. Similar 
decisions can be found in the U.S. and the U.K.  
 
 
5.2 Judicial discretion: how much space?  
 
A general tenet of comparative law studies is that judicial discretion is limited 
to the legislative framework and that judges are confined to the “interpretation” 
of the law in Civil Law countries whereas Common Law judges “create” law. 
Nevertheless, the wording of article 124 of the Industrial Property Code 
establishes that judges “may” grant injunctive relief, thus indicating that judges 
have the power to grant injunctions while not requiring them to do so in all 
cases and hence subjecting the matter to an important degree of discretion.  
 
                                                 
 
 
536 But see decision by the Cass. pen. Sez. VI, 19/03/1997, n. 4298, holding that such criminal sanctions are 
just explicitly used for a permanent decision (sentenza di condanna) and not for an interim measure 
(misura cautelar). The decision also interpreted the old provision of art. 83 r.d. 29 giugno 1939 n. 1127 
(inibitoria sui brevetti per invenzioni industriali) as an interim measure. See Adriano Vanzettti. Brevi 
considerazioni in tema di inibitoria. DIRITTO INDUSTRIALE, 2007, N. 4/5, p. 167.  
537 Some authors criticize the CPI for not having included any reference to such conditions, losing the 
opportunity to clarify when should injunctions be granted; see Marco Spolidoro, Le sanzioni civili nella 
bozza del Codice della proprieta industriale, IN UBERTAZZI, supra note 527, at p. 131; against UBERTAZZI , supra 
note 527, p. 607. 
538 See FRIGNANI supra note 297, at p. 308. “In sostanza, la giurisprudenza distingue chiaramente l’azione 
inibitoria da quella di risarcimento del danno, richiedendo per la prima solo l’idonieta degli atti a 
produrre l’efetto dannoso, con esplicita esclusione sia dell’elemento intenzionale (dolo o colpa) che di 
quello material (danno)”. 
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In spite of the language used by the CPI, which is similar to that used by 
previous laws, it is commonly argued that a permanent injunction is a legal 
right for owners and that judges could not deny an injunction in a final case 
finding infringement539. Still, some authors recognize that the judge has also 
discretion to grant or deny injunctions540. Moreover, scholars also recognize that 
judges in civil law countries enjoy certain discretion which might be created by 
the statutes themselves541. 
 
A specific example pertaining to nuisances is established in article 844 of the 
Italian Civil Code542 and evidences the possible space for judges’ discretion that 
                                                 
 
 
539 See Spolidoro, supra note 530, arguing that at least under the Directive, article 10.3 does not apply to 
the inibitoria and hence, Judges could not discretionally decide upon such measure; (free translation of the 
original text: “Posto che, almeno nel sistema della Direttiva, il precetto dell'art. 10.3 non riguarda 
l'inibitoria, il Giudice non dovrebbe poter graduare quest'ultima ad libitum”).  
540 See for instance SCUFFI, FRANZOSI E FITTANTE, CODICE DELLA PROPRIETÀ INDUSTRIALE: COMMENTO PER 
ARTICOLI COORDINATO, (Padova: Cedam, 2005) at p. 564-565, arguing that both the inibitoria and the 
destruction of infringing objects are subject to the discretion of Judges, who “may” accord such measures 
at the request of the interested parties, and due to the disruptive effects that might follow from such 
measures and especially when the controversy regards patents, it is advisablle that such measures are 
used as “extrema ratio” in order to avoid extending over non-infringing products, (free translation of the 
original text: “Gli effetti dirompenti della distruzione – che resta (come l’inibitoria) facoltativa in quanto 
“può” essere disposta dal giudice e sempre ad istanza di parte secondo il principio della domanda (art. 112 
c.p.c.)- dovrebbero poi consigliarne l’adozione -specie nel campo delle invenzioni – come “extrema ratio”, 
considerato che l’istituto è stato sempre utilizzato dalla giurisprudenza con moderazione e cautela anche 
per evitare che ordini troppo estesi ed indeterminati finissero per conglobare oggetti estranei alla 
repressione dell’illecito”.  
541 See FRIGNANI supra note 297, at p. 521 and corresponding footnotes. In particular, article 844 of the civil 
code permits judges to choose between the least oppressive remedy for the party and also to choose 
whether to give an injunction or other remedy. According to FRIGNANI, this is an application of the German 
doctrine of “Interessenabwagung”, or balancing the interest of the parties. In these cases, especially with 
regard to nuisances, judges can exert their discretion and balance the interest of the parties and 
reasonableness (Zumutbarkeit) with respect to certain commercial activities such as boycott and 
discrimination. Frignani argues that the reasons why we cannot talk about discretional granting or 
denying of injunctions  in the same way as in common law are historic and systematic but he highlights 
the role of judges in designing the content of injunctions and deciding between this and other remedies, in 
order to find the least oppressive. 
542 See FRIGNANI supra note 297, discussing the implications of article 844 of the Italian Civil Code. See also 
Roberto Pardolesi and Bruno Tassone, Guido Calabresi on Torts: Italian Courts and the Cheapest Cost Avoider, 
ERASMUS LAW REVIEW, VOL. 1, NO. 4, 2008, available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1498358, analyzing the 
application of article 844 in the context of the property and liability rules debate and referring to a decision 
by an Italian court, where the Judge considered an ample space for its application: “before determining 
that the nuisances exceeded the limit of what is ordinarily bearable and that no precautions can be taken to 
bring them below the threshold, the judge observed that article 844c.c. can be seen as a tool to protect not 
only rights on real estate but even the person who lives in it and his health”. See also Ugo Mattei, Efficiency 
in Legal Transplants: An Essay in Comparative Law and Economics, INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS, MARCH, 1994, available at: 
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1013&context=ugo_mattei, discussing article 844 
and arguing that civil law countries have also reached “efficient” legal solutions, sometimes long before 
than its common law counterparts: “seventy years before the Boomer decision, German law reached the 
liability rule solution by applying Art. 906 BGB. It has done so by following the balancing theory of the 
great nineteenth-century jurist Rudolph von Jhering. This rule has been reproduced in Art. 844 of the 
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subsists despite the underlying logic of Civil Law countries. Article 844 
establishes that a land owner cannot prevent the emission of smoke, heat, 
fumes, noises, vibrations or similar propagation originating from the land of a 
neighbour unless such emissions exceed a normal tolerability, with regard to 
the condition particular conditions of the place. In applying this rule, the court 
shall reconcile the requirements of production with rights of ownership and can 
also take account of the priority of a given use543. In fact, discretion is allowed to 
judges both with respect to the decision of whether the limit of tolerability has 
been reached; and in cases that surpass such limit the judge is also able to 
decide whether or not to grant injunctive relief544. 
 
Moreover, article 844, by allowing judges to balance the interests of property 
rights and production, inclines the balance towards a wider judicial discretion 
with regard to the protection of property when a public interest is affected. For 
our purposes, this rule can be considered to be guided by efficiency reasons that 
have allowed judges to substitute a property rule with a liability rule545. 
Nevertheless, scholars have acknowledged that these doctrines can hardly be 
transposed to property rights, given their absolute nature546, even if one could 
question whether IP fits this “absolute” definition of property.  
 
In addition and with regard to patent injunctions, judges have discretionary 
powers to tailor the scope of the injunction and courts might exercise their 
                                                                                                                                               
 
 
Italian Civil Code and has long since been the law in Austria and Switzerland as well. In the civil law 
tradition, therefore, the law has long since reached the efficient result” (footnotes omitted). 
543 Article 844 of the Italian Civil Code, (free translation of the original text: “Immissioni. Il proprietario di 
un fondo non può impedire le immissioni di fumo o di calore, le esalazioni, i rumori, gli scuotimenti e 
simili propagazioni derivanti dal fondo del vicino, se non superano la normale tollerabilità, avuto anche 
riguardo alla condizione dei luoghi. Nell'applicare questa norma l'autorità giudiziaria deve contemperare 
le esigenze della produzione con le ragioni della proprietà. Può tener conto della priorità di un 
determinato uso”).  
544 See decision Cass. 12 giugno 1964, n. 1483), highlighting the discretion of judges also with respect to the 
remedy to be provided when emmissions are deemed intolerable: (free translation of the original text: “Il 
che val quanto dire, a ben capire, che il giudice e «signore» della regola anche in relazione alle soluzioni da 
adottare ove le immissioni siano giudicate «intollerabili »  (inibitoria e/o indennizzo))”. 
545 See DI MAJO, supra note 320, at p. 94; describing this rule as modern since it allows the choice between 
remedies both ex ante and ex post with regard to the demands of activities and interests of third parties, 
(free translation of the original text: “Essa e dunque una regola profondamente moderna, giacche, nella 
misura in cui si consente che gia all’interno di essa possa esservi conversione di rimedi (da quello 
inibitorio a quello indennizatorio e infine a quello risarcitorio) da un settore all’altro nonche «travasi» di 
disciplina, non solo vengono a regolarsi ex ante diritti di proprieta contrapposti (secondo il modulo dei 
rapporti di vicinato) ma si provvede anche a diversamente redistribuirli ex post in relazione alle esigenze 
di altri attivita od interessi. Salvo a dire che, ove il rimedio dell’indennizzo dovesse veramente godere di 
assoluta prevalenza su quello inibitorio (accentuandosi di esso la componente risarcitoria, v. Cass. 15 
gennaio 1986, n. 184), come sembra stia avvenendo con la prassi giudiziale, si assisterebbe ad un 
mutamento di natura e carattere della stessa regola qui discussa, da regola di proprieta a regola di 
responsabilita”).  
546 See FRIGNANI supra note 297, quoting from a decision by the App. Ancona, 16-V-1962, Ribighini c. 
Novelli ed altri, in RIV. GIUR. UMBRO-ABRUZZ., 1963, at p. 160. 
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discretion in determining the boundaries of an injunctive order. In the case of 
Chiron vs. Sorin, for instance, the controversy gravitated around the 
infringement of a patent on the virus of HCV. The preliminary injunction was 
directed at the diagnostic kits produced by Sorin. However, the scope of the 
order was debated since in part, Sorin had found new sequences of nucleotides 
not originally disclosed in the patent by Chiron. In cases where a broad 
injunction might prohibit infringing and non-infringing activity with the 
potential risk of precluding certain innovation and technical development, the 
choice between substituting a property rule with a liability rule might also be 
complemented by the choice of issuing a narrower injunction. A narrower 
injunction would have the effect of allowing certain uses of a technology for 
free, a solution that is both fair and efficient where such uses are non-infringing 
but that of course, provides an incomplete answer for problematic injunctions 
and problematic technologies547.  
 
Italian judges also enjoy reasonable discretion to grant or deny measures as 
destruction of infringing goods, the delivery-up and removal from the channels 
of commerce of infringing goods as well as tailoring such measures to the 
particular case548. These measures are closely related to, and might strengthen 
the effects of, a property rule549 and in fact an injunction order is often 
accompanied by orders of removal and destruction of infringing goods and 
means to infringe. Those measures are even more directly under the discretion 
of the court. Given the particularly disruptive and potentially harmful effects of 
delivery up measures, an order to destroy infringing goods and machinery 
cannot be ordered when it might cause harm to the national economy, in which 
case only damages might be available550.  
 
                                                 
 
 
547 See Lemley and Weiser, supra note 72, discussing several cases, mostly in the area of information and 
communication technologies, where modern technologies make it difficult to separate infringing from 
non-infringing technologies.  
548 See FRIGNANI supra note 297, at p. 334 and current article 124 of the CPI. 
549 See FRIGNANI supra note 297, at p. 334, arguing that these measures fall even more directly under the 
discretion of the court and its frequent use along with or in close relationship with injunctions expands the 
scope of discretion over injunctive relief: “Non si deve inoltre dimenticare un altro fenomeno, e cioe la 
discrezionalità del giudice in rapporto alla concessione di altri rimedi, che molto spesso accompagnano 
l’inibitoria…In realta, a causa degli stretti rapporti esistenti tra le azioni suaccennate e l’azione inibitoria, e 
facile comprenderé che la discrezionalita del giudice esistente per quelle si ripercuotera anche su questa”. 
See also La Tutela della Varietà Vegetale: Inibitoria e Distruzione; Trib. Di Bari, 26 Marzo 2003, Est. 
Monteleone-Zanzi Fruitgrowing Equipment s.r.l. c. Susca, ordering the inibitoria and destruction of the 
involved plant varieties; and Caterina Quaranta, Commento, in IL DIRITTO INDUSTRIALE N° 2, 1004 citing the 
following decisions denying destruction orders: 1786; App. Bologna 29 settembre 1981, in GADI, 1981, 
1431; App. Milano 8 aprile 1977, in GADI 1977, 937; Trib. Milano 11 marzo 1996, in GADI, 1996, 3474. See 
also Marco Lamandini, La restitutio in Integrum nel Diritto della Proprietà Intellettuale: la Rimozione e la 
Distruzione, in AIDA, 2000, 70, discussing these measures.  
550 See Parere del Consiglio di Stato, available at: www.ubertazzi.it/it/codiceip/indice.html; considering 
that this provision contains the general limit to destruction measures contained in article 2933 of the civil 
code and that in this case only damage compensation would be available.  
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5.3 Preliminary injunctions  
Although preliminary injunctions differ in rationale and scope from permanent 
injunctions, they occupy a privileged position within Italian patent litigation. 
The practical importance of preliminary measures in Italy, follows from the 
long duration of trials which makes preliminary injunctions (as well as other 
interim measures) usually the most important decisions and often the final 
turning point for a settlement551. This not only makes them comparable to 
permanent injunctions but also determines that decisions by courts about the 
adequacy of remedies are often taken in preliminary measures, especially 
injunctions552.  
 
Preliminary injunctions are regulated by article 131 of the Civil Code of 
Procedure. Plaintiffs are required to prove two necessary conditions in order to 
obtain a preliminary injunction: 1) the strength of the legal right, manifested 
both in the likelihood of success in the merits of the case in terms validity and 
infringement (fumus boni iuris); and 2) the urgency of the requested remedy, 
which is based upon the fact that during the time needed to reach the final 
decision, an irreparable harm might be generated (periculum in mora). 
 
Italian courts have reiteratively considered that with regard to industrial 
property rights the periculum in mora should be considered in re ipsa, and also 
that such peril of irreparable harm goes beyond the danger that a defendant 
might be insolvent at the end of the trial. The reason usually given by courts is 
that damages are more difficult to calculate in this area and that the plaintiff 
might suffer losses in terms of market share, reputation and goodwill, which 
are irreparable. Several courts have even asserted that irreparability subsists 
even in cases where any subsequent damages for patentees might be easily 
calculated, as it happens when the infringed product is sold to public health 
institutions.553 
                                                 
 
 
551 See Giorgio Floridia, La tutela giurisdizionale dei diritti di proprieta immateriale in AUTERI ET AL., DIRITTO 
INDUSTRIALE, PROPRIETA INTELLETTUALE E CONCORRENZA, Second edition, 2005, at p. 630, referring a 
progressive substitution of the normal procedure by an abbreviated procedure, given that parties usually 
abide by the outcome of the decision with regard that either accords or denies the provisional measure: 
“L’attore speso non ha interesse ad attendere il tempo lungo ocorrente per la cognizione ordinaria se non 
abbia ottenuto i provedimenti urgenti richiesti e il convenuto spesso non ha piu interesse a resistere una 
volta che la situazione si sia modificata per effetto del provvedimento urgente concesso. In questo senso 
pertanto puo dirsi che si verifichi una progressiva sostituzione della cognizione sommaria rispetto alla 
cognizione ordinaria”.  
552 See also supra notes 334 and 335, discussing the application of provisional measures provided by article 
700 of the Italian Civil Procedural Code and the result that follows from the practice of using such 
provisional measures as final measures.  
553 See Sorin Biomedica s.p.a. c. Chiron Corporation e Ortho Diagnostic; Tribunale di Milano, Sez. I, 22 marzo 
2007, in RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INDUSTRIALE, 1998, PARTE II, at p. 313 ruling that excludsive rights allow owners 
to achieve a position within the market, which creates advantages that might be irreparably harmed by 
infringing activities, (free translation of the original text: “Il diritto di esclusiva, comportando 
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With this reasoning, courts have also granted injunctions, even as late as three 
months before the expiry of the patent by interpreting that the exclusive rights 
of patent holders include a right “to prepare itself for the loss, when the patent 
expires, of the monopoly granted by the patent, in the absence of promotional 
campaigns—which may include the taking of orders by wholesalers and 
pharmacists—on which generics may embark when the expiry date is 
approaching”554. Although probably an outlier decision, at least in one case, a 
court has held that not only should the requirement of periculum in mora not be 
presumed, but that it cannot be proved in cases in which the patentee does not 
have any product in the market working the patented technology555 
 
However, some scholars and courts seem to disagree with the presumption in 
favor of irreparable harm which holds that harm should be considered “in re 
                                                                                                                                               
 
 
l’incompatibilita di attivita di produzione e commercializzazione da parte di concorrenti, consente al 
titolare di raggiungere risultati di penetrazione e di consolidamento della propria posizione di 
mercato...tale situazione, di indubbio vantaggio concorrenziale...verrebbe irreparabilmente svuotata di 
contenuto nel consentire il permanere, per il tempo necessario alla definizione del giudizio, di attivita –
illegittime- da parte di concorrenti i quali neppure debbono scontare gli oneri per l’attivita di ricerca 
svolta dal brevettante, cosi potendo, addirittura, praticare politiche di prezzo piu appetibili per i 
potenziali clienti”). See also Teva v. Ist. Gentili, Trib. Genova, in RASSEGNA DI DIRITTO FARMACEUTICO, 2007, 
605, deciding that the factor of irreparable harm, is not to be excluded when the harm caused by the 
launch of the generic can be easily calculated by comparing the market share of the originator before and 
after launching the generic, specially when there are available sale records of pharmaceutical products and 
especially of those reimbursed by the National Health Service. The court argued that damages are always 
extremely difficult to calculate with precision ex post and that this fact makes a preliminary injunction 
order preferable. See also EUROPEAN GENERICS MEDICINES ASSOCIATION, KRISTOF ROOX ED., PATENT-RELATED 
BARRIERSTO MARKET ENTRY FOR GENERIC MEDICINES INTHE EUROPEAN UNION, available at: 
http://www.marcasepatentes.pt/files/collections/pt_PT/1/178/EGA%20Report%20IP%20Barriers%20G
eneric%20Medicines.pdf, accounting for this and other similar cases across Europe.  
554 Ibid at p.  
555 See Chiron Corp. v. SmithKline Beecham s.p.a., Tribunale di Milano, 27-01-98, in GADI, XXVIII, 1999, TOMO 
UNICO 3900, at p. 294-304, where the defendant argued that lack of commercialization of any product by 
the patentee would preclude the possibility of obtaining preliminary relief. The court held that even 
though lack of working of a patent is not to be considered as a precondition for preliminary relief, such 
fact makes it difficult for the patentee to prove the priority and in any case the impossibility of calculating 
the harm, which is mostly imminent and irreparable due to its effects precisely on the business activities 
which are directly or indirectly referred to the subject: “va sottolineato come lo scrivente non ritenga –in 
se- l’effettiva (diretta o indiretta) attuazione del brevetto quale presupposto della tutela cautelare, la legge 
non ponendo limiti al riguardo; tuttavia, l’assenza di quel dato fattuale rende assai disagevole per il 
titolare della privativa la possibilita di comprovare la priorita e –comunque- la impossible determinabilita 
del danno, di regola imminente ed irreparabile proprio in relazione agli effetti sull’attivita imprenditoriale 
direttamente od indirettamente riferibile al soggetto”. Ibid, ruling that the requirement of periculum in mora 
cannot be deemed to exist, in particular, when the patentee asks for a preliminary measure after several 
years of infringement have been tolerated; “e certamente singolare che Chiron agisca in via d’urgenza 
onder reprimere una contraffazione brevettuale tolerata da svariati anni: il periculum in re ipsa in materia di 
privative industriali non puo giungere a svalutare detto presupposto dell’azione cautelare riportandolo 
all’esistenza stessa della contraffazione, potendo –comunque- (quantomeno) l’asserito contraffatore 
dedurre (e provare) specifiche circostanze che escludano l’urgenza della repression della (asserita) lesion 
ed imponendo –dunque- al titolare del brevetto di far previamente accertare il proprio buon diritto in un 
giudizio ordinario, fuori delle strettoie cognitive proprie della sommarieta del procedimento”. 
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ipsa”; a condition that facilitates or substitutes any proof of the periculum in mora 
requirement556.  
 
5.4 Willful and Inadvertent infringement  
The state of mind of the infringer has a limited influence on the availability of 
injunctions which are generally awarded in spite of whether the infringement 
was or not willful557. Conversely, the state of mind is important for the 
purposes of obtaining damage compensation although the public character of 
the patent documents gives raise to strong presumptions of the culpability of 
infringement558. 
 
Moreover, as it will be discussed in the next section, the current text of article 71 
of the CPI makes compulsory licenses also available for infringers in good faith, 
a provision that opens the possibility of either applying for a compulsory 
license after infringement or to oppose against an infringement suit in both 
cases by arguing that infringement was in good faith.  
 
The possibility of defending from an infringement suit by arguing the 
independent invention of the same patented technology is generally banned in 
patent law, although some laws provide for prior rights for those using the 
invention prior to the concession of a patent. For instance, article 68 of the CPI 
establishes prior rights for anyone that has been using the invention during the 
                                                 
 
 
556 See UBERTAZZI supra note 527, at p. 630-631, explaining how some court cases sustain that the 
requirement of periculum in mora subsists in all cases because 1) infringement always creates a real danger 
of losing market share (sviamento di clientele tendenzialmente irreversibile) and 2) because damages are 
difficult to calculate, whereas some scholars, among which Spolidoro, and other court decisions sustain 
that there should be a specific assessment of the requirement of periculum in mora.  
557 See UBERTAZZI supra note 527, at p. 613 comparing articles 125 that requires culpability and article 124 
which does not: “la condanna al risarcimento dei danni patrimoniali del convenuto per contraffazione 
presuppone il dolo o la colpa (in dottirna cfr. Da ultimo Sarti, AIDA 00, 226) a differenza delle sanzioni ex 
art. 124 cpi che non sono impedite dall’assenza dell’elemento psicologico (Vanzetti-Di Catlado, 510)”. 
558 See Ibid, at p. 613: referring that the the public nature of patent (and other IP) documents in the 
corresponding offices has been interpreted as creating a presumption or at least a burden to search which 
does not allow infringers to argue innocent infringement, at least with the aim of excluding intentional 
conduct (colpa): (free translation of the original text: “Secondo la tesi maggiormente seguita dalla 
giurisprudenza, l’esistenza di un regime di pubblicita dei diritti titolati i) implica, se non una vera e 
propria presunzione di coplpa da parte di chi ha violato la privativa (come afferma ad esemplio App. 
Milano 13-12-1977, GADI 77, 844), almeno l’onere di consultare i registri di pubblicità (Trib. Milano 22-2-
1993, ivi 93, 463; Trib. Milano 26-9-1974, ivi 74, 1108); e ii) non consente al convenuto di allegare 
l’ignoranza dei titoli di proprietà industriale per escludere la colpa (da ultimo v. Trib. Roma 15-11-1988, 
GADI 88, 838”). Ibid at p. 613: Certain isolated decisions holding that such presumption was not rebuttable 
or that it only could stand if the infringing conduct was also categorized as unfair competition have now 
been superseded, (free translation of the original text: “isolate sono rimaste le sentenze secondo cui la 
presunzione di colpa sussiste solo se nella condotta del violatore sono ravvisabili gli estremi della 
concorrenza sleale (Trib. Reggio Emilia 3-2-1972, ivi 72, 434) o secondo cui, all’opposto, sarebbe esistente 
una presunzione juris et de jure de conoscenza delle altrui esclusive (App. Milano 7-12-1976, ivi 76, 779))”. 
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12 months previous to the date of patent filling or priority date, that is, the 
possibility of continuing to use the invention, but limited to the scope of such 
prior use, which in practices limits the use of such exception559.  
 
5.5 Other ex-post liability rules: compulsory licenses 
With few changes, the CPI has preserved the existing provisions on compulsory 
licensing for patents which were already adapted to the TRIPS Agreement. The 
Italian previous patent laws had incorporated compulsory licenses provisions 
by the d.p.r. 26 febbraio 1968, n. 849, which implemented article 5-A of the Paris 
Convention and hence substituted the forfeiture of patents with compulsory 
licensing provisions for non working. The most important changes with respect 
to compulsory licenses operated in fact after the enactment of the TRIPS 
Agreement, which introduced the requirements of article 31.  
 
Italian legislation includes provisions for compulsory licensing pursuant to the 
CPI in the following cases 1) non-working of invention560; 2) inventions 
dependent upon prior patented inventions561; 3) special provisions for plant 
varieties562; 4) licenses of right563; 5) special provisions for a “voluntary license” 
mediated by the Ministry with regards to active ingredients covered by 
Supplementary Certificates of Protection564. In addition to these provisions of 
the CPI, there is the possibility of applying article 82 and national antitrust 
legislation for granting compulsory licenses of patents565. 
 
However, and as it is the case in the international setting and in other countries, 
Italian compulsory licensing provisions have seldom been used566. This is often 
interpreted either as a proof of their undesirability or of the irrelevance of their 
                                                 
 
 
559 See article 68 of the CPI providing that whomever has made use of the patented invention within the 
twelve months prior to the patent application or the priority date, can continue to use such invention 
within the limits of the prior use: (free translation of the original text: “Chiunque, nel corso dei dodici mesi 
anteriori alla data di deposito della domanda di brevetto o alla data di priorità, abbia fatto uso nella 
propria azienda dell'invenzione può continuare ad usarne nei limiti del preuso”). 
560 See article 70 of the CPI. 
561 See article 71 of the CPI. See also article 72 on common provisions with regard to compulsory licenses 
and article 199 on the procedure to issue a compulsory license.  
562 See article 115 of the CPI.  
563 See article 80 of the CPI.  
564 See article 81 of the CPI and also article 200 on the procedure for this license.   
565 See also supra note 517, on the application of article 82 EC to a patent dispute in the U.K. 
566 See for instance SCUFFI, FRANZOSI AND FITTANTE, supra note 540, at p. 376 ss., referring only 9 cases in 
which a compulsory license was issued, 2 of them with regards to a temporary regime applicable when the 
duration of patents was extended from 15 to 20 years and 7 under the case of non-working within the 3 
years after the issuance of the patent and none case for dependent patents. See also Paola Frassi, 
Innovazione Derivata, Brevetto Dipendente e Licenza Obbligatoria, RIV. DIR. IND. 2006, 06, 212, at footnote 12, 
citing only two cases of compulsory licenses for dependent patents analyzed by the administrative 
authority; Tar Lazio, 30 Novembre 1981, GADI, 1718 and Tar Lazio, 7 gennaio 1985, GADI, 1881.  
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actual use -especially in the law and economics literature where emphasis is 
given to the role that compulsory licensing provisions play on setting the terms 
of bargaining between the parties- given that the threat of using a compulsory 
license would induce parties to negotiate567. Nonetheless, this argument would 
only be valid insofar as compulsory licensing provisions could effectively 
enable a would-be-licensee to launch a credible threat to opt for a compulsory 
license, which is dubious in the Italian case for the reasons we will provide. 
Less often, however, scholars recognize that such failure to use the provisions 
could be just a consequence of their inappropriate design568.  
 
Among the problems with the design of compulsory licensing provisions in 
Italy it is probably the ban for infringers to apply for a compulsory license569. 
Such prohibition importantly limits the use of compulsory licensing, in the light 
of the difficultie associated with careful previous patent search and especially in 
such industries where patent thickets are important and inadvertent 
infringement is likely to occur. By effect of the CPI, it is now permitted that 
infringers opt for a compulsory license when infringement happened in good 
faith570. However, the interpretation of “good faith” in the context of 
                                                 
 
 
567 See Ann Christoph, Patent Trolls – Menace or Myth?, in PATENTS AND TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS IN A 
GLOBALIZED WORLD, MPI STUDIES ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, COMPETITION AND TAX LAW, N° 6, at p. 361, 
arguing that “compulsory licenses are the only exception to this rule. Amounting to an expropriation, 
which requires extreme circumstances, compulsory licenses are however rarely granted”. This argument is 
described in similar terms below, for the TRIPS controversy. See infra notes 771 and 772 and 
accompanying text. 
568 See Paola Frassi, supra note 566, arguing that conversely, the reasons why compulsory licensing 
provisions have failed to deliver can be better found in the requirements for applying to such compulsory 
licenses as well as the complicated procedures which do not make this option appealing for potential 
applicants; (free translation of the original text: “Diversamente, credo che le ragioni dell’insuccesso 
dell’istituto vadano ricercate principalmente in due direzioni: la prima, risiede nelle condizioni per la 
concessione della licenza e la seconda nella farraginosità del procedimento di concessione della medesima. 
Per usare un’espressione efficace anche se non rigorosa, direi che il procedimento di concessione della 
licenza obbligatoria, formalmente devoluto al Ministero dell’Industria ma in sostanza amministrato dall’ 
Ufficio Italiano Brevetti e Marchi, e decisamente poco attraente”). See also, Julian-Arnold, supra note 213, 
referring to compulsory licenses for dependent patents and arguing that: “partially due to safeguards 
implemented by various countries, this type of compulsory license is rarely granted”.  
569 See Giorgia Floridia, Il Codice Della Proprietà Industriale Fra Riassetto E Demolizione,  DIR. INDUSTRIALE, 
2008, 2, 105, arguing that one of the main obstacles against the use of compulsory licensing provisions is 
the prohibition for infringers to apply for one, which is now attenuated with the possibility that good faith 
infringers could apply, (free translation of the original text: “Nella materia delle licenze obbligatorie il 
diritto vivente ha messo in evidenza che l'istituto resta sostanzialmente inapplicabile se viene considerata 
ostativa in modo assoluto la condizione che il richiedente la licenza non sia contraffattore del brevetto che 
viene chiesto in licenza dovendosi intendere per tale quello che, prima della presentazione della domanda 
di licenza, abbia fabbricato e/o venduto il prodotto oppure abbia attuato il procedimento brevettato. Per 
rendere questa condizione meno preclusiva, e per restituire quindi effettività all'istituto, si è disposto che 
la licenza possa essere concessa a chi abbia agito in buona fede”). 
570 See T.A.R.  Roma  Lazio  sez. III, 11 marzo 1998, n. 606, a decision prior to the coming into force of the 
CPI which interpreted that infringers could not apply to compulsory licensing provisions for lack of 
working and dependent inventions: “La contraffazione, cioè la riproduzione e l'imitazione degli elementi 
essenziali e caratteristici dell'idea coperta da brevetto, è dunque presupposto ostativo al rilascio di 
qualsiasi licenza obbligatoria , compresa quella per le c.d. invenzioni dipendenti. Il citato art. 54 bis non 
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infringement would be a particularly difficult one571. No case has so far 
analyzed a request for compulsory licensing where infringement occurred in 
good faith572.  
 
The Italian legislation also establishes the possibility to opt for a license of 
rights, established by article 80 of the CPI573. Finally, there is an important 
provision for voluntary licenses over active ingredients, subject to the 
mediation of the Ministry of Production, which is established in article 81 of the 
CPI that probably aimed at putting end to a conflict between particularly 
contrasting and primordial interests: those that sustained that an exclusive right 
over the active ingredients and those who retained that none right existed over 
such ingredients574. Such license represents a mixed type between voluntary 
and compulsory in the sense that it can be accorded or refuted by the authority 
                                                                                                                                               
 
 
opera nessuna distinzione al riguardo: l'ipotesi di licenza per mancato utilizzo viene disciplinata dal primo 
comma solo come fattispecie speciale, in relazione alla quale viene prevista una specifica causa ostativa al 
rilascio della licenza, costituita dalla non imputabilità della mancata o insufficiente attuazione del brevetto. 
Il contraffattore, pertanto, è sfornito in ogni caso di una legittima pretesa a sfruttare l'invenzione. Lo 
spirito della legislazione sui brevetti non consente concessioni al contraffattore. In questo senso si è già 
espressa chiaramente la sentenza n. 149/1994 della IV Sezione del Consiglio di Stato...”. See article 72, n. 3 
of the CPI, providing that compulsory licenses cannot be asked by infringers unless they prove they 
infringed in good faith. Compare with Michael Meller, International Patent Litigation: A country by country 
analysis, Bureau of National Affairs, BNA Books (2004), at p. DK-15, commenting the Danish Patent Act 
(Sections 45-50) where “the claim for a compulsory license is available for a defendant in an infringement 
case concerning the same patent for which a compulsory license is claimed. However, a court decision 
giving the infringer a compulsory license has no effect for the period of time before the infringer claimed 
such license”. This results in a middle-ground solution whereby an infringer can opt for applying for a 
compulsory license but is subject to liability for infringement for the time before such application. 
571 See UBERTAZZI, supra note 527, at p. 462, quoting from Sena, RIVISTA DIRITTO INDUSTRIALE, 05, 300, who 
sustains that good faith should be understood as a reasonable doubt with respect to the validity and scope 
of the patent and not to the unawareness of the existence of a patent: “la possibilita di concedere licenze 
obbligatorie al contraffattore in buona fede va riferita non all’eventualita di un’ignoranza (che sarebbe 
comunque colpevole) del brevetto anteriore, ma all’esistenza di un ragionevole dubbio circa la validita e 
l’ambito di protezione del brevetto”. 
572 Based upon a research on the following databases: Guritel, De Agostini and De Jure, last accessed on 
July, 2009, and using the following search criteria (contraffazione OR contraffattore AND “buona fede”).  
573 This provision was originally introduced by the Novella 1979, on the basis of article 44 of the CBC, See 
GIORGIO FLORIDIA AND PAOLA CAVALLARO, MARCHI, INVENZIONI E MODELLI, CODICE E COMMENTO DELLE 
RIFORME NAZIONALI (D.L. 4 DICEMBRE, 1992, N. 420), GIUFFRÈ ED. 1993, at p. 220. Similar provisions exist in 
several countries, including the U.K., see supra notes 514 and 515.  While this provision could be defined 
as a “put” option in law and economics terms, its effects in practice remain negligible, probably due to an 
insufficient incentive for patent owners to offer a license for their patented invention instead of retaining 
the right to opt for a “property rule” and thus, a “right” to hold-up potential infringers in exchange for a 
reduction of the patent fees amounting to a 50%. Hence, similar proposals that seek to expand the public 
domain by giving incentives to patent owners to put their inventions either directly in the public domain 
or at least in the paid public domain (dominio pubblico pagante) should construct upon the experience of 
systems providing for licenses of right that are not used in practice.  
574 See Giorgio Floridia and Marco Lamandini,  Commento a Merck-Principi Attivi, misure cautelari, e Merck & 
Co., Inc V. ACS Dobfar s.p.a., CPA Chemical Pharmaceutical Generic Association, in IL DIRITTO INDUSTRIALE, III,  
at p. 281. See also Floridia, in AUTERI ET AL., supra note 551, at p. 261.  
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but it is yet originated in the common will of the parties575. Its inclusion in the 
CPI and the fact that such license is not a traditional compulsory license, 
alleviates a potential tension between antitrust and patent law, and also has the 
consequence that an abuse of dominant position in an antitrust sense would not 
be needed in order to apply this rule576. The license has been deemed as a 
compromise that put an end to a conflict that arose due to the over-extension in 
terms of duration of the Italian Supplementary Certificates of Protection with 
respect to the duration of the same Certificates in Europe577, but it can also be 
viewed as a middle path between obligatory and voluntary licensing, in which 
the antitrust agency intervenes, as some U.S. courts have done, only if 
negotiation between the parties fails. 
6  Conclusions  
 
This chapter aimed at identifying and analyzing the use of ex-post liability rules 
for patent protection in their legal –international and national- context. Several 
observations emerged from a comparative description of the provisions under 
analysis. The starting point of this chapter was the importance of broadening 
                                                 
 
 
575 See Floridia & Lamandini, ibid, at p. 281, arguing that the license is voluntary not because it can be 
arbitrarily granted or denied but rather because it can only derive from the procedure of negotiations 
established by the law, which guarantee that both the interests of the patent owner and those of protecting 
a national market for the exportation of active principles: (free translation of the original text: “è 
volontaria, ma non perché possa essere arbitrariamente concessa o rifiutata, ma perché è solo dal concorso 
delle volontà delle parti che può scaturire quel regolamento negoziale che integra le condizioni previste 
dal legislatore affinché la licenza costituisca un giusto contemperamento fra l'interesse del titolare della 
privativa e l'interesse alla salvaguardia di un mercato nazionale di produzione di principi attivi destinati 
all'esportazione”).  
576 See Ibid, arguing that the legislator tried to avoid the use of a rigid instrument such as compulsory 
licensing provisions with the protection of patented inventions, except in the case of unreasonable denial 
to negotiate under the procedures provided for by the CPI: (free translation of the original text: “il 
Legislatore ha evitato di interferire nell'interpretazione delle norme che definiscono l'ambito di protezione 
dei certificati complementari di protezione; ha evitato di incrociare la tutela brevettuale con la normativa 
antitrust mediante lo strumento rigido della licenza obbligatoria; ma ha messo a disposizione delle 
contrapposte categorie un tavolo di conciliazione che favorisse la concessione di licenze fermo restando il 
deferimento all'Autorità Garante nel caso di rifiuto ingiustificato”.  See UBERTAZZI, supra note 527, at p. 
482, referring the discussion on whether compulsory licensing entails to consider that a refusal to license is 
legal or not. “Il meccanismo della licenza volontaria mediate presuppone che il rifiuto di concedere la 
licenza non sia in se illecito. Da tempo e tuttavia in corso un ampio dibattito sulla questione se in alcuni 
casi il rifiuto di licenza non possa esere illecito: vuoi seconda la dottrina del patent misuse...vuoi piu in 
generale secondo il diritto antitrust”; and citing “ACGM 14388/2005, Boll. 23/2005, confermata da TAR 
Lazio 9-11-2005, IDI, 06, 262; AGCM 15175/2006, Boll. 6/2006; CG 26-7-98, C-7/97” 
577 See Floridia and Lamandini, quoting the decision of the T.A.R. Lazio 7 marzo 2006 which held: "il caso 
in esame riveste caratteri di unicità per il contesto normativo che lo disciplina, caratterizzato da una 
eccessiva durata del CCP italiano" e secondo la quale, per effetto della norma sulla licenza "rimediale" "i 
CCP italiani ancora in vigore risultano meno efficaci in quanto circoscrivono al territorio italiano il 
godimento pieno della privativa da parte dell'impresa titolare". 
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the concept of ex-post liability rules as applied to patent law. In this sense, the 
chapter encompassed both the study of traditional compulsory licensing 
provisions as well as the cases when a court denies injunctive relief and opts for 
using a liability rule, a case that some authors describe as a compulsory license 
while some others do not. Following this broader concept, the chapter 
examined the main ex-post liability rules in patent law, within three specific case 
studies of national law: the U.S., the U.K. and Italy.  
 
In the U.S. the emphasis of scholarly work and case law is given to the 
problems of patent hold-ups, the strategic use of patenting by businesses 
characterized as “trolls” and the increasing multi-component nature of current 
technologies. In contrast and until recently, U.S. patent law seemed to sustain 
the view that patentees are free to choose whether to practice or not their 
inventions and should not, in general, be compelled to license them. This view 
is reflected in the absence of specific regimes of compulsory licenses for non-
working or for dependent patents but has been lately changed, at least partially, 
under the influx of the eBay decision.  
 
The examination of U.K. patent law and practice, serves to evidence the 
interface between remedies-based and compulsory licensing provisions. 
Whereas injunctions can be denied under equitable considerations, it has been 
commonly argued that problems of strategic use of patents, risk of blocking 
further technologies and lack of use of technologies could be better dealt with 
through the use of compulsory licensing provisions. Nevertheless, the denial of 
injunctions can also serve to tackle cases of “oppression” by right holders578. 
 
The Italian case highlights the differences in the conception of rights and 
remedies within civil law countries yet the surprising similarity of arguments 
which have been produced with respect to IP remedies. A particular reference 
was made to preliminary injunctions, which frequently put an end to 
potentially long trial procedures performing a role similar to property rules in 
other systems.  
 
The first observation that emerges from this analysis is that common law 
countries have historically conceived injunctions as an equitable remedy and 
hence subjected the award of this remedy to a factual test that aims at striking a 
balance between the particular circumstances of the case. Nevertheless, a 
glimpse into the law as it is actually practiced has showed how injunctions have 
been habitually awarded in patent cases while the conception of remedies has 
evolved -mainly but not only through the use of economic arguments- towards 
                                                 
 
 
578 See Jaggard v Sawyer, supra note 293, arguing that: “It is important to bear in mind that the test is one of 
oppression, and the court should not slide into application of a general balance of convenience test”. 
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favoring a strong or an automatic use of a property rule. This situation was 
more extremely in the U.S. and it was recently reversed by the eBay decision in 
2006. 
 
The situation is, in appearance, outstandingly different in civil law countries, 
due to a diverse conception over both rights and remedies. Injunctions are not 
considered an equitable remedy and patent statutes as well as procedural laws 
do not subject their award to a factual inquiry. Although patent statutes 
frequently grant judges the power to award injunctions without compelling 
them to do so in all cases, the law in action seems to reflect the view that a 
plaintiff whose patent right is violated (infringed) is “entitled to” or has a “right 
to” obtain injunctive relief. Moreover, the reasoning of courts in patent 
infringement cases has tended to favor a strong property rule, even in the case 
of preliminary injunctions, an outcome that could pose particular problems, 
especially in certain industries.   
 
In fact, understanding the dynamics of remedies is not only important and 
difficult in the light of the remarkable differences between different countries, 
but also with regard to their theoretical treatment, where remedies are often 
categorized either as a procedural matter or as part of substantive law: 
  
“Part of the difficulty with conceptualizing remedies as a field has been that 
remedies fits uneasily between the categories of substance and procedure. 
Remedies are central to litigation, but except for details at the edges, like the 
procedural rules for preliminary relief, remedies in the modern idea are not 
part of the law of procedure. The Supreme Court has correctly held that the 
measure of damages is substantive for Erie purposes. The same should be true 
of the standards for granting injunctions, although that question appears not to 
have been litigated. What or how much a plaintiff recovers is part of plaintiff's 
substantive entitlement and not simply a rule for processing disputes”579 
 
A second observation regards the importance of taking into consideration the 
interface between rights and remedies in order to understand the enhanced 
concept of ex-post liability rules. A remarkable difference between civil law and 
common law countries with regard to the legal treatment of rights and remedies 
consist preciselyon whether it is the remedy or the right that sets the starting 
point for such analysis. In spite of such marked difference, none form of 
reasoning –either one focusing on remedies or one focusing on rights- could be 
a priori judged as more efficient. As it has been already noticed, it would be 
rather the capacity to adapt to the demands of society – in the case of patent law 
critically influenced by the dynamic evolution of science and technology- that 
                                                 
 
 
579 Laycock, supra note 292, at p. 166 (footnotes omitted).  
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could determine whether a system that focuses on the remedy or one that 
focuses on the right is better able to cope with such new necessities580. A similar 
argument could be made with regard to the choice of each country of having 
one or another type of compulsory licenses or both, as in the U.K. case.  
 
With regard to the apparent similarities and differences between legal systems, 
the chapter also evidenced how the interpretation of Italian courts of a 
presumption of “periculum in mora” in re ipsa, has similar outcomes to the 
application of an “automatic injunction rule” in the U.S., even in spite of the 
different setting (preliminary or final injunctions). On the one hand this 
interpretation affects the use of different presumptions with regard to whether 
damages would be irreparable either in a final or in a preliminary injunction. 
On the other hand this particular aspect shows the importance of studying each 
legal provision in its context, for instance, the Italian judicial practice of 
granting preliminary injunction which might more relevant for the purposes of 
investigating the use of property rules and its comparison with other countries, 
than other practices, including those related to final injunctions. 
 
Finally, this chapter identified several common concerns with regard to the use 
of liability rules across several jurisdictions and times, namely, the difficulties 
and costs that a court (or agency) would face in order to calculate damages that 
substitute an injunction and the interpretation of the sound grounds to provide 
a compulsory license. This chapter touched upon some law and economic 
aspects of the problems surrounding the use and design of ex-post liability 
rules in different patent systems. The next chapter focuses on the examination, 
under a law and economics viewpoint, of the grounds for granting ex-post 
liability rules, as they were identified in this chapter.  
                                                 
 
 
580 See DI MAJO, supra note 320, at p. 15, arguing that neither a reasoning conducted from the remedy nor 
one starting from the right can be a priori judged to better results, as this would depend on how easily the 
legal system might be adapted to the particular circumstances; (translation of the original text: “Non e 
detto, ad esempio, che ragionare per rimedi porti, in punto di tutela, a maggiori progressi rispetto al 
ragionare per diritti. Potrebbe essere il contrario. Tutto sta nel vedere con quale capacita di adattamento 
l’ordinamento dato e disposto a qualificare diritto un determinato interesse oppure ad apprestare per esso 
un rimedio adeguato di tutela”). 
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CHAPTER IV 
EX-POST LIABILITY RULES:  
WHEN SHOULD THEY BE USED? 
 
 
“The operations of patent sharks sometimes 
compel an inventor to obtain patents for 
articles which are never meant to be placed 
on the market. A fellow often gets up a 
machine, and somebody else comes along, 
and by getting patents through for certain 
parts, can give the inventor a great deal of 
bother and make him pay well, even if the 
inventor gets control of it”581 
Thomas Edison, 1898 
1 Introduction 
The preceding chapters have sustained that strategic behavior and hold-ups are, 
in general law and economics, a key ground calling for the use of liability 
rules582. The legal overview of patent law also confirms a rather ample space for 
the use of ex-post liability rules across different jurisdictions. Nevertheless many 
law and economics scholars continue to disagree about whether transaction 
costs and holdups in the context of patented technologies constitute market 
failures and the frequency in which high transaction costs and strategic 
behavior occurs, among other controversial points. Moreover, the patent 
economics literature has confined the problem of strategic behavior to the 
specific case of patent hold-ups while directing most attention the even more 
                                                 
 
 
581 Interview in Scientific American 78 (2): 19. Available at http://www.myoutbox.net/posa78n.htm; last 
accessed on March 20, 2009. See also McDonough, supra note 430, describing Thomas Edison as a “king of 
trolls” in a recent article defending the business model of trolls: “For decades, this person held the U.S. 
record for the number of patents held by an individual— an astounding 1,093. This person primarily 
“described himself as an inventor,” and although many of his inventions were incorporated into products, 
he made a fortune from many patents that he never practiced. Not only did this man not practice nor have 
any intention of practicing many of his inventions, but he actually invented items specifically to deter 
innovation. This king of trolls was none other than Thomas Edison”. 
582 See Chapter I for the general concepts of transaction costs and holdups and their application to the 
patent area.  
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narrow study of entities such as “patent trolls” rather than to strategic patent 
behavior in general. 
 
As a consequence, there is vast discrepancy with regards to the convenience of 
using patent liability rules. Moreover, the majority of law and economics 
contributions have focused on U.S. law and practice, in noticeable contrast with 
the overly importance of international patent harmonization. This chapter seeks 
to contribute to these debates by confronting the above mentioned economic 
insights, which constitute the theoretical grounds for applying ex-post liability 
rules with case studies arising from recent patent discussions in the U.S. and 
Europe.  
 
The second section addresses the problem of patent hold-ups from the 
perspective of the specialized literature on the economics of patents hold-ups. 
The third section discusses the eBay and subsequent litigation within the U.S. as 
a case study of patent hold-ups and strategic behavior and argues for the use of 
a concept broader than patent hold-ups as treated in the economics literature. 
The fourth section refers to an even broader context for patent strategic 
behavior as it has been recently described in the European context. The fifth 
section examines the problems raised both in the U.S. and Europe while 
drawing policy conclusions in favor of focusing the discussion on the conduct 
rather than on the nature of the entity engaging in strategic behavior as well as 
proposing a concept of strategic behavior broad enough to encompass potential 
socially inefficient behavior and yet, narrow enough to avoid distorting 
innovation incentives.  
 
2 Patent Hold-ups: economic theory 
Recent scholarly work has argued that patent hold-ups might firstly impose 
losses in terms of static efficiency which are not sufficiently offset by expected 
dynamic efficiency gains in term of innovation incentives583 and that secondly; 
they might impose losses in terms of dynamic efficiency in the sense of blocking 
efficient subsequent innovations584. Nevertheless, important divergences subsist 
among scholars with respect to the actual effects of hold-ups on efficiency. Even 
in a general non-patent context, some authors have argued that bilateral hold-
ups are not necessarily inefficient but would rather impose only distributional 
                                                 
 
 
583 See above Chapter I, Section 4.2.2. “Patent Hold-ups”. 
584 See Cotter, supra note 38. 
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concerns. On the contrary, it is largely acknowledged that inefficiencies do arise 
when negotiations are multilateral585.  
 
Either in a bilateral or a multilateral case, however, hold-ups have been mainly 
studied in the context of incomplete contracts, when a party making specific 
investments is prone to opportunistic behavior by its counterpart in a contract. 
Specific investments are those that cannot be easily or at all translated into 
another useful use. Hence, a firm making specific investments which constitute 
sunk costs, becomes a potential target for strategic or opportunistic behavior586. 
The rational response to the risk of opportunistic behavior would range 
between the use of contracts and vertical integration between firms587. 
However, as explained with more detail below, it is doubtful that contracts 
might avoid all risks of strategic behavior588. In addition, vertical integration 
would not necessarily be desirable in some cases; especially those related to 
certain technological sectors and might as well give raise to further competition 
problems589.  
 
Translated outside the realm of contracts, the risk of opportunistic behavior 
might arise whenever a party makes a specific investment. When the problem is 
subsequently applied to the patent context, which is characterized by an 
increasing prevalence of transaction costs and complex negotiations that 
frequently fail, the potential risk of being exposed to opportunistic behavior, 
including hold-ups is even greater.  
 
In the patent context, specific investments are usually made by 2nd innovators in 
the development of products that embody some patented technology, either in 
the form of an improvement of a previous patented technology or through its 
                                                 
 
 
585 See ibid, at footnotes 60-61 and accompanying text, also citing from Lloyd Cohen, Holdouts, in 2 THE 
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 239 (1998).   
586 See Benjamin Klein, Robert Crawford and Armen Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the 
Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J. LAW & ECON. 297 (1978), at p. 298 explaining that: “when a specific 
investment is made and such quasi-rents are created, the possibility of opportunistic behavior is very 
real”. 
587 Ibid at 298, arguing that: “as assets become more specific and more appropriable quasi rents are created 
(and therefore the possible gains from opportunistic behavior increases), the costs of contracting will 
generally increase more than the costs of vertical integration”. 
588 See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 162, at p. 2015, noticing that: “of course, patent pools do sometimes 
overcome these obstacles and successfully form. We simply note that the transaction costs can be 
substantial and that the presence of nonmanufacturing patent owners makes the formation of successful 
pools harder”. See also Shapiro, supra note 5, at p. 8, arguing that: “I see relatively little that private 
companies can do to overcome the hold-up problem without reform of the patent system itself. But there is 
quite a bit they can do to solve the complements problem, which itself is greatly exacerbated by the hold-
up problem”.  
589 See Denicolo et al., supra note 160, discussing the possibility that certain patent policies, especially the 
denial of injunctive relief, for non-manufacturing companies, might have on the incentives for vertical 
integration as well as the potential harms arising from such vertical integration.  
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incorporation in a multi-component product. If ex-ante negotiations for a license 
fail, or, as it has been recently argued, do not happen because of problems in 
the disclosure and notice function of patents, many innovators might refrain 
from making such specific investments in the fear of being held-up, and hence 
many technological improvements or new products might not come into 
existence or might be delayed. Dynamic efficiency losses then may follow, 
especially because of the following conditions590.  
 
Firstly, and although the patent system aims at enabling patentees to profit and 
extract rents from their patented inventions, it is doubtful that extracting rents 
from hold-ups will benefit society in terms of providing more incentives for 1st 
innovators, especially if the costs of such greater capture are taken into 
account591. Secondly, most 2nd innovators are not merely users of technologies 
but rather innovators and the patent system does not only aim at fostering 1st 
innovations but also at the development of useful new applications and 
improved technologies592. Thirdly, the complement characteristic of many 
patented technologies might lead to the problem of Cournot complements by 
which the final product is priced above its social optimal593. Fourthly, hold-ups 
might also add up to the losses due to a double marginalization problem, when 
both upstream innovator and downstream user are monopolists and as a 
consequence net social benefits will be lower594.  
 
A specific case of hold-ups might arise under the above mentioned case of the 
negotiation of technical standards comprising several patented technologies. 
These cases are increasingly important in today’s world as technical standards 
have become ubiquitous and of especial value for industries relying on 
compatible products and the use of networks and interfaces. When negotiations 
for the implementation of technical standards take place, it is important for all 
firms to know which patent(s) are essential for the use of such standard. Any 
firm making specific investments in developing a product according to the 
                                                 
 
 
590 See Cotter, supra note 38, at p. 20. 
591 Ibid at p. 20-21 arguing that: “there are reasons to doubt that the ability to extract substantial rents by 
practicing holdup produces much, if any, social benefit in terms of dynamic efficiency (…)social welfare 
deficit, given the magnitude of the short-term social costs. And network effects may make it hard for users 
to avoid these costs by switching to alternative technologies”. 
592 Ibid, at p. 21: “enabling patentees to extract excessive rents from downstream users may inhibit 
investment on the part of downstream firms in developing new applications for patent- or standard-
specific technologies. In a sense, producers of end products are not merely users of the patented invention, 
but rather might be thought of as sequential innovators”. 
593 Ibid, at p. 21 “when multiple patents read on an end product, as will often be the case, holdup may 
exacerbate the “Cournot complements” problem”. 
594 Ibid, at p 23, arguing that: “if both patentee and downstream user have some degree of market power, 
another consequence of patentees extracting “too much” rent may be to exacerbate this “double 
marginalization” problem. It is conceivable, of course, that in such a case the social benefits of inducing 
upstream innovation outweigh the social costs; the point is merely that holdup exacerbates those costs, 
and thus makes it marginally less likely that there is a net social benefit”. 
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standard could be otherwise subject to opportunistic behavior if disclosure does 
not take place before the development of the product. In fact, the adoption of a 
standard reduces the available options ex ante in the sense that once the 
standard is set and the industry decides to abide to such standard, the involved 
patents would acquire a value they did not have before. Such value is not 
inherent to the technology but rather derives from the specific investment made 
by firms in developing their products according to such standard.  
 
Hence, whereas avoiding the use of the patent is not costly ex-ante, it will be 
very costly after the standard is set. The adoption of contractual terms such as 
FRAND or RAND595 precisely attempt to solve through a contractual 
commitment, the potential emergence of strategic behavior596. However, it is 
still unclear that such contractual commitments might completely avoid hold-
ups as it is precisely in the context of SSO’s negotiating technological standards 
that some firms have lately refused to abide to previously adopted 
commitments to license597.  
 
The strategic behavior arising in this context that illustrates the close interface 
between antitrust and patent policy is often known as “patent ambush”598. This 
conduct can be defined as a sub-type of patent hold-up that occurs in the 
context of negotiations for technological standards within an SSO when a 
                                                 
 
 
595 These almost equivalent terms describe licensing commitments adopted in the context of negotiated 
technical standards standing for a promise to license on Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (RAND) and 
Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) Terms, respectively. 
596 See Joseph Scott Miller, Standard Setting, Patents, and Access Lock-in: RAND Licensing and the Theory of the 
Firm, 40 IND. L. REV. 351, 366-67 (2007), arguing that: “The holdup plays on a gap in projected returns 
that depends on continued access to the standardized technology: once the standard is set, users invest in 
making goods and services that use the specification. If a user were then denied access to the standard 
technology and the standard-compliant assets were sold at salvage value, the return on those investments 
would be far lower than first projected (when continued access was assumed). After all, if other providers 
enjoy continued access to the standard and the interface-dependent market thrives, how much will 
consumers pay for the shut-out party's nonstandard product? This scenario is not unique to the standards 
setting context. Economists have long called the problem “asset specificity.” The RAND promise, which is 
an early agreement on the framework for later negotiation, is timed to take advantage of the tempering 
effect of the veil of ignorance and is designed to prevent this holdup problem”.  
597 See Pat Treacy and Sophie Lawrance, FRANDly fire: are industry standards doing more harm than good? 
JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW & PRACTICE, 2008, Vol. 3, No. 1, commenting on various cases 
including the Rambus and Qualcomm cases in the U.S. as well as the investigation by the European 
Commission and other cases in Germany and the U.K.   
598 Whereas an ambush is often referred as a conduct rather than the entity that practices it, this latter is 
often assimilated to a “troll”. There are multiple bibliographic references on SSO’s, patent ambushes, 
FRAND and RAND commitments. For a description of the role of SSO’s in the modern patent system see 
Mark Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, BOALT WORKING PAPERS IN 
PUBLIC LAW, PAPER 24, available at: http://repositories.cdlib.org/boaltwp/24. For the problem of hold-ups 
in the standard setting context see also Cotter, supra note 38 and Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 162. For a 
view contrary to Lemley and Shapiro, see Miguel Rato & Damien Geradin, Can Standard-Setting Lead to 
Exploitative Abuse? A Dissonant View on Patent Hold-up, Royalty Stacking and the Meaning of FRAND, 3 EUR. 
COMPETITION J. 101, 107 (2007). 
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member of such organization misleads other members into the adoption of a 
standard that is or will be covered by a patent or patents that were not 
disclosed at that time599.  The conduct consists in deceiving other members or in 
keeping patents hidden until the standard is set and lock-in occurs. In this 
sense, a patent ambush is a form of hold-up insofar as investments are sunk and 
SSO’s members are locked into the standard. Often, an entity engaging in 
patent ambush makes use of filling strategies, for instance, the filing of 
continuation or divisional applications in order to deceive; or else keeps her 
patent hidden until the standard is set600.  
 
The practice of filling continuation applications is in fact recalled as the key 
reason that allowed Rambus to maintain its patent secret until the DRAM 
standards were developed601. Additionally, in some cases such as Rambus itself, 
where after a long procedure that extended over 9 years the EPO decided to 
revoke Rambus’ patent, the involved patents might be of dubious validity602. 
Similar cases have been tackled either through the application of antitrust law, 
equitable defenses against enforcement of such patents or the application of 
unfair competition laws, illustrating the complementary nature of such 
statutes603.  
 
                                                 
 
 
599 See Cotter, supra note 38, at p. 43. 
600 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Patent Continuations, Patent Deception, and Standard Setting: The Rambus and 
Broadcom Decisions, UNIVERSITY OF IOWA LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER NO. 08-25 (JUNE 2008), at 28-29, 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1138002    
601 See Harhoff et al., supra note 165 at p. 95-96. Whereas the FTC found that Rambus had “unlawfully 
monopolized the markets for four computer memory technologies that have been incorporated into 
industry standards for DRAM chips”, the Court of Appeals decided for…Information on the case Docket 
No. 9302 In the Matter of Rambus Incorporated is available on: 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9302/index.shtm  
602 See Harhoff et al., supra note 165, at footnote 47 and accompanying text. See also press release by EPO, 
informing about the revocation of patent 0525068 available at: http://www.epo.org/about-
us/press/releases/archive/2004/12022004.html, last accessed on August 13, 2009. However, the patent 
remains enforceable, for instance in Italy: 
http://v3.espacenet.com/publicationDetails/inpadoc?CC=EP&NR=0525068A1&KC=A1&FT=D&date=19
930203&DB=EPODOC&locale=en_EP  
603 See Thomas Rosch, Remarks before the Newport Summit on Antitrust and Economics, 2008 WL 2312363 
(F.T.C.) referring the case of Negotiated Data Solutions LLC, FTC File No. 051 0094 (Consent Accepted For 
Public Comment, January 23, 2008), available at http:// www.ftc.gov/opa/2008/01/ethernet.shtm ("N-
Data") whereby N-Data acquired patents held by National Semiconductor Corporation in the knowledge 
that this latter had made a one-time $1,000 licensing commitment. In this case, the FTC applied Section 5 of 
the FTC Act, alleging that N-Data's conduct was an unfair method of competition and an unfair act 
because after the industry committed to the related standard N-Data refused to license in the above 
mentioned terms and demanded a higher royalty. See also the STATEMENT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE 
COMMISSION, IN THE MATTER OF NEGOTIATED DATA SOLUTIONS LLC, FTC File no. 051 0094 at 5-6, available at 
http:// www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0510094/080122statement.pdf, arguing that: “in the standard-setting 
context with numerous, injured third parties who lack privity with patentees and with the mixed 
incentives generated when members may be positioned to pass on royalties that raise costs market-wide 
contract remedies may prove ineffective, and Section 5 intervention may serve an unusually important 
role”. 
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Summing up, the risk of being held-up can occur either in a bilateral or in a 
multilateral context, and both within or outside negotiations of technical 
standards. In all these cases, incentives for 2nd innovators might nevertheless be 
affected. However, the disagreement of scholars over the economic effects of 
hold-ups is even more acute in the case of patents.  
 
2.1 Economics of patent hold-ups: the Lemley and Shapiro model 
Different economic models have been used to illustrate the problem of patent 
hold-ups. Some models attempt to study the impact of the availability of 
injunctive relief on negotiated royalties under a game theoretical approach 
considering that the outcome of negotiations depends on the threat point of 
each party, which is the value a party would obtain in case negotiations fail. 
The threat point of each party is itself dependent upon a number of relevant 
variables. The economic models described in this section aim at understanding 
how the availability of a property or a liability rule affects such threat points. 
 
One such model foresees a patentee (1st innovator) that develops a technology 
which is incorporated in a downstream product by a potential infringer (2nd 
innovator)604. By the time a 2nd innovator develops the downstream product 
that infringes on the patented technology -at some cost- she might either be 
unaware that such technology is patented or might have doubts with regards to 
whether her product infringes the technology605.  
 
Parties might negotiate ex-ante for a license, but if those negotiations fail, the 
patentee sues the 2nd innovator. The court has to determine whether the patent 
is valid and whether the product infringes the patent while some litigation costs 
will be imposed on the parties. Additionally, the final outcome of litigation is 
unknown to both parties and each of them will have some expectations from 
the results of the trial. 
 
                                                 
 
 
604 See the model developed by Lemley and Shapiro, supra note 162. See also critics developed by Denicolo 
et al., supra note 160 and Elhauge, supra note 38. The models principally illustrate the strategies that 
interested parties can adopt, the relevant variables that influence their payoffs and the decisions they 
would adopt under standard assumptions of rationality. Although the above mentioned models refer to a 
case of 1 upstream patentee and 1 downstream manufacturer, with some changes the results might also be 
applied to the context of multi-parties. 
605 The reasons why a firm designs a product using a patented invention range from the willful 
infringement of the patented invention to its independent invention and might be as well affected by the 
confluence of patent strategies including delays in publication, filling strategies including the modification 
of patent applications to include the infringing product, the file of divisional applications or continuations 
with important differences from the previous patent that might deceive 2nd innovators or the case in which 
a 2nd innovator is simply unaware of the patent or even if aware, has a reasonable belief that the product is 
not infringing.   
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Before the final decision, and if the plaintiff has asked for it, the court might 
decide whether to award or not a preliminary injunction. Depending on the 
costs of litigation, expected duration, outcomes and cost from the trial, parties 
could also negotiate on the basis of this preliminary decision and reach a final 
settlement606. If litigation continues there is some probability that the court 
declares the patent valid and infringed and if this happens, the court will 
usually award damages as well as grant a final injunction. Whereas before eBay, 
the probability that the court awarded an injunction was approximately 100% 
when the court found the patent valid and infringed, after eBay there is some 
probability that the court would nevertheless deny injunctive relief607. At this 
point, parties can again negotiate in the shadow of the court’s decision but the 
threat points would have changed. If negotiations fail at this time, the infringer 
will have to stop all productive activity related to the infringing product. 
 
In the model used by Lemley and Shapiro, the outcome of negotiations would 
depend among different variables: 
-V is the value of the patented feature to the downstream firm in comparison 
with the next best alternative technology.  
-M is the margin earned by the downstream firm on its product.  
-θ is the strength of the patent which reflects the probability that the patent is 
found to be valid and infringed by the downstream firm’s product.  
-C is the cost to the downstream firm of redesigning its product in order to 
avoid infringing the patent claims.  
-L is the fraction of the downstream firm’s total unit sales during the lifetime of 
the patent that would be lost if the downstream firm were forced off the market 
by an injunction.  
-Finally, B is the bargaining skill of the patent holder, which reflects a fraction 
of the combined gains from settling, rather than litigating, which are captured 
by the patent holder. B has a value from 0 to 1 and is usually assumed to be 0.5 
reflecting equal bargaining skills of the parties. 
                                                 
 
 
606 See Jean Lanjouw and Josh Lerner, Tilting the Table? The Use of Preliminary Injunctions. JOURNAL OF LAW 
& ECONOMICS, VOL. 44, NO. 2, PART 1, October 2001, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=281238, 
analysing, from a law and economic point of view, the granting and abuse from preliminary injunctions in 
the U.S.  
607 The set of cases (see appendix) analyzed in this thesis suggest that after eBay permanent injunctions are 
denied in approximately 31% and granted 69% of times whereas most U.S. commentators argue that 
before eBay, permanent injunctions (not preliminary ones) were awarded as a matter of course in all cases 
finding infringement and validity of patent. But see Denicolo et al. supra note 160, at p. 572-573, referring 
that previous research indicates that district courts awarded preliminary injunctions in 61% of cases (from 
the 1980s through the mid-1990s). Among those cases moving on to the Federal Court of Appeals over the 
same period, 58 percent of the injunctions granted were affirmed with percentages widely varying. In 
contrast, a study suggests that injunctive relief was awarded by federal district court cases in 1995, 1997, 
and 2000 only in 21 percent of the trials. See Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases 
Resolved? An Empirical Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 WASH. L. REV. 237 
(2006), quoted by Denicolo et al., supra note 160.  
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The model developed by Lemley and Shapiro studies how injunctions affect the 
threat points for parties bargaining over patent royalties and assumes that the 
bargaining skill of parties “B” remains constant. For the purposes of the 
analysis, the model needs to refer to a benchmark royalty that would be 
negotiated in an ideal patent system. Such benchmark, for Lemley and Shapiro, 
is B×V for an ironclad patent, that is, a patent that is certainly or almost 
certainly valid, whereas the benchmark is θ×B×V for other patents. The term θ 
discounts the benchmark by the probability that the patent is finally held valid 
and infringed608. Since reasonable royalties are calculated upon the basis of a 
hypothetical royalty, they argue that this benchmark can also be applicable for 
the calculation of reasonable royalties. Although they do not normatively argue 
for the use of such benchmark, they sustain that any rule significantly altering 
it, might distort patent incentives609. Then, they consider two cases according to 
the best strategy for infringer in the case ex-ante negotiations fail: 
 
-The “Litigate” strategy would be the best possible strategy for an infringer 
when the patent is relatively weak and redesign costs are relatively high in 
comparison with profits that the downstream firm would lose by withdrawing 
from the market while having to redesign its product. In this case, if 
negotiations fail, the best strategy is to defend during the patent suit and 
redesigning the product only if the infringer loses the suit and is unable to 
negotiate a license after losing. In particular, Lemley and Shapiro highlight that 
the negotiated royalty rate for a single patent tends to be hugely above a 
reasonable benchmark level if the value of a patented feature is small relative to 
the total value associated with the overall product. This follows from the fact 
that an injunction would cause the infringer not only to lose the value of the 
patented part but of the whole product. 
 
- The “Redesign and Litigate” would be the best strategy for an infringer when 
the patent appears stronger. Here the infringer starts redesigning the product 
even while litigating, especially if the cost of redesigning is low in comparison 
with the prospective profits that it would lose if enjoined. However, the patent 
                                                 
 
 
608 See Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents,  JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES, Vol. 19, p. 
75, 2005, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=567883, making the point that: “the actual scope of 
a patent right, and even whether the right will withstand litigation at all, are uncertain and contingent 
questions”. In this sense, patents are probabilistic rights and a value can be assigned to represent the 
strength of the patent, that is, the probability that once litigated it would not be declared invalid.  
609 See Lemley and Shapiro supra note 162, at p. 2000, arguing that: “we do not mean that the benchmark 
royalty is the “right price” that should displace the workings of the market. To the contrary, as our use of 
the Nash bargaining model suggests, we are agnostic on how the cooperative surplus from bargaining is 
actually divided between the parties. We are, however, concerned to ensure that the law does not change 
the threat points that set the boundary conditions for this bargaining in ways that systematically move it 
away from the benchmark. If the law does so, the result, especially for weak patents, is that the patent 
system has distorted the market allocation of resou
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holder benefits from the fact that the infringer’s threat point in the negotiations 
involves incurring in redesign costs for sure and not just in the event that the 
patent survives litigation. Hence, the negotiated royalties would not be 
discounted by the patent strength. The gap between negotiated royalties and 
the ideal benchmark is higher the weaker the patent is, because the infringer is 
willing to settle for an amount that is greater than the expected value of the 
patentee’s contribution but less than the cost of redesigning the product while 
litigating. 
 
- An extreme case happens when the value of the patented feature is zero 
because there would be alternative ways to redesign without infringing the 
patent. The zero benchmark reflects that the infringer would not have 
negotiated a license ex ante and all negotiated royalties are “an overcharge 
based on holdup”. 
 
Lemley and Shapiro conclude that the threat of injunctive relief for component 
products causes patentees whose inventions are only one component of a larger 
product to be systematically overcompensated. In addition, the ways in which 
U.S. courts have awarded reasonable royalties, especially for component 
inventions: “has made them into a tool for patentees to capture more than their 
fair share of a defendant’s profit margins. Realigning the reasonable-royalty 
calculation with its intended purpose—compensation of patent owners—will 
go a long way towards reducing the incentives of patent plaintiffs to engage in 
opportunistic holdup”610.  
 
According to Lemley and Shapiro, the calculations of reasonable royalties 
should take into consideration the availability of design around or non-
infringing alternatives. Whereas courts currently analyze this factor when 
calculating lost profits, Lemley and Shapiro argue that this would also be 
pertinent for the calculation of reasonable royalties. Likewise, courts should 
take into consideration whether there are unpatented components on the 
infringing product; a factor that is actually contained in those mentioned by the 
typically applied precedent yet is often ignored611. In this way damages might 
better reflect the actual contribution of the patent, something that has been 
furthermore included in recent Bills proposing a reform of the U.S. patent act612.  
                                                 
 
 
610 See Lemley and Shapiro, supra note 162, at p. 2044.  
611 Ibid, at p. 2018, explaining that while the case of Georgia-Pacific v. United States Plywood 318 F. Supp. 1116 
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) enumerated fifteen factors that might be taken into account when simulating the 
hypothetical negotiation that would have occurred ex-ante, these factors are often reduced to only three 
issues: the significance of the patented invention relative to the product and to market demand, the royalty 
rates people have been willing to pay for this or other similar inventions in the industry, and expert 
testimony as to the value of the patent.  
612 See Cotter, supra note 38, citing the HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON COURTS, THE INTERNET, AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF THE H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 109TH CONG. (2005); H.R. 1908, 110th Cong., 1st 
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In spite of presenting a model that underlines a potentially pervasive problem 
in patent law613, Lemley and Shapiro suggest that injunctive relief shall remain 
the baseline remedy for most patentees. They argue that courts shall 
nevertheless limit the availability of injunctions in some cases, especially when 
inventions are only a minor component of a larger product and when the 
patentee’s principal interest in litigating patent infringement is to obtain 
licensing revenues. Likewise, they suggest that when the cost of redesigning the 
entire product is high relative to the value of the patented technology, courts 
shall deny the injunction. Even if such redesign costs are not so large, courts 
might award a stay in order to allow redesigning while calculating reasonable 
royalties for the time of such “allowed infringement”. They suggest that courts 
should additionally take into consideration whether infringement was 
inadvertent as a prerequisite to deny injunctions. Conversely, in cases where 
the patentee might have been granted with lost profits, that is, when the 
plaintiff and the defendant are competitors, courts shall grant an injunction but 
might still allow a stay according to the proportion of the value of the patented 
innovation614. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
 
 
Sess., § 5 (2007), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=h110-1908&version=pcs. 
See also H.R. 1908, 110th Cong., 1st Sess., § 5(a)(3) (2007), which passed the House of Representatives in 
fall 2007, but was removed in 2008 from the Senate calendar. A new proposal for reform of the Patent Act, 
§ 284(b) provides that in order to award reasonable royalties, courts shall consider the following 
circumstances: (2) relationship of damages to contributions over prior art- upon a showing to the 
satisfaction of the court that a reasonable royalty should be based on a portion of the value of the 
infringing product or process, the court shall conduct an analysis to ensure that a reasonable royalty under 
subsection (a) is applied only to that economic value properly attributable to the patent's specific 
contribution over the prior art. The court shall exclude from the analysis the economic value properly 
attributable to the prior art, and other features or improvements, whether or not themselves patented, that 
contribute economic value to the infringing product or process. (3) entire market value- upon a showing to 
the satisfaction of the court that the patent's specific contribution over the prior art is the predominant 
basis for market demand for an infringing product or process, damages may be based upon the entire 
market value of the products or processes involved that satisfy that demand. (4) other factors- If neither 
paragraph (2) or (3) is appropriate for determining a reasonable royalty, the court may consider, or direct 
the jury to consider, the terms of any nonexclusive marketplace licensing of the invention, where 
appropriate, as well as any other relevant factors under applicable law. (5) combination inventions- For 
purposes of paragraphs (2) and (3), in the case of a combination invention the elements of which are 
present individually in the prior art, the patentee may show that the contribution over the prior art may 
include the value of the additional function resulting from the combination, as well as the enhanced value, 
if any, of some or all of the prior art elements resulting from the combination.   
613 The assertion that this might be a pervasive problem is not intended to judge on the actual frequency of 
hold-ups and strategic behavior in patent law, a –difficult- question left for empirical studies but it rather 
reflects a known feature about modern technologies where many of them are incorporated in multi-
component products “reading on” hundreds and even thousands of patented technologies, for which 
redesign might be costly either with respect (1) to the value of the infringed patent or (2) ex-post with 
respect to the cost of ex-ante redesign if the potential infringer was aware of the patent.  
614 See Lemley and Shapiro, supra note 162, at p. 2035-2045, providing policy suggestions in the light of 
patent hold-ups and royalty stacking. 
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2.1.1 Refinements and critics 
Many scholarly comments have followed and criticized the above mentioned 
model. In practice, however, most of the dissimilar results and policy 
suggestions vary according to the assumptions considered necessary in order to 
find a hold-up as well as whether such conditions are deemed to be more or less 
frequent in practice. 
 
For instance, according to Cotter, additional requirements should be retained 
necessary in order to confine cases of patent hold-ups as much as possible615, 
namely: 1) that the patent contributes only to a portion of some multi-
component end product; 2) that the exercise of market power is linked to the 
possibility that the patentee obtains an injunction preventing commercialization 
of the multi-component product; 3) that the patentee is not a competitor of the 
potential licensee616 and 4) that a benchmark is found that provides guidance as 
to when a patentee is extracting a royalty above some reasonable threshold. 
 
The last requirement is used to assess whether the royalty extracted by the 
patentee is above a reasonable threshold has been the source of further 
disagreement that clearly captures the divergences about other underlying 
points in discussion. The ideal benchmark proposed by Lemley and Shapiro, 
which is βθV617, means that injunctive relief systematically threatens to over-
reward component patent owners, given that it empowers them to bargain for 
royalties above that threshold. Conversely, Elhauge proposed that the accurate 
benchmark shall be θV618. If this is the correct threshold, over-rewarding would 
occur only in a few cases, in particular: 
-in cases of “strong surprise patents” only when “the fixed costs of a redesign 
exceed the expected value of the patent, taking into account the odds that the 
patent claim will be found invalid”.  
-in cases involving weak surprise patents only when “the value of the lost 
profits from the lag time to redesign plus the fixed cost of a redesign exceed the 
value of the patent without any discount for its possible invalidity” 
-in cases involving non-surprise patents, only when β > θ.  
 
                                                 
 
 
615 See Cotter, supra note 38, at p. 23-26.  
616 But see Ibid, adding that: “Of course, there might be mixed cases, in which the patentee competes in 
some markets and licenses its technology in others; holdup would be a risk in those markets in which the 
patentee does not compete, and would not be a risk in the others”.  
617 Notice that the lower the reasonable threshold, the more cases that will be found to be in excess of that 
threshold and therefore categorized as hold-ups. The term β included in βθV represents a measure of the 
bargaining power of the patent holder, which is a variable ranging from 0 to 1 and usually assumed to be 
0.5. Therefore the threshold proposed by Lemley and Shapiro (βθV) would be lower than that proposed by 
Elhauge, which is not “discounted” with the bargaining power of the patentee (θV).  
618 See Elhauge, supra note 38. 
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Cotter has argued that the Lemley and Shapiro’s benchmark is the correct one 
and that even when it is not, there would still be cases where over-rewarding is 
possible outside of those confined by Elhauge’s paper. Nevertheless, Cotter 
questions any distinction between βθv and θv, basically because it is not clear 
how, if ever, a court could possibly estimate β. In addition, he points out that 
when the courts seeks to replicate the hypothetical royalty the parties would 
have negotiated, they may not take into account the ex ante value of θ. Hence, 
Cotter concludes that the fundamental theoretical question about the ideal 
threshold should be how to estimate the value the parties would have placed on 
V, that is, the value of the patented technology619.  
 
It is clear that calculating V might also be difficult.  In fact, Cotter suggests that 
there is a trade-off between the different proposed methodologies to calculate 
reasonable royalties. One option is theoretically correct in that it reflects the 
value of the patented technology over the prior art with respect to alternative 
technologies but this option is administratively costly. The other approach is 
less costly but might create higher aggregate social costs”620.  
 
More in general, commentators argue that switching to a liability rule would 
likely lead to errors and costs in calculating the appropriate royalty, and 
whereas party-negotiated royalties reflect more accurately the value of 
innovations, court-calculated royalties would tend to err in the sense of under-
compensating patentees. An important counter-argument is that it is however 
possible that courts might err both in the sense of over-compensating or in 
under-compensating621. As expected, however, scholars do not only disagree 
about the potential biases of royalties calculated by courts but also about 
whether the current patent system over-compensates or under-compensates 
patent holders622. 
                                                 
 
 
619 See Cotter, supra note 38, at p. 36. See the conclusions of this section below, broadening the restrictive 
definition of patent hold-ups according to the threshold proposed by Cotter, which is as well compatible 
with previous literature in the economics of patent improvement (e.g., Merges and Nelson, supra note 35).  
620 Ibid, at p. 40.  
621 Ibid, at p. 28-29, footnote 119 and accompanying text, indicating that “Indeed, if Lemley and Shapiro’s 
analysis is correct, courts in patent infringement cases sometimes may be more prone to overcompensate 
in the sense of awarding royalties in excess of those which the parties themselves would have agreed to ex 
ante and citing Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 162, and Mark Lemley, Distinguishing Lost Profits from 
Reasonable Royalties, STANFORD PUBLIC LAW AND LEGAL THEORY WORKING PAPER SERIES, WORKING PAPER NO. 
1133173, 2008, at p. 12-13, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1133173 claiming that “some patentees 
who can prove lost profits elect instead to seek a ‘reasonable’ royalty that is far in excess (of) what the 
parties would have negotiated”. 
622 Compare for instance, Lemley and Shapiro supra note 162, suggesting that patent owners are 
systematically over-compensated with Denicolo supra note 26 and Denicolo et al., supra note 160. Whereas 
Lemley and Shapiro based their model on the assumption of one-way complementarity, meaning that the 
product could have been designed without infringing the patent; Denicolo et al. develop a model in which 
innovations are complementary and find that inventors are likely to be under-compensated and 
investment would be sub-optimal, given that: “With strictly complementary innovations firm A exerts a 
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2.1.2 Assumptions of the models  
An important additional source of controversy between scholars regards the 
assumptions followed by each model. For instance, Denicolo et al. explain that 
the results of Lemley and Shapiro rely on the following assumptions: (1) that 
infringement is inadvertent; (2) that infringement is detected with certainty 
(something that is implicit in their model); (3) that it is costly to redesign the 
product ex-post compared with what it would have cost ex-ante and; (4) that the 
technology has several components and the value of the infringed patent is 
small compared to the total value of the infringing product. They argue that 
notwithstanding the restrictiveness of their results in the light of these 
assumptions, Lemley and Shapiro have relaxed such assumptions for the 
purposes of drawing policy implications623. Hence, they suggest that limiting 
injunctive relief should only be possible under the above mentioned restrictive 
assumptions624. Moreover and following an error-cost approach, they argue that 
any policy restricting the availability of injunctive relief should take into 
account the possibility of errors and that any such policy would only be 
desirable when hold-ups are sufficiently frequent as to call for a change in the 
baseline rule625. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
 
 
positive externality on firm B, and vice versa”. As a consequence, under-compensation occurs since firms 
exert positive externalities on one another.  
623 See Denicolo et al., supra note 160, at p. 589, arguing that: “Assumption (i) is reduced to “no explicit 
copying,” a much easier hurdle to clear. Condition (ii), which is implicit in the theoretical model, is largely 
ignored, although it is crucial for obtaining the holdup results. Moreover, in the policy recommendation 
the important distinction between ex ante and ex post redesign costs is blurred. Finally, conditions (iii) and 
(iv) embed an additional assumption regarding the particular type of complementarity between 
components: although the stand-alone value of the technology owned by M is positive, that of the 
technology owned by I is zero. If all the multiple innovative components of a product are indispensable, 
however, the logic of the holdup problem, and hence the appropriate remedies, can be significantly 
different”.  
624 Ibid, concluding that “the theoretical circumstances under which patent holdup can occur are fairly 
narrow”. 
625 Ibid, at p. 583-584, explaining that: “On the one side is the risk of denying an injunction to a patent 
holder in the absence of a significant holdup problem, a type 1 (“false positive”) error. On the other side is 
the risk of granting an injunction to a patent holder who is indeed intent on holdup, a type 2 (“false 
negative”)  error. Different policy rules entail different risks of type 1 and type 2 errors. If injunctions were 
granted routinely, for instance, type 1 errors would be avoided altogether but the probability of type 2 
errors would remain. Conversely, with systematic denials of injunctive relief, the risk of type 2 errors 
would be avoided but a substantial risk of type 1 errors would emerge. Finally, categorical denials of 
injunctive relief, whereby injunctive relief is denied to certain types of patent holders, can produce both 
type 1 and type 2 errors if the category of firms for which injunctive relief is denied is not a clean match to 
the firms actually practicing patent holdup”. They moreover criticize any attempt of developing a 
categorical rule that systematically denies injunctive relief for non-practicing entities. For the reasons 
mentioned in the precedent section we agree that such categorical rules might not bring beneficial effects 
for patent policy.  
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With respect to inadvertent infringement, Denicolo et al. pose that a distinction 
should be made between the case of inadvertent infringement and infringement 
that even if not implying a mere copying, could not fall under the definition of 
inadvertent or innocent infringement. Assimilating cases in which copying or 
willful infringement is not proved to inadvertent infringement could be 
detrimental because it would create incentives to infringe patents. However, the 
identification of inadvertent infringement is also difficult. Although an 
inadvertent infringer might be defined as one that after performing a previous 
reasonable search did not find any relevant patent that would be infringed, it is 
however debatable that such a previous “reasonable” search by the infringer 
would suffice to avoid surprise patents nowadays. In this respect, Elhauge 
concludes that infringement can always be avoided because “the downstream 
firm can (unless patent search costs are insuperable) always assure it pays a 
royalty rate that does not exceed the true optimal rate” by “simply search[ing] 
the patent records to avoid surprise and then negotiate a license before 
designing”626. However, many recent studies highlight that such a reasonable 
search is not possible in an important number of cases, making the exception 
“unless patent search costs are insuperable” to frequently become the rule627.  
 
There are additional problems with using a standard of due diligence in order 
to rule out willful infringement as it happens in the U.S. case628. In practice, 
firms developing innovations in the U.S. often deliberately avoid performing a 
thorough patent search in order not to read previous patents. Otherwise, when 
a firm becomes aware of the existence of a patent it will be subject to an 
obligation to ask an opinion from a patent counsel or or else risk to be found a 
willful infringer and potentially be obliged to pay treble damages629. More in 
general, it is clear that a “due diligence” standard shall be subject to the court’s 
discretion in order to avoid parties behaving strategically with respect to the 
requirements set by any categorical rule as well as to adapt to future 
                                                 
 
 
626 See Elhauge, supra note 38, at p. 14.  
627 See Cotter, supra note 38, at p. 25-26, counter-arguing the difficulty of previous patent searches and 
citing Bessen and Meurer. 
628 See the CAFC decision in Re Seagate, supra note 472, correcting the threshold for willful infringement 
that was previously applied by the CAFC during the previous years, In fact, giving the punitive nature of 
enhanced damages, these should be considered as a deterrent mechanism, limited to cases of 
“recklessness” infringement. But see Cotter, supra note 38, agreeing with the new standard but 
disagreeing with the underlying analysis that relies on the probability that the patent would be declared 
valid and infringed instead than on the rate of detection, which is the relevant variable from an economic 
viewpoint.  
629 See Mark Lemley and Ragesh Tangri, Ending Patent Law’s Willfulness Game, BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW 
JOURNAL, VO. 18. P. 1085, available at ssrn.com/abstract, explaining how the willfulness rules create an 
important incentive for firms to avoid reading patents: “once a company becomes aware of a patent, it has 
an obligation to obtain a written opinion or risk later being held a willful infringer. To avoid this 
significant cost, in-house patent counsel and many outside lawyers regularly advise their clients not to 
read patents if there is any way to avoid it”.  
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technological events that either facilitate or difficult a previous search on prior 
art630. 
 
Inadvertent infringement that occurs due to the incompleteness or costliness of 
patent information –even by effect of rules providing wrong incentives- might 
then produce or aggravate the risk of hold-ups. This would not only suggest 
that some limitation of injunctive relief might sometimes be needed but would 
also favor rules allowing the application of compulsory licensing provisions for 
infringers, at least when they are inadvertent631. While a general drawback with 
limiting injunctive relief for inadvertent infringers is to give incentives to 
infringe patents, it is doubtful that awarding injunctions in cases of “good 
faith”, “inadvertent” or “innocent” infringement would help to achieve the 
optimal level of deterrence rather than tilting the balance towards over-
deterrence. For the purposes of achieving optimal deterrence, it could be 
sufficient to consider the prospective of enhanced damages when willful 
infringement is proved and whether they are large enough with respect to the 
rate of detection. 
 
A second point of controversy in the above mentioned models regards the rate 
of detection of infringement. Whereas the Lemley and Shapiro model seem to 
assume that every case of infringement is detected, Denicolo et al. criticize this 
assumption as unrealistic in the light that detection will occur only on a fraction 
of cases and as creating a problem of potential under-compensation for 
patentees632.   
 
                                                 
 
 
630 See Epstein, Kieff & Wagner, supra note 500, at p. 591, arguing that: “Any party that did not use due 
diligence to find out whether its conduct constituted infringement would be in the advantageous position 
of using its own neglect to undermine the legal protection otherwise available to a patentee. Potential 
infringers would have a palpable incentive to decrease inquiry into existing patent rights, which would in 
turn increase the number of infringement disputes”. And Ibid, arguing that: “To avoid those risks, and 
hence avoid encouraging even greater false positives, it is important that injunction policy require a 
defendant to establish not only that it infringed inadvertently, but also that it exercised due diligence in 
searching for any intellectual property right its product might have violated”. 
631 See chapter III, section 5.5.5.”Other ex-post Liability Rules: Compulsory Licenses”. Such possibility is 
found in the new Italian rule that allows good faith infringers to apply for a compulsory license. Yet the 
standard of “good faith infringer” has not been still interpreted by any court in the context of awarding a 
compulsory license. Whereas it will be difficult to prove that either one was not aware of the patent, or 
that one had a reasonable doubt of the validity of the patent in the light of the presumptions of validity of 
patents and the public nature of patent documents, however, more often a defense could consist in a 
reasonable belief that one’s product does not infringe the patent or that the product was designed 
independently. Although this latter is not an exemption under patent laws it could be useful for the 
purposes of defining “good faith infringement”. 
632 See Denicolo et al., supra note 160, at p. 592, arguing that: “in the presence of a holdup problem, 
granting injunctive relief may not necessarily over-compensate the patent holders. Over-compensation 
requires that C is large relative to v if s is small. The smaller the probability of detection s, the more likely 
it is that we have an under-compensation problem”. 
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Indeed the probability of detection is an important variable from the economic 
viewpoint which is often proposed to optimally adjust the level of retrospective 
damages633. However, courts should also be careful enough to avoid rendering 
the patentee better off than he would have been without the infringement, or 
otherwise risk to make the strategy of “being infringed” profitable enough to 
encourage strategic behavior634.  
 
Apart from the rate of detection, another variable that should probably be taken 
into account is the rate of settlement, as any previous agreement between 
patentee and infringer to put an end to the suit would probably reflect lower 
royalties than the final outcome discounted by the probability that the patent is 
found infringed. The effect of settlements might however, not be as significant 
as in other fields due to the fact that a settlement in a patent case usually 
involves also the payment of royalties to put an end to the controversy. In these 
cases, the payment of royalties or any other type of payment for the use of the 
patented technology happens in spite of the probability that the patent could 
have been considered invalid if the trial continued, with consequences that go 
beyond the private interests of the parties involved in the trial635. 
 
A third debated assumption of the above mentioned models is the requirement 
that redesigning the product would be costly ex-post. Lemley and Shapiro argue 
that courts “should evaluate the cost that the infringing firm would have to 
incur to redesign its product and avoid infringing the patent. If this cost is high 
relative to the value that the patented technology has added to the infringing 
firm’s product, no permanent injunction should be issued”636. However, it has 
been stated that whereas Lemley and Shapiro’s model assumes that redesign 
costs are zero ex ante and costly ex-post; their policy suggestions are broader and 
                                                 
 
 
633 See Denicolo et al. supra note 160, at p. 592, footnote 72. See also Cotter, supra note 38, at p.30, footnote 
127 and accompanying text, quoting also from Thomas F. Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Enhanced 
Damages and Attorneys’ Fees for Willful Patent Infringement, 14 FED. CIR. B.J. 291,315 (2004); and proposing 
an argument that can also be applied to the award of injunctive relief: “in cases in which infringement of 
the type at issue is likely to go undetected in a great many cases, enhanced damages may be necessary to 
ensure adequate deterrence”. 
634 See also Henkel et al., supra note 139, referring two inefficiencies identified by scholars in legal practice, 
namely patentee-friendly injunctions and the granting of excessive damage awards as drivers of 
‘destructive' strategies put in place by patent trolls or patent sharks that aim at appropriating innovation 
rents by threatening to patent-block other players' R&D-related value creation 
635 See Lemley & Shapiro supra note 162, noting that patent invalidation is a public good which provides 
positive externalities to other competitors and hence tends to be under-supplies as well as describing the 
problems generated by reverse payments whereby patentees pay potential incumbents to drop claims of 
invalidity, a practice that has been found in the pharmaceutical sector in order to prevent the entrance of 
generic competitors.  
636 See Lemley and Shapiro, supra note 162. 
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only require that the cost is high relative to the value that the patented 
technology has added to the infringing firm637.  
 
Critics on the Lemley and Shapiro’s model argue that different results hold 
when the infringed patent is essential for the innovative product. For instance, 
in the case of two complementary innovations which are both necessary to 
create a new product and which are hold by the patentee and the infringer, the 
optimal degree of patent protection should be higher638. Likewise, in the case of 
multi-component products, it has been argued that holdups would be a threat 
only when all the following conditions apply, namely that the patent covers a 
single component of a larger complex product, that one component is minor 
and has a small value and that a stand-alone product excluding the value of 
such patent must have been commercially and technically feasible ex ante639. 
 
2.2 From patent hold-ups to patent strategic behavior 
 
The aforementioned models offer highly dissimilar views that range from a 
broad definition of hold-ups to a limited set of cases and models with highly 
restrictive assumptions. There is still another possible interpretation of 
economic models of patent hold-up which is also in tune with law and 
economics analysis. Even though the concept of patent hold-ups might indeed 
require a number of restrictive assumptions much more confined than those 
used in the policy recommendations of Lemley and Shapiro’s model, it is still 
the case that patent hold-ups are only one out of many possible different types 
of strategic behavior belonging to the patent area. In fact, according to the 
insights of the previous chapter dealing with comparative case law as well as 
                                                 
 
 
637 See Denicolo et al., supra note 162, at p. 596, arguing that “If the suggested criterion were taken to mean 
that injunctive relief should be denied (or stays of injunctions routinely granted) whenever it is very costly 
or even impossible to design the product in a non-infringing way ex ante, this injunction policy would 
penalize the most valuable patents— precisely, those that are most difficult to circumvent even with full 
knowledge of the patent. Instead, to be consistent with the theory, the policy should indicate that to avoid 
injunctive relief an infringer must show not only that it is costly to redesign the product in a non-
infringing way ex post, but also that it could easily have designed the product in a non-infringing way ex 
ante if only it had been aware of I’s patent (which again emphasizes the importance of the inadvertent 
infringement assumption)” 
638 See Denicolo et al., supra note 160, at p. 594-595 explaining this specific case: “with two-way 
complementarity, innovators are more likely to be undercompensated and hence denying injunctions can 
be especially harmful. Intuitively, when both innovations 1 and 2 are needed to develop a product, a firm 
racing for innovation 1 exerts a positive externality on the firms racing to achieve 2, and vice versa. This 
positive externality is a source of distortion that tends to reduce the investment in R&D compared with the 
social optimum: the firm that first achieves innovation 1 will only benefit from its invention if component 
2 is achieved as well Thus, the expected payoff of each successful innovator is the reward in case of success 
multiplied by the probability (a fraction less than one) that both inventions are created.” 
639 Ibid, at p. 596.  
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the interpretation provided below, there might be at least three different 
problematic cases of patent strategic behavior. These cases might or not qualify 
as hold-ups, depending on the particular assumptions used, yet they might 
impose losses in dynamic as well as static efficiency terms.  
 
As a consequence, there will be cases in which it is costly to apply a property 
rule even if the downstream product is not multi-component or when the 
patented technology is essential –either part of a technological standard or not- 
in the sense that it could not have been easily invented around ex-ante. It is 
noteworthy that these apparently abstract cases largely correspond to most 
legal provisions and case law analyzed in the previous chapter. 
  
The first cases regard improvement patents or 2nd innovation patents that 
contribute to a much higher proportion of (social) value640 with respect to the 1st 
innovation. The case of improvement patents is much broader than the above 
discussed cases of hold-ups. Nevertheless, there might be compelling reasons to 
conclude that these cases call for a switch into a liability rule. Such cases have in 
fact been regulated for long time in the national laws of many different 
countries, although not in the U.S. even though their implementation is 
confined to few cases. This is probably a consequence of the need to confine the 
application of such compulsory licenses as well as to the difficulty of proving 
that the 2nd innovation contributes in a larger proportion to the society641.  
 
The second case envisions a company that has made important specific 
investments and is afterwards held-up by the patentee. However, this case 
comprises at least two sub-types of cases. In one, the patent is part of the setting 
of a technological standard and in the second case (to which most models and 
critics refer) the infringer inadvertently uses a patented technology to the 
development of a multi-component product and is subsequently held-up.  
 
Still, it is important to notice that the relevant variables to know whether a case 
falls within the above mentioned terms are difficult to assess. In particular, a 
threshold is needed to evaluate the contribution in terms of value from either 
innovation. This would perhaps be easier in the case of a patent contributing to 
                                                 
 
 
640 See Merges and Nelson, supra note 35, at p. 118-119 and Cotter, supra note 38, p. 18-19. 
641 Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement establishes in fact that compulsory licenses for the case of a 2nd 
patent which cannot be exploited without infringing a previous 1st patent shall comply, with the following 
additional requirements: “(i) the invention claimed in the second patent shall involve an important 
technical advance of considerable economic significance in relation to the invention claimed in the first 
patent”. Moreover, it is arguable, than in the light of such difficult assessment, such compulsory licenses 
are subject to further limits such as requiring  that:  “(ii) the owner of the first patent shall be entitled to a 
cross-licence on reasonable terms to use the invention claimed in the second patent; and (iii) the use 
authorized in respect of the first patent shall be non-assignable except with the assignment of the second 
patent”. 
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a minor part of a multi-component product than in the case of improvements 
when a 2nd innovation should have a higher social value than the 1st innovation. 
In fact, this result is compatible both with the much stringent standard for 
compulsory licenses for improvement patents and the restricted number of 
relevant case law. The following section examines different cases of potential 
strategic behavior in the field of patent law, in order to illustrate the above 
theoretical considerations with current practices both in Europe and the U.S.  
3 Strategic behavior and ex-post liability rules 
 
As explained above, strategic behavior might either enhance the ability of the 
patentee to extract monetary sums in excess of the real value of her patent and 
the potential for threatening to block subsequent innovation, which would 
cause sequential or 2nd innovators to refrain from investing in such technologies 
and hence, important static and dynamic efficiency losses. These potential 
losses are an important ground calling for the use of ex post liability rules. 
 
Of course the above mentioned losses are expected and cannot be ascertained 
accurately. However, courts might attempt to redress a situation of strategic 
behavior and under the current international patent rules are only authorized to 
do so in a case-by-case basis642. From a policy perspective, the necessity of such 
examination by courts requires to further considering whether and to what 
extent is it advisable to prevent or redress patent strategic behavior without 
creating unduly burdens in terms of administrative costs and errors. As a first 
step, this requires a proper identification of the grounds to switch to a liability 
rule.   
 
Law and Economics literature as well as an important thread of recent U.S. case 
law suggest that the problem of strategic behavior especially in the form of 
patent hold-ups is a growingly important reason calling for the use of liability 
rules notwithstanding its potential costs. Such theoretical findings are 
complemented by empirical studies showing that strategic behavior is probably 
increasing in frequency and impact and that specific industries of growing 
importance in today’s economy that have been particularly exposed to the 
increasing use of strategic behavior. Some studies have found similar evidence 
for the case of Europe643. 
 
                                                 
 
 
642 See chapter II above, section 3.3.1. “Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement”, arguing that ex-post liability 
rules for patents are the only possibility allowed by the TRIPS Agreement in the sense of the requirements 
of article 31 (a) which says that “authorization of such use shall be considered on its individual merits”.  
643 See next section 
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Indeed, patent strategic behavior can take place in different contexts, either 
through the use of a patent portfolio or individual patents and its effects can 
either be anticompetitive or not644. The following sections attempt to give a 
broader landscape for patent strategic behavior, starting from a case study 
derived from recent case law. Practices that allegedly amount to patent hold-
ups are then compared to other adjacent practices in order to better define the 
scope of patent strategic behavior, which is the principal ground for the use of 
ex-post liability rules.  
 
3.1 Problems put forward by eBay v. MercExchange 
 
The U.S. case is noteworthy, since compulsory licensing provisions were largely 
absent from patent law and at the same time, the application of equity doctrines 
that gives discretion to judges in order to grant or deny injunctive relief had 
also been curtailed for a long time. In 2006, however, the U.S. Supreme Court 
acknowledged that injunctive relief rests within the discretion of district courts 
by pointing out that patent law cases should be governed by the traditional 
principles of equity in a decision that represented a major turning point in 
patent policy. In fact, whereas patent law is said to be distinctive in many 
different ways, the uniqueness of patent law does not necessarily weight in 
favor of awarding injunctions in an automatic way. Indeed while patent’s 
unclear boundaries and the growing problems of patent notice and decrease of 
quality weight against using property rules645, the exclusive nature of patents as 
a mechanism to provide innovation incentives weights in favor.  
 
These two contradictory arguments were evidenced in the two concurring 
opinions given by Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy in the eBay decision646. In 
spite of being a unanimous decision, such divergent views provided little 
guidance for district courts to apply the traditional test in patent cases. This 
equitable test for the issuance of injunctions is probably the context in which ex-
post liability rules have been discussed most extensively and thus a useful 
framework to analyze the underlying purpose of the rules647 potential problems 
                                                 
 
 
644 See Harhoff et al., supra note 165, proposing the following concept, which, however, would only apply 
to an entire patent portfolio and not to individual patents: “strategic use of the patent system arises 
whenever firms leverage complementarities between patents in order to attain a strategic advantage over 
technological rivals. This behavior is anticompetitive if the main aim and effect of strategic use of the 
patent system is to decrease the efficiency of rival firms’ production efforts” (emphasis added). 
645 See BESSEN AND MEURER, supra note 14 and see also supra Chapter I, Section 4 ”Property and Liability 
rules in Patent Law”.  
646 See eBay v. MercExchange, supra note 2. 
647 See supra notes 335 and 405, explaining the method of comparative law, based upon the underlying 
function of legal rules.  
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with their application and also to give a sense of the current landscape in U.S. 
patent law with respect to their use.  
 
According to the Kennedy’s opinion, treating injunctions as an equitable relief -
and thus allowing the use of ex-post liability rules for infringed patents- could 
be a potential solution for three interconnected problems in the context of 
modern technologies: a) the impact of strategic behavior and specifically hold-
ups; b) the growing multi-component nature of products which can at the same 
time exacerbate the risk of hold-ups; and c) the increase in number and 
economic importance of patents of dubious quality648. 
 
The following section analyses these three reasons649, which overall reflect the 
underlying message that the modern patent landscape has greatly changed and 
that important opportunities have emerged for patent strategic behavior. 
Hence, these three main arguments in fact refer to such changing landscape and 
are all based on different strategic behavior practices of modern times.  
 
3.1.1 Strategic behavior 
The Kennedy’s opinion argued in favor of the use of ex-post liability rules due to 
the increasing evidence of patent strategic behavior in its specific variant of 
patent hold-ups. Essentially, the further two reasons described below can also 
be rephrased in the context of patent strategic behavior. According to Justice 
Kennedy concurring opinion:  
 
                                                 
 
 
648 In fact these three reasons are mentioned subsequently in the same paragraph: “An industry has 
developed in which firms use patents not as a basis for producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily 
for obtaining licensing fees. For these firms, an injunction, and the potentially serious sanctions arising 
from its violation, can be employed as a bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees to companies that seek to 
buy licenses to practice the patent. When the patented invention is but a small component of the product 
the companies seek to produce and the threat of an injunction is employed simply for undue leverage in 
negotiations, legal damages may well be sufficient to compensate for the infringement and an injunction 
may not serve the public interest. Injunctive relief may have different consequences for the burgeoning 
number of patents over business methods, which were not of much economic and legal significance in 
earlier times. The potential vagueness and suspect validity of some of these patents may affect the calculus 
under the four-factor test” (footnotes omitted).  
649 The arguments offered by the Kennedy’s opinion are mentioned as a simplified grouping of the most 
important arguments calling for the use of ex-post liability rules in the context of U.S. patent law. The 
Kennedy opinion in fact compiled a number of arguments elaborated by previous academic and policy 
discussion papers. Hence, the choice of referring to the Kennedy’s opinion is not motivated to a priori favor 
its conclusion but to discuss the potential grounds for the use of ex-post liability rules. These grounds 
would not be possible to infer from the text of the majority’s opinion as this latter did not provide ulterior 
guide or any reasoning beside the traditional use of an equity four-factor test the opinion by Justice 
Roberts does not provide any ground for the use of ex-post liability rules but rather elaborates on the 
principal arguments against their use. For this reason, the arguments of this opinion are dealt in the next 
chapter.  
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“An industry has developed in which firms use patents not as a basis for 
producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees. 
For these firms, an injunction, and the potentially serious sanctions arising from 
its violation, can be employed as a bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees to 
companies that seek to buy licenses to practice the patent (…)”650 
 
3.1.2 Multi component patents 
A second reason why injunctions should not be awarded as a matter of course 
arises when the patented innovation is just a small part of a multi-component 
product: 
 
“When the patented invention is but a small component of the product the 
companies seek to produce and the threat of an injunction is employed simply 
for undue leverage in negotiations, legal damages may well be sufficient to 
compensate for the infringement and an injunction may not serve the public 
interest”. 
 
In fact, there are two inter-related but different arguments in such assertion. 
The first is the inherent changing nature of innovations and the fact that 
modern patents are usually embed in multi-component products. This change, 
which does not pertain to patent policy but is rather an inherent characteristic 
of modern technologies, might be however problematic since most patent laws 
around the world, including the U.S. were designed when inventions were 
mostly of the one-patent/one-product type. Conversely, products of the 
information technology industries such as microprocessors, mobile phones, 
software and DVD’s are frequently covered by a great number of different 
patents651.  
 
Although this is a largely empirical issue, which has been -at least partially- 
evidenced by recent studies, more opportunities for strategic behavior have 
emerged as a consequence of this transformation. Each manufacturer that seeks 
to develop a product using a previous patent(s) must either seek consent from 
the patent owner(s) or else risk that such use might be considered infringing. As 
explained in more detail below, the problem of patent hold-up is then fostered 
by the fact that a patent owner of a small part of a multi-component product 
can extract rents above the economic value of the patent by threatening to use 
                                                 
 
 
650 See eBay v. MercExchange, (Justice Kennedy concurring), supra note 425 at p. 1842.  
651 See Lemley, Shapiro, Patent Trolls: Fact or Fiction? HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY OF THE HOUSE COMMISION ON THE JUDICIARY, 109 CONG. 5 (2006).  
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an injunction to shut down the production of the whole multi-component 
product.  
3.1.3 Dubious quality patents 
Probably one of the most controversial parts of the Kennedy’s opinion is that 
which refers to some patents, especially those over business methods652, being 
of dubious quality and hence problematic to enforce through the use of 
property rules: 
 
“Injunctive relief may have different consequences for the burgeoning number 
of patents over business methods, which were not of much economic and legal 
significance in earlier times. The potential vagueness and suspect validity of 
some of these patents may affect the calculus under the four-factor test”653. 
 
Whereas such reflection echoes widespread concerns about the convenience of 
patenting business methods and the quality of such patents, it in fact raises two 
important but different questions. The first question is whether it would be 
economically advisable to use property and liability rules in order to fine-tune 
the quality of patents or whether it is preferable to use a different policy lever. 
A second question is to what extent courts can alter the balances already 
established by the Congress in patent law, especially with regards to the 
patentability of some inventions such as business method patents.  
 
From an economic point of view it is important to ask whether a particular type 
of patent might present a problem for the overall system. Secondly, and even 
                                                 
 
 
652 It is often referred that patents on business methods were firstly allowed by the decision on State Street 
Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc, in which it was held that a claimed invention is 
patentable if it “produces a useful, concrete and tangible result”. The CAFC has recently overturned such 
test in the en banc decision in Re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2008), whereby the CAFC 
reaffirmed the rejection of patent claims on a method of hedging risks within the trade of commodities and 
also rejected the machine-or-transformation test” laid down in State Street Bank. A number of recent 
decisions have already interpreted the new test under Bilski, and for instance, in the decision of 
CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions Inc., 2009 WL 815448 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2009), it was even argued that 
the: "The closing bell may be ringing for business method patents”. The U.S. Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to hear the case, in a decision available at: 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/orders/courtorders/060109zor.pdf, June 1st, 2009, to answer two 
particular questions: (1) Whether the Federal Circuit erred by holding that a “process” must be tied to a 
particular machine or apparatus, or transform a particular article into a different state or thing … despite 
this Court’s precedent declining to limit the broad statutory grant of patent eligibility for “any” new and 
useful process beyond excluding patents for “laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.” 
And (2) Whether the Federal Circuit’s “machine-or-transformation” test for patent eligibility, which 
effectively forecloses meaningful patent protection to many business methods, contradicts the clear 
Congressional intent that patents protect “method[s] of doing or conducting business.” 35 U.S.C. § 273 and 
a decision is expected.  
653 See eBay v. MercExchange, (Justice Kennedy concurring), supra note 425 at p. 1842. 
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though it is assumed that the decreasing quality of patents imposes economic 
losses, it is important to know whether it is efficient to solve these problems 
through the use of property and liability rules or rather through the use of a 
different policy lever. An alternative in fact would be to adjust the patentability 
requirements, including such patent doctrines deciding on the patentable 
subject matter, novelty and inventive step and to improve the quality of patents 
by improving the process of patent examination. In fact, losses might be 
imposed in a general category of patents if the costs of granting patents for such 
area surpass the benefits. As the main benefits from the issuance of patents are 
to provide innovation incentives, to disclose socially beneficial information that 
could otherwise remain secret and to facilitate the commercialization of 
innovations, it is important to analyze whether such three justifications are 
achieved through the granting of business method or software patents in spite 
of variegated critics654. As explained below, from an economic point of view, 
both the use of policy levers associated with the quality of patents as well as the 
choice between property and liability rules would be necessary and 
complementary to tackle the current perceived problems in patent design.  
 
From a legal point of view, if courts opted for dealing with the problem of 
patent quality by systematically denying injunctions for some –problematic- 
categories such as business method patents, such decision could be criticized on 
the grounds of discrimination against a specific type of innovations in violation 
of article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement. In addition, it could be argued that 
correcting the problem of low patent quality and the patentability of some 
technological areas is not in principle a task for courts at the time of deciding on 
the available remedies for infringed rights.  
 
It is evident that some types of patent might pose particular difficulties for 
courts when protected through an injunction655. Nonetheless, the quality of 
patents, regardless of their type, might be affected through a set of patent 
strategies that include the use (and abuse) of divisional applications, 
continuations of applications and other filing strategies which might obscure 
the disclosure function of patents and increase the risk of inadvertent 
infringement656. Such practices extend beyond the business method, software or 
any other patent category.  
                                                 
 
 
654 This chapter concentrates on the interface if any, between the uses of liability rules with such purported 
problems of the patent system beyond strategic behavior while it does not directly address the specific 
question of business method or software patents, as it would fall out of the scope of this Thesis.  
655 The claims of a patent constitute the boundaries of the patent and business method patents usually 
present vague claims, a higher number of claims than the average patent as well as other related problems. 
See Rochelle Dreyfuss, Are business method patents bad for business, Santa Clara Computer and High 
Technology Law Journal 16, 2000, 263–278. 
656 See section below and also BESSEN AND MEURER, supra note 14. For a similar reasoning and warning in 
Europe see Harhoff et al., supra note 165. 
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Hence, two different perspectives are implied in the problem of patent quality. 
One could be described as a “macro” perspective, responding to the question of 
whether a category such as business methods should be patentable at all. The 
same might happen with other problematic fields, including the patenting of 
information-based technologies, software and certain biotechnologies of 
informational nature. Under the second perspective, which we could describe 
as “micro”, what is implied is not the technological category of the patents but 
the conduct of the patentee. This is the case of the burgeoning number of 
patents with complex, long and numerous claims, the use of filing strategies as 
divisional or continuation applications and, importantly, of any other similar 
strategy that might arise with time. 
 
It could be argued that, whereas equitable doctrines are an adequate option to 
handle the second perspective of the problem, which is in any case a strategic 
behavior of patentees, the “macro” facet of patent quality is better dealt ex ante 
through the use of the above mentioned policy levers.  
4 The landscape of strategic behavior in Europe 
 
Important differences exist between important patent rules, practices and 
industry characteristics that divide the European landscape from that of the 
U.S. Amongst the most important features for the purposes of this discussion 
are the harmonization –and lack of harmonization- of certain European patent 
rules, the opportunity for forum shopping that arises from a fragmented 
landscape with regards to patent litigation as well as the opportunity provided 
by the competition between different rules in place at the moment. The careful 
study of the characteristics of each patent system and their economic analysis 
would certainly be fundamental for the forthcoming harmonization, especially 
the projected European Patent Litigation Agreement and the Community 
Patent657. 
 
Lacking a unitary system of litigation, each country’s patent litigation widely 
varies within Europe. France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom are the countries producing the highest number of patent applications 
                                                 
 
 
657 This section attempts to provide a brief overview on the European patent litigation system, mainly 
focused on the issue of patent strategic behavior. While the analysis contained in this section is widely 
different than the above section describing the U.S. in the context for strategic behavior this is firstly due to 
the absence of completely equivalent situations to be compared to the U.S. eBay and post eBay decisions. 
Secondly it is an attempt of broadening the allegedly narrow concept of patent hold-ups as understood in 
the context of U.S. patent debates.  
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and have developed more specialized patent courts658. In fact these four 
countries concentrate approximately 90% of patent litigation in Europe659. 
Whereas patent litigation takes place either in the context of revocation 
proceedings in which the validity of patents is challenged or in infringement 
trials to enforce patent rights, the estimated probability that a patent is litigated 
varies between 1% and roughly 3% in most patent systems660, with some further 
differences according to technical sectors, industries and countries.  
 
The lack of a unified European litigation system is said to have generated 
numerous problems that have in effect encouraged negotiations on the EPLA. 
Firstly, resources are duplicated and wasted in different proceedings to enforce 
the same patent in various countries due to the territorial nature of patents and 
the absence of a European litigation court. Secondly, difficulties for trade might 
arise inside the EU due to the diverging outcomes of litigation which can cause 
one patent to be protected in one country while not in another. Thirdly, delays 
and hold-ups might follow because the fragmented nature of the system creates 
the opportunity to adopt delay strategies or the creation of entry barriers by 
raising the costs of potential entrants661. In fact, litigation and especially high 
litigation costs have been blamed to produce and worsen incentives for strategic 
behavior662.  
 
A distinctive feature of European patent litigation is the existence of a 
procedure for post-grant opposition which offers a lower cost mechanism to ask 
for the invalidation of patents. Lower cost opposition procedures have been 
perceived as a fundamental feature of the European patent system and several 
studies have in fact suggested transposing these rules into U.S. patent 
legislation in order to deal with some perceived flaws in this system663. 
 
Overall, most commentators highlight that the European patent system remains 
immunized from the problems affecting the U.S. in terms of strategic litigation 
including the emergence of patent trolls and hold-ups and the increasing 
                                                 
 
 
658 See Harhoff, supra note 381.  
659 Ibid, at p. 13.  
660 Ibid, at p. 14. 
661 Ibid, at p. 18.  
662 Ibid at p. 11, arguing that “the cost level of litigation determines to what extent a potential for hold-up 
exists” and quoting from Ellis, T.S., Distortion of Patent Economics by Litigation Costs. Proceedings of the 1999 
Summit Conference on Intellectual Property, UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON, SEATTLE. CASRIP SYMPOSIUM 
PUBLICATION SERIES, 5, July 2000, 22-26, available at: 
http://www.law.washington.edu/CASRIP/Symposium/Number5/pub5atcl3.pdf, last accessed on 
August 10, who argues that high litigation costs distort patent trade and the patent system. 
663 See Paradise, Jordan K., Lessons from the European Union: The Need for a Post-Grant Mechanism for Third-
Party Challenge to U.S. Patents. MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF LAW, SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY, VOL. 7, NO. 1, pp. 315-
326, 2005; available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=897741, discussing opposition decisions at the EPO and 
advocating for the adoption of a similar third party opposition procedure in the U.S..  
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importance of patent thickets as well as the decreasing quality of patents664. 
This is said to be the consequence of several features of the European system 
including incentives embedded in EPO patent examination rules, such as higher 
fees, a tax imposed for applications with numerous claims and others which 
have assured a higher quality of examination as well as opposition procedures 
which provide a lower cost mechanism to weed out invalid patents. 
 
Nonetheless, some recent studies providing a closer look on the European 
patent system have concluded that some of its laudable features might be either 
jeopardized or affected by the emergence of strategic patenting, an important 
increase in the number, complexity and lower quality of applications and also 
by the emergence of several instances of strategic litigation665. Studies cite that 
such events have been worryingly accompanied by a drop in the number of 
opposition procedures666. These findings are even more distressing as it is 
understood that:  
  
“Fast and low-cost revocation proceedings are also a good defense line against 
“patent trolls” seeking to extort licensing fees from other parties based on weak 
or questionable patent rights”667. 
 
The following section briefly analyzes some of the findings in recent studies on 
the European patent system that might have an impact in strategic patent 
practices and abusive behavior and that could be potentially tackled through 
the use of ex-post liability rules. As it was described in the previous chapter, 
most countries in Europe have national laws which include some sort of 
compulsory licensing provisions. If there is any lesson to be learned from the 
emergence of patent filing and litigations strategies in the U.S. which preceded 
and probably led to the U.S. Supreme court decision in the eBay case and other 
related cases adopting flexible standards in order to sort out such problems, it is 
precisely a warning against completely rigid rules. This would especially be the 
case with the adoption of property rules without the possibility of exceptions 
for the enforcement of patents, either at the level of substantive law with the 
provision of compulsory licenses or at the level of enforcement law through the 
                                                 
 
 
664 See Harhoff et al., supra note165. 
665 Ibid. 
666 See Harhoff, supra note 381 at p. 45, arguing that: “opposition at the EPO used to involve more than 
10% of granted patents in the early 1980s, but has declined to a level around 5%. One reason for the 
declining attractiveness may be the long delays in resolving opposition and any subsequent appeal cases. 
The unified Patent Court would offer an interesting alternative”. See also Graham and Harhoff Can Post-
Grant Reviews Improve Patent System Design? A Twin Study of US and European Patents, CEPR DISCUSSION 
PAPER NO. 5680, London (2006). 
667 See Harhoff, supra note 381, at p. 45.  
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regulation of remedies such as injunctive relief as well as other compulsory 
measures which might be the object of harmonization in the years to come668. 
 
4.1 Incidence and effects of strategic behavior 
 
Recent studies have highlighted that an increasing number of applications, in 
the form of an “escalation” has been taking place within Europe in a way 
similar to this process in the U.S. patent system. Such patent race does not seem 
to respond to higher innovation or other factors but rather to an offensive and 
defensive use of patents, especially in some technological areas:  
 
“specific technology areas within the patent system are affected by competition 
between large patenting firms to build large patent portfolios. In our view the 
resulting patent portfolio races lead to increases in transactions costs and 
socially wasteful investments in the management of patent portfolios(…) 
Consequently we come to the conclusion that public policy should seek to 
reduce the incentives of large patent applicants to patent innovations of 
questionable novelty value”669. 
 
Studies have suggested that such increasing “arms race” might affect 
predominantly small firms and individual innovators whereas it might not 
increase R&D expenditures but rather legal and administrative expenses 
directed at the utilization of any possible loopholes in the patent system670. In 
fact, the strategic construction and use of patent portfolios has been 
accompanied by an increase in strategic behavior practices in the application 
process, which is documented in Europe under the following terms: 
 
“Not only do firms make patents more comprehensive, longer and more 
complicated by adding claims. They also increase the number of divisional 
patents and the number of patents that share the same priority. Both of these 
measures provide an indication that patent applicants are making it more 
difficult for rivals to determine the precise content of their patents and thereby 
the degree of protection which firms will enjoy”(references omitted)671. 
 
                                                 
 
 
668 See the proceedings of negotiations on the EPLA and the European Community Patent within the 
European context, supra note 379. See also negotiations of ACTA (Anti-Counterfeiting  Trade Act), supra 
note 290. 
669 See Harhoff et al., supra note 165, at p. 277-278.  
670 See Harhoff et al., supra note 165, at p. 260 for the European landscape and a comparison with the  
U.S., citing previous studies backing up such conclusions. For the U.S. landscape see also BESSEN AND 
MEURER, supra note 14.  
671 See Harhoff et al., supra note 165, at p. 259. 
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The consequences of such landscape might be summarized as follows. Firstly, 
and from the perspective of the patent office, there has been an increasing 
number of patent applications and the use of several strategies that causes a 
decrease in the quality of patents due to constrained resources for patent 
examination and increasing workload. This result might additionally turn into 
in a vicious circle whereby low quality generates incentives to file even more 
applications672. Secondly, from the perspective of patentees, strategic behavior 
might materialize in the form of strategic management of patents portfolio, 
strategic management of individual patents or clusters of patents, the use of 
patent filling strategies and the use of enforcement and litigation strategies. 
 
“there is ample evidence that strategic patenting behaviour, such as we have 
documented it in this study, is having effects on firms’ behaviour that are 
highly likely welfare decreasing. Most importantly we can see that these 
developments are affecting the ability of the European Patent Office to fulfil its 
mission673. 
 
Such escalation of patents is more closely associated with some specific 
technological sectors. In some of these sectors the aim is to accumulate patents 
towards enabling cross-licensing whereas in others the goal is to block rivals. 
As a consequence, it has been suggested that competition policy should take 
into account such important differences in patent strategic behavior between 
technological sectors and again, that it should avoid the use of one-size-fits-all 
solutions674. 
 
Such differences by sectors are particularly manifested in the following 
changes: 1) an increasing number of patent applications in practically all 
technological sectors; 2) an increase in the number of claims, especially in the 
areas of Information technology, Pharmaceuticals, Cosmetics, Organic fine 
chemistry and Biotechnology and 3) an  increase in the number of divisional 
applications in the areas of Telecommunications; Information technology; 
Audiovisual technology; Medical engineering; Pharmaceuticals, Cosmetics; 
Biotechnology; Agricultural and Food Machinery and Handling and printing. 
                                                 
 
 
672 See ibid at p. 264: “the inelastic supply of examination capacity and of legal expertise together with 
increased demand for examinations caused by the escalation mechanism may lead to a feedback loop 
which leads to steadily decreasing quality of granted patents”. 
673 Ibid at p. 266-267.  
674 Ibid at p. 278, arguing that: “evidence of an escalation of firms patenting activities only in a subset of 
the technologies covered by patent protection by the EPO. Within these technology areas we find evidence 
of two distinct patenting behaviors. The first being directed towards cross –licensing of patent portfolios 
and the second focusing more on protection of own technologies and blocking of rivals. In consequence 
reviews of competition and enterprise policy need to recognize the difference between technology sectors. 
This is best achieved in sectoral reviews that take into account the competitive interaction of firms both in 
technology - and product markets”. 
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Table 2: the changing landscape of patent use in Europe 
Technological Sectors/ 
Patenting behaviour 
Increase 
applications675 
Increase claims Increase 
divisional 
applications 
Scores 
Telecommunications Yes No  Yes 2 
Electrical Devices Yes No  No  1 
Information Technology Yes Yes Yes 3 
Audiovisual technology No  No  Yes 1 
Medical Engineering No  No  Yes 1 
Analysis, Measurement 
and Control 
Yes No  No  1 
Pharmaceuticals  and 
Cosmetics 
Yes Yes Yes 3 
Organic fine chemistry Yes Yes No  2 
Biotechnology  Yes Yes Yes 3 
Agricultural and Food 
Machinery 
No  No  Yes 1 
Handling and Printing  No  No  Yes 1 
Total  7 sectors 4 sectors 8 sectors  
 
 
Table 3: Applications by IPC sectors and pharma sub-sectors 
Year of Filing 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
All Sectors 100702 110115 106341 106341 123761 128724 135425 140882 
Organic 
Chemistry 
5435 6022 6311 6622 6817 7193 8203 8743 
A61K* 
Medicines  
2876 3650 3762 4515 4988 5110 5562 5687 
 
Electric 
communication  
technique 
NA NA NA NA 12120 12843 13488 14409 
Biochemistry 
Genetic 
Engineering 
NA NA NA NA     
Source: Table 18: Total European and Euro-PCT (regional phase) filings at the EPO for all sectors, organic 
chemistry and A61K*; Final Report, European Commission, p. 162 plus added data on other sectors. 
 
Table 4: Patent applications in IPC classes with most filings  
IPC classes 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 
Medical or 
veterinary science; 
Hygiene 
17006 16742 15752 14688 13770 
Electric 
communication  
technique 
14842 14409 13488 12843 12120 
Computing 9520 8981 8969 8664 8134 
                                                 
 
 
675 Defined as a particular increase in the number of patent applications or in the number of claims 
respectively as described in Harhoff et al., supra note 165, analyzing the PAT Val survey and other 
previous studies.  
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Basic electric 
elements 
8901 8147 8062 7541 7385 
Measuring; testing 8206 7524 7151 6525 6700 
Organic chemistry 8016 7940 
 
7463 6570 6188 
Vehicles in general 4513 4305 
 
4322 4175 3901 
Organic 
macromolecular 
compounds 
4001 3835 3709 3331 3113 
Biochemistry; 
genetic engineering 
3953 3970 3847 4098 3975 
Engineering 
elements 
3867 3563 3298 3278 3238 
Sub-total 82825 79416 76061 71713 68524 
Others 63736 61309 59122 56966 55182 
Total 146 561 140725 135183 128679 123706 
Source: EPO Facts and figures per year, available at: http://www.epo.org/about-
us/publications/general-information/facts-figures.html  
4.2 A case study: the European Pharmaceutical Sector 
Important differences remain within technological sectors, with some of them 
being more affected by the patents “arm race” and the emergence of strategic 
behavior practices. A sector often mentioned as “immune” to such problems 
and responsive to the incentives generated by the patent system is the 
pharmaceutical sector. However, recent studies have uncovered a number of 
problematic practices present in this sector as well as the increasing use of 
several patent strategies. This section is precisely motivated and drawn from 
the recently released Report on the Inquiry of the European Commission 
directed to investigate the European Pharmaceutical Sector. It is perhaps the 
most throughout and up-to-date evidence on patent practices, including 
strategic behavior, which is available in Europe at the time. In addition the 
inquiry in the pharmaceutical sector offers an opportunity to confront with 
most other European studies -following the most debated cases from U.S. 
studies- that focus on the sector of information and communication 
technologies with the landscape of a sector that is usually assumed to benefit 
from the patent system and to be the lively proof of its correct performance.  
Ex-post Liability Rules   
In Modern Patent Law  204  
 
 
 
In addition, and without drawing definite conclusions –in the light of the 
complex features of this technological sector- it is probably not a coincidence 
that the majority of European case law analyzed in the previous chapter 
belongs precisely to this area676. There might indeed be systematic problems in 
the European Pharmaceutical industry but even in the absence of definitive 
conclusions it is yet possible to argue that the evidence weights in favor of 
maintaining proper spaces for a flexible use of ex-post liability rules. The use of 
discretionary rules could be a complement rather than a substitute of other 
policy changes directed at a particular technological sector perceived as 
problematic as it happens with business method or software patents in the U.S. 
Ex-post liability rules are probably necessary for a lower number of cases which 
nevertheless might have an important impact on the patent landscape. Such 
cases are precisely rooted in strategic behavior practices that mutate with time, 
might affect any technological sector and cannot be dealt with efficiently 
through the use of general or per se rules but rather through standards or rules 
of reason that are able to adapt to the particular circumstances of time and 
industry.  
 
The Pharmaceutical sector inquiry performed by the European Commission 
indeed pertains to one of the most complex and important technological fields 
from the perspective of patent law. It is probably the technological sector with 
the highest response to the economic incentives set by patent law677 but in 
addition to patent law, the pharmaceutical sector is subjected to a complex web 
of regulations that relate to the marketing approval of new substances, price 
controls and reimbursement systems678. The pharmaceutical sector is important 
both in terms of R&D expenditure but also in its impact on the health of citizens 
and the correct functioning of national health systems679.  
 
In 2008, the European Commission launched an investigation aiming at 
assessing “the reasons for observed delays in the entry of generic medicines to 
the market and the apparent decline in innovation as measured by the number 
of new medicines coming to the market”680. The focus was directed towards 
                                                 
 
 
676 See Chapter III, sections 4 and section 5; analyzing case law from Italy and the U.K. respectively.  
677 See Wesley Cohen, et al., Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. 
Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not), NBER WORKING PAPER NO. W7552 (Feb. 2000), surveying managers of 
firms in the U.S. and finding that only in the Chemical and Pharmaceutical sectors, patents played an 
important role as incentives to invest in R&D.  
678 See EC, Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry, Final Report, Staff Working Paper, Part I, 8 July 2009, paragraph 
(39), available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/staff_working_paper_part1.pdf  
679 Ibid at paragraphs (1), (11) and (12).  
680 See Commission Decision of 15 January 2008 initiating an inquiry into the pharmaceutical sector 
pursuant to Article 17 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 (Case No COMP/D2/39.514), available at: 
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inquiring on “the competitive relationship between originator and generic 
companies and amongst originator companies”. The Commission selected 43 
originator companies and 27 generic companies for in depth analysis, which 
together represented the 80 % of the relevant turnover in the EU, being mostly 
larger scale companies active in more than one Member State. The inquiry and 
the report concentrated on the behavior of pharmaceutical firms, leaving aside 
any other changes inherent to the technological sector or financial aspects that 
might also influence the innovativeness of the sector. For the purposes of the 
Inquiry and the Final Report, patents were classified into two main types, 
primary patents protecting the active ingredient, and secondary patents, 
protecting all other aspects relating to a pharmaceutical product681. 
 
The results of this Inquiry largely validate those of other previous studies, 
especially with regards to the increase in the number of patent applications682 as 
well as the increasing use of patent strategies which are doubtfully contributing 
to foster innovation incentives. The practice of filing divisional applications for 
instance has increased in the field of pharmaceuticals683 in a way similar to the 
overall increase in all EPO applications, yet it remains at even higher relative 
levels684. Opposition procedures are however more frequently used in the 
pharmaceutical sector and might have a countervailing effect with respect to 
the increasing number of applications685. Some specific features are found in the 
pharmaceutical sector as generic companies tend to oppose almost exclusively 
secondary patents and to prevail in approximately 60% of final decisions 
rendered by the EPO (2000 -2007). At the same time, originator companies tend 
                                                                                                                                               
 
 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/decision_en.pdf, last accessed on 
August, 10, 2009.  
681 See EC, Final Report, supra note 678 , at paragraph (427), p. 164, explaining that: “Of the nearly 40,000 
cases, some 87% were classified by the companies as involving secondary patents, giving a primary: 
secondary ratio of approximately 1:7. Of applications still pending, 93% were classified as secondary (a 
primary: secondary ratio of approximately 1:13), whilst 84% of the patents granted were classified as 
secondary (a primary: secondary ratio of approximately 1:5). 
682 But see the latest trend indicating a slightly lower number, in EC Final Report, ibid at paragraph (276), 
referring that: “In 2008, the EPO received 146,500 patent applications, an increase of 3.6% compared to 
2007. In 2008, in total, 49.5% of final actions (outcomes) in examination were grants, down from 51% in 
2007. This lower percentage of grants may be seen as a first result of the EPO's increasing focus on 
ensuring the quality of granted patents”. 
683 Ibid at paragraph (432), referring that the total number of voluntary applications for A61K* rose from 
102 in 2000 to 470 in 2007 and compared to the number of overall application in A61K*, the relative share 
of divisional applications rose from 3.5% in 2000 to 8% in 2007. 
684 Ibid at paragraph (432), referring that the number of voluntary divisional applications has grown in a 
parallel manner from 2.3% in 2000 to 4.9% in 2007, yet remains, in relative terms, on a lower level than in 
A61K*. 
685 Ibid at paragraph (277), referring that 5.2% of granted patent applications at the EPO were opposed 
during 2007 and granted patent were revoked in 38% of cases and maintained in amended form in 30% of 
cases. Oppositions in the pharmaceutical sector tend to be more frequent (8%) than in organic chemistry 
(4%) and across all sectors (5%). 
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to oppose each other's secondary patents and prevailed in approximately 70% 
of final decisions.  
 
However, in around 80% of cases, it took a long time of more than two years to 
arrive to a final decision. It is important to recall that during this rather long 
period of time generic companies are not able to obtain a clarification of the 
situation with respect to the patent and enter into the market. Further 
particularities of the patent pharmaceutical sector in Europe are the high 
concentration of the top selling products686.  
 
Litigation procedures for invalidity and infringement are, as already explained, 
variable according to each national member state. One particular characteristic 
of litigation is that some national courts provide for separate procedures for 
enforcement and invalidation. As each procedure is independent, invalidity of 
the patent cannot be used in those cases as a defense against an enforcement 
action. Additionally, some national courts make it difficult to challenge the 
validity of the granted European patent when opposition proceedings before 
the EPO are pending and hence a final answer from the EPO is needed before 
invalidity proceedings can continue in those courts687.  
 
4.2.1 Patent Strategies in the European Pharmaceutical Sector 
 
The Final Report considered a number of practices used by “originator 
companies” in order to maintain exclusivity for their pharmaceutical products. 
This is fundamental for the sector, especially with respect to products with top 
sales (blockbusters) on which the Report particularly focused. In order to 
address the questions of why generic entry is blocked and why the number of 
new pharmaceutical substances has declined with time, the Report dealt with 
both competition between originator and generic companies as well as with 
competition between originator companies.   
 
Strategies used by originator companies with respect to generic companies are 
important for competition law, patent law and regulation insofar as they might 
                                                 
 
 
686 Ibid, at paragraph (440), referring that the top 20% of INNs (International Non-proprietary Name for 
pharmaceutical substances) by total number of patents granted and pending applications, account for 60% 
of all patents and applications, whilst the top 50% account for 90%. 
687 Ibid at paragraph (685), p. 245, “Therefore it can take up to 7 years or something more to get a final 
decision from the EPO. Some National Courts are particularly good at providing decisions quickly. […] 
National revocation action or actions may be filed in parallel to a European Opposition in key territories or 
territories where prompt decision may be expected. Some National Courts may stay any such actions until 
the final outcome of the European opposition is known, but many (for example UK and Belgium) will not 
if it appears that legal certainty is important and the proceedings at the EPO have some time still to run” 
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aim at delaying the entrance of generics by creating unduly barriers. The Report 
acknowledged two principal objectives of the strategies that originator 
companies might pursue in order to exclude competitors. The first aim is 
maintaining exclusivity on blockbuster products during the whole period of the 
patent and of market exclusivity and avoiding challenges to the patent validity. 
This is mainly pursued through the filing of so-called patent clusters, that is, “a 
multitude of patent applications (on process, reformulation, etc.) protecting the 
product in addition to the base patent with the aim of creating several layers of 
defence”688. 
 
The second aim is extending the period of exclusivity beyond the duration of 
the patent. This is pursued through the same multitude of filings during and 
towards the end of the period of patent protection. In practice, both objectives 
are pursued through overlapping strategies, as the same patent clusters for a 
given product might be able to protect against patent invalidity challenges as 
well as extending the patent period689.  
 
Importantly, both of the above mentioned types of practices are used in tandem 
with enforcement procedures including preliminary and final injunctions. For 
instance, by filling clusters of patents on slightly modified versions of a 
chemical form, an originator company might then engage into an aggressive 
enforcement of such patents. In a series of documents obtained during the 
investigation, a testimony of one Originator Company expressly indicated the 
following: 
 
"We were recently successful in asserting the crystalline form patent in [name of 
country], where we obtained an injunction against several generic companies 
based on these patents by 'trapping' the generics: they either infringe our 
crystalline form patent, or they infringe our amorphous form process patent 
when they convert the crystalline form to the amorphous form. […] The 
availability of 'trapping' strategy will be evaluated on an on-going basis" 
 
Such modified versions of a new molecule, which are often categorized as 
incremental or “secondary innovations” (slightly modified chemical forms such 
as salts, esters and enantiomers) might be socially desirable insofar as they 
might enhance the safety and efficacy of a drug. However, it is still the case that 
such patents might in some cases be considered dubious in terms of 
patentability requirements, especially under the test of non-obviousness or 
inventive step. That means that even though society benefits of such 
innovations, the absence or dubious presence of the patentability requirements 
                                                 
 
 
688 Ibid at paragraph (476). 
689 Ibid at p. 186-187, footnote 355. 
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might signal that such innovations would have been developed even in the 
absence of patent protection690. This seems to be the case in many European 
cases where patents have been revoked in 60% of opposition and appeal 
procedures against originator companies whereas the scope of the patents was 
reduced in another 15%, in procedures concerning almost exclusively such 
“secondary patents”. In cases litigated between an originator company and a 
generic company concerning the validity of patents, 55% of such patents were 
finally annulled691. 
 
Filing strategies of pharmaceutical companies include the construction of patent 
clusters especially for the most (privately) valued patents. According to the 
inquiry individual medicines are protected by even 100 product-specific patent 
families, which can amount to 1,300 patents and pending patent applications 
across Member States. In addition, the number of patents and patent 
applications is 140% higher for the top selling medicines in contrast to the rest 
of the sample.692 
 
A second filing strategy is the use of divisional applications, which are a 
procedure provided by law in order to divide an initial or parent patent 
application. Whereas in theory, the divisional cannot extend the content of the 
original application or its protection period, in practice because the examination 
of divisional applications continues notwithstanding the outcome of the parent 
application -even if the parent application is withdrawn or revoked- a 
divisional can in fact extend the examination period of the patent office. This 
practice then entails great uncertainty over patents for generic companies and 
in fact, the EPO has recently limited their use693. 
 
The report also enquired on the litigation practices used by originator 
companies, starting from the premise that the enforcement of one’s right is in 
itself enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights. Nonetheless the 
                                                 
 
 
690 See Alessandra Arcuri and Rosa Castro, How Innovative is Innovative Enough? Reflections on the 
Interpretation of Article 27 TRIPS from Novartis v. Union of India). SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 
(SIEL) INAUGURAL CONFERENCE 2008 PAPER, available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1159821.  
691 More specifically, originator companies won 53% of final rulings concerning product patents, whereas 
nearly 70% of final judgments handed on process patents 83% of cases regarding second medical use 
patents and 88% regarding first medical use patents were favourable to the generic companies. See EC 
Final Report, supra note 678, at p.226-227; arguing that: “Hence, it would appear that among litigated 
patents the strength of process patents, first medical use and second medical use patents is relatively more 
limited and their challenge before court more often yields favourable results for generic companies”. 
692 See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE 
PHARMACEUTICAL SECTOR INQUIRY REPORT, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/communication_en.pdf, at p. 10.  
693 See the DECISION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN PATENT ORGANISATION OF 25 MARCH 
2009 AMENDING THE IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS TO THE EUROPEAN PATENT CONVENTION (CA/D 2/09) at: 
http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legal-texts/decisions/archive/20090325.html  
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Report recognized the potentially detrimental effects that the use of litigation 
might impose to competitors when it is used mainly as a way to deter entry of 
generic companies and as a means to create obstacles for competitors, especially 
if they are smaller694.  
 
Litigation was found to be rising and in a sample of 219 molecules, originator 
and generic companies referred more than 1300 patent-related out of court 
contacts and disputes concerning the launch of generic products corresponding 
to the period of 2000-2007, during which, the number of cases grew four times. 
From a total of 698 cases of patent litigation between originator companies and 
generic companies, 223 cases were settled, final judgments were given in 149 
cases and 326 cases were either pending or withdrawn695. 
  
Originator companies were found to have initiated the majority of the cases, 
and yet generic companies won 62% of the 149 cases. The procedures had an 
average duration of 2.8 years, but important variations were found between 
Member States. In 30% of the cases, litigation was initiated between the same 
parties in more than one Member State with respect to the same medicine and 
in 11% of the final judgments that were studied in the report, there were two or 
more contradictory final judgments on the same issue of patent validity or 
infringement across EU member States696. 
 
The findings of the Report confirm the general conclusion of patent studies 
providing evidence that litigation is costly and lengthy. The total cost of patent 
litigation in the EU (for the years 2000-2007) with regard to 68 medicines was 
estimated to be above € 420 million. In addition, the final report highlights the 
savings that could have arisen if a community patent and a unified patent court 
were present697.  
 
With regard to the use of preliminary injunctions, originator companies were 
found to have asked for one in 255 cases and to have obtained a favorable 
response in 112 cases. The average duration of such preliminary measure was of 
18 months and in 46% of cases where an injunction was granted the results of 
the proceedings consisted either in a final judgments favorable to the generic 
company, or in a settlement apparently favorable to the generic company. Yet 
the Report highlighted the differences present in different countries with regard 
                                                 
 
 
694 See EC Final Report, supra note 678, at p. 201, referring that: “litigation can also be an efficient means of 
creating obstacles for generic companies, in particular for smaller ones. In certain instances originator 
companies may consider litigation not so much on its merits, but rather as a signal to deter generic 
entrants”.  
695 Ibid at p. 11. 
696 Ibid at p. 11.  
697 See EC, COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION, supra note 692, at p. 12. 
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to the requirements to obtain preliminary injunctions. For instance, the Report 
accounts that it companies perceive it is fairly easy to obtain preliminary 
injunctions in Belgium whereas the patent holder has to show that there is a 
serious issue to be tried in order to obtain an injunction in the U.K. and courts 
in Germany and the Netherlands are more inclined to take into consideration 
the merits of the case when considering whether to grant one698. 
 
4.2.2 Policy suggestions of the Final Report  
Whereas the data compiled by the inquiry and Final Report on the European 
Pharmaceutical Sector are an important contribution towards understanding 
this specific sector and the European patent landscape in general and especially 
with regards to patent strategic behavior, some of its policy conclusions are 
rather simplistic. The Report produced four main suggestions, namely: (1) 
Intensify Competition Law Scrutiny; (2) Rapid Establishment of the Community 
Patent and Creation of a Unified Litigation System; (3) Streamlining the 
Marketing Authorisation Process and; (4) Improving Pricing and 
Reimbursement Systems and Developing a Pro-Competitive Environment for 
Generic Uptake. Whereas all these suggestions cover important aspects of the 
pharmaceutical sector, we only focus on the first two as they directly although 
only partially pertain to this debate.  
 
In particular, the Report gave a quite complete view on the practices used by 
pharmaceutical companies which might prompt the future use of antitrust or 
projected reforms in the patent system. In contrast, the suggestions to cope with 
such problems were vague and limited. In the case of competition law, this 
might be understandable as the Report only sought to compile the basis for 
further eventual intervention699. With respect to the interface between patents 
and competition law, the Report reiterates what has become a prevailing view: 
that the existence and exercise of an industrial property right are not themselves 
incompatible with competition law and yet they are not immune from antitrust 
intervention. However, these practices put in place either between originator 
companies700 or between an originator company and a generic company701 were 
considered to infringe competition law under exceptional circumstances. 
                                                 
 
 
698 See EC Final Report, supra note 678, at footnote 205.  
699 See the Communication from the Commission, at p. 18: “Where appropriate, the Commission will make 
full use of its powers under antitrust rules (Articles 81, 82 and 86 of the EC-Treaty), merger control 
(Regulation (EC) No 139/2004)38 and State aid control (Articles 87 and 88 of the EC-Treaty). The 
Commission, in close cooperation with the National Competition Authorities, will pursue any antitrust 
infringement in the sector, wherever required by the Community interest. Action can also be taken at 
national level and in areas which were not the primary focus of the inquiry or are outside its scope”. 
700 See ibid at p. 19. “With regard to competition between originator companies in particular, defensive 
patenting strategies that mainly focus on excluding competitors without pursuing innovative efforts 
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With respect to the area of patent law, the incompleteness or biases of the policy 
suggestions of the Report might be the result of a lack of more consolidated 
data for some of the problems, practices and legal rules under analysis. The two 
main suggestions made in this context were to accelerate the projects of patent 
harmonization for the implementation of a community patent and the EPLA702 
and to continue to ensure the quality of EPO patents703. In contrast with such 
strong suggestions for further patent harmonization, for instance, the Report 
gave a quite incomplete view on the use of compulsory licensing in Europe:  
 
“In Europe, compulsory licence provisions have been very rarely used in 
practice, including in the area of pharmaceuticals. In the sector inquiry, only 
two cases were identified where compulsory licences had been issued. Both of 
these cases concerned Italy. In the first case, the Italian Patent and Trademark 
Office referred the matter to the Italian Competition Authority (…) In the 
second case, the Italian Patent and Trademark Office itself granted a 
compulsory licence. This licence was subsequently revoked upon request of the 
two parties concerned after they had reached a settlement. Under the 
settlement, an exclusive licence was issued. As for compulsory licences in 
general, it has been submitted by the UK Intellectual Property Office that in the 
UK such requests - although not very common - have occasionally been made 
in other sectors than pharmaceuticals”. 
 
Even though the practice of compulsory licensing has remained largely 
limited704, this information is clearly incomplete and confined only to a few 
cases. The Report does not certainly focus only on patent law and was rather 
elaborated from a competition law viewpoint. However, in both areas of law 
                                                                                                                                               
 
 
and/or the refusal to grant a license on unused patents will remain under scrutiny in particular in 
situations where innovation was effectively blocked” 
701 See ibid at p. 19. “As regards competition between originator companies and generic companies, delays 
to generic market entry are a particular point of concern. The possible use of specific instruments by 
originator companies in order to delay generic entry will be subject to competition scrutiny if used in an 
anti-competitive way, which may constitute an infringement under Article 81 or 82 of the EC Treaty”. 
702 See ibid at p. 21: “The results of the inquiry confirm that the Community patent and unified litigation 
system would create significant cost and efficiency improvements, in particular by reducing the costs 
associated with multiple filings, by eliminating essentially parallel court cases between the same parties in 
different Member States and by enhancing legal certainty through the avoidance of conflicting rulings. The 
Commission continues to make all efforts leading to the rapid adoption of these instruments” 
703 Ibid at p. 21: “Stakeholders agree on the importance that European - and in the future Community - 
patents granted by the EPO should respond to a high quality standard. Strong support was further 
received by all stakeholders that the EPO should be enabled to accelerate procedures whenever possible. 
Based on its findings of the sector inquiry, the Commission supports the recent initiatives by the EPO to 
"raise the bar". In this respect the Commission welcomes the recent decision to limit the time period during 
which the voluntary divisional patent applications can be filed. The Commission also supports the EPO in 
its efforts to shorten the opposition and appeal procedures”.  
704 See chapter III above. 
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the practice of compulsory licensing is far more complex than stated by the 
above quoted footnote. Although this fact might only reflect a normal limitation 
on the scope of the inquiry which could not possibly cover all strategic 
patenting practices and all patent rules involved, it is important to consider that 
one out of the four policy formulations of the Report is the “Rapid 
Establishment of the Community Patent and Creation of a Unified Litigation 
System”. In contrast, such further processes of harmonization should 
previously give consideration to the difficulties that might surround the 
practice of compulsory licensing worldwide and also to the lessons learned 
through the latest case law in the U.S., to which the same Final Report refers705. 
 
4.2.3 Beyond the European Pharmaceutical Sector 
As mentioned above, the Final Report on the Inquiry about the European 
Pharmaceutical sector is an important source of information on patent “strategic 
behavior” within Europe. Beyond the European Pharmaceutical Sector, 
however, it is also possible to link some of these practices by the 
Pharmaceuetical Industry, which are described in the Report with the more 
general case of strategic behavior as described in U.S. current practice.  
 
With this regard, patent strategic behavior might be divided into two different 
types of practices. The first group encompasses the practices related with patent 
filling, including clusters of patents, filling strategies with respect to the claims 
of the patent and with patenting many adjacent technologies. The second group 
encompasses practices related with the enforcement of patents, and is mainly 
represented by enforcement practice initiated by Originator Companies against 
Generic Companies. One of such practices uses precisely the possibility of 
obtaining injunctions and especially preliminary injunctions in order to 
maintain competitors out of the market, even when patents are of a dubious 
quality and validity.  
 
An important difference between the Pharmaceutical sector and for instance, 
the information and communication technologies is that in this latter, products 
tend to be multi-component whereas most pharmaceutical products are thought 
to relate to the one-patent/one-product paradigm. Nonetheless, such premise is 
changing, not only due to the technical evoluation of the sector, where 
pharmaceutical substances are currently identified by making use of complex 
                                                 
 
 
705 Ibid at p. 6, arguing that “Poor quality rights can also contribute to problems with "patent trolls" that 
have arisen in the US judicial system”. Whereas we have argued that a categorization such as “trolls” does 
not efficiently tackle issues of patent strategic behavior, it is undeniable that these issues have been 
discussed in the context of the recently issued compulsory licenses in the U.S. 
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methods, including the use of biotechnologies, which are associated with a 
multi-component paradigm of patent protection but also by the use of strategies 
where patents are sought in many slightly modified versions of such substances 
in order to create “clusters” and “thickets”. For both reasons, the possibility that 
Pharmaceutical companies act “strategically” is importantly present and 
furthermore aggravated by the impact of this particular sector on social 
welfare706 
 
This situation is noticeably not foreign to similar practices in other countries of 
the world, including the U.S. A widely discussed case in which these latter 
practices are put in evidence and in which Judge Posner gave an opinion as 
district judge, was that involving Originator Company SmithKline Beecham 
Corp. and Generic Company Apotex Corp.707. Whereas Judge Posner had 
dismissed the case on infringement of SmithKline’s patent708, an interesting part 
of his opinion regarded the creation of a new equitable defense, whereby an 
infringer would be excused as long as the patentee’s behavior had inhibited 
“non-infringing practice of the prior-art”709. Although the CAFC declined to 
follow the reasoning by Judge Posner, at the end the patent was invalidated, 
apparently signaling that neither court was willing to validate the strategic 
behavior of the patentee:  
 
“This behavior is certainly opportunistic, and Judge Posner, sitting by 
designation, was bothered by SKB’s actions. As a result, he postulated a number 
of alternative theories, some quite novel, which allowed Apotex to escape 
liability and bring the substantially pure anhydrate to market. The Federal 
Circuit initially declined to adopt any of Posner’s myriad approaches and 
invalidated the SKB patent based on public use. After the original opinion was 
vacated en banc, the court subsequently invalidated the patent as inherently 
anticipated on remand”710 (footnotes omitted).  
                                                 
 
 
706 See Jeremiah Helm, Why Pharmaceutical Firms Support Patent Trolls: The Disparate Impact of eBay v. 
MercExchange on Innovation, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 331 (2006), available at 
http://www.mttlr.org/volthirteen/helm.pdf, giving examples of “trolling-like” behaviour by 
pharmaceutical companies (Originator Companies), and specifically referring at p. 340: “Especially 
suspicious is the practice of listing patents of questionable validity in the Orange Book to keep generic 
firms off the market. This allows the branded firms to maintain their monopoly pricing and extract greater 
profits from society as a whole. This opportunistic behavior, focused on extracting rents from society, is 
suspiciously similar to that of the patent troll holding up a large, established company”.  
707 SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 247 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1048–50 (N.D. Ill. 2003), 365 F.3d 1306 
(Fed. Cir. 2004), vacated, 403 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2005), remanded 403 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
708 Judge Posner’s opinion is available at: http://www.projectposner.org/case/2003/261FSupp2d1002.  
709 See Dennis Crouch, SmithKline Beecham v. Apotex (Paxil), April 24, 2004, available at: 
http://patentlaw.typepad.com/patent/2004/04/smith.html, last retrieved on December 15, 2009.  
710 See Helm, supra note 706, at p. 341.  
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5 Patent strategic behavior: towards a broader framework 
Liability rules are normally justified by the presence of high transaction costs 
and strategic behavior. However, recent patent discussions on the use of 
liability rules have mostly been confined to the problem of hold-ups. 
Additionally, patent hold-ups have been mostly identified with the emergence 
of a business model in which firms often named patent trolls principally use 
patents as instruments of hold-up. This section discusses the notion behind 
patent trolls and hold-ups and argues in favor of preferring the latter concept as 
a normative threshold for the use of ex-post liability rules while a broader 
context for strategic behavior is proposed as a more adaptable alternative to the 
use of categorical definitions such as the current definition of hold-ups. The 
section revises different purported definitions of actors engaging in patent 
hold-ups and strategic behavior while concluding that the focus of analysis 
should be the purported strategic conduct rather than any specific actor 
involved. 
 
5.1 Actors: Non-manufacturing entities, trolls, ambushes and others 
The emergence of a new business model in which firms use patents -and the 
threat of injunctive relief- in a strategic way, has generated distress on 
governmental agencies, innovators and the U.S. Supreme Court711. Such 
concerns have also been expressed in some recent European reports712 and used 
by the eBay decision to call for the use of ex-post liability rules, specifically in the 
concurring opinion by Justice Kennedy713. 
 
A substantial part of the discussion following the eBay decision has in fact 
focused on the potential efficiency or inefficiency of a business model where 
firms are often named trolls714. Nevertheless many issues related to the 
emergence of such “new” business model still remain unclear and a source of 
divergence between scholars and policy makers. Among the unanswered 
questions are which type of firms are trolls and whether trolls -a particular type 
of entity- should pose a concern for policy makers or whether patent policy 
should  focus on the particular type of behavior behind trolls.  
 
To begin with, the label “troll”, an arguably pejorative term, which is often 
substituted with the name “non-manufacturing” or “non-practicing entities” 
                                                 
 
 
711 See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 5, at chapter 3, pp 38-39, also quoted in the Kennedy 
concurring opinion in eBay v. MerExchange, supra note 425, at p. 1842 (Kennedy’s opinion).   
712 See also Harhoff et al., supra note 165.  
713 See supra note 425 and accompanying text. 
714 See infra note 716. 
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(hereinafter NMEs), comprises in fact a number of widely different entities 
ranging from individual inventors, joint ventures and universities to firms 
specialized in financing and enforcing patents. As a consequence it is difficult to 
identify which type of firm –if any- threatens the correct functioning of the 
patent system and hence the incentives to innovate.  
 
The question that naturally follows is whether it is the type of entity that should 
be the object of distress or whether any type of entity can -once the proper 
incentives are in place- act as a patent troll. If the last statement is correct, the 
analysis should focus on “trolling” behavior rather than on the aforementioned 
entities. Such result would be furthermore in line with the theoretical insights of 
law and economics that warn against a type of behavior –opportunistic 
behavior, strategic behavior and hold-ups- instead of warning against any 
special type of firms or individuals or against the intention, mission or principal 
activities of a firm. These latter could at the most be used as a presumption or 
guide for judges or agencies when deciding whether they are in front of any 
allegedly harmful behavior715.  
  
In what follows, it is suggested that from a law and economics point of view, it 
is more accurate to identify patent hold-up and strategic behavior 
independently and isolated from the entity that carries on such behavior. This 
would be the case if strategic behavior can be explained in both subjective 
(intentional) and objective terms. 
 
The following section describes trolls and identifies the various forms that trolls 
–understood as NMEs actively pursuing the enforcement of their patents- can 
adopt. At least three reasons are given why trolls should not be the potential 
object of a rule tackling with the above mentioned problems. The first reason 
relates to the difficulty of finding a unitary legal and business definition of 
potential trolls. The second reason is historical because any business model and 
even the modus operandi of any entity intending hold-ups and strategic behavior 
is likely to evolve as technologies and rules change. Strategic behavior is largely 
adaptable and hence, the design of legal rules tackling with strategic behavior 
shall be as flexible as possible. The third reason why a rule directed against 
trolls would not be desirable is that it could deter presumably efficient behavior 
while failing to encompass inefficient behavior. 
                                                 
 
 
715 See Mark Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls? (April 11, 2007). STANFORD PUBLIC LAW WORKING PAPER 
NO. 980776. Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=980776, advancing a similar argument and arguing 
that: “Universities will sometimes be bad actors. Nonmanufacturing patent owners will sometimes be bad 
actors. Manufacturing patent owners will sometimes be bad actors. Instead of singling out bad actors, we 
should focus on the bad acts and the laws that make them possible. We will solve the troll problem not by 
hunting down and eliminating trolls, but by hunting down and eliminating the many legal rules that 
facilitate the capture by patent owners of a disproportionate share of an irreversible investment”.  
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5.1.1 Definition and business models  
Patent trolls have been generally described as companies that do not use their 
patents but rather devote their resources to licensing and/or enforcing them. 
Whereas the definition of NMEs comprises any patent holder that does not 
commercialize or works her invention, patent trolls have been often defined as 
patentees that do not only abstain from using their patents but rather wait until 
someone “infringes” and uses litigation and the threat of litigation and 
injunctions to actively enforce their patents716. Thus -at least indirectly- it is the 
typical element of hold-up that occurs when someone makes specific 
investments in a 2nd innovation, which often separates a troll from other types 
of NMEs.  
 
There is however a wide spectrum of different sub-types of NMEs that might be 
classified according to different features717 such as the way in which inventions 
                                                 
 
 
716 See Lisa Dola and Blaine Bettinger, Ebay and the Blackberry®: A Media Coverage Case Study (DECEMBER 11, 
2007). Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1082220, illustrating how scholarly papers and even press 
articles about “patent trolls” have mushroomed in the follow-up of the eBay case. For the origin of the term 
“patent troll” see William Everding, "Heads-I-Win, Tails-You-Lose": The Predicament Legitimate Small Entities 
Face Post Ebay And The Essential Role Of Willful Infringement In The Four-Factor Permanent Injunction Analysis, 
41 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 189, referring that Peter Detkin created the term "patent troll" in 1999 while being 
assistant counsel at Intel Corp. and after having being suited for libel due to the use of the term “patent 
extortionist”: “A patent troll is somebody who tries to make a lot of money off a patent that they are not 
practicing and have no intention of practicing and in most cases never practiced”; and also explaining that 
Mr. Detkin afterwards left Intel to join Intellectual Ventures, which could itself be considered a patent 
troll. (See Intel, FTC and eBay’s definition). See also BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE YAHOO! INC. AS SUPPORTING 
PETITIONERS, IN EBAY, INC. V. MERCEXCHANGE, L.L.C., 126 S. CT. 1837 (2006), No. 05-130, available at: 
http://patentlaw.typepad.com/eBay/eBayYahoo.pdf, last accessed on August 11, 2009, posing that trolls: 
“do not innovate, but rather seek to acquire broad and nebulous patent claims that arguably encompass 
existing technologies relied on by companies with deep pockets(…)By acquiring these claims and 
threatening or pursuing litigation, the patent trolls seek and often receive economic settlements from 
genuine innovators and producers that greatly exceed the true economic value of the patents in question”. 
717 See for instance, Allison, Lemley and Walker, Extreme Value or Trolls on Top? The Characteristics of the 
Most-Litigated Patents, STANFORD PUBLIC LAW WORKING PAPER NO. 1407796, available at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1407796, classifying non-practicing entities in different classes that include: 1) 
acquired patents, 2) university heritage or tie, 3) failed startup, 4) corporate heritage, 5) individual 
inventor started company, 6) University government or NGO, 7) startup/pre-product, 9) individual, 10) 
industry consortium and 11) subsidiary of product company, and found that the most litigated patents 
were owned in a greater proportion by non-manufacturing entities, principally “licensing companies 
which are in the business of buying up and enforcing patents (“trolls” virtually by anyone’s definition)” 
and by companies started by the inventor but which do not make products. Also concluding, among other 
things, that features such numerous claims, more prior art citations, more forward citations, more 
assignments between issue and litigation, and larger numbers of continuing applications, which 
distinguish the most litigated patents from other patents could signify that “the most litigated patents are 
also the most valuable patents”, however warning that such higher value expresses private rather than 
social value of such patents.  
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are developed, the ownership of patents and their commercialization policies718. 
NMEs have largely been classified according to whether or not they perform 
any innovation activity into two main types: 1) research centers, universities or 
companies devoted to R&D but not to the commercialization of their 
innovations and 2) companies specializing in the commercialization of or 
financial intermediation and/or managing or enforcement of patents, especially 
through the use of patent litigation or threats of using patent litigation. Whereas 
many commentators have argued that the first type of NME should have easier 
access to injunctive relief than the second719, some have considered both types 
of companies to be justified upon efficiency considerations720. The decision of 
abstaining from commercializing patented inventions is in the case of 
universities, research centers or companies specializing only in research, based 
upon economic reasons as specialization and efficient division of labor721. A 
most efficient use of resources could arise when entities specialize, some of 
them focusing on research and some of them on commercialization. Hence, the 
mere fact that an entity invents and patents an invention with no intention to 
practice the technology does not seem to per se imply any efficiency problem.  
 
Companies specializing only on patent enforcement and financing activities 
have also been defended because of the special enforcement needs and the 
benefits provided by financial intermediation in the patent area722. One specific 
type of companies are funds operating on a similar basis to a normal fund with 
investors buying shares on the fund and the fund buying and managing patents 
or exclusive licenses on patents. However, and differently from a normal stock 
                                                 
 
 
718 Ibid at p. 39. See also McDonough, supra note 430, at p. 192-193, describing three types of trolls: 1) 
individual inventors that do not practice their patents; 2) companies that generate ideas for patenting and 
eventually licensing, e.g. Intellectual Ventures and 3) patent holding companies that buy patents for the 
only purpose of licensing and enforcing them, e.g. Acacia Research Corporation. Compare the  mission of 
Intellectual Ventures LLC: “to assemble a world-class team to invent and invest in inventions with the 
intent of creating a new, dynamic marketplace where inventors are fairly compensated for their work and 
the public can be assured fair access to innovation”, available at: 
http://www.intellectualventures.com/background.aspx, last visited on August 9, 2009 with that of Acacia 
Research Corporation stating that: “Acacia Research's subsidiaries develop, acquire, and license patented 
technologies. Acacia controls over 100 patent portfolios covering technologies used in a wide variety of 
industries”, available at: http://www.acaciaresearch.com/aboutus_main.htm  
719 See for instance Lemley, supra note 715 . See also the eBay decision, supra note 2, acknowledging that: 
“For example, some patent holders, such as university researchers or self-made inventors, might 
reasonably prefer to license their patents, rather than undertake efforts to secure the financing necessary to 
bring their works to market themselves”. 
720 See McDonough, supra note 430. See also Ronald Mann, Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software 
Industry?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 961, 1024 (2005), arguing that: “Essentially, trolls are serving a function as 
intermediaries that specialize in litigation to exploit the value of patents that cannot be exploited 
effectively by those that have originally obtained them. That is not in and of itself a bad thing”. 
721 See Denicolo, et al., supra note 160. 
722 See McDonough, supra note 430, at p. 190, arguing that: “These trolls act as a market intermediary in 
the patent market. Patent trolls provide liquidity, market clearing, and increased efficiency to the patent 
markets—the same benefits securities dealers supply capital markets-. Ultimately, this Comment suggests 
that the emergence of patent trolls is simply a stage in the natural evolution of the patent market”. 
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or bond fund, the commercialization and enforcement of the patent portfolio is 
particularly important given the complexities of patent litigation723. Hence, 
apart from hedging risks as a typical fund, companies operating patent-based 
funds need to actively pursue the enforcement of their patents. It is the 
particular means used to enforce and commercialize their patents that is often 
criticized as troll-behavior724. 
 
In addition to identifying efficiencies in the operation of NMEs, some analysts 
have considered that a rule disfavoring NMEs as a category –for instance by 
creating a presumption for denying injunctive relief- would favor big 
companies over small ones either intentionally or not725. Whereas such 
argument might actually point towards a valid concern it is however troubling 
to conclude by suggesting that permanent injunction should always follow a 
finding of infringement because otherwise small companies would be at a 
disadvantage.  
 
In fact, it can be argued that although the prototypical patent hold-up case 
involves a small NME suing a large company726, this would not be necessarily 
the case, and defendants (presumed infringers) are not necessarily big 
companies in all cases. A possible example –under a broader concept of 
strategic behavior- would be the case of pharmaceutical companies which have 
presumably acted strategically in order to impede the commercialization of 
                                                 
 
 
723 See McDonough, ibid, at p. 211-212, proposing the alternative name of “patent dealers” to substitute the 
pejorative label of trolls and arguing that patent dealers are efficient because they (1) create a credible 
threat of litigation that an individual inventor would not have by himself and “which encourages 
exchange, makes patents more liquid, and facilitates market clearing through price equalization”; (2) 
create liquidity and transform patents in “commodities” by matching patent owners with companies 
seeking to commercialize patents, managing transactions and providing a “central place of exchange” and 
they do so precisely by holding a patent inventory and licensing it to companies seeking specific 
technologies and finally; (3) patent dealers clear the market by equalizing prices and undertaking risks in a 
market such characterized by information asymmetries among participants that might cause market 
friction induced by search and evaluation costs and lead to inconsistent pricing and eventually to a failure 
of the market.  
724 In Europe, for instance, the company SISVEL specializes in the management and enforcement of some 
patents, also promoting the formation of patent pools. See mission of Societa Italiana per lo Sviluppo 
dell’Elettronica SISVEL, available at: http://www.sisvel.it/english/aboutus/mission last accessed in 
August 8th, 2009:  ”In short, SISVEL operates as a bridge between manufacturers that require access to key 
technology and patent owners that wish to license their portfolios to finance further research. Among its 
activities, SISVEL assists companies in preparing and executing a strategy to protect their R&D efforts 
with effective intellectual property”. It is noticeable that SISVEL appears as applicant of approximately 93 
patent filing applications at the EPO –search in esp@cenet.com, last visited in August 8th, 2009-. See also 
Christoph, supra note 567, citing the case of SISVEL, which has been sometimes referred as a European 
patent troll. 
725 See John Golden, ‘Patent Trolls' and Patent Remedies. TEXAS LAW REVIEW, VOL. 85, p. 2111, 2007, available 
at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=991698  
726 See among others, the above mentioned cases of Amado v. Microsoft, Paice v. Toyota and MercExchange v. 
eBay.  
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generics727. Moreover, recent studies show that among other litigation patterns, 
small firms have a higher probability of being sued relatively to their R&D 
expenditure than large firms728. This data could warn against associating typical 
troll cases with a small firm suing a large firm and especially against building 
policy suggestions on that basis. 
 
A closely related argument against an absolute right to obtain injunctions for 
NMEs is based upon the misleading view that describes NMEs as “innovators” 
and large companies as “infringers”. This assertion is also part of a broader and 
much more complex issue that derives from the fact that patent law in principle 
does not provide for an exception in case of independent invention. Hence, 
even if a second innovator could or in fact arrived to the same innovation 
independently, there will still be patent infringement729. In fact, several recent 
studies have underlined the difficulties behind assessing the intention of 
infringement (willfulness in the U.S.), which is important for the purposes of 
calculating damages. The problem is also closely related to the recently 
acknowledged fact that a great number of infringement cases occur 
inadvertently but rather due to the difficulties of an optimal prior art search and 
the increasing complexity of patent landscapes filled with thickets and complex 
clusters of patents over adjacent technologies.  
 
In front to these realities it is probably advisable to reject both the a priori 
identification of plaintiffs as presumed trolls and that of defendants as 
presumed infringers. If the controversy over hold-ups is rooted in the 
complexities of patent scope and the ambiguous results in the economic theory 
of patent improvement, as it has been recently argued730, most cases would 
actually reflect a tension between first and second innovators rather than a 
conflict between innovators v. infringers or trolls v. innovators. These reasons 
also weight in favor of maintaining a certain degree of discretion and flexibility 
for the issuance of injunctive relief.   
 
Additionally, studies have suggested that defendants (presumed infringers) are 
often firms that invest hugely in R&D, in contrast with the image of firms 
                                                 
 
 
727 See Helm, supra note 706, describing examples of pharmaceutical companies acting like trolls in the 
sense of acting strategically including through the use of a threat to enjoin generic companies to avoid 
competition even when patents have expired. 
728 See BESSEN AND MEURER supra note 14, at p. 123. 
729 See also Cotropia and Lemley, supra note 432, arguing that “one of the most significant differences 
between patent law and other areas of intellectual property is that copying is irrelevant to the 
determination of infringement”. See Stephen Maurer & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Independent Invention 
Defence in Intellectual Property, 69 ECONOMICA 535 (2002).   
730 See Cotter, supra note 38, arguing that disagreement about hold-ups was due to an underlying 
disagreement about the economics of patent improvement and citing the pioneering work “On the 
Complex Economics of Patent Scope”, Merges and Nelson supra note 35.   
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stealing other firm’s property and/or free riding on other’s innovation. 
Actually some of those presumed infringers have invested more on R&D than 
their plaintiffs in infringement suits731. In the highly publicized case involving 
the manufacturer of Blackberry732, RIM, it has been argued that this latter had 
invested nearly half a billion dollars in developing this technology -much more 
than NTP’s R&D expenditures- even before knowing about the existence of the 
NTP’s patents. Furthermore, in many cases, including this one, patents have 
been subject to re-examination on multiple grounds that rise doubts with 
regard to the validity of the involved patents. However, decisions on 
infringement of patents, including preliminary and final measures are 
independent from re-examination procedures. For all these reasons, an 
injunction might have potentially disruptive consequences even if it refers to a 
patent that might be eventually held invalid and/or relates to a technology that 
another firm has independently developed by making important investments in 
R&D.   
 
In this sense, arguments in favor of awarding injunctive relief for NMEs that are 
research institutes or universities due to the fact that such entities invest in R&D 
are usually based upon the fact that the bargaining power they exercise would 
be necessary to recover their investments as well as being the basis for further 
R&D investments733. Such arguments could also be applied to defendants that 
make important investments on R&D and are then object of hold-ups. Empirical 
studies have in fact showed that higher expenditures in R&D are associated 
with a higher probability of being sued for infringement734. Moreover, studies 
have found that most infringers do not usually attempt to hide their infringing 
products, as one would expect if infringement were willful, and that only in a 
very small portion of cases -around 4% in the U.S.- defendants have been found 
to have willfully infringed735. These data is supportive of the thesis, sustained 
by some scholars, that it is inadvertent infringement more than intentional 
infringement that drives most litigation736. In practice, again, the fact that either 
the defendant or the plaintiff might invest in R&D, should only weight in favor 
of rejecting a categorical a priori identification of both defendants and plaintiffs 
rather than suggesting which party should patent policy irrefutably favor.  
 
                                                 
 
 
731 See BESSEN AND MEURER, supra note 14, at p. 123. See also below Graph 1: Who files more patents? 
732 See NTP v. Research In Motion, supra note 390. 
733 A similar reasoning was developed by the circuit court in the case of Commonwealth Scientific & Indus. 
Research Organisation v. Buffalo Tech. Inc. (CSIRO) supra note 461, which argued that CSIRO should be 
entitled to an injunction as it is a center that invested in R&D activities.  
734 See BESSEN AND MEURER, supra note 14, at p. 124. 
735 See also Re Seagate, supra note 472.  
736 See BESSEN AND MEURER supra note 14, at p. 124, arguing that: “this pattern is entirely consistent with 
the inadvertent-infringement explanation -the more a firm invests in technology, the more it inadvertently 
exposes itself to patents of which it is not aware”. See also Cotropia and Lemley, supra note 432, making a 
similar argument.  
Ex-post Liability Rules   
In Modern Patent Law  221  
 
 
Table 1: Who files more patents? Parties in US litigation filing patents at the EPO737 
Case Plaintiff Patents filled in EPO Defendant Patents filled in EPO 
Tivo Inc. v. Echostar Communications Corp. Tivo Inc. 228 Echostar 2
Visto Corp. v. Seven Networks, Inc. Visto Corp. 71 Seven Networks 34
MPT, Inc. v. Marathon Labels, Inc. MPT Inc. 7 Marathon Labels Inc 0
Novozymes A/S v. Genencor Int’l, Inc Novozymes 3764 Genencor 3399
Ortho-McNeil Pharmaceutical, Inc. v. Mylan Labs. Inc. Ortho-Mc Neil 3 Mylan Labs 9
O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co. O2 Micro Int'l 5 Beyond Innovation Tech. 166
800 Adept, Inc. v. Murex Securities, Ltd. 800 Adept Inc 3 Murex Securities 14
MGM Well Services, Inc. v. Mega Lift Systems MGM Well  Services 2 Mega Lift systems 0
Brooktrout, Inc. v. Eicon Networks Corp. Brookout Inc 0 Eicon Networks 8
Commonwealth Scientific & Industrial Research Organisation v. Buffalo Technology Inc. CSIRO 5604 Buffalo Technology Inc 707
Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex Inc. Sanofi  Synthelabo 3675 Apotex 313
Johns Hopkins University v. Datascope Corp. J.H. University 6026 Datascope Corp 386
Baden Sports, Inc. v. Kabushiki Kaisha Molten Baden Sports 1 Kabushiki Kaisha Molten 17
Verizon Services Corp. v. Vonage Holdings Corp. Verizon 1486 Vonage 84
Sundance, Inc. v. Demonte Fabricating Ltd. Sundance Inc 8 Demonte Fabricating 0
Martek Biosciences Corp. v. Nutrinova Inc. Market Biosciences 1 Nutrinova 4
Broadcom v. Qualcomm Broadcom 8561 Qualcomm 34119
z4 Techs. v. Microsoft Corp. z4 8 Microsoft 43677
Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Group Finisar 1626 Directv 766
Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp. Paice 42 Toyota 63874
Voda v. Cordis Corp. Voda 98 Cordis 4298
IMX, Inc. v. LendingTree, LLC IMX 24 LendingTree 8
Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc Praxair 6800 ATMI 21
Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp Acumed 81 Stryker Corp 1112
MercExchange, LLC v. eBay, Inc. MerchExchange 5 eBay 588
Innnogenetics v. Abbott Innogenetics 1146 Abbott 26200
Amado v. Microsoft  Amado 1 Microsoft 43677
Joltid v. Skype Joltid 2 Skype 77
NTP v. RIM NTP Inc 22 RIM 9621
Source: Search done in EPO sp@cenet da ta bas e, l as t revis ed on August 8, 2009  
 
Graph 1: Who files more patents?  
 
Source: table 1 
5.1.2 Evolution of patent strategic behavior 
Another reason why defining firms as “patent trolls” or NMEs would not be 
useful to weed out hold-ups without incurring in significant costs and errors is 
that even if one such category was sufficiently homogenous at present, it would 
                                                 
 
 
737 The table only shows the number of patent fillings before the EPO of the main parties involved in 
several U.S. cases applying the eBay precedent. The number of filled patents is only a rough proxy for the 
capacity of innovation and investments in R&D of a company, however it gives an approximate sense of 
the fact that the typical case of infringement does not necessarily involve an innovative plaintiff against a 
copyist infringer but rather, as sustained by Cotter, supra note 38, mostly a problem between parties 
involved in patent improvements and sequential innovations. 
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be likely to evolve rapidly. As a consequence, any policy measure targeting a 
similar category of patentees would most probably fail. The reason is that 
entities anticipating such policy responses would probably mutate their 
strategies and change their business model, licensing practices and any other 
factor taken into consideration by courts in order to avoid any policy respons.  
 
In fact, there are historical examples of strategic behavior put in place at 
different periods of time by different types of entities although with the use of 
similar litigation and patenting strategies. An example has been drawn from the 
U.S. agricultural sector following the creation -first by the U.S. Patent Office and 
then on the patent statute- of a new type of design patents during the 1860s, 
which was meant to provide incentives for incremental innovations. In practice, 
this reform is said to have lowered the bar for the patentability of such designs 
and opened the door for an important increase in the number of applications. 
As a commentator explains, “patent sharks” –as they were named at the time- 
bought inactive patents, mainly in the agricultural field, in order to sue 
inadvertent farmers who were using such patented products738. At that time, 
the practice was criticized on grounds similar to those used now with respect to 
patent trolls739. Moreover, patent sharks presumably emerged due to reasons 
comparable to those nourishing the emergence of patent trolls nowadays: 
  
“Opportunistic licensers flourish when there is a large gap between the cost of 
getting a patent and the value that can be captured with an infringement action. 
This sort of arbitrage is likely to occur when: (1) those being sued cannot easily 
substitute away from the disputed technology; (2) the average scope of 
improvements in the industry is incremental, which makes the outcome of 
infringement litigation hard to gauge; and (3) the cost of acquiring and 
retaining patents is low”740. 
  
The menace of patent sharks was finally tackled through the elimination of the 
design patents that made their emergence possible. Although the situation was 
different from the multi-component and abstract nature of modern patents, 
some insights can still be learned for the purposes of today’s challenges. Recent 
scholarly commentary suggests that any patent reform would encounter 
significant opposition given that the problem of patent trolls is confined to a 
particular type of patents. In the case of the modern controversy about patent 
trolls the more problematic sectors are business method and software patents or 
                                                 
 
 
738 See Gerard Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the Perils of Innovation. NOTRE DAME 
LAW REVIEW, June 2007, available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=921252.  
739 Ibid, arguing that: “At that time, the growth of sharks was blamed on excessive patent remedies, 
incompetent examiners, and the lack of compulsory licensing” 
740 Ibid at p. 6. 
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more in general abstract patents of growing technological sectors as information 
and communication technologies and biotechnologies741: 
 
“any proposal affecting substantive rights is a non-starter because most 
patentees are not susceptible to holdups. Whether this is just a fact of interest-
group politics or a principled stance that remedies should be tailored to fit 
harms, the point flows directly from the observation that only some types of 
patents are exposed to opportunistic licensors. In the eBay case discussed 
earlier, the effort to convince the Court to restrict injunctive relief (a form of 
compulsory licensing) was met with a stack of hostile amicus briefs from 
groups like the pharmaceutical industry that do not fear trolls. Similarly, the 
bills that are languishing in Congress seek to stop opportunistic licensing by 
overhauling standards on willful infringement and injunctive relief while 
altering the examination process by allowing third parties to challenge patents 
in an administrative proceeding”742. 
 
Another similar practice to that employed by patent trolls, in the sense of 
exploiting the unawareness of potential infringers about an existent patent, was 
used for a long time by so-called “patent submarines”, which kept patents from 
being published during a long period of time following the application743. Such 
practice was possible according to U.S. law, where a continuation could be 
filled for a patent whereas the first application could be finally abandoned. 
Strong incentives to hide applications were importantly present when the 
duration of a patent was calculated from the time of issuance since the system 
allowed patents to remain secret until that time. Hence, the applicant could 
delay the issuance of a patent as long as she kept on filing successive patent 
continuations.  
  
Several solutions were proposed to avoid patent submarines. In fact the patent 
reform that extended the duration of patents from 17 year from the issuance to 
20 from the application lowered the incentives for hiding applications but not 
necessarily for filing continuations744. In 2001, an additional reform was needed 
to make the publication of patents mandatory after 18 months from the day of 
                                                 
 
 
741 Ibid, discussing alternative reforms suggested at that time and why they possibly failed, and making 
the interesting point that one important reason why other alternative policy changes failed were the 
opposition of groups, especially of patent holders of other technologies, which lobbied against any such 
reform. In particular, some proposals for compulsory licensing were put forward. Ibid at footnote 98, 
quoting from 45 CONG. REC. 398 (1878) (statement of Sen. Christiancy) (“There is still another class of 
cases in which, for patents hereafter to be issued, to prevent extortion, some rate of compensation should 
be fixed by the statute . . . when the infringement consists in using the thing patented.”). 
742 Ibid at p. 51.  
743 The term patent submarine often refers to the patent in question, whereas the entity or individual 
engaging in such practice is also named a “troll” or “shark”. See Harhoff et al., supra note 165, at p. 95 
744 Ibid at p. 95. 
Ex-post Liability Rules   
In Modern Patent Law  224  
 
 
application in order to adapt the U.S. legislation to international standards. 
However, it is still possible for a patent applicant in the U.S. to keep a patent 
application secret as long as the applicant declares that he does not intend to file 
patents in jurisdictions requiring publication after 18 months. The USPTO hence 
proposed a revision on the rules governing such practice targeted at avoiding 
abuses745. The issue was subject to wide controversy and to the disagreement 
between industries holding different views about the convenience of patent 
continuations. The controversy then centered on whether the USPTO was 
competent to issue such rules that might affect substantive patent law and in 
2009, the Federal Circuit issued a permanent injunction against the 
implementation of the rules proposed by the USPTO746.  
 
A potential approach to avoid the abuse on the practice of patent continuations 
is the use of equitable doctrines, for instance the doctrine of prosecution laches, 
which allows declaring a patent unenforceable. This was the case in a land 
marking decision in which some patents hold by Jerome Lemelson747 were held 
unenforceable: 
 
”Jerome Lemelson, a prolific inventor with close to 600 patents, is renowned 
among patent lawyers as the master of “submarine” patents –patents kept 
hidden for many years-. Lemelson slowed the prosecution of his patents, 
sometimes for over twenty years. He waited until his technologies were 
independently invented and commercialized, and then he brought his patent to 
the surface and negotiated royalties after the potential licensees were locked 
into the patented technology. Although his patents covered breakthrough 
technologies as bar-code scanning, he did not contribute these breakthroughs to 
society”748. 
 
A drawback with the doctrine of prosecution laches and probably with other 
doctrines such as equitable estoppel and patent misuse would be that they are 
likely to be applied only to a subset of cases under strict requirements that do 
not often allow to balance all the circumstances of the case. In the case of 
                                                 
 
 
745 See the USPTO, PROPOSED CHANGES TO PRACTICE FOR CONTINUING APPLICATIONS, REQUESTS FOR 
CONTINUED EXAMINATION PRACTICE, AND APPLICATIONS CONTAINING PATENTABLY INDISTINCT CLAIMS, NOTICE 
OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING, available at:  http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/notices/71fr48.pdf, 
last accessed on August 13, 2009.  
746 The Eastern District of Virginia issued an injunction against the implementation of the rules considering 
that they were substantive rather than just procedural and hence affected rights of the applicants under 
the Patent Act. However, in March 2009, on appeal before the Federal Circuit, this latter overturned 
the decision by the District Court, upholding several of the proposed rules. The controversy continues and 
on July 6, 2009, the Federal Circuit agreed to rehear the case en banc. 
747 Symbol Technologies v. Lemelson 301 F.Supp.2d 1147, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d 1738 (D.Nev. 2004) 
748 See BESSEN AND MEURER, supra note 14, at p. 170. 
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prosecution laches, an additional requirement is that the inaction of the 
patentee takes place over an important number of years749.  
 
Moreover, and as above mentioned, it is still possible for an applicant to avoid 
the publication of the patent, as long as the applicant does not seek the filling of 
applications outside the U.S. under the Patent Cooperation Treaty. Given the 
size and importance of the U.S. market, in an important number of cases it 
could still be a rational and profitable strategy to keep applications hidden for 
as long as a potential infringer independently develops an infringing 
technology. 
 
Finally, from an efficiency perspective, a rule that directly punishes trolls or 
NMEs would not be desirable. Such rule could be over-deterrent750, insofar as it 
could affect companies that presumably carry out efficient activities such as 
management and enforcement of patents. At the same time such rule could also 
be under-deterrent751, by failing to tackle the behavior of certain types of 
companies, which in spite of falling out of the definition of trolls, could 
nevertheless engage in trolling, e.g. universities or research centers and also 
manufacturing firms.  
 
5.2 The conduct: Trolling behavior 
 
The definition of patent trolls does not encompass all cases of detrimental 
strategic behavior involving potential losses in terms of static and/or dynamic 
efficiency and also unduly extends to cases beyond those losses. Hence, in the 
light of the necessity to examine alternative benchmarks, a natural alternative 
for courts to determine whether in a particular case, a plaintiff is taking 
advantage of patent law doctrines to engage in hold-up or other similar type of 
inefficient strategic behavior is to focus on the conduct rather than on the entity 
that is engaging in such practice.  
 
In fact, some scholars have already proposed that the focus of study should not 
be “trolls” understood as the entities but “trolling” understood as a behavior. 
Yet others insist on using the definition of patent trolls or argue for the use of 
both factors (trolls and trolling behavior) as appropriate benchmarks:  
                                                 
 
 
749 See Cotter, supra note 38. See also Robert Merges and Jeffrey Kuhn, An Estoppel Doctrine for Patented 
Standards, 97 CAL. L. REV. 1, February, 2009.   
750 A type 1 error would happen under a rule that ends up in false convictions where the entity considered 
a troll is engaging in socially efficient behaviour.  
751 A type 2 error would happen under a rule that ends up in false acquittals given that an entity that is not 
a troll under the above mentioned definitions or a NME, could nevertheless be engaged in patent strategic 
behaviour.   
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“determining whether a particular patent holder should be awarded an 
injunction demands a fact-specific inquiry that cannot be reduced to a rigid 
checklist. But two factors are most important in distinguishing patent holders 
entitled to an injunction from patent trolls that are not. The first is the nature of 
the entity. If it is an entity organized for the purpose of investing in litigation 
rather than innovation, a remedy at law is more than adequate to compensate 
any legitimate claims it might have. The second is whether the entity engaged 
in any strategic troll-like behavior designed to increase disproportionately the 
settlement value of its claim. If such an entity set a trap for a productive firm, it 
should not be entitled to an injunction”752. 
 
Moreover, and as it is explained with further detail below, “trolling” conduct 
can be said to pertain to the broader class of hold-ups. At the same time, hold-
ups have been deeply analyzed by the law and economics literature and pertain 
to the broader concept of “strategic behavior”. Moreover, these types of conduct 
can also be identified from a legal point of view through a diverse set of 
conditions that might include objective elements as well as subjective elements 
denoting intention.  
 
Objective elements might include some external factors as the type of 
technology patented and whether it constitutes a small or an important portion 
of a multi-component product and even if being a small portion, whether it is a 
core element of such product or just one trivial or minor element. Subjective 
elements understood as factors to analyze the hold-up intention of a plaintiff, 
might include considerations such as her past litigation pattern –using patents 
as a sword rather than a shield to protect innovations- whether the patented 
technology was plainly suppressed due to financial hardships that made it 
difficult to commercialize such inventions or whether it was an intended 
suppression as well as the specific causes of suppression or non-working. 
 
Although an often cited principle in patent law is that patentees are free to 
work or not, and even to suppress their patented technologies from the market, 
such considerations might still matter under a rule or reason, equitable doctrine 
or case-by-case examination. If the intention of suppressing a patent is to block 
competition in a technological area, patents could also be in tension with 
competition laws753. Although it is often acknowledged that patents do not per 
                                                 
 
 
752 See BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE YAHOO! INC. AS SUPPORTING PETITIONERS, IN EBAY, INC. V. MERCEXCHANGE, 
L.L.C., supra note 716. Compare with Lemley, supra note 715, focusing on trolling behaviour.   
753 See Kurt Saunders, Patent Nonuse and the Role of Public Interest as a Deterrent to Technology Suppression, 
HARVARD JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY,VOLUME 15, NUMBER 2, Spring 2002 analyzing patent 
suppression and suggesting ways through which patent law and antitrust law could deal with this 
problem, including compulsory licenses for particular cases.  
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se confer market power or do not pose any a priori anti-competitive concern, it is 
also well-known that the abusive exercise of a patent does. This will be the case 
if patent suppression comports the emergence of more efficient standards or 
technologies. From an economic point of view such blocking would be 
detrimental for the promotion of innovation incentives and hence for the overall 
goals of patent law as well as competition law. Even if such conduct cannot be 
deemed as contrary to antitrust statutes of a particular jurisdiction or in the 
particular circumstance of the case, such cases might still run counter to the 
goals of patent policy.  
 
A leitmotiv of “trolling” and more in general of patent strategic behavior is 
precisely the intention of surprise that is present in the conduct of submarines, 
ambushes and trolls. Such surprise element of hold-ups has been already 
acknowledged by the CAFC as it: 
 
“obliges the producer to pay [the patent holder] as much as it would cost to 
shift to a noninfringing product, an amount, given investment in infringing 
systems, perhaps far more than a reasonable royalty [as determined 
preinvestment]. These incentives . . . encourage patentees to adopt a strategy of 
ambush rather than providing fair notice754. 
 
The above mentioned subjective or objective elements to judge the occurrence 
of troll-like behavior are not easy to discern. But they are neither impossible for 
a court to assess, especially given that some of the factors that were explained 
above with regards to patent hold-ups, such as willfulness of the conduct, 
likelihood of inadvertent infringement, cost of redesigning and impact of the 
patented technology on the infringing product, among others, are already 
considered –at least by U.S. courts- when calculating reasonable royalties and 
more recently within the application of the four-factor test to award or deny 
injunctive relief. 
 
Moreover, and as we have sustained, trolling behavior is neither a new nor the 
sole basis calling for the application of a case-by-case reasoning to deny 
injunctive relief or to opt for the use of other type of ex-post liability rules. In 
fact, since the times of the first major harmonized instrument for patent law, the 
Paris Convention, it was precisely the concept of patent abuse that provided 
one of the most important bases for switching into such rule755. Legal provisions 
                                                 
 
 
754 See Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Technology Corp., 185 F.3d 1259, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 1999) See also Brief Amici 
Curiae Yahoo, supra note, 716. See also Note, The Disclosure Function Of The Patent System (Or Lack Thereof), 
supra note 471. 
755 Under the well known standards of article 5-A (2) of the Paris Convention, supra note 12: “Each country 
of the Union shall have the right to take legislative measures providing for the grant of compulsory 
licenses to prevent the abuses which might result from the exercise of the exclusive rights conferred by the 
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around the world have sanctioned different conducts as abuse, misuse, anti-
competitive uses of patents as well as other similar grounds, which in an 
economic sense, might correspond with the concept of “strategic behavior”.  
 
Economic analysis has the further task of identifying the effects of such rules 
and helping to determine when such behavior shall be corrected through the 
use of a liability rule. Among other questions it is important to analyze whether 
there might be any anti-competitive effects affecting consumers or whether it is 
only competitors that are affected by such practices. Even if only competitors 
are affected by such practices, however, it is still possible that competitors have 
developed second or improved innovations and hence the use of first 
innovations under a liability rule would still be socially beneficial. This factor 
could be examined upon the basis of whether strategic behavior causes 
dynamic losses, static losses or both and in which cases a patentee should be 
liable according to such different losses. Additionally it is also important to 
consider the suggestions of economic analysis about a proper definition of 
patent abuses and whether such definition(s) overlaps or complements those of 
antitrust law and unfair competition statutes. 
6 Conclusions  
Whereas law and economics studies justify the use of liability rules in the 
presence of high transaction costs, including in the form of “strategic behavior”; 
recent discussions on the use of patent liability rules have tended to focus on 
the purported problem of hold-ups. This chapter highlights that the adoption of 
such narrow focus is mainly due to the fact that discussions have followed the 
logic of notorious U.S. cases including the eBay and Blackberry litigation. Some 
analysts have further narrowed the concept of patent hold-ups concluding that 
liability rules would be preferable on efficiency grounds only on very specific 
context and under particularly restrictive assumptions. Furthermore, many 
studies have focused on the role of patent trolls in order to explain the 
emergence of a type of strategic behaviour that occurs when firms use their 
patents in order to extract large settlements above their economic value. This 
chapter argued that such focus is not correct as it might improperly conduce to 
condemn efficient behaviour while still tolerating inefficient behaviour from 
patentees. 
 
In contrast, this chapter provided an alternative view on the question of when 
should patent ex-post liability rules be used. To this purpose, the chapter started 
                                                                                                                                               
 
 
patent, for example, failure to work”. Such provision is further subject to the requirements of article 31 of 
the TRIPS Agreement, which nevertheless left ample space for the implementation of compulsory licenses 
to correct the aforesaid abuses.  
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from the main insights generated by recent case law in the U.S., the U.K. and 
Italy. Those cases not only addressed presumed patent hold-ups but also 
extended to cases of sequential and incremental innovation and of bargaining 
breakdown between the involved parties. A broader concept of strategic 
behaviour was then proposed in order to identify the potentially problematic 
cases where a liability rule might offer a superior outcome in terms of 
efficiency. 
 
Patent hold-ups have been furthermore linked to a particular type of patents, 
i.e. patents on business methods and to a particular sector, i.e. the information 
and communication technologies. Based upon those premises, it has often been 
argued that Europe is somehow immunized from the emergence of problems 
similar to those present in the U.S. which have recently justified a major 
departure from the use of strong property rules in the patent field. Consequent 
with the aim of providing a broader view on the problem that includes both 
sides of the Atlantic, the chapter examined the main features of the European 
landscape that are associated or might be related with high transaction costs 
and patent strategic behaviour. Not surprisingly, an increasing number of 
studies have reported the emergence of patent strategies related to the filing of 
single applications, the management of patent portfolios and litigation of 
specific patents.  
 
A particular sector, which has opposed any reform towards the use of ex-post 
liability rules both within and outside the U.S. as well as exercised important 
pressure within international negotiations, is the pharmaceutical sector. 
Whereas the information and communication technologies have often been 
identified as a problematic sector where patent strategic behaviour plays a 
central role, and where patens are used more as bargaining chips than to 
reward and incentivize innovation, the pharmaceutical sector is often cited as 
the paradigmatic case for patent protection. In contrast with this widely held 
view, the results of a recent inquiry performed by the European Commission on 
the European Pharmaceutical sector have put in evidence the increasing 
frequency and importance of strategic practices relating with the filing of  
patents, managing of patent portfolios and litigating pharmaceutical patents 
that might potentially affect innovation incentives as well as create unduly 
burdens for citizens in such a vital sector as health.  
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CHAPTER V 
EX-POST LIABILITY RULES 
TOWARDS AN EFFICIENT DESIGN 
1 Introduction  
The previous chapter analyzed the main economic grounds for a switch into an 
ex-post liability rule to protect patent rights. The central problem identified both 
by recent literature and case law is the occurrence of strategic behavior in 
multiple sectors, which has been facilitated by a changing technological and 
patent landscape. Hence, the previous chapter focused on the question of when 
should liability rules be used using a comparative perspective and hence, taking 
into account the particularities of the most relevant case law.  
 
Using a similar approach, this chapter focuses on the costs arising out of the 
application of ex-post liability rules. While many critics against the use of 
liability rules have been largely formulated in abstract, an overview of specific 
cases might serve to refine those critics while highlighting the (potential) costs 
as well as the (potential) benefits of each alternative rule. Once more, the wave 
of cases applying the eBay precedent in the U.S. might serve precisely to 
confront the insights of previous theoretical studies with the insights of recent 
particular cases.   
 
As it was previously illustrated by a comparison of the most important cases in 
selected jurisdictions, the design of a compulsory licensing provision is 
fundamental to its successful or even just workable application. In effect, 
previous theoretical discussions have coincided that the main cost arising from 
the use of liability rules is the difficulty in assessing the compensation for a non-
voluntary use of the patented technology. Hence, this chapter focuses on 
analyzing this particular cost. Two other main critiques against the use of ex-
post liability rules, namely the effects on efficient bargaining between the parties 
and the potential uncertainties arising from the use of an ex-post liability rule 
are also briefly addressed.  
 
This chapter is organized as follows. The second section focuses on the problem 
of implementing a liability rule in general. The third section analyses the 
problem and different approaches used to calculate a monetary compensation 
that substitutes a property rule. The third section concludes by suggesting a 
summarized cost-benefit analysis of the alternative rules, ranging from 
categorical rules to open standards.  
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2 The Efficient Implementation of ex post liability rules 
The efficiency of any liability rule regime would depend upon whether the 
system preserves the incentives of patent law and/or is able to redress a 
situation where such incentives are unbalanced. Among other factors that 
would affect the capability of liability rules to preserve innovation incentives 
and to redress a situation of imbalance are the level of compensation that 
substitutes the property rule and the impact of the rule on the ability of parties 
to achieve a negotiated solution. In practical terms, the switch from a property 
to a liability rule is done under a “standard” of interpretation756 that foresees a 
balance of the particularities of the case, including a comparison of innovation 
incentives of the involved parties. 
 
2.1 How could courts efficiently apply ex-post liability rules? 
 
A general framework to assess the alternative effects of property and liability 
rules must take into account static as well as dynamic efficiency effects. Liability 
rules might help in dealing with high transaction cost situations where 
otherwise bargaining would not have happened efficiently; hence ensuring 
potential static and dynamic efficiency gains. Nonetheless, liability rules impose 
important administrative costs as well as potential dynamic efficiency losses. 
An important question is then whether and how can courts decide upon the 
switch to a liability rule757. Moreover, the question arises especially in Civil Law 
countries as to whether courts could engage in this type of balancing exercise758.  
 
2.1.1 The balancing test in post-eBay cases 
 
The above mentioned balancing exercise might take place, to a different extent; 
either in the context of patent infringement cases or on compulsory licensing 
                                                 
 
 
756 See law and economics literature on the use of rules v. standards, supra note 108 . See Posner, supra 
note 68, at p. 590-591, explaining that: “to control behavior through a set of detailed rules rather than 
through a general standard involves costs both in particularizing the standard initially and in revising the 
rules to keep them abreast of changing conditions; as we have noted, a specific rule will obsolesce more 
rapidly than a general standard. The costs of governance by specific rules are particularly high for bodies 
like the Supreme Court or Congress, where every rule is very costly to promulgate. But often the benefits 
of particularization outweigh the costs. These benefits are obtained at three levels: in guiding the courts 
themselves, in guiding the behavior of the people subject to the rule, and in guiding the behavior of the 
parties to actual disputes”. 
757 Of course, these questions depend upon the desired policy goals as conceived, tacitly or expressly in 
patent law. Such policy goals might express that the use of liability rules is desirable only when a property 
rule may cause potential dynamic efficiency losses by discouraging follow-on innovation; whether the use 
of liability rules would also be advisable when a property rule may cause static losses that surpass possible 
losses in terms of innovation incentives or whether liability rules might also be desirable when a property 
rule would impose important static efficiency losses, irrespectively of whether they surpass or not any 
dynamic efficiency gains.  
758 See above Chapter III, Section 5, discussing the spaces for discretion that Judges might have in Civil 
Law countries.  
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procedures but both cases share similar concerns. For instance, the calculus of 
the adequate remuneration has a vital importance either for the issuance of a 
compulsory license or for the substitution of injunctive relief with damage 
compensation.  
 
With regards to the balancing test done by courts, the recent set of cases 
decided by U.S. district courts after the eBay decisions might serve to illustrate 
such common problems and the ways in which such courts have addressed 
them. For instance, U.S. district courts have been performing different tests in 
order to facilitate the factual considerations of the four-factor test with regards 
to injunctions. The cumulative application of these tests might allow courts to 
efficiently screen cases of holdups and strategic litigation while granting 
injunctive relief in cases where innovation incentives might be affected in the 
absence of an injunction759.  
 
This “multi-factor” test has at least attempted to include the following reasons. 
A first important factor that has been taken into consideration is whether 
plaintiff and defendant are competitors. Many commentators have criticized the 
use of such factor, since, if adopted as the only test to judge on the availability 
of remedies, it could in practice discriminate against non-practicing entities that 
for different reasons might lack resources to commercialize their inventions760. 
In fact, when patentees compete with the infringer, courts have almost 
automatically found that the first two factors are satisfied, deriving the 
corollary that competitors might lose market shares, reputation or goodwill as a 
result of infringer’s activities. Differently, when the patentee is not a competitor, 
courts have tended to rely on the competition test only if this is coupled with 
other complementary measures that suggest the inadequacy of injunctive relief: 
the patent covering a small component, the patentee’s willingness to license or 
the effects of an injunction or the lack thereof in innovation incentives.  
 
Secondly, an innovation-effects test as it has been applied by few courts, which, 
in analyzing the balance of hardships test, have asked about the effects that an 
injunction would have in the innovation incentives. The U.S. Supreme Court 
had already recognized that a categorical rule denying injunctions for all non-
practicing entities was not in line with the discretionary nature of the four-
                                                 
 
 
759 Efficiency in this context could refer to several concepts. First, it could refer to the cost minimizing way 
in which courts might take account of costs derived from errors in granting injunctive relief and secondly 
it could reflect the need to balance innovation incentives with access to knowledge and the use of 
technology by developers (infringers). In this analysis we follow the second option, considering both static 
and dynamic efficiency effects.   
760 See Denicolo et al., supra note 160. See also Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Supreme Court Engages in 
Judicial Activism in Interpreting the Patent Law in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. 
PROP., VOL. 10:165 (2007), at p. 199-200, arguing that denying injunctions to non-competitors, would put 
small companies at a disadvantaged position before big rivals 
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factor test, explicitly referring to the case of “university researchers” and “self-
made inventors” centers as capable of satisfying the four-factor test even if they 
would be willing to license their patents and would not be practicing or 
commercializing any of them. In such cases, it is straightforward to presume 
that innovation incentives would be harmed if a permanent injunction is not 
granted761.  
 
A third possible test would refer to the multi-component nature of the product, 
which, as acknowledged by the Supreme Court would differentiate between 
cases, according to whether the patent covers only a small part of a multi-
component product or not. Such cases might exacerbate the risk of holdups if 
patentees are able to threaten to stop all activities related with the whole 
product, which was the case in the Blackberry and eBay litigation. Moreover, a 
patent reform has been discussed to apportion damages in such cases, as a 
complementary and necessary mechanism to avoid over-compensation762.  
 
Overall, just the careful consideration of all factors might conduce to decisions 
that respect the equitable nature of injunctions. The adoption of one or several 
tests to facilitate the interpretation of the particularities of each case might save 
on administrative costs and errors that courts might face with the examination 
of such factual considerations. Nonetheless, the adoption of any test as a 
definite answer to similar cases would again fall into the categorical application 
of rules that the U.S. Supreme Court rejected in the eBay decision. Hence, courts 
have to engage into significant fact-finding activity as well as deciding on such 
delicate issues as the determination of the appropriate compensation to 
substitute for injunctive relief. The next section discusses some of the options 
with regard to such difficult task while the last section of this chapter compares 
the costs and benefits of each different rule with a special emphasis on these 
problems.  
3 A monetary substitute for a property rule 
 
The law and economics literature on entitlement protection, its extensions to the 
case of IPRs and especially to patent law as well as recent debates on the 
                                                 
 
 
761 At least two post-eBay cases have concerned a university or research center. In Commonwealth, for 
instance, the court, decided to grant a permanent injunction, even in the absence of competition between 
the plaintiff and defendant. John Hopkins University and Arrow International Inc. v. Datascope Corporation, No. 
05-0759, 2007 WL 2682001 (D. Md. Aug. 9, 2007), involved a University research center, but the court did 
not consider the innovation incentives for this particular type of patentees, instead basing its decision in 
the fact that co-plaintiff Arrow International Inc. was a licensee which manufactured a product competing 
with the defendant’s. Cases such as Amado v. Microsoft and the same eBay v. MercExchange instead regard 
an individual inventor but such cases are rare. See also BESSEN AND MEURER, supra note 14, concluding that 
the impact of small inventors in the U.S. patent system is very limited.  
762 See supra note 610. 
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exclusivity of patents have all coincided in one relevant aspect. The use of 
liability rules to protect patents entails the task –often deemed as discouraging 
or insurmountable- of calculating a remuneration or compensation that 
preserves the goals of patent law.  
 
While most critics argue in a general way that such calculation is costly and/or 
impossible to be accurately performed, important insights have been already 
developed under different patent doctrines that aim at setting up a 
compensation for past damages as well as in the context of adequate 
remuneration for traditional compulsory licenses. These insights might 
contribute to a better understanding of how such determination might resemble 
an optimal amount. This section discusses the main insights produced in these 
dissimilar contexts with the aim of examining the calculation of an appropriate 
compensation or remuneration to be applied when a property rule is 
substituted with an ex-post liability rule.  
 
The section highlights how difficult and problematic might indeed be the 
calculation of a valid monetary substitute for property rules when a patent is 
protected through a liability rule. However, such exercise is neither impossible 
nor absent of the ordinary practice of courts and agencies. In patent 
infringement decisions, courts have to calculate a compensation for past 
damages in most cases. Agencies and courts have as well a vast experience in 
the estimation of an adequate remuneration in the context of compulsory 
licenses for a variety of cases.  
 
Moreover, recent literature highlights how property rules are also costly to 
administer. This is the case when the patented technology is complex and 
difficult to be separated from other technologies763 and, in general when the 
patent notice system is not functioning correctly764. In such cases, a chilling 
effect might preclude or offset any dynamic gains from patent protection, as 
further innovation might be blocked. When other factors such as the risk of 
bargaining failure surpass the information costs of liability rules, each 
alternative rule should be considered under different settings. As a 
consequence, the argument that liability rules do not offer a viable solution in 
high transaction cost cases because it is too costly to determine the 
compensation cannot be sustained plainly, and must instead be confronted with 
the particular conditions of the case.   
 
3.1 TRIPS: Adequate compensation and adequate remuneration 
 
                                                 
 
 
763 See Lemley and Weiser, supra note72. 
764 See BESSEN AND MEURER, supra note 14. 
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In this first sub-section, the legal and economic meaning of the “adequate 
remuneration” and “adequate compensation” thresholds established within the 
TRIPS Agreement765 are briefly discussed. Contradicting the importance that 
scholars attribute to calculating such appropriate threshold, the issue of 
compensation or remuneration has received modest attention766. In comparison, 
other issues related to compulsory licensing provisions, and in particular, the 
grounds for using compulsory licenses, especially with regards to the case of 
public health have been the focus of most discussions. The modest use of 
compulsory licenses makes it difficult to foresee a serious discussion and/or 
further harmonization on the issue of compensation, notwithstanding the fact it 
is the most often cited argument against the use of liability rules in general and 
compulsory licenses in particular:   
 
“Currently, a dispute over the level of compensation seems unlikely. If the scale 
of compulsory licensing under patents were to grow, under pressure of political 
and economic change, to rival that of the historic episodes of expropriation of 
property, there would be a similar systemic need to deliver pragmatic 
judgments on adequacy of compensation. A greater case load would induce 
pressure to produce judgments more responsive to the particular facts of each 
case, calling for clearer analytical tools”767 (footnotes omitted). 
 
If a WTO panel were asked to interpret the concept of “adequate remuneration” 
in the context of a dispute settlement procedure, it could use several rather 
different approaches, starting from the classical rules of interpretation in 
                                                 
 
 
765 Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement establishes that one of the requisites for uses non-authorized by the 
right holder that must be respected by member states is that: “(h) the right holder shall be paid adequate 
remuneration in the circumstances of each case, taking into account the economic value of the 
authorization”. Article 44 of the TRIPS Agreement refers to payment of remuneration according to article 
31 and to “adequate compensation”: “ Notwithstanding the other provisions of this Part and provided that 
the provisions of Part II specifically addressing use by governments, or by third parties authorized by a 
government, without the authorization of the right holder are complied with, Members may limit the 
remedies available against such use to payment of remuneration in accordance with subparagraph (h) of 
Article 31. In other cases, the remedies under this Part shall apply or, where these remedies are 
inconsistent with a Member’s law, declaratory judgments and adequate compensation shall be 
available”. 
766 See Taubman, supra note 97;  arguing that: “Debate and analysis on the compulsory licensing issue has 
concentrated on the substantive grounds, legal conditions and political economy of threatening to and 
actually issuing compulsory licenses. But the level of remuneration expected, and actually paid, may in 
itself become a trade issue, in part because it is an area of comparative uncertainty. Further, the level of 
entitlement due to the patent holder should in principle determine the remedies available in a dispute. 
Assessments about the likely cost or other implications of losing a dispute could influence a State's choices 
when weighing costs and benefits of invoking a compulsory license as an instrument of public policy”. See 
also Daniel Cahoy, Confronting Myths and Myopia on the Road from Doha, GEORGIA LAW REVIEW, Vol. 42:131 
2007, at p. 153, noticing that: “The flexibility of TRIPS opens up a number of methods for ascribing value to 
compulsory licenses. However, the subject of remuneration rules has received relatively little attention.93 
If addressed at all, it is generally a small component—seemingly an afterthought—in broader compulsory 
license discussions” (footnotes omitted).  
767 See Taubman, Ibid, at p. 958.  
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International Law and including a literal and a contextual reading768. 
Nonetheless, it is expected that any hypothetical decision in the context of the 
WTO would be “defendant-friendly” in the sense that given a dubious 
interpretation, a formula to be preferred would be the least onerous for the 
country under an obligation769. 
 
Apart from the interpretation of “adequate remuneration” which is the 
threshold for compulsory licenses, a similar standard of “adequate 
compensation” is established by article 44 with regard to infringement cases:  
 
“Further textual guidance is given by Article 44.2 (…) One commentator reads 
this as requiring in effect that adequate remuneration should be the same as 
(commercial) damages awarded in infringement cases. TRIPS uses a similar 
formula when requiring that judicial authorities should be able, in the case of 
infringement of IP rights, to order 'damages adequate to compensate for the 
injury' caused by the infringement”770 (footnotes omitted) 
 
In addition, other international law fields distinct from the international trade 
discipline might provide other (contradictory) insights with respect to the issue 
of compensation. For instance, investment law implies a threshold of 
compensation that aims at ensuring the protection for foreign investments. The 
application of investment protection to patent rights could be based on the fact 
that the definition of investment, contained in most of the currently existing 
investment treaties, includes intellectual property rights as a type of intangible 
investment771.  
 
Nonetheless, the application of expropriation rules, especially with regards to 
the standard applicable to monetary compensation is still controversial and has 
not been directly addressed in any precedent so far. The insights elaborated by 
                                                 
 
 
768 See Ibid at p. 951, mentioning the different approaches used by WTO panels, ranging from a literal 
reading to the application of a broader context, including national practices. 
769 See Taubman, supra note 97, at p. 952 , arguing that “This 'defendant-friendly' approach is reinforced 
by a literal reading of the text. The Appellate Body in applying the customary rules of treaty interpretation 
noted that 'Article 31 of the Vienna Convention provides that the words of the treaty form the foundation 
for the interpretative process: "interpretation must be based above all upon the text of the treaty"'. 
Dictionaries suggest 'adequacy' means mere sufficiency to meet a need. Since the term 'equitable 
remuneration' was available and is used elsewhere, a strict reading of adequacy may suggest only a 
minimum 'safety net', and not an equitable balancing of interests” (footnotes omitted).  
770 See Taubman, supra note 97, at p. 956.  
771 Compensation for expropriation in the context of investment treaties is usually defined in the formula 
dating from the Hull rule of “prompt, adequate and effective”. This treatment is often viewed as pro-
investors and its potential application to intellectual property disputes, especially with regard to 
compulsory licenses is rather controversial.  See Rosa Castro, Compulsory Licensing and Public Health: 
TRIPS-Plus Standards in Investment Agreements, TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTE MANAGEMENT, VOLUME 6, ISSUE 02 
(August 2009), available at: http://www.transnational-dispute-
management.com/samples/toc.asp?key=27. See also Taubman, supra note 97.  
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the economics of takings and compensation with respect to the incentives to 
take property and the incentives for inefficient investments might contribute to 
a better understanding of the economic effects of such remuneration. The 
standard economic analysis of compensation in the cases of takings, argues for 
just compensation, which is less than full compensation, and equivalent to the 
discussion about damages in cases of breach of contract.772 Of course, the 
typical case of expropriation might greatly differ from the type of compulsory 
license mostly discussed in this Thesis, not only with respect to the public 
interest goal that surrounds any expropriation but also with respect to the 
authorized user, which is often the government in expropriations whereas the 
cases here discussed have mostly regarded the use by other competitors or 
potential competitors of the patent owner. Nonetheless, the possibility of 
inducing socially inefficient over-investment might be an important concern in 
the calculation of compensation for patent owners, especially in the context of 
International Investment Law, which often involves countries with highly 
dissimilar levels of development and other North-South contentious issues773.  
 
Another important field that might contribute to the interpretation of the 
compensation due to patent holders is human rights law, which would of 
course tilt in the opposite direction of investment protection and towards a 
lower threshold of compensation.  
 
3.2 Determining the level of compensation: an impossible task?   
 
Different references might be used in order to estimate the remuneration or 
compensation of patent owners when a liability rule is applied. The choice 
between such different approaches often depends on whether the patent 
liability rule is a compulsory license, a damage award substituting injunctive 
relief in patent infringement cases or a mandated license in antitrust litigation 
involving a patent right. In addition, the absence of international harmonization 
with regard to the level of compensation has lead to the application of several 
different standards in different countries, as well as to a tension between 
different international law fields, such as patent law, investment law and 
humanitarian law as described in the previous section.  
 
Notwithstanding such complex array of mechanisms to calculate the 
remuneration for non-authorized use of patented technologies, there seems to 
                                                 
 
 
772 See Posner, supra note 68, at p. 64-65, arguing that “full compensation would probably be a mistake 
even if subjective values could be determined accurately at law cost. It might induce overinvestment in 
property that the owner had reason to think was likely to be taken eventually by the government”. 
773 For a discussion on some of the contentious issues with regard to the application of investment law to 
patent protection and the issue of public health, see Castro, supra note 771.  
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be a practical convergence with regards to a level of payments, which often 
consist in royalties based upon the sales prices of patented products:   
 
“This practical tension highlights one of the paradoxes of the increasing 
legalization of trade relations--constructing a legal pathway to determining the 
question of 'adequate remuneration' is potentially fraught with complexity, and 
entails traversing competing doctrines and reconciling differing legal 
constructions (…) but these diverse ways of legalizing and constructing the 
question may in practice end up delivering very similar outcomes within a 
similar general band. Essentially, a 'reasonable' royalty might lie within the 
region of 3-5% of the sales price of the product delivered under the NVUA, or 
would at least fall between the truly nugatory (say, 0.1%) and the unrealistically 
high (say, 15%). This apparent paradox of legal analysis may be resolved by 
simply welcoming this convergence as a symptom of the greater practical 
coherence and mutual consistency of these sets of international norms that are 
often assumed to be at odds with one another, and assumed to express 
irreconcilably diverse values”774.  
 
Such alleged convergence might or might not mimic the optimal remuneration 
for the non-voluntary uses of a patent right. Nevertheless, in economic terms, 
the fact that most royalties might fluctuate between known reference points or 
percentages might entail potential savings in administrative costs related to the 
calculation of such remuneration when fixed thresholds are adopted, as it is the 
case with guidelines adopted by several countries for specific cases775. 
 
In any case, the compensation or remuneration for patent owners might reflect 
three possible levels with respect to the market price of the patented innovation. 
One possible level mimics the market price of the patented technology, as it 
happens with some compulsory licenses but also with reasonable royalties in 
the context of infringement. A second possible level surpasses such market 
price assuming a deterrent or punitive component as it happens with other 
doctrines on infringement damages such as lost profits776 and unjust 
enrichment but especially with punitive damages. A third possible level of 
compensation could be set below the market price threshold either due to 
                                                 
 
 
774 See Taubman, supra note 97. 
775 See JAMES LOVE, REMUNERATION GUIDELINES FOR NON-VOLUNTARY USE OF A PATENT ON MEDICAL 
TECHNOLOGIES, WHO/TCM/2005.1 (2005), available at http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/te 
chnical_cooperation/WHOTCM2005.1_OMS.pdf, referring to several cases including infringement cases, 
compulsory licenses, licenses of right and the special case of the waiver of article 31 (f) of the TRIPS 
Agreement and explaining and comparing the different approaches used to calculate the remuneration for 
patent holders.  
776 See Lemley supra note 621, analysing the reasonable royalties and lost profits thresholds and 
suggesting that the measure of reasonable royalties might produce higher levels of damages within the 
U.S. 
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humanitarian or other reasons of public interest or due to a punitive component 
against the patent holder, as it happens mostly in antitrust cases where the 
royalty can also be set at a zero price. Where the remuneration stands with 
respect to the market price will have effects in terms of economic incentives to 
innovate for the first and second innovators as well as the incentives to bargain 
for a license, incentives to settle or to continue litigation. The following table 
summarizes these choices: 
 
Table 1: level of remuneration or compensation  
Level of 
damages 
Infringement  Compulsory 
licensing 
Policy goals 
Zero No Antitrust Punish 
anticompetitive 
behavior 
Increase supply 
Decrease price 
Below market 
price 
Rarely (depends on 
jurisdiction) 
Public interest 
cases 
Antitrust 
Increase supply  
Decrease price 
 
Market price  Reasonable 
royalties 
Dependent patents 
Lack of working 
Compensation  
Above market 
price 
Punitive or treble 
damages 
 No Compensation  
Deterrence 
 
The following sections examine the different ways to estimate the remuneration 
in cases of non-authorized uses in the context of traditional compulsory licenses 
and also on patent infringement cases. The economic insights on the optimal 
level of compensation and deterrence are briefly reviewed and confronted with 
the available options to calculate the remuneration. With regards to the patent 
infringement case, a few remarks are provided about the main patent damages 
rules under a law and economics perspective with a special focus on the 
practice of granting forward-looking damages or ongoing royalties, a 
calculation that has taken place in recent cases applying the precedent of the 
U.S. Supreme Court in eBay. 
 
3.3 Remuneration for compulsory licenses after the TRIPS Agreement  
 
At first sight, the case of patent infringement and compulsory licensing for 
dependent patents and lack of working should be markedly different with 
regard to the remuneration of patent owners. Nonetheless, the level of 
remuneration tends to be linked in most debates and each level of 
compensation or remuneration to right owners seems to conduce to the other in 
the sense that the expected damages for patent infringement would most of the 
times influence the calculation of voluntary licenses and this latter would also 
exercise an influence over damage awards, which are often calculated with 
reference to a hypothetical royalty on a voluntary negotiation. Moreover, the 
remuneration in compulsory licenses is often calculated by referring the awards 
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of damages provided by courts and by the available royalties from voluntary 
deals777.  
 
Only the particular case of compulsory licenses for pharmaceutical patents 
under the Doha Declaration seems to follow a rather different and 
humanitarian policy goal of “access to medicines for all”, as stated in the Doha 
Declaration. Nonetheless, even in this special framework, several scholars have 
also defended the use of patent damage awards and voluntary licenses as 
applicable thresholds778. The most important problem of such approach is that 
the underlying policy goal of access to medicines might be contradicted if the 
level of remuneration is such that it does not solve the allocative efficiency 
problem of increasing supply and reducing the price:  
 
“By imposing the market cost as a compensation measure, countries will only 
issue a compulsory license when negotiation fails or the desired quantities 
cannot be produced by the patent owner. Such a system may create exactly the 
right kind of incentives” (footnotes omitted)779 
 
In effect, while creating, or better, maintaining the incentives for R&D 
embedded in patent law, a market compensation level might undermine the 
goal of access to medicines for all, if such goal implies a cost reduction. To be 
sure, in that case, compulsory licensing would only remain a viable option for 
the hold-up cases when the patent owner attempts to extract a supra monopoly 
rent780. 
 
In fact, the most developed discussion on the use of compulsory licensing and 
particularly on the remuneration regards the case of pharmaceutical patents, 
the Doha Declaration and the waiver of article 31 (f) of the TRIPS Agreement. In 
spite of the controversy that surrounds most aspects of this topic, the 
emergence of guidelines and country study cases demonstrate that the issue of 
remuneration is not impossible to solve, at least once the policy goals of the 
particular patent liability rule are clearly identified781.  
 
                                                 
 
 
777 See SCOTCHMER, supra note 29, at p. 211, referring to the circularity problem in the calculation of patent 
damages.  
778 See for instance Cahoy, supra note 766, emphasizing the importance of remuneration for the 
controversy over compulsory licensing. The author argues in favor of using a market value approach for 
the determination of the compensation due in compulsory licensing cases, nonetheless proposing a three-
tiered system that differentiates developed countries, developing countries and least-developed countries 
for the purposes of its calculation.  
779 Ibid, at p. 159.  
780 Ibid, at p. 160.  
781 See LOVE, supra note 775. 
Ex-post Liability Rules   
In Modern Patent Law  241  
 
 
In this particular case, the humanitarian and public health aspects differ widely 
from the high transaction environments and hold-ups that call for the use of 
other liability rules. Not only is the economic case different, but there are also 
distributional and equity concerns involved, that widely differ from the 
economic reasoning used so far in this thesis. Moreover, in the case of 
compulsory licensing to address public health concerns, these licenses are 
usually provided under the framework of governmental licenses, whereby the 
government covers (and attempts to diminish) the cost of the royalties even 
though the manufacturer might be the same government or a generic company. 
So, in these cases, the government has to pay both the royalties to the patent 
holder as well as the costs of manufacturing the generic medicines. Were the 
royalties to be fixed at the market level, the costs of issuing a compulsory 
license might be higher than the cost of manufacturing through the patent 
holder company, undermining the goal of this type of compulsory license, 
which is to reduce costs for the government acquisition of medicines with the 
aim of enhancing the access to medicines for the public782.  
 
The case is different in the context of dependent patents or lack of working 
when a competitor or potential competitor of the patent holder asks for a 
compulsory license or a damage award substituting an injunction in order to 
develop and commercialize a product that “uses” the previous patent. Through 
this action, the “beneficiary” of such liability rule would be advancing a goal of 
dynamic efficiency in the sense of providing a different product to consumers 
and maintaining the incentives to further develop patented technologies. The 
cases might coincide, especially under the test put forward by the eBay case, 
which foresees that the interest of the public should be taking into consideration 
in the decision regarding injunctive relief, but in principle, the economic 
rationale is different for patent liability rules aiming predominantly at dynamic 
efficiency goals and patent liability rules aiming predominantly at static 
efficiency goals  
 
3.4 Patent infringement: the goals of damages substituting injunctions 
 
An examination of patent remedies indicates that, as it is the case in other legal 
fields, remedies are envisaged both to compensate and deter infringing activity. 
However, available remedies are thought to have a complementary role; it is 
usually conceived that damages aim at compensating for past losses and 
injunctions at deterring future infringing activity. It is important however to 
acknowledge that damages can also have a deterrent effect provided they are 
set at a threshold that makes the infringing activity unprofitable, e.g. in the case 
                                                 
 
 
782 See LOVE, supra note 775. 
Ex-post Liability Rules   
In Modern Patent Law  242  
 
 
of punitive and enhanced damages783 whereas injunctions might and in fact do 
exert an effect on any possible settlement between the parties.  
 
The above considerations are fundamental both for understanding how 
damages might constitute an appropriate substitute for injunctions and in order 
to perform any comparison between different legislations. In such comparisons, 
it is important to take into consideration both the probability that an injunction 
will be granted and also the level of expected damages to be awarded. For 
instance, a country where damage awards are usually high and the possibility 
for enhanced or punitive damages exists, damage compensation in substitution 
of injunctions could still act as a quasi property rule, achieving both deterrence 
and compensation and sometimes even exceeding the optimal level for both 
goals. So, when a liability rule is warranted because the activity by the infringer 
would be efficient, and hence should not be deterred, high damages could take 
with one hand what the denial of injunctive relief had just given with the other. 
Conversely, when courts give relatively lower damage awards, which hence 
might not deter the infringing activity, the case for injunctions might be 
stronger in order to achieve an optimal level of deterrence. 
 
In fact, the possibility of awarding enhanced damages with regard to the 
calculation of prospective relief has been analyzed by scholars although it is not 
a factor that is usually considered by courts. The argument is that enhanced 
damages might truly substitute an injunction both by providing incentives for 
the infringer to negotiate a license as well as an economic incentive (or 
disincentive) to deter such infringing activity:  
 
“Although not as powerful as the threat of injunctive relief, the knowledge that 
going forward the court may enhance the reasonable royalty damages by up to 
a factor of three, could give the defendant an incentive to enter into a license. 
Moreover, for a patentee who truly wants to exclude the defendant from using 
the patentee’s patented technology, enhanced damages may provide a 
sufficiently high economic disincentive to achieve this result without injunctive 
relief. In any event, the potential award of enhanced damages for future 
infringement is an element that has been missing from the analyses to date”784. 
 
The problem, from a practical point of view, is to determine precisely where the 
optimal level stands, in order to know also the threshold beyond which, a 
damage award might be considered as equivalent to a property rule. Beyond 
                                                 
 
 
783 See Smith, supra note 92, arguing that punitive damages are property rules whereas damages granted 
at a reasonable royalty threshold are liability rules.  
784 See Newcombe et al., Prospective Relief for Patent Infringement in a Post-eBay World, NYU JOURNAL OF LAW 
AND BUSINESS, Vol. 4:549, at p. 576.  
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such level, it is useful to remind that the costs of property rules will once again 
enter into the picture785. 
 
Table 2: Damages calculations across different jurisdictions  
 Lost profits   Licensing fee Infringer’s profits Can the plaintiff 
choose? 
U.S.  35 USC Section 
284. 
Requirements: (1) 
demand; (2) 
marketing 
capacity; (3) 
absence of 
competition, 
non-infringing 
substitutes 
Fall-back 
provision where 
lost profits cannot 
be or 
are not claimed 
 
No Yes 
 
Japan Section 102(1) 
Patent 
Act: multiplication 
of infringer’s 
turnover with 
profits the 
patentee would 
have made for 
such a number of 
products. 
Marketing 
capacity of 
patentee must be 
proven 
Section 102(3) 
Patent Act: fall-
back provision; 
estimate of 
royalty rate 
 
Section 102(2) 
Patent Act. Not 
applicable where 
patent was not 
used by patentee 
 
Yes 
Germany Section 249 Civil 
Code: restitution 
of the status quo 
ante. Limitation by 
production 
capacity and proof 
that infringing 
product could act 
as a substitute 
Most common 
form of 
calculation, 
normally agreed 
upon in court 
settlement. No 
“infringer’s 
surcharge” can be 
claimed except for 
copyright matter 
(double royalty) 
Based on the legal 
fiction that 
infringer 
undertakes a 
business allocated 
to the patentee. 
Deduction of 
infringer’s  
expenses. 
Infringer’s 
marketing efforts 
taken into account 
Yes: claim for 
inspection 
of infringer’s 
accounts 
allowed prior to 
choice 
of calculation base 
 
UK Yes, likelihood of 
having 
made the 
infringer’s sales, 
deduction of 
infringer’s efforts 
to commercialize 
Yes, a notional 
royalty as 
the minimum of 
lost profits 
 
Yes, but rarely 
requested 
 
Yes, after review 
of the 
defendant’s 
commercial 
documents 
 
France Only if patent is 
used; 
calculated by 
amount of 
counterfeit 
Where the 
invention is not 
used. Infringer’s 
turnover 
multiplied by an 
No, clarified in 
Patent Act 
1968 
 
If patent is 
actually 
used: Yes 
 
                                                 
 
 
785 See Paul J. Heald, Optimal Remedies for Patent Infringement: A Transactional Model, JOHN M. OLIN LAW & 
ECON. WORKING PAPER NO. 431 (2D SERIES), (Sept. 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1278062, at 
p. 8, arguing that “If patent damages were set too high, excessive transaction costs would be incurred and 
innovation would be stunted. On the other hand, if damages are set too low, inventions will be 
misappropriated excessively, and both transacting and innovating would likely be deterred”.  
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products, loss 
of turnover 
(determined 
inter alia by the 
quality of 
the patent) and 
amount of 
lost profits. 
Market share 
of patentee 
considered 
appropriate 
royalty rate 
 
The Netherlands  
 
Same as Germany. 
Section 42(2) 
Patent Act 
1910, Section 70(3) 
Patent Act 1995 
Regarded as the 
minimum 
that can be 
claimed as lost 
profits 
 
Section 43(3) 
Patent Act 1910; 
Section 70(4) 
Patent Act 1995: 
the 
infringer should 
not be allowed to 
keep his profits 
Yes, after 
inspection of 
documents 
 
Source: Reitzig et al., 2007 and own elaboration.  
 
3.4.1 Post-eBay application  
 
Applying the eBay precedent, courts have been faced with the special case of 
calculating patent infringement damages in substitution for injunctive relief. 
With this respect, the position of courts has not been uniform. Some courts have 
awarded future damages786; some other courts have done nothing in the sense 
of declaring infringement and leaving it for the patentee to ask for future 
damages787 and some others have issued compulsory licenses788. 
 
These three approaches used by U.S. courts applying the eBay precedent can be 
analyzed from a cost-benefit point of view. The first option used by courts has 
been to apply some measure of past damages to future or prospective damages, 
by using the measure of reasonable royalties and not of lost profits. The 
calculation of reasonable royalties in the U.S. is largely focused on a 
hypothetical negotiation that is governed by the principles stated in Georgia-
Pacific, a series of 15 factors that might be taken into account when calculating 
such royalties. This method offers the advantage of being predictable and 
avoiding further litigation costs789. 
                                                 
 
 
786 See Newcombe et al., supra note 784 at p. 569, citing: Voda v. Cordis Corp., No. CIV-03-1512-L, 2006 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 63623 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 5, 2006) and Paice L.L.C. v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 2:04-CV-211, 2006 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61600 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006). However, in this latter case, the court imposed an 
“ongoing royalty that could be still considered as a compulsory licensing. In accordance to the authors: 
“The Federal Circuit has only just begun to express its views on the appropriateness of these varied 
remedies, allowing for the award of future infringement damages, which unlike a compulsory license, 
correctly keep the infringer in the status of an ongoing (and willful) infringer as opposed to a licensee”. 
787 Ibid citing z4 Tech., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437 (E.D. Tex. 2006). 
788 Ibid citing Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Group, No. 1:05-CV-264, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76380 (E.D. Tex. July 
7, 2006). To this, we could add Paice v. Toyota (depending on the view one holds about the differences 
between ongoing royalties and compulsory licenses) and Innogenetics v. Abbott, supra notes 462 and 463. 
789 Ibid at p. 570. 
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Under this option, error costs might however be large, especially when past 
damage awards are inexact. However, administrative costs would be lower 
than in the cases when another different calculation is needed for prospective 
damages. The question is whether the court should consider that circumstances 
have changed in the light of the decision of validity and infringement so as to 
affect the hypothetical negotiation that was previously used. In this sense, two 
positions are possible. Firstly, one could argue that there is no need for any 
change in the hypothetical negotiation setting790. However it could be counter-
argued that there is a need to take into consideration the change of 
circumstances after the decision of validity and infringement was taken791.  
 
A second alternative is that courts “do nothing” in a way similar to what a U.S. 
district court did when deciding the case of z4 v. Microsoft. In that case, the 
district court recognized that when a permanent injunction is denied, courts 
need to find an efficient method for the recovery of future monetary damages 
post-verdict. In the case, the court judged that such efficient method could 
consist in abstaining from calculating prospective damages so that the verdict 
on injunctive relief was the following:  
 
“The Court severs z4's causes of action for post-verdict infringement (…) and 
orders z4 to file an appropriate complaint within ten days of the issuance of this 
Memorandum Opinion and Order. The Court orders Microsoft to file an answer 
to z4's complaint within the normal time allotted under the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Furthermore, the Court orders Microsoft to file quarterly 
reports in the new action beginning on July 1, 2006 indicating the number of 
units sold with regard to all Microsoft products found to infringe z4's patents in 
this case. This will preserve z4's rights to future monetary damages in an 
efficient manner, while relieving Microsoft of the hardship and expense that 
would be occasioned by the issuance of a permanent injunction”792. 
 
                                                 
 
 
790 Ibid at p. 571 arguing that: “One might argue that that it is fair to assume that any agreement reached 
during a hypothetical “negotiation” runs for the life of the patent. Under this theory, the patentee’s victory 
at trial merely confirms certain key facts presumed during the hypothetical negotiation – validity and 
infringement – and validates the running royalty conceived in such a negotiation”. 
791 See Ibid at p. 571, quoting from Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., Nos. 2006-1610, -1631, 2007 
U.S. App. LEXIS 24357, at *51 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 18, 2007) (“pre-suit and post-judgment acts of 
infringement are distinct, and may warrant different royalty rates given the change in the 
parties’ legal relationship and other factors”). 
792 See z4 Tech., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 444-45 (E.D. Tex. 2006) 
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Such order has in effect been interpreted as equivalent to omitting the 
calculation of forward damages while leaving it for the plaintiff to file a 
separate (new) cause of action for post-verdict infringement793.  
 
A third option for courts is to issue a compulsory licensing. Commentators and 
courts have disagreed about whether there is any (relevant) difference between 
issuing ongoing royalties and a compulsory licensing. Some scholars argue that 
ongoing royalties are fundamentally different than compulsory licenses, 
especially as this latter mechanism somehow transforms the status of infringer 
into a forced licensee794. In spite of the legal subtleties that might differentiate 
the issuance of an ongoing royalty from a compulsory licensing, from a law and 
economics perspective both methods share an important number of similarities. 
As it was posed by Judge Rader’s dissent on Paice v. Toyota “calling a 
compulsory license an "ongoing royalty" does not make it any less a 
compulsory license”795.  
 
Nonetheless, Judge Rader based his dissent on the fact that district courts 
should not merely consider the possibility of allowing parties an opportunity to 
negotiate the terms of such license, which go beyond the calculation of the 
royalty, but that they should actually be compelled to do so in the light of the 
possible disruptive costs of issuing such compulsory licenses. The opportunity 
for parties to negotiate the terms of a license is, in the opinion of Judge Rader’s 
dissent what differentiates an “ongoing royalty” from a “compulsory license” 
and would as well eliminate the harmful effects of compulsory licensing796. 
 
It is doubtful, however, that such negotiations between the parties might indeed 
arrive at a more efficient calculation of the royalties after a costly litigation has 
been initiated and maintained for a long period of time: 
 
“It is far from clear that providing the opportunity to the parties – who have 
just fought for several years – one more opportunity to settle before the court 
                                                 
 
 
793 See ibid, at p. 573-574, arguing that: “the Court crafts such a remedy by severing z4's continuing causes 
of action for monetary damages due to Microsoft's continuing post-verdict infringement of z4's patents”. 
794 See Newcombe et al., supra note 784, at p. 575, arguing that: (“First, the “license” may give rise to cross-
licensing obligations, trigger most-favored-nation clauses whereby the patentee has to alter terms with 
other licenses, or affect any exclusive license that the patentee has granted. Second, a compulsory license 
changes the infringer’s status from an ongoing willful infringer to a licensed entity. That change in status 
could have major implications for determining whether a patentee is entitled to enhanced damages for 
future infringement”). 
795 Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., Nos. 2006-1610, -1631, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 24357, at 55 (Fed. Cir. 
Oct. 18, 2007) (Rader, J., concurring).  
796 Ibid, arguing that: “To avoid many of the disruptive implications of a royalty imposed as an alternative 
to the preferred remedy of exclusion, the trial court's discretion should not reach so far as to deny the 
parties a formal opportunity to set the terms of a royalty on their own. With such an opportunity in place, 
an ongoing royalty would be an ongoing royalty, not a compulsory license” 
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issues prospective relief will be a fruitful exercise once the threat of an 
injunction is eliminated (and setting aside the issue of enhanced damages). 
Other than eliminating future uncertainties on appeal and possible remand, 
there appears to be little incentive for the parties to reach such an agreement. 
The plaintiff is unlikely to accept a royalty rate less than the jury awarded and 
the defendant has no incentive to pay more than that amount”797 
 
Judge Rader’s dissent also focuses on the potential administrative costs that 
either option would impose to courts. Whereas the extrapolation of damages 
calculated for past infringement would entail lesser costs since it would not 
require an additional assessment of the changed circumstances, it would also 
impose potentially higher error costs:  
 
“Evidence and argument on royalty rates were, of course, presented during the 
course of the trial, for the purposes of assessing damages for Toyota’s past 
infringement. But pre-suit and post-judgment acts of infringement are distinct, 
and may warrant different royalty rates given the change in the parties’ legal 
relationship and other factors. When given choices between taking additional 
evidence or not, and between remanding to the parties or not, a district court 
may prefer the simplest course – impose its own compulsory license. This 
simplest course, however, affords the parties the least chance to inform the 
court of potential changes in the market or other circumstances that might affect 
the royalty rate reaching into the future”798. 
 
Finally, another important case of a district court applying the eBay precedent 
was that of Innogenetics v. Abbott, where the court granted an injunction 
accompanied with an ongoing royalty plus a fee corresponding to the entrance 
in the market. On appeal, the CAFC reversed the decision for abuse of 
discretion and denied the permanent injunction. The reason was that, in the 
opinion of the court, a market-fee entry plus ongoing royalty was considered to 
be sufficient to ensure the plaintiff’s relief and hence totally substituting the 
need for injunctive relief. In this case the court considered that forward-looking 
damages are a good substitute for injunctive relief799. The following table 
summarizes the different choices that courts might use in substituting an 
injunctive order with monetary damages.  
 
                                                 
 
 
797 See Newcombe et al. supra note 784, at p. 573.  
798 Ibid.  
799 See John Skenyon, Christopher Marchese and John Land, Patent Damages Law and Practice, § 
3:20.50, DATABASE UPDATED AUGUST 2008, referring also the case of Amado v. Microsoft Corp., 
517 F.3d 135 (Fed. Cir. 2008): “There, the district court awarded a post-verdict royalty which 
consisted of trebling of the original jury verdict rate of $.04 per unit. The Federal Circuit was 
"unable to determine" whether the award was reasonable or not, and it was vacated”. 
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Table 3: cost-benefits of damage calculation methods in post eBay cases 
Approach Benefits Costs Cases 
Extrapolating past 
damages for the future 
Less administrative 
costs  
More error costs Voda v. Cordis 
Corp. 
No calculus Less administrative 
and error costs  
Uncertainty 
Continuous 
litigation  
Z4 v. Microsoft 
Ongoing 
royalty/Compulsory 
licensing 
Less error costs More administrative 
costs 
Innogenetics v.  
Abbott  
Paice LLC v. 
Toyota Motor Co. 
Amado v. Microsoft 
License is imposed only if 
voluntary negotiations fail 
Administrative and 
error costs are saved 
if voluntary 
negotiations succeed 
Double transaction 
costs? Negotiation 
costs; plus 
administrative and 
error costs in case 
negotiations fail 
Paice L.L.C. v. 
Toyota Motor Co. 
(Judge Rader 
dissent) 
 
 
3.4.2 Law and Economics of Damage Remedies  
 
The majority of law and economics analysis considers that damage awards 
should achieve compensation and deterrence pursuant to the goal of providing 
(and preserving) sufficient incentives for innovation. Most economic models are 
based upon innovation incentives but face the difficulty of the changing 
economic landscape and function for patents. If indeed patents are not mainly 
or at least not necessarily conceived in the majority of industries as instruments 
to foster innovation incentives and if the optimal level of R&D is in itself 
difficult to be identified, a model based upon incentives to transact might be 
closer to the current problems of patent law. An alternative is then to consider 
optimal incentives to transact instead of optimal incentives to invest in R&D800, 
as has been recently proposed in an academic article taht develops a model to 
determine optimal remedies for patent infringement, based upon the optimal 
incentives to transact with patents.  
 
The model is arguably a better alternative to models based upon incentives for 
R&D, given the multiple problems of this latter approach. A normative 
conclusion of this model is that the use of per se rules such as the automatic rule 
for injunctive relief in place before the eBay decision should be abandoned. The 
model also suggests that the intention of the infringer and the cost of patent 
searches are taking into consideration in order to decide whether or not to 
                                                 
 
 
800 See Heald, supra note 785. 
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award injunctive relief as well as justifies an independent invention defense801. 
In spite of the inherent difficulty of calculating actual values, the model 
suggests some guidelines in order to determine whether or not to award extra-
compensatory damages802. In addition, the model argues in favor of using the 
unjust enrichment measure for calculating patent damages803, a standard for 
damage that was abandoned in the U.S. but is still applicable in several other 
countries. 
 
Economic analysis still has to produce more definite conclusions with regard to 
the optimal level of compensation for patent owners. In the meanwhile, it is 
important from a policy point of view to compare all the costs and all the 
benefits associated with the use of property and liability rules to protect patent 
rights.  
4 Other costs of Patent Liability Rules 
4.1 Interference with bargaining outcomes 
Many commentators have argued that liability rules disfavor the voluntary 
bargaining between the parties, a solution that would be better if compared 
with a forced license. This is because parties themselves are supposed to be 
better able to negotiate all terms of a license, including the royalties. In this 
light, property rules have been defended as a better mechanism to induce 
efficient bargaining between the parties and the emergence of contractually 
negotiated mechanisms such as patent pools and their equivalents in copyright 
law804.  
 
However, some of these comments disregard the potential emergence of 
strategic behavior which is precisely what precludes an efficient bargaining 
between the parties. In fact, it is in the context of patent pools and specifically 
during the negotiation of technological standards that some of the most recent 
cases of hold-ups (so called patent ambushes) have taken place. As Shapiro has 
described, it is possible to differentiate between different types of transactions 
costs and whereas patent pools and collective organizations can help to 
decrease the transaction costs related with the presence of multiple parties and 
                                                 
 
 
801 See Heald, supra note 785, arguing that courts should not increase the award of damages or accord 
injunctive relief where the defendant has engaged in a reasonable search before infringement and yet 
failed to discover the plaintiff’s patent.  
802 Ibid, explaining that: “Along with the eBay decision, the model supports the other important CAFC 
decision in the case, which also disfavor the automatic application of a rule that indicated the use of treble 
damages when a failure to search patents occurred. The decision in Seagate, takes into account the 
possibility that sometimes, patent searching would be inefficient, and enhance damages would be over-
deterrent under such circumstances (…). 
803 Ibid, arguing that: “Economic research has yet to . . . offer any efficiency argument for the abandonment 
of unjust enrichment, the most commonly used regime into the 1960.” 
804 See Merges, supra note 114 and Kieff supra note 124.  
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the necessity to clear many rights, they are doubtfully capable of dealing with 
potential hold-up805.  
 
4.2 Ex-post liability rules and legal uncertainty 
 
Whether strict rules or flexible standards should govern the protection of patent 
rights has been the object of long discussions and growing interest by scholars, 
courts and policy-makers. For instance, the rule for equitable relief as 
interpreted by eBay while being part of a historical tradition, poses new issues 
in the context of IP and innovation in our days. On the one hand, allowing more 
discretion to district courts might increase uncertainty. This can be detrimental 
especially for technological fields requiring great amounts of investment and 
surrounded by uncertain results, which is the typical case of the pharmaceutical 
and biotech industries. On the other hand, the fact that courts can apply the 
four-factor test in the light of particular circumstances can be welcomed as 
technologies change, become more complex and are poorly understood by 
policy makers and as different costs and incentives are in place for different 
industries while patent law remains inherently uniform806.  
 
In this sense, if patent policy is guided by efficiency, it must attempt to balance 
legal certainty with the capacity to adapt to technological changes or else risk 
that rules become obsolete and hinder rather than foster innovation. This 
balance is easier to achieve through equity decisions adapted to particular 
circumstances such as the increasing number and importance of multi-
component industries, patenting information-based products and the 
emergence of patent-thickets and anti-commons.  
 
The application of the four-factor test after the eBay case has indeed been 
characterized by legal uncertainty. In fact, the same eBay decision did not 
provide enough guidance for district courts relative to the task imposed upon 
them, resulting in some conflicting decisions807. Nonetheless, such legal 
uncertainty should be compared with the costs arising from the use of a rigid or 
categorical rule awarding injunctive relief, which was not only rejected by the 
U.S. Supreme Court in eBay but that is also not in tune with the analysis 
presented in the previous chapters with regard to emerging “strategic 
behaviour” practices of patentees.  
                                                 
 
 
805 See Shapiro, supra note 5.  
806 See Carroll, supra note 56. 
807 See supra notes 457 and 458 as well as accompanying text.  
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5 Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Rules 
The prospective costs and benefits of protecting patents through a property or a 
liability rule should be measured either in static or dynamic efficiency terms. In 
fact, whereas the traditional justification of patent compulsory licensing 
provisions has been posed in static efficiency terms, the newest literature 
examining the denial of injunctions and the case law adopting this                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
form of ex post patent liability rules has underlined the potential losses from the 
use of property rules in environments with high transaction costs and strategic 
behavior from the perspective of static and dynamic efficiency losses808:  
 
(1) The static efficiency losses that arise from the ability of 1st innovators of 
extracting rents from a holdup due to the highest prices imposed to both 
second innovators and final users. With regard to the relationship between the 
first and second innovators, there are also distributional consequences in the 
sense that the ability of holding-up puts the 1st innovator in a bargaining 
position that allows her to extract a higher surplus at the cost of the 2nd 
innovator surplus.  
 
(2) The dynamic efficiency losses that arise when, given the distributional 
consequences favoring 1st innovators at the cost of the surplus of 2nd innovators; 
the second innovator anticipates such windfall and limits or abstains from 
investing in a second innovation. Such losses might be higher in the presence of 
multi-component innovations, where the possibility that each 1st innovator 
extracts similar rents might amount to royalty stacking.  
 
(3) Dynamic efficiency losses due to rent-seeking “investments” of 1st 
innovators to induce hold-ups through the use of filling strategies such as 
increasing the number of patent applications over slightly different 
technologies, drafting complex and numerous claims, filling continuations and 
divisional applications. These practices might lead to a more general effect, 
which cancels out the capacity of the patent system of disclosing efficient 
information and providing efficient notice of patented innovations.  
 
(4) Investments of 2nd innovators to avoid hold-ups among other activities in 
inefficient patent searching, i.e. searching beyond reasonable and rational 
terms, which precisely responds to the presence of filing strategies, patent 
thickets and in general, the increasing number and complexity of patent 
documents and the inefficiency of the patent notice system. 
 
5.1 A comparative overview of costs and benefits of rules 
                                                 
 
 
808 This section draws on the analysis contained in Cotter, supra note 38; BESSEN AND MEURER, supra note 
14 and Lemley & Weiser, supra note 72. 
Ex-post Liability Rules   
In Modern Patent Law  252  
 
 
 
Combining the choice of type of protection (property rule or liability rule) and 
the type of interpretation to apply such protection (whether it is a per se rule or 
rule of reason) we might obtain four possible combinations. However the table 
below differentiates between liability rules, according to whether the reasons 
for basis for applying to such rule is a ban on strategic bheavior or whether it is 
based upon a compulsory license on non-working or dependent patents. The 
tables below reflect an overview of the costs and benefits of such possible 
combinations.  
 
Rule v. Standard Exceptions Entitlements Examples 
1. Strict property 
rule 
-Subject to a per se 
rule 
 
-Only public 
interest exceptions  
-Right holder always 
gets injunction against 
infringement 
-Pre-eBay decisions; 
Continental Europe; 
U.K. 
2. Property rule 
-Subject to a rule of 
reason/standard 
-Ban on strategic 
behavior  
-Right holder gets 
injunction unless there 
are (either intention or 
presumption) of hold-
up 
- If hold-ups occur  
- Decisions applying 
eBay v. MercExchange 
3. Liability rule  
-Subject to a rule of 
reason/standard  
-Ban on strategic 
behaviour 
- Right holder is 
entitled to injunction 
unless infringer applies 
for liability rule 
- Balancing test where 
right holder gets 
injunction unless the 
balance of hardship 
favors defendant in 
some U.K. decisions  
-or, compulsory 
licensing as a defense 
for some (good faith) 
infringers 
4. Liability rule  
-Subject to a rule of 
reason/standard  
-Non-working 
innovations 
-Dependent 
innovations 
- 2nd innovator is 
entitled to compulsory 
license under grounds 
established by law 
-compulsory licensing 
for either infringers (ex-
post) or non-infringers 
(ex-ante) 
5. Liability rule 
-Subject to a per se 
rule  
-None, the property 
rule is transformed 
into a right to 
compensation  
- 2nd innovator is 
always entitled to 
apply to a compulsory 
license  
-Not possible for WTO 
country members 
 
 
Nonetheless, rule number (3) and rule number (4) are both ex post liability rules 
subject to a rule of reason and only differing on whether infringers might also 
be entitled to a compulsory license, hence, in the following analysis, they are 
treated as one rule, obtaining the possible combinations ranging from a 
protection favoring property rules to one favoring liability rules through a per se 
rule and the intermediate choices of rules of reasons or standards favoring 
either a property or a liability rule.  
Ex-post Liability Rules   
In Modern Patent Law  253  
 
 
 
Rule 1: property rule subject to a per se rule 
 
A cost-benefit analysis: private costs and benefits 
 Potential costs Potential benefits 
1st innovator 
 
-Inefficient investments in 
filing/negotiation strategies 
-Higher rents 
2nd innovator 
 
 -Inefficient investments in 
previous patent search 
 
-None  
 
A cost-benefit analysis: social costs and benefits 
 Potential costs Potential benefits 
Society  -Misalignment of incentives 
which might be not 
proportional to the value of 
innovation 
-Inefficient investments in 
previous patent search 
-Inefficient investments in 
filing/negotiation strategies 
-Higher prices for final 
consumers 
-Less incentives for 2nd 
innovators 
-Higher prices for 2nd 
innovators, possibly royalty 
stacking   
-Incentives to invest in 
(patentable) R&D 
-Saved administrative and 
error costs in analyzing both 
the grounds to switch into a 
liability rule and deciding any 
possible compensation.  
 
Rule 2: property rule subject to a rule of reason (ex post liability rule) 
A cost-benefit analysis: private costs and benefits 
 Potential costs Potential benefits 
1st innovator 
 
-Rents from hold-up -Rents from a property rule 
2nd innovator 
 
 -Less search costs 1st 
innovations 
 
A cost-benefit analysis: social costs and benefits 
 Potential costs Potential benefits 
Society -Prices might still be high for 
final consumers 
-Administrative and error 
costs 
 
-Incentives to invest in 
(patentable) R&D 
- Less inefficient investments 
in previous patent search 
-Less inefficient investments 
in filing/negotiation 
strategies 
 
Rule 3: liability rule subject to a rule of reason 
A cost-benefit analysis: private costs and benefits 
 Potential costs Potential benefits 
1st innovator 
 
-Lower rents 
-Less bargaining power 
 
2nd innovator -Subject to the interpretation - Less search costs 
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 of the court 
 
A cost-benefit analysis: social costs and benefits 
 Potential costs Potential benefits 
Society  -administrative and error 
costs in analyzing the 
grounds to switch into a 
liability rule 
-administrative and error 
costs in calculating the 
royalties 
 
 
Rule 4: liability rule subject to a per se rule 
A cost-benefit analysis: private costs and benefits 
 Potential costs Potential benefits 
1st innovator 
 
-Lower rents 
-Less bargaining power 
 
2nd innovator 
 
 -Higher rents 
-More bargaining power 
 
A cost-benefit analysis: social costs and benefits 
 Potential costs Potential benefits 
Society -administrative and error 
costs in calculating the 
royalties 
-less incentives to invest in 1st 
innovations 
-saved administrative and 
error costs in analyzing the 
grounds to switch into a 
liability rule 
-more incentives to invest in 
2nd innovations when benefits 
surpass costs 
6 Conclusions 
This chapter focused on the cost side of patent liability rules. As it is often 
argued in economics as well as legal studies, the administration of liability rules 
imposes important costs. In particular, the calculation of the appropriate 
compensation for patent owners is often presented as so difficult and costly as 
to make property rules look preferable in comparison.  
 
Contrary to this view, there is a recently growing understanding that property 
rules might also impose costs of their own in a significant magnitude. This is 
the case of patent law, where the boundaries of patented inventions are often 
unclear and embedded in increasingly complex claims. Before this reality, the 
task of mimicking the market through the calculation of the optimal 
remuneration might indeed be less costly, at least in some cases. Pursuant to the 
analysis of previous chapters, this would be the case in the presence of patent 
strategic behavior. 
 
In addition, and without attempting to enter in the specialized field of damage 
calculation, this chapter compared the methods used to calculate remuneration 
focusing especially on the new sub-set of cases from the U.S. as they present 
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some alternatives to more traditional ways of calculating the remuneration 
under a liability rule. Notwithstanding the important differences between the 
context of compulsory licenses and damage calculation in patent infringement 
cases as well as the differences pertaining to each national law, the principles 
underlining patent protection suggest that the difficulties surrounding this 
calculation are not insurmountable. Moreover, such difficulties should be 
always compared with the costs associated with the use of pure property rules 
as neither option is free from costs. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS  
 
 
This research began with the objective of providing new insights on the use of 
liability rules to protect patent entitlements. The project was ambitious since the 
economic analysis of patents is a well-developed field and the particular 
framework of property and liability rules had already been examined by 
renowned economic and legal scholars. Nonetheless, previous research had 
resulted in contradictory callings for and against liability rules in patent law 
and, in effect, an interesting controversy surrounded the possibility of limiting 
the exclusivity of patent rights. A large amount of previous discussions focused 
either on the use of compulsory licensing provisions in the context of the 
implementation of the TRIPS Agreement, the Doha Declaration and access to 
medicines, or on the interface of IP rights and antitrust regulation. In contrast 
with the important amount of literature produced about these cases, many 
studies highlighted the fact that patent liability rules were seldom used in 
practice.  
 
Soon after this research was initiated, the case of NTP v. Research in Motion809 
(RIM) regarding some patents held by the former company and used in the 
BlackBerry manufactured by RIM, captured the attention of the patent 
community. The case was also popular among the public opinion as the news 
warned about the possibility that an injunctive order against RIM would have 
shutdown the whole service for users of this device. Following the denial of 
certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court, the controversy was settled on March 
2006. Hence, in spite of the great amount of discussion generated by scholars, a 
decision addressing the potential disruptive effects of a property rule did not 
arrive at that time. 
 
Nonetheless, a similar casepromptly arrived as the U.S. Supreme Court granted 
certiorari on the case of eBay v. MercExchange810, which likewise regarded a 
patent holder that did not practice her patents and threatened to shut down a 
popular website for online trading. The U.S. Supreme Court decision of 2006 
                                                 
 
 
809 See supra notes 390, 414 and 415 and accompanying text. 
810 See eBay v. MercExchange, supra note 2, and Chapter III, section 3.1. “The eBay case”; explaining the case 
and the decision by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
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served as the starting point of a line of patent infringement cases using a factual 
test in order to consider whether or not to grant injunctive relief. Scholarly 
controversy rapidly flourished, but most discussions focused on the issue of 
holdups and specifically on the emergence of a particular type of firms 
sometimes denominated as “patent trolls” or “non-manufacturing entities”.  
 
Such case law provided a unique opportunity to produce new insights under a 
widely known framework as the property and liability rules. The research plan 
was to provide a comparative view of several patent systems using a law and 
economics methodology to examine patent liability rules. Besides attempting to 
analyze this new case law, this research work examined a variety of cases 
addressing different inter-related problems. Finding a sub-set of cases that 
could be compared to those applying the eBay precedent in the U.S. was a 
difficult task. On the one hand, the equitable nature of injunctions can only be 
found in common law countries. On the other hand, the counterpart sub-set of 
cases applying compulsory licenses are few and dispersed throughout the 
world. Nonetheless, the framework of property and liability rules is precisely 
useful in that it allows -if broadly interpreted- bringing together a wider 
number of cases apparently different from the legal point of view but sharing 
the important feature of transforming the way in which patent entitlements are 
protected.   
 
A number of fruitful conclusions emerged precisely from the fact that the 
“liability rules” label describes such varied cases where patent rights are 
protected through a right to get a remuneration that substitutes the right to 
exclude. This conclusive chapter provides an overview of the findings of each 
chapter, the main implications of the findings of this research both for 
theoretical and policy discussions as well as some suggestions for future 
research.  
 
1 The research question 
 
The central question of this Thesis was whether and to what extent can the use 
of liability rules for patent protection be supported on efficiency grounds. In 
order to answer this question, the Thesis analyzed the use of patent liability 
rules from a historic, economic as well as a legal point of view while developing 
and then focusing on the concept of ex-post liability rules as currently applied in 
the patent field. The answer to the research question was affirmative in the 
sense that, under certain circumstances, the use of patent liability rules might be 
superior in efficiency terms. The most difficult issue, to which the Thesis 
provides a partial answer, is the identification of such circumstances as well as 
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the evaluation of the (potential) costs and (potential) benefits of both property 
and liability rule in the context of patent law.  
 
2 Findings of the research  
 
The findings of this research may contribute in several ways to current 
theoretical and policy discussions in the patent field. In particular, each chapter 
aimed at testing the general research question from a different perspective and 
allowed a particular contribution. 
 
2.1 Chapter I 
 
The first chapter undertook a review of the literature addressing property and 
liability rules both in general and with regards to IP and patent law in 
particular. Solid theoretical reasons were found in the law and economics 
literature that support the use of liability rules in many fields, including patent 
law. A basic insight from the law and economics literature is that liability rules 
are superior to property rules when transaction costs are high in comparison 
with the administrative costs inherent to the administration of property rules. 
Whereas such normative proposition has been the subject of multiple 
extensions and critics, its explanatory logic continues to be applicable to 
multiple legal problems. In this sense, the literature on entitlements conceives 
property and liability rules as alternatives to protect entitlements according to 
the relative costs and benefits of each rule.  
 
In the light of this framework, the first chapter undertook a critical review of 
the application of these insights to the IP field. In spite of the divergences in the 
patent economics literature, a recurring concern regards the potential costs of 
strategic behavior and the potential excesses of patent protection. In contrast to 
this, however, the application of the entitlements literature to the IP and patent 
fields has been rooted in a restricted view.  
 
One contribution of this chapter was bringing together the insights developed 
by recent patent literature focussing on transaction costs in the patent field and 
the specific consequences of patent strategic behavior together with the insights 
from a long-standing application of compulsory licensing provisions in patent 
law. The most recent patent literature has addressed the use of a type of liability 
rule administered by courts that deny property rule protection in some patent 
infringement cases and limit the relief of patentees to the grant of damage 
compensation.  
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In this sense, the chapter set up the framework for the following chapters that 
analyze both types of ex post liability rules for the patent case, keeping in mind 
that one type of liability rule is usually included in substantive provisions of 
patent law, whereas the other belongs to enforcement or procedural rules. In 
particular, the second and third chapter analyzed both types of rules from a 
historical and legal perspective, keeping in mind the law and economics 
framework that makes it possible to bring them together under the liability 
rules umbrella.  
 
2.2 Chapter II 
 
The second chapter focused on the use of patent liability rules from a historical 
viewpoint. The choice of incorporating a historical perspective had a special 
advantage for this particular research question. The use of patent liability rules 
as well as other inter-linked patent controversies has historically emerged at 
different times. The problems faced by today’s patent system are driven by the 
particular features of modern and high technologies and indeed far away from 
the mechanical type of invention that was the prototype that experts had in 
mind when drafting the first national and international patent statutes. 
Nonetheless, the lessons from the most important patent reforms and processes 
of harmonization can still enlighten many modern patent law discussions. 
 
The main lesson from history is that liability rules have actually played an 
important role throughout the history of patents. The first example of liability 
rules were compulsory licensing provisions when a patent was not worked in 
the country granting protection. In their origin, hence, compulsory licenses 
created a balancing mechanism that was incorporated in the international 
system to substitute the much harsher measure of patent forfeiture in cases of 
lack of national or local production. Hence, compulsory licensing entered into 
the patent landscape as an improvement in the protection of patentees at the 
same time that it allowed countries to continue the defense of their national 
spaces by maintaining local requirements.  
 
Another important lesson from history is that, on the one hand, the extension of 
patent protection, and on the other hand, the limitations and exceptions of 
patent law, have clearly oscillated with time. Traditional compulsory licensing 
provisions have already been the object of much discussion and analysis. In 
contrast, the importance that enforcement provisions might have for the use of 
liability rules in patent law was far less known until recently and may indicate a 
fluctuation in patent law, this time towards a more restricted view on patent 
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protection. The 2006 decision on the eBay case could be in fact understood as 
part of a broader trend towards restraining an excessive expansion of patent 
protection in the U.S.811.  
 
In the international context, important requirements for the use of liability rules 
were set for by the TRIPS Agreement and in fact, a great amount of the 
controversy after the enactment of the TRIPS referred to the limitations on the 
use of compulsory licenses812. In contrast with substantive patent law 
harmonization, enforcement is a late comer in the international arena and 
mostly remains a national issue depending on each country’s legal system and 
traditions. The possibility of denying injunctions, subjecting them to equitable 
considerations that vary case-by case is rooted in the common law distinction of 
courts of equity and courts of common law, while a largely different approach 
is used by civil law countries where legal analysis has emphasized rights over 
remedies. Nonetheless, countries that view IP rights as absolute rights have 
always conceived them, to a varying extent, as limited rights. Such limits are 
set, among other doctrines by the application of compulsory licenses.  
 
An observation that emerged was that common law countries have historically 
conceived injunctions as an equitable remedy and hence subjected the award of 
this remedy to a factual test that aims at striking a balance between the 
particular circumstances of the case. Nevertheless, a glimpse into the law as it is 
actually practiced showed how injunctions have been habitually awarded in 
patent cases while the conception of remedies has evolved -mainly but not only 
through the use of economic arguments- towards favoring the use of strong 
property rules. This situation was more extremely in the U.S., yet it was 
recently reversed by the eBay decision. 
 
The situation is –at least apparently- different in civil law countries, due to a 
diverse conception over rights and remedies where injunctions are often 
conceived as a right, or inherently inseparable from the right. The law in books 
in many countries usually follows a language similar to that of article 44 of the 
TRIPS Agreement, which only obliges countries to grant the authority to judges 
in order to issue injunctions without compelling them to do so in all cases. 
However, the law in action seems to reflect that a plaintiff whose patent right is 
infringed is entitled to obtain injunctive relief.  
 
In this sense, the chapter analyzed the interface between rights and remedies 
that allows countries from different legal systems to converge in the law in 
                                                 
 
 
811 This interpretation could be valid if the eBay decision is analyzed in the context of other recent decisions 
by the U.S. Supreme Court mentioned in supra note 314.  
812 See Chapter II, Section 3.3.1. Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement”.  
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books and diverge in the law in action. It seems that in the light of the 
information available at our times, no system can be considered a priori as more 
efficient according to whether remedies dictate or are separated from the nature 
of rights. This is even more important in a dynamic field as patent law, where 
the progress of technology demands the ability of adapting to the particular 
challenges of this field. 
 
2.3 Chapter III 
 
The third chapter developed the concept of ex post liability rules for patents in 
order to compare and analyze these provisions in patent law. The analysis 
referred to the international level as well as to three specific national patent 
laws: the U.S., the U.K. and Italy. Some important conclusions were drawn from 
each specific case. In the U.S. the emphasis of scholarly work and case law has 
been given to the problems of patent hold-ups, the strategic use of patenting by 
businesses characterized as “trolls” and the increasing multi-component nature 
of current technologies. In contrast, U.S. patent law seemed to sustain the view 
that patentees are free to choose whether to practice or not their inventions and 
should not, in general, be compelled to license them. This view is reflected in 
the absence of specific regimes of compulsory licenses for non-working or for 
dependent patents.  
 
The U.K. patent law is an interesting case to understand the interface between 
remedies-based and compulsory licensing provisions. Whereas injunctions can 
be denied under equitable considerations, it has been commonly argued that 
the problems of strategic use of patents, the risk of blocking further 
technologies and the lack of use of technologies could be better dealt through 
the use of compulsory licensing provisions. Nevertheless, the denial of 
injunctions has also served to tackle extreme cases of “oppression” by right 
holders without admitting a “balance of convenience” test813. 
 
The Italian case highlights the differences in the conception of rights and 
remedies within civil law countries yet the surprising similarity of arguments 
with respect to IP remedies. A particular reference was made to preliminary 
injunctions, which frequently put an end to potentially long trial procedures 
performing a role similar to property rules in other systems. The reasoning of 
courts in patent infringement cases has sometimes favored a strong property 
rule in the sense that some Italian courts have presumed the requirement of 
                                                 
 
 
813 See Jaggard v Sawyer, supra note 293, arguing that the balancing test is one of oppression, and the court 
should not slide into application of a general balance of convenience test.  
Ex-post Liability Rules   
In Modern Patent Law  262  
 
 
“periculum in mora” in re ipsa for patent infringement cases. The outcome is 
similar to the application of an “automatic injunction rule” in the U.S. and 
hence, some courts have “tilted the table” in favor of patent owners that can 
easily obtain a preliminary injunction that sets up favorable terms for a 
settlement814. This could pose particular problems, especially in certain sectors, 
such as the pharmaceutical industry where delays in allowing the entrance of 
generic products can generate significant welfare losses.  
 
In addition to these particular conclusions by country, the comparative 
examination performed in this Thesis, produced some suggestions to improve 
the use of patent liability rules. For instance, the eBay case, highlights that 
compulsory licensing might contribute to dynamic efficiency when strategic 
behavior might otherwise preclude follow-on innovation. Secondly, while a 
question mark surrounds the practical utility of compulsory licenses as they are 
seldom used815, the rule applied in the eBay case suggests an important 
deficiency of traditional compulsory licenses which are seldom available in 
cases of patent infringement.  
 
The chapter also identified how a common concern with regards to the use of 
liability rules across several jurisdictions and times is the difficulty and cost that 
a court (or agency) would face in order to calculate damages that substitute an 
injunction and the interpretation of the sound grounds to provide a compulsory 
license. 
 
2.4 Chapter IV 
 
The first chapters focused on a positive analysis and hence on the questions of 
when and how are patent liability rules used. This chapter instead addressed 
the normative question of when should patent liability rules be used. From a 
law and economics perspective, several misconstructions on the application of 
the liability rules framework to patent law were found. Whereas studies justify 
the use of liability rules upon the presence of high transaction costs, including 
strategic behavior; recent discussions on the use of patent liability rules have 
tended to focus on the problem of patent hold-ups. The adoption of such 
                                                 
 
 
814 See Lanjouw & Lerner, supra note 606, using the term “tilting the table” to describe the effect of 
preliminary injunctions in the U.S. 
815 Nonetheless, it is often argued that compulsory licenses have an important effect as negotiations 
happen in the shadow of such rules but any blocking effect would prevail in case they are not used 
because of an inefficient design. Below we explain some of the features that might lead to such inefficient 
design. One of these is the fact that they are not available as a defense within patent infringement cases, at 
least for the case of inadvertent or good-faith infringers.   
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narrow focus is mainly due to the fact that discussions have mostly followed 
the renowned U.S. case of eBay.  
 
In addition, some studies have proposed a narrow definition of patent hold-ups 
and suggested that the use of patent liability rules be limited to a very specific 
context with particularly restrictive assumptions. Furthermore, another 
extremely narrow approach is to focus on the figure of patent trolls as business 
entities that make use of their patents mainly through litigation and the threat 
of using litigation in order to extract large settlements above the economic value 
of their patents. The principal message of this chapter was that such restricted 
views are misleading in that they might improperly suggest condemning 
efficient behavior while still tolerating inefficient behavior from patentees. 
 
In contrast, an alternative view of the question of when should patent ex-post 
liability rules be used was provided. The main insights generated by the 
analysis of national practices holds that problematic cases refer to patent hold-
ups but also the problem of sequential and incremental innovation and the 
potential bargaining breakdown that might occur between the involved parties. 
A broader concept of strategic behavior was then proposed in this chapter that 
might offer guidance as to when a liability rule might offer a superior outcome 
in terms of efficiency. 
 
Patent hold-ups have been furthermore linked to a particular type of patents, 
i.e. patents on business methods and to a particular sector, i.e. the information 
and communication technologies. Based upon those premises, it has been often 
argued that Europe is immunized from the emergence of some of the problems 
recently faced in the U.S. patent system. This chapter contributed to such debate 
by examining the main features of the European landscape that are associated 
or might be related with high transaction costs and patent strategic behavior. 
Several recent studies have found an emergence of patent strategies both 
related to the filing of single applications, management of patent portfolios and 
litigation of specific patents.  
 
A particular sector, as the pharmaceutical, which has been distinguigshed from 
the problematic features of sectors such as information and communication 
technologies and where patents are said to play a major role, wwas recently 
confronted with the results of a recent inquiry performed by the European 
Commission on the European Pharmaceutical sector. This inquiry put in 
evidence the increasing frequency and importance of strategic practices with 
regard to pharmaceutical patents, which might potentially affect innovation 
incentives as well as create unduly burdens for citizens in such a vital sector as 
health.  
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2.5 Chapter V 
 
The last chapter of this thesis concentrated on the cost side of patent liability 
rules. As it is often argued in economics as well as legal studies, the 
administration of liability rules might impose important costs. It is often 
mentioned that the calculation of the appropriate compensation for patent 
owners would be so difficult and costly that property rules would be preferable 
in comparison.  
 
Contrary to this view, is the recent understanding that property rules might 
also impose significant costs, for instance when the boundaries of patented 
inventions are unclear and entrenched in increasingly complex patent claims. 
Facing this reality, the calculation of the optimal remuneration might indeed be 
less costly, at least in some cases. Coinciding with the analysis of previous 
chapters, this would be the case in the presence of patent strategic behavior. 
 
In addition, and without attempting to enter in the specialized field of damage 
calculation, this chapter compared the methods used to calculate remuneration 
focusing especially on the new sub-set of cases from the U.S. as they present 
some alternatives to more traditional ways of calculating the remuneration 
under a liability rule. Notwithstanding the important differences between the 
context of compulsory licenses and damage calculation in patent infringement 
cases as well as the differences pertaining to each national law, the principles 
underlying patent protection suggest that the difficulties surrounding this 
calculation are not insurmountable. Moreover, such difficulties should be 
compared with the costs associated with the use of pure property rules.  
 
3 Impact and applications of this research 
 
3.1 Lessons from the entitlements literature to the patent field   
 
The application of the property and liability rules framework to the particular 
case of patent law has produced several interesting findings. In particular, this 
research allowed clarifying several points of misunderstanding which had 
biased the use of liability rules to protect patent rights. A first finding regards 
some deficiencies of previous theoretical analysis based upon a limited view of 
patent law. In spite of the long-lasting presence of compulsory licensing 
provisions in patent law, their study has been largely confined. For instance, a 
first commonly stated view is that patent compulsory licensing provisions were 
largely absent from U.S. law. A second commonly held view is that patent 
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compulsory licensing is potentially beneficial from a static efficiency viewpoint 
while it is detrimental from a dynamic efficiency viewpoint.  
 
Contrary to such views, this research found that the presence of liability rules in 
patent law has only oscillated in time. Likewise, it was highlighted how this 
presence has also permeated U.S. patent law, as demonstrated by the new wake 
of cases after eBay but also through historical examples of the application of 
compulsory licenses by antitrust authorities. In addition, this research showed 
how, in some situations, protecting a patent through a liability rule can achieve 
objectives of dynamic as well as static efficiency. This is the case when a 
property rule would otherwise preclude further investments in R&D activity 
due to the fear of being exposed to patent strategic behavior. 
 
In addition, the recent case of eBay in the U.S. has re-opened discussions about 
the use of patent liability rules but has also been similarly surrounded by a 
number of debatable conclusions. A first misunderstanding is reflected in the 
narrow view that liability rules are only justified when hold-ups are frequent; 
costly in comparison with the purported costs of liability rules and cannot be 
solved by means of contractual agreement by the interested parties. Contrary to 
this view, this research shows that law and economics supports the use of 
patent liability rules in a wider number of cases. More in general, those cases 
would arise when patent strategic behavior imposes costs higher than those 
arising from the switch to a liability rule.  
 
A second contentious view is that the eBay decision and applications of this 
precedent is only possible in the framework of equitable doctrines in common 
law countries. Conversely, patent liability rules nowadays tend to converge into 
a model of ex post rules, under a case-by-case reasoning that fully considers the 
particular circumstances of the case. Thus, even though it might be easier to 
imagine such type of liability rule in a common law country, a similar reasoning 
might be applied with respect to compulsory licenses for patents in civil law 
countries as well.  
 
3.2 Patent policy: efficiency and other goals of public interest  
 
This thesis used economic analysis in order to analyze the use of ex-post liability 
rules in patent law. Under an economic approach to law, the guiding policy 
principle is that of efficiency. However, an important concern that was reflected 
throughout the analysis is the presence of other important public interest goals 
in patent law. Indeed, the interface between efficiency and those other public 
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interest goals, such as fairness and distributive concerns has been reiteratively 
the object of multiple discussions within and outside of the patent realm816.  
 
Under the law and economics literature patents are mainly justified as 
temporary exclusive rights that foster innovation incentives. However, and 
consequent to the conclusions of this research, the guiding principle of 
efficiency requires that exclusive rights over technological and scientific 
knowledge do not preclude their further advancement. Efficiency indeed 
suggests that patent rights should not extend beyond a social optimal in order 
to avoid that patents encroach upon other goals such as access to knowledge. In 
a similar way, goals such as social justice also call for limitations on the 
exclusive nature of rights817: 
 
“There are essentially two reasons why we might be concerned about the 
dynamic described above. One is fear that parties may fail to come to terms in 
these cases even where the infringing product would not conflict with any 
development of the IP by its owner, thus resulting in wasted resources and the 
loss of potentially large gains from trade. The other is the belief that even if the 
parties do come to terms, it is undesirable for the IP owner to command a 
disproportionately large share of those gains where they result primarily from 
the other party’s productive investments. This latter position can be understood 
as a belief about the demands of equity, based on a particular notion of 
distributive justice. Or it might be understood as another form of efficiency 
concern, based on the idea that overcompensating IP owners at the expense of 
people who make productive downstream use of their works will skew 
investment incentives in an unproductive manner”818. 
 
Hence, both efficiency and other public interest grounds support the need for 
patent policy to address several current problems. For instance, there are 
reasons to believe that certain technological areas will benefit more from other 
incentive mechanisms different than patents. Recent proposals for prizes and 
public-private partnerships in order to provide incentives for research related to 
                                                 
 
 
816 See e.g., Kaplow and Shavell, supra note 54. See also Richard Craswell, Kaplow and Shavell on the 
Substance of Fairness, THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES, vol. 32 (January 2003); on the particularities of IP law 
see Farber, Daniel A., & McDonnell, Brett. (2003). Why (and How) Fairness Matters at the IP/Antitrust 
Interface. UC Berkeley: Boalt Hall. Retrieved from: http://escholarship.org/uc/item/60c8d09h  
817 See Rosa Castro, Ex-post Liability Rules: a Solution for the Biomedical Anti-commons? IN INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL JUSTICE PERSPECTIVES, FLANNAGAN AND MONTAGNANI EDS., EDWARD 
ELGAR PUBLISHING (2010). See also  Giovanni Ramello, Access to vs. exclusion from knowledge: Intellectual 
property, efficiency and social justice,  P.O.L.I.S. DEPARTMENT'S WORKING PAPERS 90, Department of Public 
Policy and Public Choice – POLIS (2007), available at: 
http://polis.unipmn.it/pubbl/RePEc/uca/ucapdv/ramello100.pdf. 
818 See Christopher Newman, Infringement as Nuisance. CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, FORTHCOMING; 
GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY LAW & ECONOMICS RESEARCH PAPER NO. 09-17. Available at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1354110.  
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neglected diseases are a vivid example of a failure of private IPR’s to provide 
sufficient incentives for R&D. Such mechanisms were not evaluated in this 
research, but other research has highlighted the importance of incentive 
mechanisms that can be an alternative to patent protection in areas where 
patents have failed to deliver819.  
 
Different reasons would also justify precluding patent protection for some 
types of technologies. One example is the case of business method patents 
where it is often argued that patents do not exercise a positive effect on R&D, or 
at least not positive enough to outweigh the costs imposed by this type of 
patents. Patents on business methods have incremented at an exponential rate, 
imposing unduly burdens for patent offices to screen out “good” from bad 
“patents”. This detrimental effect is not only circumscribed to the field but 
obviously, the administrative burdens imposed by the examination of these 
patents probably affects the scarce resources of patent offices in general, hence 
translating into an structural problem pertaining to all patent fields. In addition, 
the great private value relative to the social value of these patents has created 
enormous opportunities for patent strategic behavior as well as incentives for 
the beneficiaries of this protection to engage in rent-seeking activities, including 
lobbying for lenient legislation with regard to these patents.  
 
The aforementioned problems and their solutions in terms of substituting 
patent protection in certain cases are only adjacent to the main research 
question of this Thesis. The central question of this Thesis rather dealt with the 
type of protection that should be accorded to patent rights, once it is decided 
that such protection is preferable than its complete absence. In this sense, the 
use of liability rules is an option that stands in the middle from either full 
protection or the absence of protection for patents in certain complex cases. 
Liability rules cannot however be proposed as a solution either to problems 
where the complete absence of patent protection would be superior or those 
where full patent protection would be better. But the use of liability rules to 
protect patents remains an important option for implementing patent policy 
grounded in efficiency as well as other public interest goals. Whereas much 
previous research had focused on the fairness and development justifications 
for the use of liability rules for patents, this research highlighted that their use 
can also be supported under efficiency grounds, both on a static and a dynamic 
efficiency perspective. A possible convergence then exists between efficiency 
and other public interest goals of patent policy in the sense that the use of 
patent liability rules will sometimes be supported by both grounds.  
                                                 
 
 
819 See WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, REPORT OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION EXPERT WORKING 
GROUP ON RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT FINANCING, January 2010, available at: 
http://www.who.int/phi/documents/ewg_report/en/index.html, discussing other alternative 
mechanisms to finance R&D activities.  
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3.3 Intellectual Property as property 
 
One question that reiteratively appeared in the analysis of patent liability rules 
regards the nature of IP entitlements and the interface between the nature of the 
right and the remedy used to protect it. The question of whether IP rights 
should be granted the same treatment as real property has been the object of 
much recent discussion in the U.S. following the eBay case and various Bills for 
patent law reform proposed to the U.S. Congress during the last few years820. 
One of the most important advocates of the extension of property rights 
treatment to IP is Professor Epstein, who filed one of the numerous amici briefs 
in the eBay v. MercExchange case arguing in favor of maintaining a “structural 
unity” between real property and IP. Professor Epstein, as well as other scholars 
have interpreted that the property rule protection for real property would only 
be denied under cases of necessity and applying such logic to IP, he concludes 
that such cases will be rare in patent law:  
 
“To be sure, the likelihood that these necessities will arise in the context of 
intellectual property is lower than it is with respect to tangible property, for it is 
highly unlikely that persons will need to infringe patents in order to escape 
with their lives. But the class of cases in which this issue is raised is not empty. 
Indeed, it is just those cases that are tracked by the Federal Circuit below when 
it references “public health” dangers as a category of reasons that could lead to 
a suspension of patent property rights”821 
 
Indeed, one can argue that this interpretation was followed in the U.S., 
especially by the CAFC, before the decision of eBay and that it is still probably 
shared by some courts in the U.S. as well as other countries. But as this research 
showed, such interpretation has not prevailed throughout patent history and it 
is not supported by economic reasoning. On the contrary, an appropriate 
contribution of property rights theory to patent law highlights the importance 
of taking into account that property law has also provided for mechanisms to 
ensure that society benefits from such protection. In addition, a well balanced 
application of property rights theory to patent law would take into account the 
similarities as well as the differences between both fields. Such differences are 
reflected in mechanisms of patent law that do not have a strictly identical 
equivalent in real property, including liability rules.   
 
                                                 
 
 
820 See supra note 612. 
821 See Epstein, Kieff & Wagner, supra note 500. 
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One of the most important examples is that of eminent domain or expropriation 
which permits a government to take private property upon the payment of 
compensation. Whereas such provision can be compared not only with the 
expropriation of IP rights but also with compulsory licenses in cases of public 
utility or governmental uses, the varied cases of patent liability rules described 
in this research cannot be restricted to such limited example with respect to 
tangible property. Limitations and exceptions are much more profuse in patent 
law, precisely because this field is based upon a different dynamic which 
requires balancing the interest of inventors, second innovators and final users of 
innovation822.  
 
Contrary to the view of IP rights as reflecting the logic of property, Professor 
Menell and other scholars have argued against the application of such unitary 
structure to both fields. The reasoning, which is similar to that used by this 
Thesis is that neither history, nor legal or economic reasons clearly sustain a 
completely uniform treatment of both fields:  
 
“While there are certainly historical connections and functional parallels 
between “intellectual property” and “property,” philosophical, legal, economic, 
and political bases for protecting intellectual property and tangible property 
differ in significant ways”823.  
 
A Lockean conception of property as a natural right implies that property 
should be protected from any private or government interference. This is for 
instance reflected in the U.S. interpretation of the Constitutional taking clause 
that grounds the protection of property rights on liberty. Nonetheless, those 
opposing an unrestricted application of a property rights approach to IP, 
sustain that the Constitutional mandate for Congress “to promote the progress 
on Science and the Useful Arts” is based upon a different justification. Menell, 
for instance, cites a 1790 speech by President George Washington to the 
Congress that preceded the enactment of the first patent and copyrights 
legislation and to which the House of Representatives responded that:  
 
“We concur with you in the sentiment that (...) the promotion of science and 
literature will contribute to the security of a free Government; in the progress of 
our deliberations we shall not lose sight of objects so worthy of our regard.” 
                                                 
 
 
822 To this we may add other patent law exceptions such as experimental research which have no 
equivalent for tangible property. Experimental research exemptions may have probably been neglected for 
reasons similar to those described with respect to compulsory licenses, that is, their absence or current 
limitation within U.S. law, which has been the most influential patent law legislation, at least for the field 
of law and economics.  
823 See Peter Menell, Intellectual Property and the Property Rights Movement, REGULATION, VOL 30, NO. 3, FALL 
2007. 
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According to Menell, IP rights fundamentally differ from the Blackstonian 
view824 of property rights as absolute, perpetual and exclusive rights. For these 
purposes, Menell and other scholars highlighting these fundamental 
differences, cite, among other features, the limited duration, exceptions and 
limitations entrenched in IP laws. Compulsory licenses are an important 
example of when the exclusive right is transformed into a remunerative right 
following a special approach of patent statutes. In substance, this position 
highlights the economic rationale of IP rights as a mechanism to provide 
innovation incentives and solve the public goods problem that affects the 
production of knowledge and information. Patent rights nevertheless create 
costs in the form of a deadweight loss, the potential inhibition of further 
research and the inexact allocation of resources in R&D which are not 
necessarily produced by the most efficient firms under the influence of patent 
incentives. Such costs are even more critical in cumulative innovation and 
sequential innovation settings, so that exclusive and unlimited rights would 
hinder rather than foster the objectives of IP protection and hence the 
importance of keeping in mind the necessity of a patent system balanced with 
exceptions and limitations.   
  
Outside of the U.S. debate, the conception of property and IP as natural rights is 
followed by several other countries. Nonetheless, the utilitarian theories of IP 
rights and patent law have permeated the most important processes of 
harmonization around the world. Although the TRIPS Agreement only defines 
IP rights as “private rights”825, it is noticeable that it does not fix any position 
with respect to whether IP rights belong or not to the realm of other property 
rights. Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement, which refers to the objectives of the 
agreement, establishes that: 
  
“The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should 
contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and 
dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of 
technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic 
welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations”826 
 
Closely related to this question is that on the interface between rights and 
remedies in the sense of how the system determines the type of protection rule 
to be applied. As it was pointed out in this Thesis, patent laws can use two 
                                                 
 
 
824 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, Book 2, Chapter 1, at p. 2, “defining 
property as that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things 
of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe”. 
825 See Preamble of the TRIPS Agreement.   
826 Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
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different types of reasoning with regard to this issue. The first approach 
considers that the nature of the right determines the remedy, and hence a 
property right would deserve protection through a property rule. Under the 
second approach, it is the remedy that determines the nature of the right, for 
instance, the availability of a property rule would determine that the right in 
question is a property right.  
 
Hence, whereas different legal traditions privilege different solutions, the 
results of this research suggest that it is not possible to establish which solution 
would be more efficient. The specific problems of patent law require that the 
reasoning used to establish which protection rule to adopt, should be 
responsive to the problems posed by the development of new technologies. In 
this sense, one might argue that a remedies-based approach would be more 
flexible than a rights-based approach in that it would permit to choose a 
different type of remedy and balance its prospective costs and benefits.  
 
Nonetheless, this research evidenced that the law in books can widely differ 
from the law in action, so that the practical relevance of such differences might 
be less intense than it appears. The law in books of common law countries puts 
an emphasis on remedies whereas the law in books of civil law countries 
emphasizes the nature of the right and judges are more limited to decide upon 
the available remedies outside their statutory definition. Nonetheless, the law in 
action in common law countries has tended to converge in the development of 
presumptions and case law interpreting IP rights as deserving property 
protection and/or an automatic entitlement to injunctive relief precisely by 
emphasizing the nature of the right. This was the case in the U.S., at least before 
the eBay case. Hence, the findings of this research would support the common 
law solution insofar as it is the remedy and not the conception of IP rights as 
property that is emphasized. Nonetheless, a closer look into the law in action 
suggests that either making the right determine the remedy or vice versa can 
lead to efficient or inefficient solutions.   
 
This is also confirmed by the differences with regards to the justification of IP 
rights in different legal traditions. Countries from continental Europe tend to 
follow a French conception of IP as natural rights or personality rights where 
creativity and invention supports the recognition of rights belonging to the 
individual. The U.S. has for instance a diametrically different approach which 
reflects a utilitarian approach to IP and patent protection.  
 
Whereas such different legal traditions have largely recognized that IP rights 
are limited in nature, limitations have been frequently misinterpreted. A typical 
misconception is that the only limit to IP rights should be their duration. Such 
statement is contradicted by the historical presence of limitations and 
exceptions in patent law, including the use of liability rules. A second statement 
addressed by this research was the view that substantive IP laws contain rules 
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that balance benefits and costs of the system, so that enforcement should not 
attempt to fix such balance827. Notwithstanding the diverse views with respect 
to IP rights, countries of civil law and common law traditions have 
progressively adopted incremental levels of protection for IP entitlements so 
that it is not possible to plainly assume that substantive laws are always 
following an adequate balance. This suggests firstly that enforcement rules 
should also be interpreted in the light of the objectives of patent law. Secondly, 
it is a confirmation that neither a common law nor a civil law approach is better 
able to deal with current patent law problems.   
 
One of the most important conclusions from this research is to confirm the 
detrimental effects of any unbalanced view that privileges the need for 
protection and loses sight of the need of a balanced patent system. In contrast, 
all legal traditions have for long recognized this need, not only by establishing a 
limited duration but also through patent scope and the design of proper 
limitations and exceptions. Although compulsory licenses and other liability 
rules are only part of this complex system, they have played a historical role in 
the patent field that has reflected the evolution in time of the justifications for 
patent protection. Compulsory licenses flourished at a time of controversy 
between a protectionist view of patents and the development of an ideological 
conflict between free trade and monopoly. In that context, compulsory licenses 
entered into the patent landscape as an ambiguous instrument of national 
protectionism and a middle ground solution for more protectionist measures as 
patent forfeiture in the absence of local working.  
 
In our times, the international patent landscape has largely evolved side by side 
with the international trade system. But this evolution, as it has been argued by 
many renowned authors before, has not been a balanced one. Strong interests 
have surrounded many land marking reforms in the IP and the patent field828. 
The study of patent liability rules confirms the need for balancing mechanisms 
that act as contention devices for the indiscriminate increment of patentability, 
patent scope, patent duration and above all, as it was the focus of most of this 
analysis, of an indiscriminate use of enforcement measures that reflect such 
unbalanced view.  
 
Summing up, it is not the reasoning that starts from the right or from the 
remedy that might be inefficient. Both systems might lead to a well-designed or 
                                                 
 
 
827 See Canada – Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DS114/R, 17 March 2000 (EC-Canada) case at 
the WTO, where the Dispute Settlement Body noted with regards to the standards of interpretation for the 
TRIPS Agreement that: “Both the goals and the limitations stated in Articles 7 and 8.1 must obviously be 
borne in mind when doing so as well as those of other provisions of the TRIPS Agreement which indicate 
its object and purposes.” See also supra notes 51, 52 and 53, and accompanying text.  
828 See LANDES AND POSNER, supra note 15 and Scherer, supra note 479, among others. 
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to a badly designed patent system. It is rather the misconception of patents and 
IP rights as unlimited rights that might impose severe losses in static efficiency 
terms as well as block rather than foster innovation in the future.  Of course, if 
one’s view of property reflects a Blackstonian “absolute” view, the conception 
of IP rights as property will determine an unlimited extension of protection. 
Such view would be incompatible with the historic, legal and economic 
justifications of patent rights as almost every country in the world has 
traditionally provided for exceptions and limitations for patent protection.  
 
Under efficiency grounds, every patent system should be careful in maintaining 
such exceptions and limitations while fine-tuning those that might run against 
other objectives such as those embedded in the TRIPS Agreement, which 
include free trade and technology transfer. From this analysis, it is easy to 
conclude that patent liability rules, constructed either on the traditional way or 
on other equitable doctrines do not run counter to the objectives of the TRIPS 
Agreement, which, at this time, at least partially reflects a global understanding 
in the IP field. Article 7, 8 and 40 as well as the preamble829 of the TRIPS 
Agreement seem to support such view although their interpretation in relation 
to other provisions such as articles 27 and 28 on patent rights and articles 30 
and 31 on exceptions and other uses not-authorized by the patent holder is stil 
highly controversial830. 
 
3.4 Rules of interpretation: the role of Courts and Agencies  
 
One of the most often raised critiques to the analysis of the eBay case in the 
context of traditional compulsory licenses regards the impossibility that 
countries of civil law tradition undertake a similar type of equitable analysis. In 
part, this is due to differences in the legal traditions but in some other countries 
an important constraint regards the additional (and scarce) resources that 
would be needed to enforce the law if courts were asked to engage in 
substantial fact finding activity. This is even more critical with respect to patent 
law where courts lacking specialization struggle with the difficulties of a highly 
technical field.  
                                                 
 
 
829 See preamble of the TRIPS Agreement, expressing that: “Desiring to reduce distortions and 
impediments to international trade, and taking into account the need to promote effective and adequate 
protection of intellectual property rights, and to ensure that measures and procedures to enforce 
intellectual property rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade” (…) “Recognizing the 
underlying public policy objectives of national systems for the protection of intellectual property, 
including developmental and technological objectives”. 
830 It is often argued that articles 7 and 8 express non-operational rules. Moreover, it has been argued that 
the balance referred in article 7 is already reflected in the text of the Agreement; although such 
interpretation would signify that these articles are meaningless even if included in the text of the 
agreement.  
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Nonetheless, this research put in evidence that the utilization of ex-post liability 
rules for patents requires a similarly in-depth activity from the courts or 
agencies whether under the application of an equitable doctrine to deny 
injunctive relief or through the issuance of a compulsory license. In this latter 
case, as it was highlighted several times, the TRIPS Agreement imposes that 
each compulsory license is considered in its own individual merits as well as 
mandates that the “adequate remuneration” that should be awarded to patent 
holders be calculated according to “the circumstances of each case, taking into 
account the economic value of the authorization”. The second requirement is 
probably the most complicated and costly part once the authority has decided 
the switch from a property rule to a liability rule. The first requirement, that 
each compulsory license be considered in its own merits curtails the possibility 
of saving up costs by awarding compulsory licenses in “blanket”. The 
possibility of using compulsory licenses as well as administering them 
efficiently would hence, greatly depend on their design just as it happens with 
the application of equitable doctrines in Common Law countries.  
 
3.5 The design of patent liability rules  
 
An interesting aspect of Italian patent liability rules that was analyzed in this 
Thesis is a new provision included in the 2005 Industrial Property Code that 
would allow good faith infringers to apply for a compulsory licensing. 
Infringers were previously excluded from applying for a compulsory license in 
the context of patent litigation for infringement. This was apparently one of the 
most important obstacles for the use of compulsory licenses, as demonstrated 
by important cases such as Chiron v. Sorin, which regarded the development of 
an improved version of an immunodiagnostic kit for HCV that infringed upon 
the controversial patent held by Chiron831. Nonetheless, it is possible that a rigid 
interpretation of such formula might in practice preclude any important change 
in the way compulsory licenses are administered. If compulsory licensing 
provisions are indeed to play a role in practical terms, more flexibility is needed 
with regard to some of the constraints surrounding their use. This is just an 
                                                 
 
 
831 See above discussion in Chapter III, Section 5.5.5. “Other ex-post Liability Rules: Compulsory Licenses”. 
The Chiron patent was subject to litigation in an important number of countries. See Keith Maskus, 
Reforming U.S. Patent Policy: Getting the Incentives Right, CSR, No. 19, November 2006, available at: 
www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/PatentCSR.pdf, at p. 19-20, referring how: “Since that 
time Chiron has aggressively enforced its patent, and critics claim that its enforcement has held up 
research by other firms and agencies for years (…) A 2003 study by the National Academy of Sciences also 
singled out Chiron as a company with a reputation for limiting access to its patents. Moreover, a number 
of small companies interested in extending research on hepatitis C claim to have abandoned that research 
because of an inability to license the Chiron patent” 
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evident example of an improper design that has precluded the use of 
compulsory licenses in situations where –at least in efficiency terms- society 
would have gained from such use.  
 
Similar arguments can be raised with regard to the effective use of compulsory 
licensing under the TRIPS Agreement. In effect, some of the requirements of 
article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement have precluded its use. The most often 
discussed requirement is that of article 31 (f) that “any such use shall be 
authorized predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of the Member 
authorizing such use”. A problem with this requirement arises because the 
countries that precisely need to use this system are constrained if they lack or 
have insufficient manufacturing capacities to produce locally such products 
under a compulsory license. This case was addressed by paragraph 6 of the 
Doha Declaration and then transformed into the first proposal for amendment 
of the TRIPS Agreement832. Nonetheless, it is often argued that the exception 
provided either by the Doha Declaration and now on the proposal for 
amendment has not facilitated the use of compulsory licenses especially by 
developing and least developing countries.  
 
Another problematic requirement is the one established in article 31  (b), by 
which “such use may only be permitted if, prior to such use, the proposed user 
has made efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder on reasonable 
commercial terms and conditions and that such efforts have not been successful 
within a reasonable period of time”. The same article 31 (b) established a 
possible derogation of this requirement in cases of “a national emergency” or 
“other circumstances of extreme urgency” or “in cases of public non-
commercial use”; and in the same article 31 (k), it is also established that 
conditions of subparagraphs (b) and (f) do not have to be applied “where such 
use is permitted to remedy a practice determined after judicial or 
administrative process to be anti-competitive”.  
 
Hence, drafters of the TRIPS Agreement considered that such conditions would 
have disfavored or blocked the possibility of using compulsory licensing in 
such cases. However, and as it was shown in this research, similar reasons 
would hinder the use of compulsory licenses in cases of patent strategic 
behavior, which is precisely when they are needed the most. Such problem has 
                                                 
 
 
832 The TRIPS Council has extended the period giving an additional two-years term for countries to 
approve the amendment in two occasions. See AMENDMENT OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT – EXTENSION OF THE 
PERIOD FOR THE ACCEPTANCE BY MEMBERS OF THE PROTOCOL AMENDING THE TRIPS AGREEMENT, WT/L/711, 
18 December 2007, available at: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/wt-l-711_e.pdf and 
AMENDMENT OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT – SECOND EXTENSION OF THE PERIOD FOR THE ACCEPTANCE BY 
MEMBERS OF THE PROTOCOL AMENDING THE TRIPS AGREEMENT, 17 December 2009, available at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/wt-l-785_e.pdf.  
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been already evidenced in both of the cases analyzed here. In the context of the 
eBay case in the U.S. the solution has been to by-pass the requirements of article 
31, giving that the possibility of denying injunctions is also embedded in article 
44 of the TRIPS Agreement. Nonetheless, in some of the cases applying the eBay 
precedent to deny injunctive relief “the proposed user” (infringer) had made 
previous “efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder on reasonable 
commercial terms and conditions” but such efforts were not successful within a 
reasonable period of time. From that perspective, eBay case law might still 
comply with article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement. In the same eBay v. 
MerExchange case, the company eBay attempted to negotiate a license but it was 
after such negotiations failed that MercExchanged sued for patent infringement.  
 
The question remains whether, from an efficiency viewpoint it is advisable to 
require negotiations with the patent holder as a prerequisite for applying for a 
liability rule. Strategic behavior, which is one of the most important factors 
preventing efficient bargaining would preclude any fruitful effect from such 
negotiation while such requirement might impose an unduly burden for 
potential users. The problem of this requirement is that liability rules are 
thought to facilitate efficient bargaining in environments with high transaction 
costs and in this sense, they provide a mechanism that is less costly or solves 
the bargaining breakdown that would otherwise preclude efficient transactions 
under the property rule. But such transaction costs are precisely formed by 
those arising out from the negotiation, and especially by the costs produced by 
opportunistic behavior of the parties involved in such negotiation. The 
requirement of paragraph (k) of article 31 hence imposes an additional cost of 
“prior efforts” to obtain a voluntary license as a requirement to opt for a 
liability rule in cases where transaction costs are already high.  
  
In addition, one of the most important cases here discussed which is that in 
which the infringer is unaware of the existence of the patent, its validity or 
precise scope would be completely precluded from the possibility of applying a 
liability rule to prevent strategic behavior. A possible interpretation is that the 
requirements of article 31 do not apply for the case of restricting the availability 
of injunctions as allowed by the text of article 44 of the TRIPS Agreement. As 
suggested, one possibility for courts applying an equitable appreciation of the 
facts of the case in order to grant or deny injunctions is to mandatorily require a 
negotiated solution from the parties as it was suggested in the case of Paice v. 
Toyota833. According to Judge Rader, the fact that the court mandates such 
solution instead of just suggesting that parties do so, would allow to actually 
differentiate an ongoing royalty from a compulsory license, hence avoiding any 
doubts with respect to the application of article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement. In 
                                                 
 
 
833 See Judge Rader’s concurring opinion, supra note 795. 
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spite of the possible compatibility with the TRIPS Agreement, these 
requirements seem to impose great costs from an economic point of view that 
might even preclude the use of compulsory licenses. This issue as well as other 
pointed out below are open for future research and dissenting opinions as this 
specific line of case law is just starting to develop in the U.S.  
 
4 Future research  
 
As it is the typical case, this research raised more questions than the answers it 
provided. It is clear that efficiency supports the alternative use of property and 
liability rules according to particular circumstances; that such rules are now 
mostly applied ex-post; and that the costs implied in their use are sometimes 
outweighed by the costs of using a property rule. Nevertheless, further research 
is needed in order to clarify the precise conditions to use such rules, their 
approximate costs and benefits and the multiple differences in their application 
to various technological sectors. Certainly there is an abundant literature and 
multiple previous empirical researches done, but there is still a need to connect 
such empirical evidence with the theory behind patent protection as well as 
with the legal framework regarding protection, limitations and exceptions of 
patent law and especially of patent enforcement rules. With regard to these 
questions, there are some areas in which more theoretical work is needed as 
well as some projects of harmonization where the use of patent liability rules 
needs to be seriously considered.  
 
4.1 Other IP rights: copyright, trademarks and unfair competition law 
 
This research started from a general view of liability rules in IP but 
concentrated on the specific features of patent law. Nonetheless, there are many 
consequences for other IP rights as well. For instance, whereas trademark law 
does not provide for compulsory licensing provisions pursuant to article 21 of 
the TRIPS agreement, common law countries still are able to limit the (abusive) 
enforcement of trademarks. A reflection should hence be made in the sense that 
other IP statutes need to give serious consideration to rules preventing abuse of 
the rights and especially the abuse in the enforcement of rights.  
 
For a long time, liability rules have also been proposed in several areas, 
including for the protection of undisclosed information, and more specifically 
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the clinical data used to obtain marketing authorization of pharmaceutical 
products834. Whereas such proposals have been widely addressed by scholars, 
they have been largely neglected by policy makers. Other proposals relate to the 
copyrights field, including one to make certain fair uses subject to appropriate 
compensation, thereby creating a liability rule similar to those used in patent 
law insofar as their application is not automatic and needs a revision from a 
court835.  
 
4.2 Public choice applications 
 
Particular developments in U.S. patent law, including the recent decisions by 
the U.S. Supreme Court and the CAFC could be interpreted as a new 
fluctuation in the trend of IP protection836. As it was confirmed also by this 
research, the national regulation of patents as well as international 
harmonization processes have been subjected to expansion and contraction 
waves. A similar argument is often made with respect to the interface between 
antitrust law and IP law. For instance, it is often pointed out that antitrust law 
had a preeminent role during the 1940’s, then it had contracted during the 
1980’s, coinciding with a period of great expansion for the protection of IP 
rights837.    
 
Likewise, the oscillation in the use of patent liability rules might respond to a 
similar rationale. Positions contrary to the use of patent liability rules might 
only be a reflection of a movement towards an excessive increment of patent 
protection during the past decades. Underlying the utilization of a property 
rights’ rhetoric there is probably a willingness to extend patent protection 
without appropriate balancing mechanisms, and hence, a matter for public 
choice analysis838. 
 
Additionally, this research has evidenced that efficiency does not preclude but 
actually requires a balance in patent law that includes rules to avoid or put a 
remedy to strategic behavior, including patent hold-ups. This might be 
                                                 
 
 
834 See Jerome Reichman, Rethinking the Role of Clinical Trial Data in International Intellectual Property Law: 
The Case for a Public Goods Approach (January 1, 2009). MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW, 
VOL. 13, NO. 1, 2009, available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1433392, citing those proposals as well as the 
resistance against them as well as arguing in favor of treating clinical trial data as a public good.  
835 See Thomas Cotter, Fair Use and Copyright Overenforcement, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1271, advancing such 
proposal.  
836 See supra note 314. 
837 See for instance, Herbert Hovenkamp, United States Antitrust Policy in an Age of IP Expansion, U IOWA 
LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER NO. 04-03, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=634224.  
838 See LANDES AND POSNER, supra note 15, on the necessity of explaining certain the expansion of some IP 
rights under public choice theory.  
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achieved through the use of exceptions and limitations and defenses in patent 
infringement cases. Moreover, in some cases, as it was already pointed out, the 
solution is not to use liability rules but to completely re-think the protection of 
certain rights, as it is the case with some matters lately considered as patentable. 
Hence, the use of liability rules is only an alternative among many other policy 
levers839 that probably need to be readjusted. But more extreme reforms, as 
Menell accurately has pointed out, would be likely subject to great pressure 
from interest groups:  
 
“more fundamental adjustments to the patent system are called for to 
distinguish among the very different fields of inventive activity covered by 
patent law. But given the various political and other impediments to such a 
direct cure to the patent system’s root ills, more flexibility at the remedy stage 
looks to be a good utilitarian compromise”840 
 
Future research should compare the costs and benefits of the application of 
liability rules in comparison with other policy levers also taking into account a 
public choice dimension. One situation analyzed in this thesis was the case of 
dubious quality patents whereby it is often argued that patentability 
requirements or the restriction of patentable subject matter are the proper tools 
to deal with these issues841. It would be interesting to revise this and other 
problematic issues that were only touched upon indirectly in this research and 
that might be explained in public choice terms as well as suggest the least costly 
alternatives for policy reform.  
 
4.3 Antitrust and IP interface 
 
The focus of this thesis was the study of patent liability rules embedded in 
patent law, but the application of antitrust statutes is an important factor that 
was mentioned in several related discussions, including the legal tools available 
in different countries to immunize from patent strategic behavior. Hence, this 
research addressed some but not all of the questions that arise from the 
perspective of the interface between antitrust and patent legislation. 
 
Whereas the modern vision of antitrust and patent law sustains that both work 
“in tandem to bring new and better technologies, products, and services to 
                                                 
 
 
839 See supra note 4, defining policy levers.  
840 Peter Menell, Intellectual Property and the Law of Land, REGULATION, VOL. 30, NO. 4, WINTER 2007-2008; UC 
BERKELEY PUBLIC LAW RESEARCH PAPER NO. 1078982, available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1078982.  
841 See Chapter IV, Section 3.1.3. “Strategic Behavior”.  
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consumers at lower prices”842, it is widely acknowledged that a number of 
potentially anticompetitive practices by patentees might pose challenges for a 
balanced IP-antitrust policy. The exclusivity of patent rights signifies that in 
principle, a patentee might refuse to grant a license to any potential user. As 
this research evidences, however, there are a number of exceptions to this rule 
in the form of compulsory licenses or the denial of injunctive relief for patent 
rights.  
 
Moreover, antitrust laws around the world also foresee the possibility of 
requiring a compulsory license and sanctioning patentees which use their 
patents in an anti-competitive way. The TRIPS Agreement explicitly allows 
countries to grant such compulsory licenses and even authorizes countries to 
waive certain requirements as the prior negotiations and “adequate 
remuneration” in such cases843.  
 
Yet, controversy surrounds many questions, including, when should a refusal 
to license a patent be considered anti-competitive, whether this problem should 
be held by antitrust law, patent law or both and how to determine the realm of 
each field. These questions are not new but the abundant law and economics 
literature evidences that there are neither complete nor totally convergent 
answers844. 
 
This thesis analyzed a type of refusal to license patent rights and the legal tools 
available for potential users from the perspective of patent law. However, one 
important case that was also discussed is that of hold-ups arising under the 
framework of standard setting organizations when a patentee conceals a patent 
that is essential to a standard and only discloses such patent to litigate potential 
infringers after the standard has been set. This case has been described as a 
special instance of patent hold-up whereby a patent ambush waits until the rest 
of negotiating parties have sunk their costs by locking into a specific 
technological standard and then sues them, most times even in spite of an 
assumed FRAND or RAND commitment845.  
Whereas some authors suggest that this problem could be better held by 
contract law or unfair competition, the argument advanced here is that patent 
law, should intervene when dynamic efficiency is threatened. This would be the 
case if the deceiving conduct of a patentee causes potential relevant parties to 
SSO’s to abstain from disclosing and participating due to fears of investing and 
                                                 
 
 
842 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION (2007), available at: 
www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/hearings/ip/222655.pdf 
843 See Chapter II, Section 3.3.1., “Article 31 of the TRIPSAgreement”.  
844 See Cotter, supra note 38. 
845 See supra notes 595-599 and accompanying text.  
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then suffer a hold-up by an “ambush”. Since the goals of both antitrust law and 
patent law are mostly conceived as complementary, more research is needed to 
understand the proper role of antitrust and patent statutes in these as well as 
other cases of patent strategic behaviour.  
 
4.4 Further national, international and European harmonization  
 
The discussion of this research has been a recurrent issue of controversy over 
the last few years, in various national, international and European forums. The 
issue is likely to be debated also in the near future846. Discussion continues in 
the U.S. as the eBay precedent is just starting to be applied in patent decisions as 
well as in other IP fields. Consequent to the problem of over-enforcement, 
several bills for patent law reform have addressed the problem of calculating 
patent damages and proposed the rule of “apportionment of damages” by 
which compensation to right owners should reflect "only [the] economic value 
properly attributable to the patent's specific contribution over the prior art”. As 
predictable, such proposal has been contentious, envisioned by some as the 
required complement to the eBay decision in order to avoid problems of over-
enforcement and tackle with patent strategic behavior and by others as a 
prospective erosion of patent profits847.  
 
In the meanwhile, European authorities are trying to move forward 
negotiations for further patent harmonization as the European patent landscape 
remains fragmented and patent enforcement remains a national issue. In this 
sense, the draft European Patent Litigation Agreement and the Community 
patent are among the most important initiatives that will still be discussed in 
European context during the forthcoming years848. While these proposals for 
the EPLA and the Community patent have received a recent impetus, they have 
also met with important resistance.  
 
Although such instruments will likely contain a compromise between the 
countries in terms of the use of compulsory licenses and enforcement 
provisions, their discussion might also be a useful moment for the construction 
of a properly balanced European patent system. Any future harmonization with 
regard to patent substantive and enforcement standards should take into 
                                                 
 
 
846 See supra note 5 on discussions centered on the U.S. patent system; supra note 6 on International 
discussions about exceptions and limitations in patent law, including the use of liability rules; and 379, on 
similar discussions between Europe.  
847 See supra note 612. See also Maskus, supra note 831 and Scherer, supra note 479, discussing a potential 
patent law reform in the U.S. 
848 See supra notes 378, 379 and 380 and accompanying text, describing these projects for future 
harmonization.  
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account the lessons learned with regard to the use of property and liability rules 
and more in general with regard to the importance of limitations and exceptions 
in patent law. This is critical in a time where the EPO starts to face important 
problems with respect to an overload of patent applications and a decreasing 
quality of granted patents. In this sense, further harmonization processes 
should not lose sight of the need to balance the aspirations of users of the patent 
system which mainly seek to save on patent application costs and the needs of 
users of technologies that might often be also second innovators that would 
benefit from a system that preserves the proper balances as well as of final users 
of technologies and society as a whole.  
 
There are futher important initiatives at the international level that need to be 
seriously examined in the context of this discussion and more in general in the 
context of discussions on a properly balanced patent system. Among the most 
important examples are the regional and bilateral free trade agreements often 
signed between the U.S. or the EU on the one hand and one developing or least 
developed country on the other hand. Such treaties often contain commitments 
that go beyond the level of protection set up by the TRIPS Agreement even 
though the economic case for patent and IP protection in general is lower for 
the case of these latter countries849. 
 
In addition to these treaties, there are several global initiatives for 
harmonization. One such initiative is the Substantive Patent Law Treaty (SPLT) 
promoted by the WIPO and which has recently stalled due to the resistance of 
developing countries, which are nevertheless signing other bilateral treaties. 
The other most recent example is the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Act, a 
multilateral treaty proposed by OECD countries and which has been moreover 
surrounded by non-disclosed negotiations850. The future of international patent 
law depends on a properly balanced and informed negotiation of any 
forthcoming treaty. In such negotiations, a balance must be preserve both in 
substantive as well as in enforcement rules, keeping in mind also the 
differences, which might seem obvious and are nevertheless often conflated 
between piracy and counterfeiting activities on the one hand and the use of 
limitations, exceptions and defenses in patent law on the other hand.  
                                                 
 
 
849 See Vivas, supra note 286 and Castro, supra note 771, on TRIPS-plus agreements and new international 
IP standards affecting developing and least developed countries.  
850 See supra note 290. 
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APPENDIX 
COMPULSORY LICENSING PROVISIONS  
 
Table 1: Compulsory Licenses for public interest reasons 
Country/Treaty Provision 
 Paris Convention 5-A 
TRIPS Article 31 “other use without authorization of the right 
holder”, plus articles 1, 7, 8, 27.1, 30 and 44  
 
 
 
US 
28 USC 1498, concerns uses of patents or copyrights by or for 
the government. The US government does not have to seek a 
license or negotiate for use of a patent or copyright and any 
federal employee can use or authorize the use of a patent or 
a copyright. The right owner is entitled to compensation, but 
cannot enjoin the government or a third party authorized by 
the government, to prevent the use. 
 
Spain LEY 11/1986, de 20 de marzo, de Patentes.  
Artículo 90. 1. Por motivo de interés público, el gobierno 
podrá someter en cualquier momento una solicitud de 
patente o una patente ya otorgada a la concesión de licencias 
obligatorias, disponiéndolo así por Real Decreto. 
2. Se considerará que existen motivos de interés público 
cuando la iniciación, el incremento o la generalización de la 
explotación del invento, o la mejora de las condiciones en 
que tal explotación se realiza, sean de primordial 
importancia para la salud pública o para la defensa nacional. 
Se considerará, asimismo, que existen motivos de interés 
público cuando la falta de explotación o la insuficiencia en 
calidad o en cantidad de la explotación realizada implique 
grave perjuicio para el desarrollo económico o tecnológico 
del país. 
3. El Real Decreto que disponga la concesión de licencias 
obligatorias deberá ser acordado a propuesta del Ministerio 
de Industria y Energía. En los casos en que la importancia de 
la explotación del invento se relacione con la salud pública o 
con la defensa nacional, la propuesta deberá formularse 
conjuntamente con el Ministro competente en materia de 
sanidad o de defensa, respectivamente. 
4. El Real Decreto que someta una patente a la concesión de 
licencias obligatorias por su importancia para la defensa 
nacional podrá reservar la posibilidad de solicitar tales 
licencias a una o varias empresas determinadas. 
5. Cuando el interés público puede satisfacerse sin necesidad 
de generalizar la explotación del invento, ni de encomendar 
esa explotación a una persona distinta del titular de la 
patente, el Real Decreto podrá disponer el sometimiento 
condicional de la patente a la concesión de licencias 
obligatorias, autorizando al Ministro de Industria y Energía 
para que otorgue al titular un plazo no superior a un año 
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para iniciar, aumentar o mejorar la explotación del invento 
en la medida necesaria para satisfacer el interés público. En 
tal caso, el Ministro de Industria y Energía, una vez oído al 
titular de la patente, podrá concederle el plazo que estime 
oportuno o someter la patente de forma inmediata a la 
concesión de las licencias. Una vez transcurrido el plazo que, 
en su caso, hubiere sido fijado, el Ministro de Industria y 
Energía determinará si ha quedado satisfecho el interés 
público, y, si no fuera así, someterá la patente a la concesión 
de licencias obligatorias. 
 
 Art.141.Espropriazione.  
1. Con esclusione dei diritti sui marchi, i diritti di proprieta' 
industriale, ancorche' in corso di registrazione o di 
brevettazione, possono essere espropriati dallo Stato 
nell'interesse della difesa militare del Paese o per altre 
ragioni di pubblica utilita'. 
2. L'espropriazione puo' essere limitata al diritto di uso per i 
bisogni dello Stato, fatte salve le previsioni in materia di 
licenze obbligatorie in quanto compatibili. 
3. Con l'espropriazione anzidetta, quando sia effettuata 
nell'interesse della difesa militare del Paese e riguardi titoli 
di proprieta' industriale di titolari italiani, e' trasferito 
all'amministrazione espropriante anche il diritto di chiedere 
titoli di proprieta' industriale all'estero. 
 
 
Table 2: Compulsory Licenses for lack of working 
Country/Treaty Provision Practice 
 Paris Convention 5/A. “Each country of the 
Union shall have the right to 
take legislative measures 
providing for the grant of 
compulsory licenses to 
prevent the abuses which 
might result from the exercise 
of the exclusive rights 
conferred by the patent, for 
example, failure to work”.
  
N/A 
TRIPS 31 No panel decision 
interpreting article 31, only on 
Article 30. See Canada – 
Protection of Pharmaceutical 
Products, WT/DS114/R, 17 
March 2000 (EC-Canada). 
U.S. No provision and long history 
of rejection. After 2006 eBay v. 
MercExchange decision it is 
possible if the district court 
denies injunctive relief for 
non-working entities 
Post-eBay decisions 
U.K. Section 48 of the UK Patents N/A 
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Act 1977 as amended by the 
Copyright, Designs and 
Patents Act, 1988 
Italy Article 70 of the CPI, if the 
invention is not worked in 
any country of the European 
Union, European economic 
Space or the WTO or if even 
though it is being worked, 
production is not 
proportionate to the national 
needs. 
N/A 
France Article L-613-12, reformed to 
allow granting as exclusive or 
non-exclusive granting 
Rarely granted 
Lyons Court of Appeals, 
September 11, 1997; 1998 
PIBD III. 167; 1998 JCP ed. E 
Chronique at 172 
Spain Artículo 86. 
Artículo 87. 1. Una vez 
finalizado el plazo establecido 
en el artículo 83 para iniciar la 
explotación de la invención 
protegida por la patente, 
cualquier persona podrá 
solicitar la concesión de una 
licencia obligatoria sobre la 
patente, si en el momento de 
la solicitud, y salvo excusas 
legítimas, no se ha iniciado la 
explotación de la patente o no 
se han realizado preparativos 
efectivos y serios para 
explotar la invención objeto 
de la patente, o cuando la 
explotación de ésta ha sido 
interrumpida durante más de 
tres años. 
2. Se considerarán como 
excusas legítimas las 
dificultades objetivas de 
carácter técnico legal, ajenas a 
la voluntad y a las 
circunstancias del titular de la 
patente, que hagan imposible 
la explotación del invento o 
que impidan que esa 
explotación sea mayor de lo 
que es. 
 
N/A 
 
Table 3: Compulsory Licenses for dependent patents 
Country/Treaty Provision 
 Paris Convention 5/A 
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TRIPS Article 31 
U.S. N/A 
U.K. Section 48 of the UK Patents Act 1977 as amended by the 
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988 
European Directive 98/44/EC  
on The Legal Protection of 
Biotechnological Inventions 
Article 12 cross-licensing of patents in cases where there is 
another invention or a new seed variety that provides a 
“significant technical progress of considerable economic 
interest.”  
Italy Article 71 of the CPI 
Spain Artículo 89. 1. Cuando no sea posible la explotación del 
invento protegido por una patente sin menoscabo de los 
derechos conferidos por una patente o por un derecho de 
obtención vegetal anterior, el titular de la patente posterior 
podrá solicitar una licencia obligatoria, que será no 
exclusiva, para la explotación del objeto de la patente o de la 
variedad objeto del derecho de obtención vegetal anterior, 
mediante el pago de un canon adecuado. 
2. Cuando no sea posible obtener o explotar un derecho de 
obtención vegetal sin menoscabo de los derechos conferidos 
por una patente anterior, el obtentor podrá solicitar una 
licencia obligatoria, que será no exclusiva, para la 
explotación del invento protegido por la patente, mediante el 
pago de un canon adecuado. 
3. Si una patente tuviera por objeto un procedimiento para la 
obtención de una sustancia química o farmacéutica 
protegida por una patente en vigor, tanto el titular de la 
patente de procedimiento como el de la patente de producto, 
tendrán derecho a la obtención de una licencia obligatoria no 
exclusiva sobre la patente del otro titular. 
4. Los solicitantes de las licencias a que se refieren los 
apartados anteriores deberán demostrar: 
a) Que la invención o la variedad representa un progreso 
técnico significativo de considerable importancia económica 
con relación a la invención reivindicada en la patente 
anterior o a la variedad protegida por el derecho de 
obtención vegetal anterior.  
b) Que han intentado, sin conseguirlo en un plazo 
prudencial, obtener del titular de la patente o del derecho de 
obtención vegetal anterior una licencia contractual en 
términos y condiciones razonables.  
5. Cuando según lo previsto en el presente artículo proceda 
la concesión de una licencia obligatoria por dependencia, 
también el titular de la patente o del derecho de obtención 
vegetal anterior podrá solicitar el otorgamiento, en 
condiciones razonables, de una licencia por dependencia 
para utilizar la invención o la variedad protegida por la 
patente o por el derecho de obtención vegetal posterior.  
6. La licencia obligatoria por dependencia se otorgará 
solamente con el contenido necesario para permitir la 
explotación de la invención protegida por la patente, o de la 
variedad protegida por el derecho de obtención vegetal de 
que se trate, y quedará sin efecto al declararse la nulidad o la 
caducidad de alguno de los títulos entre los cuales se dé la 
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dependencia. 
7. La tramitación y la resolución de las solicitudes de 
licencias obligatorias por dependencia para el uso no 
exclusivo de una invención patentada, se regirán por lo 
dispuesto en la presente Ley.  
La tramitación y la resolución de las solicitudes de licencias 
obligatorias por dependencia para el uso no exclusivo de la 
variedad protegida por un derecho de obtentor se regirán 
por su legislación específica. 
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INJUNCTIONS  
 
Table 4: Injunctions for patent infringement in International Treaties 
TREATY PROVISION 
TRIPS Agreement 
 
PART III: Enforcement Of Intellectual Property 
Rights. Section 2: Civil And Administrative 
Procedures And Remedies  
Article 44. Injunctions 
 
 
 
The judicial authorities shall have the authority to 
order a party to desist from an infringement, inter 
alia to prevent the entry into the channels of 
commerce in their jurisdiction of imported goods 
that involve the infringement of an intellectual 
property right, immediately after customs clearance 
of such goods. Members are not obliged to accord 
such authority in respect of protected subject matter 
acquired or ordered by a person prior to knowing or 
having reasonable grounds to know that dealing in 
such subject matter would entail the infringement of 
an intellectual property right.  
2. Notwithstanding the other provisions of this Part 
and provided that the provisions of Part II 
specifically addressing use by governments, or by 
third parties authorized by a government, without 
the authorization of the right holder are complied 
with, Members may limit the remedies available 
against such use to payment of remuneration in 
accordance with subparagraph (h) of Article 31. In 
other cases, the remedies under this Part shall apply 
or, where these remedies are inconsistent with a 
Member's law, declaratory judgments and adequate 
compensation shall be available. 
 
U.S.–Peru Trade Promotion Act 
Article 16.11: Enforcement of Intellectual Property 
Rights. Civil and Administrative Procedures and 
Remedies 
In civil judicial proceedings concerning the 
enforcement of intellectual property rights, each 
Party shall provide that its judicial authorities shall 
have the authority to order a party to desist from an 
infringement, in order, inter alia, to prevent the entry 
into the channels of commerce in the jurisdiction of 
those authorities of imported goods that involve the 
infringement of an intellectual property right 
immediately after customs clearance of such goods, 
or to prevent their exportation. 
(Bolded text goes beyond TRIPS) However, a salient 
TRIPS-plus feature is contained in what is omitted in 
the article rather than what is prescribed, e.g. the 
lack of reference to the TRIPS’ exceptions in cases of 
non-willful infringement and most importantly in 
cases related to subparagraph (h) of Article 31. 
Agreement on the establishment of a European 
patent litigation system 
(Draft, December 2005).  
Article 62. Injunction 
The European Patent Court may order a party 
infringing or threatening to infringe a European 
patent to cease and desist from any act infringing the 
patent under Articles 33 or 34.  
Notes. See Art. 44 TRIPS.  
DE, FR, MC and NL delegations and one expert 
supported the idea of considering whether the right 
to request an injunction should expire after a certain 
time period; cf. Art. 67 on the limitation of the right 
to claim damages.  
(Emphasis added) 
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European Enforcement Directive851 
CHAPTER II 
MEASURES, PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES 
Article 11: Injunctions 
Member States shall ensure that, where a judicial 
decision is taken finding an infringement of an 
intellectual property right, the judicial authorities 
may issue against the infringer an injunction aimed 
at prohibiting the continuation of the infringement. 
Where provided for by national law, non-
compliance with an injunction shall, where 
appropriate, be subject to a recurring penalty 
payment, with a view to ensuring compliance. 
Member States shall also ensure that rightholders 
are in a position to apply for an injunction against 
intermediaries whose services are used by a third 
party to infringe an intellectual property right, 
without prejudice to Article 8(3) of Directive 
2001/29/EC. 
(Bolded text goes beyond TRIPS). 
 
Andean DECISION 344 
Common Regime on Industrial Property 
 
SECTION VIII 
Legal protection of the patent 
Article 51  
The owner of the patent or the person who considers 
himself entitled to a patent by virtue of this Decision 
may institute any actions claiming ownership or 
indemnification that are available to him under the 
national legislation of the Member Country 
concerned. 
Without prejudice to any other action that may be 
available to him, the owner of the patent may, after 
the patent has been granted, bring action for 
damages against any person who, without his 
consent, has exploited the patented process or 
product, where such exploitation took place after the 
publication date of the patent application. 
In cases of alleged infringement of a patent relating 
to a process for the manufacture of a product, the 
defendant shall be responsible for proving that the 
process used by him to manufacture the product is 
different from that protected by the patent allegedly 
infringed. To that end it shall be assumed, in the 
absence of proof to the contrary, that any identical 
product manufactured without the consent of the 
owner of the patent has been manufactured by 
means of the patented process if: 
(a) the product manufactured by means of the 
patented process is new; 
(b) there is a reasonable likelihood that the identical 
product was manufactured by means of the process, 
and the owner of the process patent is not able to 
                                                 
 
 
851 Within European Law, a Directive, differently than a Regulation should be transposed into national 
legislation. Therefore, in spite of the fact that it might be regarded as domestic European law I have 
included it along with other international treaties because countries enjoy a significant degree of discretion 
to implement its provisions. 
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establish, after reasonable effort, what process 
actually was used. 
In the submission of proof to the contrary, due 
account shall be taken of the legitimate interests of 
the defendant with respect to the protection of his 
trade and manufacturing secrets. 
(Emphasis added) 
 
POST-EBAY CASES IN THE U.S. 
 
Table 5: summary of injunctions granted and denied after the eBay case 
Cases  Competitors Non-competitors Total 
Granted Injunctions  28 cases852 1 Case 
Commonwealth v. Buffalo 
29 granted 
injunctions 
69% 
Denied Injunctions  2 Cases  
-Innogenetics v. Abbott 
(on appeal) 
-Praxair v. ATMI 
11 Cases853  13 injunctions 
denied 
31% 
Total cases  30 competitors 12 non-competitors 42 
 
 
SUMMARY OF SELECTED CASES APPLYING THE EBAY V. MERCEXCHANGE 
PRECEDENT 
 
GRANTED INJUNCTIONS  
1. Wald v. Mudhopper Oilfield Servs., U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51669 (D. Okla. 2006) 
Parties Wald v. Mudhopper Oilfield Servs., 
Citation U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51669 (D. Okla. 2006) 
Patent(s) 6,655,475  
“Product and method for treating well 
bores” 
Current International Class854 E21B 27/00 (20060101);  
                                                 
 
 
852 Wald v. Mudhopper Oilfield Servs.; Telequip Corp. v. Change Exchange; Tivo Inc. v. Echostar Communications 
Corp.; Floe Int’l, Inc. v. Newmans’ Mfg.; Litecubes LLC v. Northern Lights Prods; 3M Innovative Properties Co. v. 
Avery Dennison Corp; Rosco v. Mirror Lite Co.; Smith & Nephew, Inc. v. Sythes (U.S.A.); Black & Decker Inc. v. 
Robert Bosch Tool Corp.; Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. GlobalSantaFe Corp.; Visto Corp. v. 
Seven Networks, Inc.;  MPT, Inc. v. Marathon Labels, Inc.; Novozymes A/S v. Genencor Int’l, Inc.; Ortho-McNeil 
Pharmaceutical, Inc. v. Mylan Labs. Inc.; O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co.; 800 Adept, Inc. v. 
Murex Securities, Ltd; MGM Well Services, Inc. v. Mega Lift Systems, LLC.; Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex Inc.; 
Miniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp.; Allan Block Corp. v. E. Dillon & Co.; Johns Hopkins University v. Datascope 
Corp.; Baden Sports, Inc. v. Kabushiki Kaisha Molten; Verizon Services Corp. v. Vonage Holdings Corp.; Sundance, 
Inc. v. Demonte Fabricating Ltd.; Martek Biosciences Corp. v. Nutrinova Inc.; Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp. 
853 Respironics, Inc. v. Invacare Corp.; MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc.; Voda v. Cordis Corp.; Paice LLC v. 
Toyota Motor Corp.; z4 Techs. V. Microsoft; Amado v. Microsoft; Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp.; IMX v. 
LendingTree LLC; Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs; Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Group; Sundance Inc. v. Demonte 
Fabricating Ltd. (D.C.) 
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E21B 27/02 (20060101);  
E21B 21/00 (20060101);  
E21B 033/13  
Claims855 35 claims 
3 independent claims 
Infringing Technology  Poly Drill Sticks, a product used in the 
treatment of oil wells 
Arguments of the court 
(irreparable harm) 
“As a result of Defendants' infringement, 
Plaintiffs suffered injuries in addition to lost 
sales. Specifically, Plaintiffs note that they 
lost market share and "the opportunity to 
maintain their own polymer stick to as the 
industry standard" and that their "reputation 
for innovation" was damaged as a result. 
(Pls.' Reply at 8-9.) Thus, damages, either 
awarded by the jury or trebled, do not 
necessarily take into account other items of 
loss”. 
 
Willful infringement  “given the finding of willful infringement 
and because there have been no indications 
that Defendants do not still possess an 
inventory of these products or the ability to 
secure more, the Court is unpersuaded that 
there is no need for an injunction” 
 
2. Telequip Corp. v. Change Exch., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61469 (N.D.N.Y Aug. 15, 2006).  
Parties Telequip Corp. v. Change Exch., 
Citation U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61469 (N.D.N.Y Aug. 15, 
2006). 
Patent(s) Patent 5,830,055  
“Coin/token canister and ejection 
mechanism” 
Current International Class G07D 9/00 (20060101);  
G07D 1/00 (20060101);  
G07D 001/00 
Claims 15 claims 
5 independent 
Infringing Technology  Poly Drill Sticks, a product used in the 
treatment of oil wells 
Arguments of the court 
(irreparable harm) 
“monetary damages are not an adequate 
remedy against future infringement because 
"'the principal value of a patent is its 
statutory right to exclude.   
Ceased infringement does not preclude 
injunction  
“the fact that an infringing defendant has 
apparently, at least temporarily, ceased its 
infringement is not a basis for the court to 
deny a permanent injunction against future 
infringement unless the evidence is very 
persuasive that the infringing defendant will 
                                                                                                                                               
 
 
854 For information about the International Patent Classification see 
http://www.wipo.int/classifications/ipc/en/. See also Joshua Lerner,  The Importance of Patent Scope: an 
Empirical Analysis, THE RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, VOL. 25, NO. 2 (SUMMER, 1994), at pp. 319-333, using 
the IPC as a proxy of patent scope, however limiting to the first four digits of the Code. 
855 According to Niels Stevnsborg and Bruno van Pottelsberghe, at p. 163, applications with a few 
independent claims and a limited number of dependent claims would constitute a ‘good’ patent. The EPC 
in fact establishes higher fees for applications having more than ten claims at filing. Moreover, “the 
number of claims is, in addition, also closely linked to the breadth of claims, e.g. a very broad independent 
claim may become considerably more limited in scope if combined with one or more of its dependent 
claims”. 
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not resume its infringement” 
 
Public Interest "'without the right to obtain an injunction, 
the right to exclude granted to the patentee 
would have only a fraction of the value it 
was intended to have, and would no longer 
be as great an incentive to engage in the toils 
of scientific and technological research.” 
 
 
 
3. Tivo Inc. V. EchoStar Communications Corp., 446 F. Suppl. 2d 664, 669-70 (E.D. Tex. 
2006) 
Parties Tivo Inc. V. EchoStar Communications Corp 
Citation 446 F. Suppl. 2d 664, 669-70 (E.D. Tex. 2006) 
Patent(s) 6,233,389  
“Multimedia time warping system” 
Current International Class G11B 27/10 (20060101);  
G11B 27/034 (20060101);  
H04N 5/775 (20060101);  
G11B 27/031 (20060101);  
H04N 5/44 (20060101);  
H04N 5/00 (20060101);  
G11B 27/032 (20060101);  
G11B 27/024 (20060101);  
G11B 27/022 (20060101); H04N 
5/782 (20060101); G11B 27/00 (20060101); 
H04N 7/16 (20060101); H04N 005/92  
Claims 61 Claims  
4 Independent  
Infringing Technology  DVR’s 
Arguments of the court 
(irreparable harm  
Loss of market shares for new industries 
with sticky consumers) 
“Loss of market share in this nascent market 
is a key consideration in finding that Plaintiff 
suffers irreparable harm – Plaintiff is losing 
market share at a critical time in the market’s 
development, market share that it will not 
have the same opportunity to capture once 
the market matures. One thing the parties 
agree on is that DVR customers are “sticky 
customers,” that is they tend to remain 
customers of the company from which they 
obtain their first DVR.  
“Thus, the impact of Defendants’ continued 
infringement is shaping the market to 
Plaintiff’s disadvantage and results in long-
term customer loss. This is particularly key 
where, as is the case here, Plaintiff’s primary 
focus is on growing a customer base 
specifically around the product with which 
Defendants’ infringing product competes. 
And, as Plaintiff is a relatively new company 
with only one primary product, loss of 
market share and of customer base as a 
result of infringement cause severe injury” 
Public Interest The public has an interest in maintaining a 
strong patent system. This interest is served 
by enforcing an adequate remedy for patent 
infringement --- in this case, a permanent 
injunction. The infringing products are not 
related to any issue of public health or any 
other equally key interest; they are used for 
entertainment. The public does not have a 
greater interest in allowing Defendants’ 
customers’ to continue to use their infringing 
DVRs. 
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4. Floe Int'l, Inc. v. Newmans' Mfg., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59872 (D. Minn. 2006). 
Parties Floe Int'l, Inc. v. Newmans' Mfg., 
Citation 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59872 (D. Minn. 2006). 
Patent(s) Patent 5,738,379  
“An improved trailer structure constructed 
of light-weight material and especially 
adapted for hauling snowmobiles” 
Current International Class B62D 63/06 (20060101);  
B62D 63/00 (20060101);  
B62D 021/20 
 
Claims 17 Claims 
3 independent 
Infringing Technology  Snowmobile trailers 
Arguments of the court 
(irreparable harm) 
Citing eBay with no discussion of the four-
factor test 
 
5. Litecubes LLC v. Northern Lights Prods., 2006 U.S. WL 5700252 (E.D.Mo.)) 
 
Parties Litecubes LLC v. Northern Lights Prods. 
Citation 2006 U.S. WL 5700252 (E.D.Mo.)) 
Patent(s) 6,416,198 on a Illuminable beverage 
accessory device  
Current International Class F21V 1/00 (20060101);  
F21V 1/10 (20060101);  
A47G 19/22 (20060101);  
A47G 21/00 (20060101);  
A47G 21/18 (20060101);  
F21V 33/00 (20060101);  
F21V 033/00  
Claims 44 Claims 
3 independent  
Infringing Technology  Lighted artificial ice cubes that were 
designed, as a novelty item, to be placed in 
beverages 
Arguments of the court 
(irreparable harm) 
“Potential customers in the United States 
were buying infringing devices sold and 
imported by Defendant, instead of 
purchasing the products sold by Plaintiffs. 
Plaintiff VanderShuit went through the time 
and expense of developing the patented 
device and obtaining legal protections for his 
invention in the form of a patent, trademark 
and copyright. Defendant has no such 
protection and seeks to poach customers in 
the United States in violation of Plaintiffs' 
rights. The Court believes that an injunction 
is necessary in order to prevent Defendant 
from continuing to sell and import its 
infringing products in the future” 
Scope of injunction The parties disagreed as to the scope of the 
injunction.  
 
 
6. 3M Innovative Props. Co. v. Avery Dennison Corp., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70256 (D. 
Minn. Sept. 25, 2006). 
Parties Innovative Props. Co. v. Avery Dennison 
Corp. 
Citation 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70256 (D. Minn. Sept. 
25, 2006). 
Patent(s) 5,897,930 
Multiple embossed webs 
Current International Class C09J 7/02 (20060101); 
B29C 59/02 (20060101);  
A61F 013/02 ();  
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E04F 015/16  
Claims 12 Claims 
2 independent  
Infringing Technology  EZ Series Fleet Marketing Film 
Arguments of the court 
(irreparable harm) 
Litigation costs 
“3M has spent nearly five years litigating to 
protect its interest in this patent” 
Unwillingness to license “and has consistently refused to execute a 
licensing agreement with Avery” Having 
lost at trial, Avery wants to force 3M to grant 
a license that 3M refused to grant before 
trial. The Court will not disturb 3M’s 
determination that its business interests will 
not be served by the licensing of this 
product” 
7. Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. GlobalSantaFe Corp.  
Parties Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, 
Inc. v. GlobalSantaFe Corp. 
Patent 
Citation 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73366, 13-14 (E.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 28, 2006) 
Patent(s) 6,047,781 Multi-activity offshore exploration 
and/or development drilling method and 
apparatus 
Continuation  
B63B 35/44 (20060101); E21B 
7/12 (20060101); E21B 19/00 (20060101); 
E21B 15/00 (20060101); E21B 
15/02 (20060101); E21B 019/20  
30 claims 
7 independent  
 
Current International Class:  6,056,071  
Multi-activity offshore exploration and/or 
development drilling method and apparatus 
Continuation  
B63B 35/44 (20060101); E21B 
7/12 (20060101); E21B 19/00 (20060101); 
E21B 15/00 (20060101); E21B 
15/02 (20060101); E21B 007/12  
42 claims 
10 independent  
 
Current International Class 6,068,069  
Multi-activity offshore exploration and/or 
development drilling method and apparatus 
Continuation 
 
B63B 35/44 (20060101); E21B 
19/00 (20060101); E21B 15/00 (20060101); 
E21B 15/02 (20060101); E21B 007/12 
26 claims 
6 independent 
Claims  6,085,851 
Multi-activity offshore exploration and/or 
development drill method and apparatus 
B63B 35/44 (20060101); E21B 
7/12 (20060101); E21B 19/00 (20060101); 
E21B 15/00 (20060101); E21B 
15/02 (20060101); E21B 015/02 (); B63B 
035/44 
13 claims 
2 independent 
Infringing Technology  Deep water drilling rigs 
Scope of injunction  
(contended)  
“Transocean asks the court to enter a 
permanent injunction prohibiting [GSF] 
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“from making, using, selling, offering to sell 
or importing the Development Drillers I and 
II, or any drilling rigs not more than 
colorably different, in the United States for 
the term of the  
patents.”  
“Asserting that the injunction Transocean 
seeks is overly broad, GSF argues that the 
injunction should be limited to prohibit only 
actual operations on one well by the 
Development Drillers”  
Small component  
 
“the structures on GSF’s Development 
Driller rigs that the court found to infringe 
the apparatus claims of the patents-in-suit 
(…)are not small components of those rigs 
but, instead, structures that are related to the 
rigs’ core functionality” 
Compulsory licenses 
 
“the court is persuaded that if it does not 
enter a permanent injunction, it will force a 
compulsory license on Transocean that will 
not contain any of the commercial business 
terms typically used by a patent holder to 
control its technology or limit encroachment 
on its market share” 
Other arguments “GSF has not only used the Development 
Driller rigs equipped with the infringing 
structure to compete for the same customers 
and contracts as Transocean, but also to win 
contracts over competing bids from 
Transocean.” 
Willingness to license “Nor is the court persuaded that the mere 
fact that Transocean is willing to consider 
licensing its invention to GSF and others on 
“fair grounds” is sufficient to defeat 
Transocean’s request for a permanent 
injunction. It is undisputed that Transocean 
makes and markets deep water drilling rigs 
equipped with the patented  invention ” 
 
 
8. Visto Corp. v. Seven Networks, Inc. 
Parties Visto Corp. v. Seven Networks, Inc. 
Citation 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91453, (E.D. Tex. Dec. 
19, 2006). 
Patent(s) 5,857,201 
Enterprise connectivity to handheld devices 
Current International Class G06F 17/30 (20060101); H04L 
29/08 (20060101); H04L 29/06 (20060101); 
G06F 017/30  
Claims 19 claims 
2 independent 
Patent (s) 6,324,542 (continuation of the 5,857,201) 
Enterprise connectivity to handheld devices 
Current International Class G06F 17/30 (20060101); H04L 
29/08 (20060101); H04L 29/06 (20060101); 
G06F 017/30  
Claims  40 claims 
6 independent 
Infringing Technology   
Arguments of the court 
Irreparable harm  
“Although future damages may compensate 
Visto for an approximate loss, that does not 
make them adequate in the sense that they 
are a suitable proxy for injunctive relief. 
What makes legal remedies inadequate 
under the circumstances of this case is the 
inability to calculate the plaintiff’s future 
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losses with precision” 
 
9. Novozymes A/S v. Genencor Int’l, Inc 
Parties Novozymes A/S v. Genencor Int’l, Inc 
 
Citation No. 05-cv-160-KAJ (D. Del. 2007) 
Patent(s) Patent 6,867,031 on amylase variants 
 
Current International Class C12N 9/28 (20060101);  
C12N 9/26 (20060101); 
C11D 3/38 (20060101);  
C11D 3/386 (20060101);  
D06L 1/14 (20060101);  
D06L 1/00 (20060101);  
C12N 009/28 ();  
C12N 015/56 
Claims 5 claims 
3 independent claims 
Infringing Technology   
Arguments of the court 
Irreparable harm  
“Novozymes has suffered irreparable harm 
because of Genencor's infringement of 
Novozymes's right to exclude others from 
practicing its patent. Contrary to Genencor's 
argument (D.I. 209 at 37, 39), the Supreme 
Court in eBay did not state that loss of the 
right to exclude could not be irreparable 
harm. Rather, the Court simply rejected the 
proposition that the patentee's right to 
exclude should always lead to injunctive 
relief for patent infringement”  
Damages not adequate  
(Lost profits not available) 
“Because Novozymes markets its technology 
by licensing it to a subsidiary, the legal 
remedy of lostprofits damages is not 
available. Even if it were, the statutory right 
to exclude represents a benefit that, under 
these circumstances, cannot be equated by an 
award of cash. These are head-to-head 
competitors, and Novozymes has a right, 
granted by Congress, not to assist its rival 
with the use of proprietary technology” 
Independent invention “Thus, while Spezyme Ethyl infringes 
Novozymes's patent, Genencor and EBS 
apparently developed the enzyme on their 
own” 
Factors that amount to willful infringement  “the most relevant Read factor here is the 
question of "whether the [**50] infringer, 
when he knew of the other's patent 
protection, investigated the scope of the 
patent and formed a good-faith belief that it 
was invalid or that it was not infringed." 
Read, 970 F.2d at 827. Genencor's decision to 
continue infringing without a good faith 
belief in the '031 patent's invalidity is the 
basis for my finding of willful infringement, 
and it supports an award of enhanced 
damages. 
 
 
10. O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co.  
Parties O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation 
Tech. Co. 
Citation No. 04-32, 2007 WL 869576 (E.D.Tex. March 
21, 2007) 
Patent(s) 6,259,615 
High-efficiency adaptive DC/AC converter 
Current International Class H02M 7/505 (20060101);  
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 (2) H02M 7/5387 (20060101);  
H02M 7/523 (20060101);  
H05B 41/282 (20060101);  
H05B 41/28 (20060101);  
H05B 41/285 (20060101);  
H05B 41/392 (20060101);  
H05B 41/39 (20060101);  
H02M 003/24 ();  
H02M 003/335 
Claims 19 claims 
4 independent 
 
Patent(s) 6,804,129; continuation application of U.S. 
patent 6,396,722, which itself is a 
continuation application of U.S. patent 
6,295,615, on a high-efficiency adaptive 
DC/AC converter 
Current International Class 
 (2) 
(11)  
H02M 7/505 (20060101);  
H02M 7/5387 (20060101);  
H02M 7/523 (20060101);  
H05B 41/39 (20060101);  
H05B 41/282 (20060101);  
H05B 41/28 (20060101);  
H05B 41/285 (20060101);  
H05B 41/392 (20060101);  
H02M 003/335 ();  
H02M 003/24 ();  
H05B 037/02  
Claims 30 claims 
4 independent 
Infringing Technology   
Arguments of the court 
Irreparable harm  
Direct competitors 
the court “has recognized the high value of 
intellectual property when it is asserted 
against a direct competitor in the plaintiff’s 
market”.  
 "Because BITEKs co-defendants purchase in 
the same market, O2 micro will suffer 
irreparable harm absent an injunction 
directed towards them" 
When Defendant is a foreign company Defendants are foreign companies so 
plaintiff has "little assurance that it could 
collect monetary damages"  
 
 
11. Commonwealth Scientific & Industrial Research Organisation v. Buffalo Technology 
Inc. 
 
Parties Commonwealth Scientific & Industrial 
Research Organisation v. Buffalo Technology 
Inc. 
Citation 492 F. Supp. 2d 600, 600–02 (E.D. Tex. 2007) 
Patent(s) 5487069 on a Wireless LAN 
Current International Class H04L 5/02 (20060101);  
H04L 12/28 (20060101);  
H04L 1/18 (20060101);  
H04L 1/16 (20060101);  
H04L 1/00 (20060101);  
H04B 007/01 
Claims 72 claims 
10 independent 
Infringing Technology   
Previous bargaining  “In 1998, the Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers ("IEEE") contacted 
CSIRO to request assurance that CSIRO 
would license its patent to companies 
Ex-post Liability Rules   
In Modern Patent Law  328  
 
 
wanting to implement the IEEE's 802.11a 
standard on reasonable and non-
discriminatory ("RAND") terms once the 
IEEE approved the 802.11 standard, which 
pertains to WLANs. CSIRO agreed” CSIRO 
contacted companies using its patent but 
they refused to license it.  
 
Arguments of the court 
A research institution 
 
CSIRO is the principal scientific research 
organization of the Australian Federal 
Government: “CSIRO is a research 
institution and relies heavily on the ability to 
license its intellectual property to finance its 
research and development. The revenue 
from licensing its intellectual property is 
used to fund further research and 
development for frontier projects” 
Arguments of the court 
Competition 
 
“CSIRO has shown that its harm is not 
merely financial. While CSIRO does not 
compete with Buffalo for marketshare, 
CSIRO does compete internationally with 
other research groups--such as universities--
for resources, ideas, and the best scientific 
minds to transform those ideas into realities” 
Arguments of the court 
Reputation 
 
“CSIRO's reputation is an important element 
in recruiting the top scientists in the world 
(…) “Delays in funding result in lost research 
capabilities, lost opportunities to develop 
additional research capabilities, lost 
opportunities to accelerate existing projects 
or begin new projects” 
“Its reputation as a research institution has 
been impugned just as another company's 
brand recognition or good will may be 
damaged 
Small components v. essential patents “Buffalo's infringing use of CSIRO's 
technology is not limited to a minor 
component of the technology. The '069 
patent is the core technology embodied in 
the IEEE's 802.11a and 802.11g standards” 
 
 
12. Johns Hopkins University v. Datascope Corp.  
Parties Johns Hopkins University v. Datascope 
Corp. 
Citation No. 05-0759, 2007 WL 2682001 (D. Md. Aug. 
9, 2007) 
Patent(s) 5,766,191  
Percutaneous mechanical fragmentation 
catheter system  
(Continuation) 
Current International Class A61B 17/22 (20060101); A61M 
1/00 (20060101); A61B 017/22 
Claims 7 claims 
2 independent 
Patent(s) 6,824,551 
Percutaneous mechanical fragmentation 
catheter system 
(Continuation) 
Current International Class A61B 17/22 (20060101); A61M 
1/00 (20060101); A61B 017/22 
Claims 39 claims 
3 independent 
Patent(s)  7,108,704 
Percutaneous mechanical fragmentation 
catheter system 
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(Continuation) 
Current International Class A61B 17/22 (20060101); A61B 
6/00 (20060101) 
Claims 52 claims 
2 independent 
Infringing Technology  ProLumen device 
Arguments of the court 
Irreparable harm  
Direct and only competitor.  
Incentives to infringe “If the plaintiffs do not obtain injunctive 
relief, others may be encouraged to infringe 
their patents and risk litigation, thus 
devaluating the plaintiff’s property…as the 
“principal value of a patent is its statutory 
right to exclude, the nature of the patent 
grant weighs against holding that monetary 
damages will always suffice to make the 
patentee whole”… 
Plaintiff’s manufacturing capacity Plaintiffs have sufficient manufacturing 
capacity to meet the demand currently met 
by Datascope. 
 
 
13. Verizon Services Corp. v. Vonage Holdings Corp.  
Parties Verizon Services Corp. v. Vonage Holdings 
Corp. 
Citation (Fed. Cir. Sept. 26, 2007) 
Patent(s) 
The patents (specification shared) provide a 
server for enhanced name translation, which 
can be used but is not limited to implement 
an internet telephone. The invention is 
“particularly advantageous for processing of 
voice telephone communications through the 
internet”.  
6,282,574,  
Method, server and telecommunications 
system for name translation on a conditional 
basis and/or to a telephone number 
Continuation  
 
Current International Class H04Q 3/00 (20060101); H04L 
12/64 (20060101); H04L 29/12 (20060101); 
H04L 29/06 (20060101); H04M 
15/00 (20060101); H04M 7/00 (20060101); 
H04M 3/493 (20060101); H04M 
3/487 (20060101); G06F 015/16  
 
Claims 30 claims 
9 independent 
Patent(s) 
 
6,104,711  
Enhanced internet domain name server 
Current International Class H04L 12/64 (20060101); H04L 
29/06 (20060101); H04M 7/00 (20060101); 
H04M 15/00 (20060101); H04L 
29/12 (20060101); H04Q 3/00 (20060101); 
H04M 3/493 (20060101); H04M 
3/487 (20060101); H04L 012/64 
Claims 37 claims   
7 independent 
Patent(s) 
 
6,359,880  
Public wireless/cordless internet gateway 
Divisional application 
Current International Class H04Q 7/26 (20060101); H04M 
7/00 (20060101); H04Q 7/38 (20060101); 
H04L 012/66  
Claims 14 claims 
3 independent 
Infringing Technology  Telephone service using the Voice over IP 
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(VoIP) technology  
Arguments of the court 
Stays and inventing around 
One factor that is relevant to the balance of 
the hardships required by the Supreme 
Court's decision in eBay was not considered 
by the district court, namely whether the 
district  [court should have allowed time for 
Vonage  to implement a workaround that 
would avoid continued infringement of the 
'574 and '711 patents before issuing its 
injunction. Verizon had a cognizable interest 
in obtaining an injunction to put an end to 
infringement of its patents; it did not have a 
cognizable interest in putting Vonage out of 
business. However, as Verizon points out, 
Vonage made no request for a workaround 
period to the district court, and Vonage has 
already had several months since the district 
court's judgment to implement a 
workaround” 
 
DENIED INJUNCTIONS 
14. Sundance, Inc. v. Demonte Fabricating Ltd. 
 
Parties Sundance, Inc. v. Demonte Fabricating Ltd. 
Citation No. 02-73543, 2007 WL 37742 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 
4, 2007) 
Patent(s) 5026109 on a Segmented cover system 
Current International Class B60J 7/02 (20060101);  
B60J 7/06 (20060101);  
B60D 025/06  
Claims  18 claims  
3 independent 
Infringing Technology  Quick Draw system 
First instance  Injunction denied  
 “Not only did Sundance delay in filing suit 
and seeking injunctive relief, the market for 
tarp systems contains many other 
competitors and non-segmented cover 
systems have a larger percentage over 
segmented systems. Moreover, as DeMonte 
points out,  [*8]  the segmented cover is but 
one feature of its Quick Draw system. Thus, 
it cannot be said that Sundance's licensees 
are losing sales to DeMonte expressly 
because of its infringement of the segmented 
cover. It is possible that lost sales are due to a 
desire for other features of the Quick Draw 
system or are sales lost to other competitors 
in the marketplace. Sundance simply cannot 
tie alleged lost sales to the nature of 
DeMonte's infringement” 
Willingness to license “Indeed, Sundance licenses the '109 patent to 
others, and offered to license it to DeMonte 
prior to filing suit against it, thus 
demonstrating that money damages are 
adequate. Their conduct against DeMonte 
and others (Aero) indicates an interest only 
in obtaining money damages against accused 
infringers” 
Interest of customers and employees  “due to the fact that a injunction would 
harm third parties (DeMonte's employees 
and customers) and given the nature of the 
marketplace, this factor does not weigh in 
Sundance's favor” 
 
Appeal  Injunction granted (No. 02-73543, 2007 WL 
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3053662 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 19, 2007)) 
  
15. z4 Techs. v. Microsoft Corp.  
Parties z4 Techs. v. Microsoft Corp. 
Citation 434 F.Supp.2d 437 (E.D. Tex. June 14, 2006) 
Patent(s) Patents 6,044,471  
Method and apparatus for securing software 
to reduce unauthorized use 
Current International Class G06F 1/00 (20060101);  
G06F 21/00 (20060101);  
H04L 009/32 
Claims  45 claims of which 26 independent 
 6,785,825, Method for securing software to 
decrease software piracy 
 176 claims  
48 independent 
Average Claims 111/48 
Irreparable harm Any harm from future infringement could be 
compensated through a reasonable royalty.  
While z4 had argued that monetary damages 
for future infringement were not an 
adequate remedy because they could not 
compensate z4 for the loss of “its right to 
exclude Microsoft”, the Court deemed z4’s 
argument as implying “that a violation of the 
right to exclude under the patent act can 
never be remedied through money”. On the 
contrary, the eBay rule established that the 
right to exclude alone is not sufficient to 
support a finding of injunctive relief and 
cannot lead to conclude that remedies other 
than an injunction cannot adequately 
compensate a patent holder.  
Monetary damages are not adequate “when an infringer saturates the market for a 
patented invention with an infringing 
product or damages the patent holder’s good 
will or brand name recognition by selling 
infringing product or damages”. 
Balance of hardships 
 
“the potential hardships Microsoft could 
suffer if the injunction were granted 
outweigh any limited and reparable 
hardships that z4 would suffer in the 
absence of an injunction” because the patent 
covered a very small component of the 
software products that infringe upon this 
patent.“Although it is impossible to 
determine the actual events that would 
follow the deactivation of Microsoft’s 
product activation serves, it is likely that the 
market would see an increase in pirate 
versions of the software”.  
  
 
16. Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp,  
Parties Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp. 
Citation Paice LL.C, v. Toyota Motor Corp., et al. CV-
211-DF., 16, August 2006.   
Patent(s) Patent 5,343,970 on a Hybrid electric vehicle 
Current International Class B60L 11/12 (20060101);  
B60K 6/04 (20060101); 
 B60K 6/00 (20060101); 
 B60L 11/02 (20060101); 
 B60K 23/04 (20060101); 
 B60T 1/00 (20060101); 
 B60T 1/10 (20060101);  
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B60K 006/04 
Claims  40 claims of which 5 independent 
Patent  6,209,672 
Current International Class B60K 6/00 (20060101); B60K 6/04 (20060101); 
B60K 006/04 
Claims 33 claims of which 7 independent 
Patent (s) 6,554,088, a continuation in part of the ’672 
patent.  
Current International Class B60K 6/04 (20060101); B60K 6/00 (20060101); 
B60L 15/20 (20060101); B60H 
1/32 (20060101); F02B 37/18 (20060101); 
F02B 37/00 (20060101); F02B 
37/12 (20060101); F02B 37/16 (20060101); 
F01N 3/20 (20060101); F02D 
41/00 (20060101); F02M 35/10 (20060101); 
B60K 006/04 (); B60L 011/02  
Claims 9 claims of which 1 independent 
Infringing technology hybrid transmission system of cars  
First instance 
Irreparable harm 
Probability to license 
the court considered that licensing efforts 
can also be aided by monetary relief plus 
findings on validity and infringement of its 
patents. What most likely would be affected 
is the bargaining position of the plaintiff. 
First instance 
Small component  
Patent concerns a small component of the 
final product. Since the vehicles were 
introduced to the market during the 2006 
model year, “enjoining their sales will likely 
interrupt not only defendant’s business but 
that of related businesses, such as dealers 
and suppliers. The burgeoning hybrid 
market could also be stifled as the research 
and expense of bringing its product line to 
market would be frustrated.” 
Appeal 
Ongoing royalties and voluntary v. 
compulsory licenses 
“We use the term ongoing royalty to 
distinguish this equitable remedy from a 
compulsory license. The term “compulsory 
license” implies that anyone who meets 
certain criteria has congressional authority to 
use that which is licensed. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. 
§ 115 (“When phonorecords of a 
nondramatic musical work have been 
distributed . . . under the authority of the 
copyright owner, any other person . . . may, 
by complying with the provisions of this 
section, obtain a compulsory license to make 
and distribute phonorecords of the work.” 
(emphasis added)). By contrast, the ongoing-
royalty order at issue here is limited to one 
particular set of defendants; there is no 
implied authority in the court’s order for any 
other auto manufacturer to follow in 
Toyota’s footsteps and use the patented 
invention with the court’s imprimatur” 
(footnote 13) 
“Perhaps the most apparent restriction 
imposed by § 283 is that injunctions granted 
thereunder must “prevent the violation of 
any right secured by patent.” We have 
previously held that this statutory language 
limits the scope of activities that may be 
enjoined. See, e.g., Joy Techs. v. Flakt, Inc., 6 
F.3d 770, 777 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (holding that 
noninfringing acts may not be enjoined). The 
more difficult question raised by this case, 
however, is whether an order permitting use 
of a patented invention in exchange for a 
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royalty is properly characterized as 
preventing the violation of the rights secured 
by the patent (…)” 
“Under some circumstances, awarding an 
ongoing royalty for patent infringement in 
lieu of an injunction may be appropriate. In 
Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey–Owens 
Ford Co., 758 F.2d 613, 628 (Fed. Cir. 1985), 
this court upheld a 5% court-ordered royalty, 
based on sales, “for continuing operations.” 
Although the parties in that case contested 
the amount of the royalty, styled a 
“compulsory license” by the court, there was 
no dispute as to the district court’s authority 
to craft such a remedy. See id. In the context 
of an antitrust violation, “mandatory sales 
and reasonable-royalty licensing” of relevant 
patents are “well-established forms of relief 
when necessary to an effective remedy, 
particularly where patents have provided 
the leverage for or have contributed to the 
antitrust violation adjudicated.” United 
States v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 410 U.S. 52, 59 
(1973)” 
“But awarding an ongoing royalty where 
"necessary" to effectuate a remedy, be it for 
antitrust violations or patent 
infringement, does not justify the provision 
of such relief as a matter of course whenever 
a permanent injunction is not imposed. In 
most cases, where the district court 
determines that a permanent injunction is 
not warranted, the district court may wish 
to allow the parties to negotiate a license 
amongst themselves regarding future use of 
a patented invention before imposing an 
ongoing royalty. Should the parties fail to 
come to an agreement, the district court 
could step in to assess a reasonable royalty 
in light of the ongoing infringement (…)In 
this case, the district court, after applying the 
four-factor test for a permanent injunction 
and declining to issue one, imposed 
an ongoing royalty sua sponte upon the 
parties. Thus, this court is unable to 
determine whether the district court abused 
its discretion in setting the ongoing royalty 
rate. Accordingly, we think it prudent to 
remand the case for the limited purpose of 
having the district court reevaluate the 
ongoing royalty rate.  
District Court on remand, 609 F. Supp. 2d 
620; 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32723 
 
“the Court has given the parties full and fair 
opportunity to set their own ongoing royalty 
rate. Having failed to come to an agreement, 
the Court finds, based on the evidence 
submitted at the evidentiary hearing, that 
significant changes in the legal relationship 
between the parties as well as other 
economic factors justify the imposition of a 
different royalty rate to compensate Paice for 
Toyota's continued, voluntary, and willful 
infringement. 
  
 
17. Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc.  
Parties Praxair, Inc, and Praxair Technology Inc, v. 
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ATMI, Inc. and Advanced Technology 
Materials, Inc.  
Citation Civ. No. 03-1158-SLR (D.C. Delaware, Mar 
27, 2007) 
Patent(s) 6007609 on a Pressurized container with 
restrictor tube having multiple capillary 
passages 
Current International Class F17C 7/00 (20060101); F17C 7/04 (20060101); 
F17C 13/04 (20060101); B01D 053/04  
Claims Claims 
19 of which 2 independent 
Patent (s) 6045115 on a Fail-safe delivery arrangement 
for pressurized containers 
Current International Class F17C 7/00 (20060101); F17C 7/04 (20060101); 
F16K 1/00 (20060101); F16K 1/30 (20060101); 
F17C 13/04 (20060101); F16K 031/365  
Claims 20 claims of which 3 independent 
Irreparable harm The court based the denial of injunctive relief 
on Praxair failure to meet the burden of 
proof: 
“Praxair has not provided or described any 
specific sales or market data to assist the 
court, nor has it identified precisely what 
market share, revenues, and customers 
Praxair has lost to ATMI”.  
Praxair failed to prove why it would have 
difficulties calculating damages going 
forward and how money damages could not 
adequately compensate for “lost market 
share” or any “lost research opportunities”. 
Monetary damages are not adequate Although Praxair stated “that it spends $75 
million per year in R&D and that denying 
protection to its rights to exclude through 
injunctions it would have “no incentive to 
innovate” and its patents “would be 
effectively meaningless” the court however 
added that “Praxair does not explain why 
money damages could not suffice to 
compensate for any lost opportunities to 
conduct research due to budgetary 
constraints” 
 
Further developments  Both patents were later declared 
unenforceable for inequitable conduct 
(Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 2d 
387, 397 (D. Del. 2007)).  
Appeal The CAFC partially reversed decision on 
unenforceability and inequitable conduct. 
Since parties came to a settlement where 
Praxair will not seek an injunction against 
ATMI, the CAFC did not touch upon the 
issue.  
Dissenting opinion on the Appeal Dissenting opinion of Judge Lourie 
“…The Supreme Court, in eBay, did not rule 
out entitlement to a permanent injunction 
when one competitor in a two-party market 
has been found to infringe a patent of 
another competitor. eBay Inc. v. 
MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 394, 126 S. 
Ct. 1837, 164 L. Ed. 2d 641 (2006) ("[W]e take 
no position on whether permanent injunctive 
relief should or should not issue in this 
particular case, or indeed in any number of 
other disputes arising under the Patent 
Act."). It held only that the traditional four-
factor test should be applied. Id. The district 
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court here seemed to be impressed with the 
fact that both companies were large 
companies with substantial revenues, and 
that  the infringing materials constituted a 
small portion of those revenues, implying 
that the patentee would not be sufficiently 
harmed by the denial of the injunction (…) 
However, it is important to recognize that a 
patent provides a right to exclude infringing 
competitors, regardless of the proportion 
that the infringing goods bear to a patentee's 
total business. Therefore, provided the four-
factor test has been met, a patentee should be 
able to exclude competitors who sell only a 
small amount of an infringing product or 
competitors whose sales of an infringing 
product constitute only a small portion of its 
sales or of the patentee's sales. Otherwise, 
the patent right becomes devalued” 
  
 
18. MercExchange, LLC v. eBay, Inc. 
Parties eBay Inc and Half.com v. MercExchange 
LLC. 
Citation WL 2172587, No. 01-736 (E.D. Va. July 27, 
2007) 
Patent(s) Patent 5845265 on consignment nodes 
Current International Class G06Q 30/00 (20060101); G06Q 
20/00 (20060101); G06F 017/60  
Claims  29 claims of which 5 independent  
 
Patents 
6202051 on Facilitating internet commerce 
through internet worked auctions 
Current International Class G06Q 20/00 (20060101); G06Q 
30/00 (20060101); G06F 017/60 
Average Claims 52 claims of which 8 independent 
Balance of hardships the court considered firstly that potential 
hardships for MercExchange were likely to 
be low because the company was willing to 
license its patents and was not competing 
with eBay. It also ascertained that the harm 
of a dubious patent (still the process before 
the U.S.P.T.O. is ongoing) would impose on 
the defendant was important. Nevertheless, 
the court recognized that the third prong did 
not clearly favor any party because of the 
uncertainty surrounding the validity of the 
patent, whether they had been designed 
around and whether the plaintiff could, in 
association with other companies, start 
competing with eBay as well:  
“With the future so speculative in this 
continually-developing, complex scenario, 
the court cannot confidently determine in 
which party's favor the balance of hardships 
tips”. 
 
Public interest  
 
“…both common sense and caselaw suggest 
that “the public-interest factor often favors 
the patentee, given the public’s interest in 
maintaining the integrity of the patent 
system.” Odetics, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 795; see 
TiVo, 446 F. Supp. 2d at 670 (“The public has 
an interest in maintaining a strong patent 
system.”). Were the protection of a strong 
patent system the only relevant 
consideration, there would not be reason to 
go through the four-factor test or at least to 
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consider the public interest. On the contrary, 
the district court highlighted “integrity of the 
patent system will always be a consideration 
in the public interest analysis” courts should 
also consider other relevant factors as “the 
type of patent involved, the impact on the 
market, the impact on the patent system, and 
any other factor that may impact the public 
at large”. In this case, after reviewing these 
facts, the court concluded against the entry 
of an injunction. 
Further developments Ongoing PTO reexamination procedures 
Both patents are continuations of previous 
applications  
  
 
 
19. Innogenetics, N.V, vs. Abbott Laboratories 
Parties Innogenetics N.V. vs. Abbott Laboratories 
Citation Innogenetics, N.V., v. Abbott Laboratories, 
05-C-0575-C, January 3rd, 2007 
Patent(s) 5846704 on a “process for typing of HCV 
isolates” 
Current International Class C12Q 1/70 (20060101); C12Q 
1/68 (20060101); C12Q 001/70 (); C12Q 
001/68 (); C12Q 019/34  
Claims  13 claims of which 1 independent 
Irreparable Harm  The district considered the fact that 
Innogenetics manufactures but does not 
commercialize the tests, which is done by 
Bayer. However it concluded that its 
reputation and market share were at stake. 
The court considered it improper that a 
plaintiff’s willingness to license its patents as 
sufficient to establish that the patent holder 
would not suffer irreparable harm if an 
injunction did not issue.  
“It would denigrate the value of plaintiff’s 
patent rights to allow defendant to continue 
to sell plaintiff’s invention as its own in 
exchange for the same fee it would have 
paid without a lawsuit”. (emphasis added).  
Public Interest Public interest the court found that plaintiff 
had 
 “Ample capacity to supply HCV diagnostic 
products, that plaintiff’s manufacturing 
process complies with Good manufacturing 
Practices and that its products comply with 
FDA labeling requirements”.  
“Plaintiff proffered evidence that even if it 
were unable to manufacture the diagnostic 
product for a short period of time, the risk to 
public health would be non-existent, for two 
reasons. First, other diagnostic techniques 
exist and would suffice, even if they are not 
as effective as the patented technique. 
Second, Hepatitis C is a chronic disease that 
does not require instant genotyping. A delay 
in obtaining a test would not have any 
perceptible adverse effect on a person 
suffering from the disease”. However, the 
court denied enhanced damages because 
“defendant’s infringement was not willful. 
Appeal On appeal the court reversed finding abuse 
of discretion, denying the permanent 
Ex-post Liability Rules   
In Modern Patent Law  337  
 
 
injunction and granting a compulsory 
license, holding that a reasonable royalty at a 
high level that includes an entry fee can 
substitute the injunction.  
  
 
 
20. Amado v. Microsoft 
Parties Carlos Amado vs. Microsoft Corporation 
Citation WL 2172587, No. 01-736 (E.D. Va. July 27, 
2007) 
Patent(s) Patent: 5293615 on a Point and shoot 
interface for linking database records to 
spreadsheets whereby data of a record is 
automatically reformatted and loaded upon 
issuance of a recalculation command 
 
Current International Class  
Claims 21 claims of which 2 independent 
Infringement  “The jury found that Access 95 and Excel 95, 
and Office Professional 95, which includes 
Access 95 and Excel 95, and all subsequent 
forms of those products infringe claim 21 of 
the '615 patent both literally and under the 
doctrine of equivalents” 
 
Inventing around  “Microsoft continues to sell versions 2002 
(XP) and 2003 of Office Professional and 
Access, which the jury found infringed 
Amado's '615 patent. However, during the 
pendency of its appeal, Microsoft designed, 
implemented, and released a software fix to 
remove the infringing functionality from its 
products”  
Small component  “Moreover, Amado's patent only covers a 
very small component of the infringing 
products - claim 21, the only claim that the 
jury found Microsoft Office and Access 
infringed, covers a single feature linking 
Access and Excel. See eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1842 
(Kennedy, J. concurring) ("When the 
patented invention is but a small component 
of the product the companies seek to 
produce and the threat of an injunction is 
employed simply for undue leverage in 
negotiations, legal damages may well be 
sufficient to compensate for the infringement 
and an injunction may not serve the public 
interest"). Thus, Amado's injury can be 
adequately compensated through monetary 
damages” 
  
 
 
 
GENERAL ARGUMENTS USED IN POST-eBay CASES 
 
Table 5: Injunctions and incentives to innovate 
Cases analyzing the influence of 
permanent injunctions on incentives 
Sanofi v. Apotex 
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to innovate CSIRO v. Buffalo 
 
 
Table 6: Cases analyzing the “Small-Component” Patent argument856 
Case Injunction Arguments of the court 
Amado v. Microsoft Denied See above summary 
Paice LLC v. Toyota 
Motor Corp. 
Denied See above summary 
z4 Techs., Inc. v. 
Microsoft Corp., 
Denied See above summary 
Commonwealth Sci. 
& Indus. Research 
Organisation v. 
Buffalo Tech. Inc. 
Granted “The right to exclude becomes more urgent 
when the product is the invention. This 
case is not the situation that concerned 
Justice Kennedy; Buffalo's infringing use of 
CSIRO's technology is not limited to a 
minor component of the technology. The 
'069 patent is the core technology embodied 
in the IEEE's 802.11a and 802.11g standards. 
Buffalo's products are designed to provide 
the wireless functionality of the IEEE's 
802.11 and 802.11 g standards. Since 
Buffalo's infringement relates to the essence 
of the technology and is not a "small 
component" of Buffalo's infringing 
products, monetary damages are less 
adequate in compensating CSIRO for 
Buffalo's future infringement”.  
Trading Tech Int’ 
Inc v. eSpeed Inc  
 
 In this case that “TT offered testimony that 
the features of MD_Trader that make it 
patent able over prior art are not simply 
small components of a larger package, but 
are the central features that make 
MD_Trader the popular software program 
that it is. The balance of hardships weighs 
in favor of an injunction” 
Broadcomm v. 
Qualcomm; MPT v. 
Marathon Levels 
Granted The PTT service is a cutting edge service. 
The availability of such a service is highly 
desired by consumers and of benefit to 
them. QChat has technological advantages 
over other services, including scalability, 
reduced [*15] call setup latency, and 
increased reliability. It is not a "small 
component" in the analysis for injunctive 
relief”  
 
 
Table 7: Cases analyzing compulsory licenses  
Case Injunction  Arguments of the court 
Commonwealth Sci. & 
Indus. Research 
Organisation v. Buffalo 
Tech. Inc. 
Granted “A compulsory license will not adequately 
compensate CSIRO for Buffalo's continued 
intentional infringement. The royalty payment 
would be extrapolated from a determination of 
Buffalo's past sales, which may not adequately 
reflect the worth of the patent today to Buffalo. 
Further, such a royalty payment does not 
necessarily include other non-monetary license 
terms that are as important as monetary terms to 
a licensor such as CSIRO” 
                                                 
 
 
856 Methodology: a Lexis search of cases citing eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. Federal and State Cases 
retrieved 210 cases and further focus through the term “small component” narrowed the search to 8 cases.  
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Paice V. Toyota Denied Circuit Judge Rader, concurring 
“…calling a compulsory license an "ongoing 
royalty" does not make it any less a compulsory 
license. To avoid many of the disruptive 
implications of a royalty imposed as an 
alternative to the preferred remedy of exclusion, 
the trial court's discretion should not reach so far 
as to deny the parties a formal opportunity to set 
the terms of a royalty on their own. With such an 
opportunity in place, an ongoing royalty would 
be an ongoing royalty, not a compulsory license”. 
 
“In this case, because the court imposed an 
ongoing royalty on the parties sua sponte after 
denying injunctive relief, the parties had no 
meaningful chance to present evidence to the 
district court on an appropriate royalty rate to 
compensate Paice for Toyota's future acts of 
infringement. Evidence and argument on royalty 
rates were, of course, presented during the 
course of the trial, for the purposes of assessing 
damages for Toyota's past infringement. But pre-
suit and post-judgment acts of infringement are 
distinct, and may warrant different royalty rates 
given the change in the parties' legal relationship 
and other factors. When given choices between 
taking additional evidence or not, and between 
remanding to the parties or not, a district court 
may prefer the simplest course--impose its own 
compulsory license. This simplest course, 
however, affords the parties the least chance to 
inform the court of potential changes in the 
market or other circumstances that might affect 
the royalty rate reaching into the future.  
 
In most cases, the patentee and the 
infringer should receive an opportunity at least 
to set license terms that will apply to post-suit 
use of the patented invention. This general 
principle has deep roots in both law and policy. 
Projecting the costs to be incurred for what 
would otherwise be future acts of infringement is 
necessarily a speculative exercise, even for the 
most stable markets and technologies. As licenses 
are driven largely by business objectives, the 
parties to a license are better situated than the 
courts to arrive at fair and efficient terms. After 
all, it is the parties, rather than the court, that will 
be bound by the terms of the royalty. Particularly 
in the case of the patentee, who has proven 
infringement of its property right, an opportunity 
to negotiate its own ongoing royalty is a minimal 
protection for its rights extending for the 
remainder of the patent term. 
Amado v. Microsoft Denied “Although these cases show a general disfavor 
for compulsory licenses, they do not establish a 
categorical rule, barring any type of compulsory 
license. In fact, contrary to Amado's assertion, 
this Court has the authority to issue a 
"compulsory" license by staying an injunction 
pending appeal, as recognized by the Federal 
Circuit (…)” 
 
“Thus, even if the stay, in effect, results in a 
compulsory license, there is no prohibition 
against allowing such a "compulsory license" 
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pending appeal when, as in the instant case, the 
Court determines that such a stay is appropriate 
after evaluating the four factors (…) In addition, 
the Supreme Court recently held that not all 
patentees are entitled to an injunction against 
post-trial infringement. eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1841. 
District courts applying eBay and following the 
guidance of Justice Kennedy's concurrence have 
awarded monetary damage for future 
infringement based on the jury's reasonable 
royalty calculation. See, e.g. z4 Techs., Inc., 434 F. 
Supp. 2d at 442” 
 
 
Table 8: Burden of proof to show irreparable injury and inadequacy of legal remedies 
Case Burden of proof Injunction  
Praxair vs. ATMI Highest: 
-“Praxair has not provided 
or described any specific 
sales or market data to assist 
the court, nor has it 
identified precisely what 
market share, revenues, and 
customers Praxair has lost to 
ATMI”. 
-“Praxair does not explain 
why money damages could 
not suffice to compensate for 
any lost opportunities to 
conduct research due to 
budgetary constraints” 
Denied 
Novozymes  “evidence demonstrated that 
plaintiff originally secured 
an 80% market share with its 
patented product, which fell 
to approximately 50% after 
infringing competitor’s 
market entry”. 
Granted 
Transocean vs. 
Globalsantafe 
the court accorded a 
permanent injunction where 
the customer base is small 
and the defendant has not 
only used the infringing 
technology to compete for 
the same customers and 
contracts as plaintiff but also 
to win contracts over 
competing bids from 
plaintiff. 
 
TiVo v. EchoStar plaintiff was “a relatively 
new company with only one 
primary product” and the 
parties agreed that 
customers tend to remain 
loyal to the company from 
which they obtained their 
first DVR recorder, “shaping 
the market to plaintiff’s 
disadvantage and resulting 
in long-term customer loss”). 
Granted 
 
 
Table 9: Cases subjected to appeal 
Sundance Inc. v. DeMonte Fabricating Ltd., 
2007 WL 3053662 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 19, 2007) 
Injunction granted 
MPT Inc. v. Marathon Labels Inc., 2007 WL Injunction reversed as overly broad 
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4351745 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 12, 2007)  
Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Vonage Holdings 
Corp., 503 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 26, 
2007)  
Injunction not an abuse of discretion 
Amado v. Microsoft Corp., 517 F.3d 1353 
(Fed. Cir. Feb. 26, 2008)  
Dissolution of injunction not an abuse of 
discretion 
Ortho-McNeil Pharm. Inc. v. Mylan Labs. 
Inc., 2008 WL 834402 (Fed. Cir. March 31, 
2008)  
Injunction affirmed without comment 
 
